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Linha de Pesquisa
TEORIAS CONTEMPORÂNEAS SOBRE A MODERNIDADE
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**BRAZIL AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:
THE CASE OF CLIMATE CHANGE**

N 15–março- 2001

Cadernos de Pesquisa Interdisciplinar em Ciências Humanas

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BRAZIL AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF CLIMATE CHANGE

EDUARDO VIOLA* & HÉCTOR LEIS**

ABSTRACT

This paper has four parts. In the first one we discuss the concept of global governance and the differentiation of the world society in relation to the problems of global governance at the beginning of the 21st century: liberals, nationalists, cosmopolitans and neo-feudals. In the second part we discuss the problematic of climate change, one of the most important questions of global governance. In the third part we discuss the Brazilian standing in relation to most of the issues of global governance and show the transition from nationalism to liberalism. In the fourth part we analyze the Brazilian standing in the formation of the climate change regime.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Global Governance, Climate Change, Brazilian International Relations, Cosmopolitans.

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1- GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY

In the last two decades all the nation-states have increasingly become part of a global world. Obviously, they are not parts of a whole in the same way and/or importance, but all of them depend (and contribute) more and more on the global transformations and flows of the world. From a formal point of view we are still living in an international society of states, but from a real perspective a significant part of the world is going deeper and deeper in a global society with a interdependent and interconnected network of power, capital, people, goods, technology, communications, beliefs, environment, etc. Actually the contemporary world is formed by three world: the OECD world formed for countries with well established market economies and democratic regimes; the transitional world formed by countries with heterogeneous status that are in some kind of transition toward the market economy and/or democracy, from Brazil or Poland that are very close to the first world to Saudi Arabia and China (where there is some market economy but no democracy) to Russia (where there is some democracy and some market economy); and, the marginal world, where there is no transition toward markets or democracy (Africa, Middle East, Central Asia) and which neo-feudals forces prevail. In this new context is essential to clarify the emergent concepts of global politics and global governance.

The common sense associate globalization with economy. It seems more difficult to grasp the transformations of politics in a global world. Today politics has all kind of ramifications, inside and outside the national frontiers, the global politics has increased its sites and actors beyond the states, governments and political parties. The political actions come to society through complex networks of actors and decision-making processes that include along the "full time" political actors a new group of very effective "partial time" political actors coming from the civil society and the economy. In other words, politics today is something more (or less) than politics yesterday. This is not an effect of globalization; this is globalization in itself. Not only global political, but also global economy implies an intensification of interactions among actors, processes and functions of economy, politics and civil society, in all directions.

But globalization, like Janus, has two faces. In one sense, it means the breakdown of barriers among different sectors and elements of the world. The globalizing processes today spread readily across national boundaries and are not prevented by any cultural or territorial frontiers. Also the traditional political hierarchy among actors has been affected. A global political action can be initiated from above or below with equivalent repercussions. A transnational corporation, a big state, a local activist group or even an individual alone can push people, capital, governments and institutions in different parts of the world. Obviously, any action does not imply the same effects in a worldwide scale. Globalization means that any action could reach a global effect, but not that always any action has a global effect. Globalization is simultaneously a real and a potential process.

This real and potential power of any action is justified by the complex characteristics of globalization. By the same reason, along with the trend towards integration, globalization presents another opposite trend towards fragmentation and/or inhibition of actors, processes and functions. Rosenau (1997) proposed the concept "fragmigration" to suggest this (another) simultaneity between integrating and fragmenting trend and processes of the global world (many times we find cooperation and conflict among the same actors). In fact, in the global order, order and disorder come together. In part because the world is not any more exclusively centered in the states (and their governments). In the past legal authorities were characterized by the power and regulation all over the social life on a territory, but in the global world there are authorities, with and without territory, with power on a specific (economical,

environmental, political, etc.) issue in a very extended region (or even all the world) or with a extended power on a very local community. The reorganization of the interrelations and power of actors through globalization explain why today the focus is much more on governance than in government. The old actors tend to be formal, concrete and territorial; the new ones tend to be more informal, less concrete and non-territorial.

In spite of the states are still powerful, they cannot prevent the emergency of other actors in the global arena. Now an increasing number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) based on the existent states, civil society and multinational corporations challenge the states. From supranational political entities (like the European Union) and multinational corporations to local social movements and transnational professional or scientific association, all of them participate in global politics. Even those small actors that are against globalization by ideological reasons cannot deny an intense participation in global politics. It is not relevant the size or importance of the national or subnational actors, or if they are in favor or against globalization, all of them are part of global politics.

In some degree all politics today are global politics. The political action, as well as the political authority, appears in a very wide and diffuse way. This fact explains why global politics and democracy has an intimate relationship. The tremendous democratization of the world in the last two decades is not only an effect of the US and liberalism won the Cold War. Democratization today is more than an ideological political proposition among other; its strong development is a direct consequence of systemic constitution of a polyarchic mixed actor system for global arena (Held et al, 1999). A non-polyarchic actor system could work in a democratic or non-democratic way, but a polyarchic one only could work with democratic actors and procedures. The governance of global politics is incompatible with authoritarianism and/or bureaucratic centralized regimes.

There is no globalization in a world of only authoritarian states. In the same way, in the long run there is small room to authoritarian states in a global world, many authoritarian states have collapsed during the 1990's and remain as failure states giving room to the development of powerful neo-feudal forces, some of them forming a global network of crime. Many critics of globalization come from the wrong perception of this phenomenon as a side effect of the expansion of capitalist economy. This blind reductionism prevents to see the multiplication of actors and issues that are emerging with globalization. Global politics presupposes global governance because, in the present changing political life, governments alone (being democracies or dictatorships) are not capable any more to govern the world. And global governance presupposes democracy because without general accountability, obedience of law and public rational values and arguments, there is no way to understand each other and establish rules and procedures to solve conflicts and problems in a complex world of a mixed actor system.

The fact that global governance is based in a polyarchic mixed actor system does not provide support to the societal version of "governance without government". This interpretation led to the wrong hierarchy of civil society's actors and utopian perspectives against states actors and realistic perspectives. It is a mistake to exclude or underdimension governments as well as multinational corporations or NGOs from governance. Global governance supposed an effective mixed actors and values system that cannot be confused by ideological approaches. The international regimes are good examples to understand this point. They do not exist in any political vacuum of states. It is true that regimes are elements of a decentralized system of public order that have affected the sovereignty of nation-states. But regimes are firmly tied to states; they cannot exist out of them. There is no doubt that regimes are supported by the international society of states as well by the global society and the multinational corporations (Young, 1997). Regimes do not exist on behalf of states, civil

society or corporations; they exist to deal with specific and concrete global problems. It does not matter who is officially in charge or who is primarily responsible by the problem. What really matters is to establish correct rules and relationships among all the actors related with the problem, in order to deal efficiently with the solutions in the public global arena. Regimes means governance at work. Governments, corporations and civil society are deeply associated each other when and where the regimes are at work.

One assumption of this paper is that regimes works better when the different actors establish a democratic and realistic relationship. Governance implies democracy in a realistic sense, not only as a form of government but as strong compromise with liberal economy and cosmopolitan law. When regimes do not work most of the times is because the actor system related with them has established rules without any compromise with the real dynamic of contemporary world. It is important to insist that democratic relations among actors of a polyarchic system imply the existence of much more vote and elections imply rule of law and accountability, and also rational values and actors. There is no democratic rule that could solve the global climate change without a realistic approach capable to enforce a cosmopolitan law.

The real challenges of global governance (and this specially applies to environmental global governance) are not so much of a technique-formal type but rather of a realistic communicative character (Leis, 2000). Governance does not exist without negotiation among different actors with different interests. And there is no negotiation without participation supported on realistic bases and efficient communicative action. The utopian or instrumental proposals have no condition to create and to operate a regime. To embrace a wide specter of actors, from global to local, including national and departmental authorities, big corporations and small NGOs, it is necessary a realistic and complex institutional approach, as well a rational and complex value approach (which means that the actors should give to each other the right hierarchical place related with the issue at stake, as well they should look forward realistic and non utopian solutions). At this point we may ask if could exist real governance in a world like this, so anarchic and full of particularisms? Certainly, global government would be not possible, but global governance yes. It is possible because the chance for governance never is one chance but many, each of them depending on the particular issue at stake. There are issues more easy to grasp from a rational and realistic approach than others (for example, the ozone problem facilitate this kind of approach, but the climate change is more difficult to confront).

In fact, there is no one single global governance, there are many global governance's, so many as issues at stakes. So, global governance is a complex balance of several processes that are going together, sometimes in a converging way, and another times in a diverging way. Everything is possible in a global world, but global governance, as we understand here, implies value-actors more cosmopolitan than national or neo-feudal, more liberals than utopian and more realistic than formal.

From the beginning of modernity, the rise of nation-state brought national identity to the center of political life. The most remarkable characteristic of national oriented actors is a fantastic hierarchization of the national interest. Even moral values are put aside when the national interest is jeopardizing from outside or inside the country. Cosmopolitan philosophers (like Kant) have denied that national community could come first than moral community. The concern of these philosophers was traditionally presented as related to human kind in first place. But the cosmopolitan approach is more than a substitution of particular values by universal ones. Cosmopolitanism cannot be reduced to a kind of utopian world citizenship or moral law. It is wrong to deduce, from the fact that national identity privileges a particular interests, that the cosmopolitan identity gives only importance to universal interests (even in the Kant's view, the cosmopolitanism does not deny the

importance of nation-state). In fact, this identity seek the harmonization of universal and particular obligations, through a broadening of political and moral values from a rational perspective (Linklater, 1998).

The liberal modern nation-state does not prevent citizens to acknowledge that they and alien are part of the same (moral, political, economical and ecological) world. Only despotic and/or fundamentalist states prevent that. Cosmopolitanism is not unitarianism but pluralism, it is not a particular value-interest transformed in universal one, but many particular value-interests transformed in a whole. The national identity demands loyalty to the nation-state, the cosmopolitan identity accepts many loyalties, but all of them must be rational and work together. From a cosmopolitan point of view, the alien could be our enemy only when they try to impose on us the supremacy of their own particular value-interests. In the XX century, it was proved in the Second World War that only the liberal nation-states (not the nazi-fascist neither the communist) were convicted to maintain a pluralist international society. The nazi-fascist and communist occupation of Europe did not look for a pluralist relationship (cooperation among free partners), like the American did. The (totalitarian) alternatives to liberal democracies were implicitly in favor of a "national" world government, demanding the recognition of supremacy for one single national authority to organize the world. The liberal nation-states were the only ones in history not in favor of a world government to run the world. In this sense, the liberal states never were idealistic or utopian, but realistic. Before the explosion of globalization, they believed in the capacity of international society to organize the world, now they believed in global governance. Because the liberal value-actors are realistic, they are now becoming cosmopolitan.

We must insist in this point. Today, the only realistic way to organize (and to accept) the disorder coming from the global relations among different nation-states is having a cosmopolitan conception of law and social action and a liberal vision of political and economical life. To get a balance between universal human rights and international law, on the one side and particular political and economical background of nation-states, on the other side, means to be cosmopolitan-liberal. To develop only capitalist economy in all over the world could be liberal but not cosmopolitan. After the tremendous breakdown of Soviet Union, even the remainder communist parties know that there is no alternative to capitalism economy. This does not imply to every country and social group in the world should accept the western vision of the world, but implies that the relationship among everybody must be guaranteed by international and transnational rule of law.

Far away to cosmopolitan value-actors, in the contemporary world there are neo-feudal forces. We said before that globalization has two faces. One goes towards integration, another going towards fragmentation. In the same way that the dynamics of the first trend push liberalism to cosmopolitanism, the dynamic of the second trend push nationalism to neo-feudalism. The fragmentation processes of globalization create conditions to develop and strengthen forces that are dissolving the union among sovereignty, territoriality, nationality and citizenship. These forces are not new in the political framework of modern world, but their importance is growing faster with globalization. The neo-feudal value-actors produce a system of corruption, crime and overlapping powers and multiple loyalties, inside and outside the nation-states. If the cosmopolitan forces are the best support for global governance, the neo-feudal ones are the worst (with the national and liberal forces something in between).

The cosmopolitan value-actor are oriented towards global governance because they accept multiple but compatible loyalties. The contrary is the case of neo-feudal forces. They constitute a system of multiple authorities, but each of them demand exclusive and total loyalty because of their fundamentalism and criminal bias. There are no global governance without recognition to each particular culture and actors, and there is such recognition only through the existence of cosmopolitan law. But the neo-feudal forces do not respect any law

than the proper “law”. It is usual to understand cosmopolitan law as a reference to that law, which transcend the claim of nation-state and try to protect basic humanitarian values (see: Held, 1995). In consequence, the cosmopolitan law set down basic standards that may contradict the national law and come into conflict with national government and neo-feudal forces. But here we meant more than a simple humanitarian law, the cosmopolitan law implies to establish rules of commerce, diplomacy, warfare, etc.

From the perspective of cosmopolitan law, the cosmopolitanism cannot be confused with a human right movement and/or with a hegemonic ideology of western superpowers. In fact, the nationalism serves better than cosmopolitanism to hegemonic aspirations. The last one allows for subordinate nation, regions and social groups to organize globally in defense of actual common interests and values. The nationalism (and much more the neo-feudalism) prevents the use of interaction capabilities of globalization. It is from a cosmopolitan point of view that a minor actor or a complex issue can obtain new chances or opportunities. It is certainly not from a neo-feudal or national political system that would be possible to deal with climate change. On the contrary, from a cosmopolitan social action is possible to indigenous people in the Amazon, for example, to counteract hegemonic forms of globalization, through multi dimensional cooperation among civil society, economic corporations and governments (Santos, 1995).

2- CLIMATE CHANGE AS A CRUCIAL ISSUE IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

The existing mechanisms for Global Environmental Governance are very limited for multiple reasons: lack of coordination among mechanism, overlap of institutions, contradictions between Environmental Sustainability and Social Integration creating a strong problem of legitimacy, and, supremacy of economic institutions or regimes like the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Young 1997).

UNEP has succeeded to a certain extent in its catalytic role, with notable achievements in the fields of ozone depletion, toxic waste, biodiversity and regional seas. But it has been a failure in the role of coordinating global environmental action and in the mid 1990's seemed to lose its way entirely: lack of effectiveness, inefficiency and inability to attract qualified staff. However in recent years, due to the energetic leadership of Topfer, UNEP has regained some momentum strengthening its role in monitoring and assessment related functions.

More than 200 Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA) now exist, forming a central part of the framework of global environmental governance (Brown et al 2001). Some have been initiated by UNEP, such as the Ozone and Biodiversity, while others as the UN fish stock agreement had their beginnings elsewhere in the system. MEA vary significantly in nature, from narrowly focused agreements such as CITES or the Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals to MEAs with broad coordination functions, such as the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. In general, the more recent MEAs, such as the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, have dealt with increasingly important areas of economic activity, in contrast to many earlier MEAs, which were much more limited in their coverage, often dealing with the protection of a single species in a limited geographical area (Porter and Brown 1996).

The MEAs currently in place and under negotiation cover many of the key environmental issues but there is a lot of room for improvement in coordination of the MEAs and their institutions. Roles, responsibilities and priorities are fragmented and functions duplicated to an unnecessary extent. The proliferation of MEAs and their COPs and interim meetings makes it difficult for small and poorer countries to become effectively involved in

the real decision-making. On the other hand, many MEA regimes have proved themselves dynamic and innovative, not being constrained by existing institutional structures.

The Montreal Protocol is the best example of success in building international regimes for protecting the global environment. The use and production of CFCs has fallen dramatically in developed countries since the beginning of the 1990s and has been closely controlled in other countries although illegal trade in CFCs does remain a problem. Four factors underpin the overall successful result: the rapid achievement of consensus in the scientific community about the severity of the problem and the efficiency of information exchange within this community, the fact that CFC production is concentrated among a few key players in the private sector, focused leadership by one country in the international negotiations and the fast response by CFC producers in investing in the research and development of alternative technologies that were commercially feasible. The ozone regime is a clear example of a successful coalition between Liberals and Cosmopolitan-liberals with the support of many Nationalists (Gehring 1994; Porter and Brown 1996; Clark, Van Eijndoven and Jaeger 1998; Weiss Brown and Jacobson 1998).

The developing of the Global Environment Facility since 1991 has implied a conceptual revolution: the definition of incremental cost of protecting the global environment. The operation of the Facility is being slowly consolidated and it has become an efficient mechanism for transferring multilateral resources for specific projects. Although the amount of resources available for disbursement is small compared to needs, the achievements to date have been commendable. Several features have contributed to the success of the Facility's work: a negotiation process in which the developed countries endorsed a democratic decision-making process and developing countries took seriously the need to achieve efficiency in the Facility's operations, the formation of a dynamic *ad hoc* structure to manage funds involving the UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank, and a multi-disciplinary approach to problem analysis and project implementation (Sandler 1997).

The Biodiversity Convention has had a double impact. On the one hand, it has significantly increased international public awareness about the importance of biological diversity, an area not well known outside a specialist community before the 1990s, and it also introduced the concept of "common concern of humankind." On the other hand, its implementation has been constrained by the attitude of the US concerning the Convention's provisions for the protection of intellectual Property rights. This is particularly significant given that two-thirds of the world's scientific and technological capacity in biodiversity research and biotechnology is located in the US. A second major constrain to the implementation of the Biodiversity Convention is the existence of the much more powerful World Trade Organization. Whenever there is conflict between free trade and protection of biodiversity, a coalition of Liberals and Nationalists in USA and Emerging countries assures the victory of the first. Whenever there is conflict between Intellectual Property Rights and Rights of Traditional People, the WTO will rule in favor of Intellectual Property rights as defined in the Western World. The Biodiversity regime implies a diffuse victory of a wide coalition among Liberals and Nationalists. A proposal for strict regulation for protecting biodiversity coming from Cosmopolitan-liberals was defeated.

Efforts to protect biodiversity and to promote its sustainable development are extremely diverse and not always encouraging. Some countries such as Costa Rica and Australia have been strongly promoting the merging between their Biodiversity and Transnational Corporations. In those cases some part of the biotechnology cycle (small in Costa Rica, large in Australia) are settled within the national territories. These brings new intensive capital investments, new qualified jobs, either through the re-qualification of workers (like in the case of biodiversity taxonomists and para-taxonomists) or knowledge intensive jobs provided by local universities or coming from foreign countries. Both cases

demonstrate how vital is the existence of a strong rule of law for the development of the Biodiversity/Biotechnology complex. Australia and Costa Rica are tropical forest countries with vital democratic regimes and weak internationally organized crime.

The Biosafety Protocol to the Convention of Biodiversity, signed in January 2000 after four years of difficult negotiations, can be seen as a compromise between the European culture, which is very concern about transgenic foods, and the American culture whose more dynamic sector has promoted the research and the use of transgenic crops. This division is well reflected in South America, where Argentina follows American positions and Brazil is divided with consumers in metropolitan areas tending to follow the European position and farmers and agribusiness aligned with the Americans.

Tensions between the world trade regime (WTO) and the MEAs have grown over the second part of the 1990's. The WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment was established to analyze the relationship between trade and environment policy and consider whether any modifications of trading rules were required. Up to now the role of this Committee has been marginal since conventional trade forces dramatically shape the dynamic of WTO.

The United Nations Commission for Sustainable Development (UN CSD), established in 1993 after its creation by the General Assembly in 1992, has developed slowly and has to date had questionable influence in international relations. The destiny of the UN CSD was connected to the obsolescence of the main bodies of the UN (especially the General Assembly and ECOSOC) and to the failure of reformist efforts that seemed to hold promise when Butros Ghali was appointed secretary-general of the UN in January 1992. The UN Commission on Global Governance lead by Kenneth Carlson that produced the 1995 report "Our Global Neighborhood", and the Commission on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the UN, led by Paul Kennedy, were excellent initiatives and presented innovative proposals for reforming the UN. Unfortunately, their impact on the organization has been minimal. At the time of the Rio "Earth Summit" optimists envisioned that environmental issues would drive the UN and be the principal catalyst for internal structural reform. What actually happened was the contrary: the inefficiency and the inertia of the UN system obstructed the dynamism of environmental issues. Today, it is evident that a mainstreaming of environmental issues into the UN system depends on deep structural reform within the organization, which may require shifting from an international-intergovernmental system to a transnational-transgovernmental system (Viola 1998). In the absence of strong actors to champion change, however, "business-as-usual" prevails. Countries such as the US, France, the UK, Japan, Russia, China, India, Brazil, Korea and Indonesia oppose strongly any shift to a transnational-transgovernmental system. Others such as Germany, Italy and Canada are reticent while the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Costa Rica and New Zealand are mildly favorable. Many representatives of transnational corporations oppose the idea because of perceptions about controls on their global operations, while international NGOs are generally in favor. The position of the scientific community is unclear and that of major religious groups is ambiguous. Beside the traditional inefficiency of UN bureaucracy, their initiatives were affected by a wrong conception of global governance. Most of them are not cosmopolitan-liberals as they should be in order to facilitate the processes of governance. The founding fathers of UN were nurture by cosmopolitanism, but their children slowly were transforming this spirit in something more nationalist and more utopian and unrealistic (almost anti-liberal). The UN did not totally lose the original spirit, but it lost the last decades going wrong, against history. In this environment, any changes are likely to be incremental; insofar they will never match the actual challenge of global governance.

The climate regime, including the United Nations Convention on Climate Change signed in Rio in June 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol signed in December 1997, is the more

comprehensive and ambitious of all environmental regimes, linking in a very direct way one the most crucial economic issue, the use of energy and energy efficiency with the strongest environmental threaten (Rayner and Malone 1998, Soroos 1997, O’Riordan and Jager 1996). The Kyoto Protocol was approved having Liberals and Cosmopolitan-liberals as the key supporters. Actually Cosmopolitan-liberals were fighting for a much more strict Protocol but facing the possibility of a total defeat moved to support Liberal position.

The importance of the Kyoto Protocol is hard to overstate. Although 150 countries agreed in principle to reduce global warming pollution at Rio in 1992, it wasn't until Kyoto that they agreed to legally binding limits. If ratified by enough countries, the Kyoto Protocol will require developed countries to reduce their combined output of six greenhouse gases by a modest 5 percent below 1990 levels by 2010. This is a small step toward protecting the Earth from the risks of global warming, but it is a vital one. Emergent (middle-income) countries do not have commitments for the first period of the Protocol and most of them have stated they will not assume commitments at least until 2025. This creates a very strong resistance against Kyoto among Liberal and Nationalists in USA, but also in a lesser degree in all developed countries. The impasses of the climate change regime are product of the weakness of the Liberal/Cosmopolitan-liberal coalition and its difficulties to cope with a conservative coalition formed by Nationalists from all over the world and some Liberals in the U.S. and Emergent countries.

Some transnational corporations like British Petroleum Amoco, Shell, DuPont, Microsoft, Cisco Systems, Oracle, General Electric, Toyota, Honda support the Kyoto Protocol and have committed to reduce emissions from their own operations by more than the agreement would require. The Pew Center on Climate Change has been successfully acting as a coordinator of corporations supporting Kyoto. Corporation’s opposition to Kyoto is diminishing at an increasing rate in the last year. While continuing to express doubts about the Kyoto agreement itself, Ford Motor and DaimlerChrysler recently withdrew from the virulently Anti-Kyoto Global Climate Coalition, citing the desire to take a more constructive approach to the global warming problem.

The Kyoto treaty includes some excellent mechanisms to make it less rigid, but in practice it is not easy to implement them. One would allow Developed countries to buy excess emission permits from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, which have a large surplus because their economies have collapsed and emissions are likely to be much lower than their targets. Such transfers will help countries like United States and Canada to reach their obligations but it may also enrich Russian/ Ukrainian/Belarus ruling elites (strongly interconnected with international crime) by around US\$100 billion without improving the lives of millions of strong losers from Communist collapse. A second mechanism would let developed countries buy credits from developing countries that reduce their emissions through Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). It would offer an incentive for energy intensive corporations to invest in projects that reduce emissions from developing countries. That is an excellent idea, but working out rules for the CDM is proving highly complicated and time-consuming

As a tool for helping in the climate change politics analyze, we elaborate a classification of country position on the Climate Regime as it is by the year 2000 (Viola 2000). First, we have the High Carbon Intensive Developed Countries (HCIDC), in which the energy matrix is strongly based on fossil fuels (particularly coal and oil) and/or are continental countries with high-energy consumption in transportation (U.S., Canada, Australia). In these countries the society is highly divided in relation to the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: most of Nationalists and some Liberals are strongly against, but they have a sector of Liberals and Cosmopolitan-liberals who are strongly in favor. In these societies there is strong support for demanding voluntary commitments from Emergent countries.

Second, we have the Middle Carbon Intensive Developed Countries (MCIDC), in which the energy matrix is based mostly on renewals or nuclear and/or have a very efficient system of public transportation (European Union, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Israel, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan). In these societies there is a growing consensus, leaded by Cosmopolitan-liberals and Liberals in favor of the implementation of Kyoto. Also in these societies there is strong support for demanding voluntary commitments from Emergent countries.

Third, we have the Former Communist Countries (FCC), whose economy has dramatically declined during the 1990's (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Romania, Bulgaria). These countries have strong interest in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol because they have emission credits they can profit from. In those societies there is a strong consensus in favor of Kyoto, just as a mean of getting cash in the middle term, generally, without concern about the carbon emissions profile of the country in the long term. Their strong interests in Kyoto seem to be a paradox; insofar these countries are nationalists (also with neo-feudal elements inside the power system). But, precisely, the presence of this kind of opportunism shows the extreme difficulties to produce long run agreements in this issue.

Fourth, we have the Super Carbon Intensive Emergent Countries (SCIEC), in which the energy matrix is strongly based on fossil fuels and the exportation of oil is more than a half of the total (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arabs Emirates, Iran, Venezuela, Mexico, Nigeria). In these societies most people are against Kyoto, though in some of them there are significant Cosmopolitan-liberals sectors in favor of Kyoto, like Mexico and Venezuela.

Fifth, we have the Middle Carbon Intensive Emergent Countries (MCIEC), in which the energy matrix is based on fossil fuels and/or have strong carbon emissions derived from land use/land change/ deforestation (China, India, Thailand, Malaysia, South Africa, Turkey, Brazil). In these societies there is strong support for Kyoto as far as does not imply commitments for theirs countries and because they expect to have benefits from the Clean Development Mechanism. In those societies there is strong rejection of voluntary commitments for Emergent countries. In some of these countries (Brazil, India) there are significant Cosmopolitan-liberals sectors which are in favor of diminishing the importance of carbon in the energy matrix, fight strongly against deforestation, and promote some kind of commitments for Emergent countries.

Sixth, we have the Low Carbon Intensive Emergent Countries (LCIEC), in which the energy matrix is based mostly in renewals or nuclear and/or have an efficient system of public transportation (Poland, Check Republic, Hungary, Baltic states, Philippines, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica). In these societies there is significant support for Kyoto because of the same reasons than HCIEC. In some of these societies (Argentina, Costa Rica) Cosmopolitan-liberals support voluntary commitment for Emergent Countries because they suppose they will be able to manage the rate of increase of carbon emissions and because they think that will increase international cooperation.

Seventh, we have the Island/Low Continental Countries (ILCC), which are extreme vulnerable to climate change (Fiji, Malta, Jamaica, Barbados, Bangladesh). In these countries there is massive support for Kyoto as far as all sectors will be benefited from and also for commitments for Emergent countries. Indonesia is on a very contradictory situation because as an Island-nation is highly vulnerable to climate change, but its economy strongly depends on oil exportation

Eight, we have the Stagnant Countries (SC) which are very vulnerable to natural disasters because of the high level of poverty but do not perceive themselves as immediately threaten as the IC. These countries are strongly in favor of Kyoto as far as they perceive that they will benefit from the Clean Development Mechanism.

Since the signature of the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism started to have a prominent place in the Emergent and Stagnant countries agenda, in reason of its voluntary character, and its capacity to be a catalyst for new sustainable foreign investments. This has strengthened support for the Kyoto Protocol in Emergent and Poor countries. The combination of Developed countries obligation to domestic reduction of emissions and the CDM produced a shift in many Emergent countries diplomacy, like Brazil and India, that has been previously militant against the joint implementation mechanism. For most Emergent and Poor countries, the CDM should be considered just as a very important instrument capable to offer increasing in emissions reduction at a cheaper cost, and consequently beneficial for everybody as a market mechanism of resource transfer to Emergent and Poor countries and capable to establish cleaner development patterns.

In spite of years of intense negotiations the Kyoto Protocol is far away from being ratified. This could be attributed to the combination of three major factors; the first being the weak leadership by major greenhouse gas emitting countries and lack of progress in meeting stabilization targets settled in the Kyoto Protocol in crucial developed countries. Compared with the baseline of 1990, in 1999 carbon emissions were the following: United States (commitment 7% lower by 2010) was 14% higher; Canada (commitment 6% lower by 2010) was 17% higher; United Kingdom (commitment 12% lower by 2010) was 15% lower; Germany (commitment 21% lower by 2010) was 17% lower; The Netherlands (commitment 6% lower by 2010) was 17% higher; Japan (commitment 6% lower by 2010) was 4% higher. Among developed countries only U.K, Germany, Sweden and Denmark were in a trend of compliance with the commitments by 2010. Even countries like The Netherlands and Austria, which have been for decades at the world vanguard in environmental policies, are having strong difficulties in addressing their commitments. The weak leaderships of OECD countries also should be explained as a strong ambivalence towards cosmopolitan and realistic positions.

A second factor would be the reluctance on the part of large (and fast growing carbon emissions) Emerging Countries (China, India, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand) to commit to reduction in the future rate of growth of their emissions; and, the third factor would be the disagreement among the scientific and economic community about respectively, the pace and extent of climate change, and the costs and benefits of alternative response strategies, though this disagreement seems to start to narrow after the publication of the 3rd IPCC Report in January 2001.

Even with difficulties to be ratified, Kyoto is fast becoming as a crucial source of soft law. The Kyoto Protocol is already shaping technological development in favor of decarbonizing the world economy. In the expectations of the scientific community and corporations, wind, solar and hydrogen powers are rapidly moving to the main stream of the energy matrix. According to many analysts estimations renewable energy (solar PV, wind, modern biomass, geothermal, etc.) will jump from less than 2% of the world energy matrix in 2000 to around 20% in 2020. The recent agreement among the Iceland government, Daimler Chrysler and Shell in order to develop a large-scale test of hydrogen powered cars is a clear demonstration of that shifting expectations. This paper is not the right place to explain the role of emerging technological innovations in global governance. But, especially in the last two decades, we have seen many examples (not only environmental ones) of technological innovations creating very positive conditions for governance (The Montreal Protocol is a good example). In this sense, a good reason to be optimistic is the increasing dependency of these countries on technological innovations. On the other side, pessimist analysts make their argument exemplifying with the fact that the plan for pushing energy development being elaborated by the Bush administration is mostly based in the expansion of oil, coal and natural gas.

Beyond the specific fate of the Kyoto Protocol, there is small doubt that climate change is the greatest threat to the future of humankind. In the last year the intensity of severe storms and floods in different parts of the world has intensified, probably as a demonstration that we have already entered in the soft version of climate change: the increase in numbers of extreme meteorological phenomenon. These events show dramatically how vulnerable are societies, much more if they are poor: stronger than historically recorded floods in China, Mozambique, Venezuela, United Kingdom and India, devastating drought and famine in Central Asia and the Horn of Africa, extremely severe storms in France and Italy, severe drought in the Great Plains and the West of United States, retreat of the glacier in the Andes, the Rockies and the Alps ranges, devastating fires in Indonesia, Australia, the Northern Amazon and the West of United States.

The Cosmopolitan-liberals have already built up a strong support from the Liberals in the European Union, Costa Rica and Singapore. The Cosmopolitan-liberals are already significant in USA, Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, Japan and New Zealand and some key Emergent countries (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Hungary, and Poland) but they have not gained the support of Liberals. The ratification of Kyoto and the deepening of the climate regime depend upon the capacity of Liberal-cosmopolitan to win the support of the Liberals in the countries mentioned above, and to increase their presence in other key Emergent countries, where they are very small now (India, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, South Africa, Turkey). Also the fate of the climate regime depends upon some development of Cosmopolitan-liberals and Liberals in China and Russia.

During the Conferences of the Parts after the signature of the Kyoto Protocol (Buenos Aires 1998, Bonn 1999 and The Hague 2000) countries formed four large groups of negotiation: the European Union, the Umbrella group (USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Ukraine and Switzerland); the G77/China and the Small Island States Alliance. Within the G77/China there were two sub-group differentiation in some issues: the less developed countries and the oil exporter countries. The most relevant cleavage have been between the European Union proposing that countries targets should be accomplished mostly through domestic efforts to reduce emissions, a restricted role for the flexibility mechanisms (emissions trading, joint implementation and Clean Development mechanism), a strict regime of compliance and being against deducting carbon sinks from the national emissions on one side; and the Umbrella Group on the other side (the G77/China have been strongly divided in those issues). A second relevant cleavage have being between the European Union, the Umbrella group and the Small Island States proposing that middle income developing countries should assume voluntary commitments for reducing the rate of increase of their carbon emissions in the first period of commitments, from one side and the G77/China from the other side. The third cleavage have been between the G77/China and the Small Island States proposing a large package of free transfer of climate related technology from developed to developing countries from one side and the European Union and the Umbrella group from the other side proposing a very small package. The failure of The Hague Conference in reaching an agreement was mostly due to the differences between the European Union and the Umbrella group in relation to the amount of carbon sinks to be allowed to compute as deduction from the national emissions.

3- BRAZIL IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Brazil participated in the foundation of the League of Nations in 1920 and kept its commitments with the organization until its collapse in the late 1930's. The Brazilian contribution to the Second World War effort was significant. Unlike other Latin American countries Brazil dispatched troop units to Europe to participate in combat. Because of the participation in the war effort Brazil was considered by the U.S. and the U.K. as the crucial

country in Latin America for the construction of a New World Order. Brazil participated in the foundation of the Bretton Woods and United Nations systems as an allied nation, having the prerogatives of the victorious. Brazil has been a member of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since the beginning. In no moment since 1945 Brazil has questioned the main role of those institutions. Many times Brazil has been member of the U.N. Security Council and in some terms has presided it. Brazil has been also a major player in the development of the regional institutions: the Organization of the American States, the Inter-American Military Treaty signed in Rio 1948 and the Inter-American Development Bank.

Brazil has been a very active member of the international community during the whole 20th Century. During the second half of the 20th century the Brazilian economy has growth above the world average and since the 1970s the country became one of the ten largest economies of the world. In spite of the strong growth of the economy, Brazil has not been capable of overcoming the extremely unequal income distribution. During the whole century Brazil has always been one of the worst countries in the world in terms of income distribution. The links between Brazil and the rest of the world have been mostly based in the principles of world peace, free trade, cultural diversity and religious freedom. Political democracy has been most of the times a stated goal of the Brazilian society, though there have been several periods of political authoritarianism. Between the middle 1960's and the late 1980's there were some sectors of the military/foreign policy establishment that attempted to build up nuclear weapons capabilities as a platform for achieving a great power status in the global arena. Between 1960 and 1990 the Brazilian society experienced a strong tension derived from the growing of two contradictory economic-political trends: from one side the development of transnational corporations, private initiative and Western values, from the other side the expansion of state owned corporations, bureaucracies and nationalists values (Martins 1986).

The Brazilian position in the emerging arena of the global environment in the early 1970's was correspondent with its economic profile. Brazilian standing was based in the principle that the main pollution was poverty, and environmental protection should come only after economic development has dramatically increased per capita income to the level of Developed countries (Guimaraes 1991). At the Environment Conference of Stockholm in 1972, Brazil and China lead the formation of a coalition of Third World countries contraries to recognizing the importance of emergent global environmental problems. Brazil standing in Stockholm was based in three principles: defense of unrestricted national sovereignty with relation to the use of natural resources, environmental protection should come only after reaching high per capita income, and, the burden of paying for the protection of the global environment should be exclusive responsibility of Developed countries (Viola 1997).

During the 1990's Brazil has consolidated the democratic regime, has expanded the Rule of Law (though more is still needed), has opened its economy to foreign trade and investment and has had a foreign policy based in a new approximation with Western countries. By the end of the 1990s Brazil continuous being an important country in the world arena. Brazil has 6% of the world surface and 2.7% of the world population, growing 1.3% a year, with a density of 20 inhabitants per square kilometer and 80% of the population being urban. Brazilian GDP is around 750 billion dollars considering exchange rates and around 1,050 billion dollars considering purchase capacity; 4,300 dollars of per capita income considering exchange rates and 6,400 dollars of per capita income considering purchase capacity; around 1.9 % of the World Economic Output considering exchange rates and around 2.4% of the World Economic Output considering purchase capacity. The proportional value added in the economy is agriculture 8.4%, industry 28.8% and services 62.8%. The Gross domestic investment is 21%, the government revenues (federal, state and municipal) are 32% of GDP and the overall budget deficit is 3% of GDP (discounting the interest of the public

debt the country has almost 3% of superavit). The annual foreign direct investments in the period 1996-2000 were 27 billion dollars, a top record in Brazilian history and among the highest in the world. In 1999, the public debt was 300 billion dollars and the total debt service was 50 billion dollars. Brazil participates with only 0.9% of the world foreign trade (mostly commodities and intermediate technology manufactured products) and ranks 64th in the Human Development Index. Brazil produces around 3.5% of the world carbon emissions (considering industry, energy, transportation and land use/land change), with carbon emissions of almost 3 metric tones per capita. Brazil has 5.5 million square kilometers of forests with a deforestation rate of 0.5% a year, around 20% of the world terrestrial Biodiversity, and around 15% of world fresh water, from which only uses 0.5%.

There are some dissonances that are at the core of the Brazilian position in the global arena. Income per capita is slightly below the world average if calculated according to exchange rates and slightly above the world average if calculated according to purchase capacity, though in both cases much more unfairly distributed since the 1% richest sector of the population gets 13.8% of the National Income and the 50% poorest sector of the population gets 13.5% of the National Income. The economy is still significantly more closed than the world average because the export capacity is low, only 8% of GNP. Carbon emissions per capita are well below Developed countries but above the average of middle income countries. Carbon emission per unity of GNP doubles the world average, well above developed country and slightly above the average of middle income countries. Carbon emissions coming from the modern sector of the economy (industry, transportation, housing and modern agriculture) are very low because the matrix is based in hydropower, and consequently carbon emissions coming from the modern sector are well below the average of middle income countries. Carbon emissions coming from land change and traditional land use are extremely high. In this point modern Brazil is hostage from traditional Brazil. In terms of energy efficiency, the modern Brazilian economy is doing much better than most middle income countries and the traditional Brazilian economy is doing much worst than most middle income countries (Fearnside 1999).

The Cardoso administration produced a paradigmatic shift in the Brazilian foreign policy. It strengthens the economic ties with the U.S., the EU and Japan, and abandoned previous attempts of having close ties with China, India and Russia (Onis 2000). Brazil also strongly supports the West in most global issues: Human Rights Protection, Intellectual Property Rights, expansion of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, Protection of Women and Reproductive Health, and condemnation of Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism. However, the ministry of foreign affairs kept some Non-Western approaches (continuity in the affiliation with G77 in U.N. forums, conflict with Argentina because of its military alliance with the U.S.) as a way of looking for wide support for its candidacy to be a new permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.

Brazilian participation in the global arena of the 1990s was shaped by four major trends: the acceptance of limitations to the principle of National Sovereignty, the clear decision of fighting to become one of the new permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in the occasion of its enlargement (subject about what it exist a diffuse consensus), the strong commitment of strengthening Mercosur as a way to cope with the challenges of integration in the globalized economy, and the support of universalism and contractualism in issues like Human Rights, Political Democracy, Reproductive Rights, Women Rights, Social Equity and the Environment. The four principles are far away from the Brazilian foreign policy during the 1970's and the 1980's based in the principle of absolute national sovereignty and the attempt of becoming a Great Power in the global arena including the building up of a strong military.

The Treaty of Asuncion that created Mercosur, signed in 1991, was developed under Brazilian leadership. The Treaty was crucial in two dimensions: it finished definitively with the regional rivalry between Brazil and Argentina deepening the civilian argument in favor of diminishing the importance of the military both sides, and promoted fast increasing in the flow of goods, capital, people and information among the four countries (Fauriol and Weintraubb 1995). Some months after Asuncion the presidents of Brazil and Argentina signed the Treaty that created the Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials submitted to the regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Both Senates rapidly ratified the Treaty and since 1991 the Brazil/Argentina relationship made a turning point, definitively overcoming the profile of nuclear proliferation rivalry that prevailed between the 1960s and the 1980s.

In 1994, after significant efforts for trade convergence led by Brazilian diplomats, the countries signed the Ouro Preto Protocol and deepened Mercosur, though still falling short of committing to the build up of supranational institutions. Mercosur was strongly shaken during the global financial crisis in the Emerging Markets in 1997/99, particularly after the devaluation of the Brazilian currency in January 1999. However, more recently Mercosur has become an excellent mean of promoting commitments with healthy public policies in all the countries (trade liberalization, fiscal equilibrium, coordination of macroeconomic policies, middle term prospective of a common currency). In 2000 the Mercosur framework support the social-economic forces committed with responsible policies against the populists forces. During 1996-99, the four Mercosur countries led by Brazil negotiated an additional Environmental Protocol that was ready to sign at the end of 1999. According to this Protocol the process of economic integration should include at its core environmental protection. The Protocol states that Mercosur is committed with clean air, clean water, the appropriate disposal of solid waste, the carefully management of hazardous waste, the preservation of biodiversity, the integrity of the ozone layer and the stability of the global climate. The Protocol negotiated reflects the higher environmental standards present in the Brazilian economy and because of fears from Argentinean and Uruguayan entrepreneurs, in terms of undermining their competitiveness, has not been signed yet by early 2001.

During the final negotiations of the GATT Uruguay round in 1993 Brazil strongly supported trade liberalization based in its recent openness of the economy and was generally allied with USA, Australia, Canada and Argentina against the agriculture protectionism from the European Union and Japan. Also, Brazil strongly supported the foundation of the World Trade Organization in January 1995. However, Brazil opposes a general initiative rose by the U.S. vice-president Gore for starting a new negotiation round based in settling environmental protection clauses in international trade. During the second ministerial meeting of WTO in Singapore (1996) Brazil had a very defensive standing. It strongly opposed to the establishment of labor and environmental standards in international trade. Also, Brazil was out of an agreement among developed and emergent countries for a complete liberalization, in eight years, of trade on Information Technology products. During the difficulties negotiations that preceded the Seattle ministerial meeting in 1999, Brazil assumed the leadership of developing countries strongly confronting developed countries with relation to their trade barriers in relation to agriculture and industry products, and opposing labor and environmental conditions in a proposed new round of trade liberalization.

During the negotiations for the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), started during the Miami Summit in 1994, Brazil always defended a slow pace: not before 2005 and not previous partial implementation. Brazilian position was based in the need to prepare its industry to completely open competition with the North American one. During the period 1994-97 the Brazilian standing implied conflict with the official policy of other Latin American countries (like Argentina, Uruguay and Chile) and USA, that were in favor of

a faster pace. Finally, in 1997, American Congress denied fast track legislation to Clinton, and the slow pace became a real constrain for the players that were favoring fast track. The tensions between Brazil and the rest of the American countries with relation to the pace of FTAA have started again in 2001 since Bush signed his interest in moving fast toward the FTAA.

During his fast tenure as Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1992-93, Cardoso persuade the Franco government about the necessity of moving the Space Program from the military to civilian control in order to get highly needed technological exchange for the development of the program. Also following Cardoso initiative, the Brazilian Senate ratified the Nuclear Free Latin American Zone Treaty (Tlatelolco) in 1994, significantly later than other Latin American countries. Immediately after starting his presidency, in 1995, Cardoso started a series of foreign policy movements that put Brazil in complete alignment with the West. In 1995, Cardoso completed his work in the missile area signing the Brazilian joining to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). During the 1980's and the early 1990's the military had strongly opposed the MTCR. Immediately after the signing of MTCR Brazil was invited to participate in the project for the construction of the multinational space station to be settled in orbit around 2008, and consequently Brazil became a member of the select Space Club. Finally, a last step in Brazilian credibility as a peaceful member of the world community happened in 1999, when Brazil overcome some American distrust and signed an agreement with USA, Italy and Ukraine, for launching commercial satellites from the Alcantara base, with strong competitive advantages because is located almost in the Equator line.

Brazil was one the leader countries in designing the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed in 1995 and support, with some resistance from the military, the Land Mines Ban Treaty signed in 1997. It took more than two years in his tenure for Cardoso persuading the military and diplomatic establishment about the need to sign the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. By the time Brazil signed (1997), it was the one out four countries (North Korea, Iraq, and Libya) that have not signed the Treaty yet. The Brazilian diplomacy was very rigid in this issue and continued arguing that the treaty was unfair, like if the world were still in the 1970s. The long opposition to sign of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty is one of the major errors of Brazilian diplomacy in 20th century. By early 2001, the Brazilian Senate has not ratified the Treaty yet, though there is not any more significant resistance to the ratification. Also in 1995 Cardoso persuaded the military about the need of better coordination between the U.S. and Brazil with relation to Narco-traffic and consequently both countries signed a new cooperation agreement.

The U.S. and Western European countries were very pleased with the new Cardoso policy of breaking up the State monopolies in petroleum and telecommunication sectors and American and European telecommunication corporations invested very strongly in Brazil since 1996. During Clinton visit to Brazil in 1997, Brazil and USA signed important agreements for cooperation in several areas: higher education, science and technology, environment and drugs. According to the environmental agreement both countries compromised to exchange as deeply as possible ideas in order to reach more common positions in several issues: climate change, depletion of the ozone layer, conservation and Sustainable use of biological diversity, deforestation, desertification, ocean pollution and management of hazardous wastes and toxic substances. In order to further their common agenda for the environment, the United States and Brazil stated their intention to hold regular high level consultations, on at least an annual basis, to discuss priority issues of mutual concern in the area of environment and Sustainable development. Such consultations should involve the participation of the relevant governmental agencies from both sides concerned with environmental protection and sustainable development.

During three of the United Nations deliberations about military intervention in crisis situations in the 1990's Brazil was reluctant to approve interventions: Iraq 1991, Haiti 1994 and Kosovo 1999. The Brazilian position in relation to the Persian Gulf War was highly costly in terms of credibility for the country but at least was the last time that Brazilian military had some power in defining crucial issues of foreign policy. A Brazilian contingent participated in the UN observer force that guaranteed the October 1994 elections in Mozambique and in the UN observer force in Bosnia in 1995. Brazil has sent military contingent for acting as peacekeepers in Angola (1998) and East Timor (1999). In the Angolan case Brazilian participation is at the core of the U.N. force.

In all the World Summits related to Human Rights - the Vienna Conference on Human Rights from 1993, the Cairo Conference on Population and Development from 1994, and the Beijing Conference on Women Rights from 1995 - Brazil strongly aligned with Western countries liberal coalitions in the promotion of individual rights against the State or traditional institutions (Nickel and Viola 1994). In the Cairo and Beijing Conferences the Brazilian delegation had a significant participation of feminist leaders coming from the civil society and consequently had a leadership role in promoting universalistic and liberal causes. Different from other Latin American countries, the Brazilian Catholic Church was not successful in shaping the international standing of the country in a conservative direction.

Brazil has supported since the beginning all the treaties related to the global environment signed during the 1990's: the Basel Treaty for controlling and discouraging the international trade in hazardous waste from 1989, the London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol establishing technology transfer mechanism for substituting CFC from 1990, the Madrid Amendment (1991) to the Antarctic Treaty extending for more fifty years the moratorium to economic activities in that Continent, the Convention on Biodiversity (1992), the creation (1991) and expansion (1993) of the Global Environment Facility, and the Protocol of Biosafety (2000). In the development of all these treaties Brazil has middle to low profile participation, excepting for the Convention of Biodiversity.

During the negotiations of the Convention of Biodiversity (1990-92) Brazil had a leading role derived from its reality of being the biggest country in the world in biodiversity. One of the most important issues at stake during negotiation of the Convention of Biodiversity was related to the connections between biodiversity and biotechnology. In one side, the U.S. (where it is installed 2/3 of the biotech industry of the world) strongly defended the principle of Intellectual Property Rights according to the conventional definition. In the opposite side, a coalition of countries rich in Biodiversity led by Brazil defended the right to royalties for countries where biodiversity is located, in biotech products derived from Biodiversity. The Convention finished in May 1992, implied a partial victory for the coalition of countries led by Brazil since the convention did not recognize the full principle of Intellectual Property Rights and defined it in a broad sense giving rights to indigenous people.

During the 1990's Brazil progressed dramatically toward a deep convergence with Western democratic capitalism: deep markets reforms created for the first time in history an economy that is more based in market mechanism than in State regulations, direct foreign investment from developed countries have been among the highest in the world, independent courts have operated in all dimensions of social/economic life, open public accounts and fiscal responsibility became goals of the national society, corruption in politics has diminished though continuous being relatively high, political democracy became more deeply rooted in the social web and the political culture, respect of Human Rights became core goals of the domestic and international public policies, attempts to build up a strong military machine were abandoned and the military have gradually been civilized, public awareness about environmental protection have growth continuously, and, the country foreign policy has achieved, for the first time, some capacity of regional and global leadership, giving substantial

foundations to the pretension of becoming a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. The only area in which there has not been significant transformation is related to income distribution and its consequence since the early 1980s, the growing urban and rural violence. From this point of view there has been a vicious circle between the difficulties in overcoming the heritage of slavery and the trend of the globalized economy to produce a new digital/information divide. The growing of urban/rural violence in the 1990s has been strongly related to the production, trade and consumption of illegal drugs and other illicit like smuggling in electronic products and trade in endangered species. By the end of the 20th century, 1990s Brazil has successfully adapted to globalization from an economic point of view, but highly unequal income distribution and growing social violence and crime are a major threat to the stability of the society.

The Brazilian position in the global arena is ambivalent, in spite of the significant and positive shifts of the Collor and Cardoso administrations, in the last decade (1990's), to tune in and converge with the liberal policies of OECD countries. A significant part (military, foreign affairs, industry) of the Brazilian state bureaucracy is nationalist (although pragmatic) and traditionally afraid of any kind of cosmopolitanism (always associated with Amazonian fears). The civil society, in spite of the active participation of many Brazilian NGOs in global networks of social action on several issues, defends a diffuse and utopian nationalism (almost anti-liberal). The Brazilian native corporations are taking good advantage of globalization but continue more nationalist than liberal. In this context it is hard to any local authority or citizens avoid goes back and forth in essential issues of global governance. The hope for a better Brazilian contribution to global governance depends more upon external (than internal) conditions. The Brazilian will for modernization is a historic certainty; it would be very hard to change this feeling (even for a leftist national government). In the present circumstances we can expect that the country will follow (even not very close) the mainstream of globalization and global governance. The Brazilian participation in the climate regime is a good example of its ambivalent "escort" of global governance.

4. BRAZIL IN THE CLIMATE REGIME

The Brazilian government's position in the Rio-92 Conference was founded in the following: global environmental problems are very important and priority should be given to them by the international community; the causing of global environmental problems has had differentiated historical responsibilities and that should be reflected in the measures for coping with them, being rich countries that should assume a much higher cost. During UNCED negotiations (1990-92) the Brazilian government was progressively standing back from its Nationalism (1972-88) and was assuming a Liberal position: it had leadership role in writing the Biodiversity Convention; it facilitated negotiations and the agreement in the climate change convention; and, it supported funding commitments in relation to Agenda 21. Though, the Nationalist heritage emerged when Brazil supported Malaysia in its opposition to a forest convention (Viola 1997).

The Brazilian position in UNCED was Liberal with some components of Cosmopolitan-liberalism, though inserted in a State structure in which still prevailed a declining Nationalism. In spite of its declining Nationalism was still hegemonic in fundamental sectors of the State like the Armed Forces. The Brazilian Liberal standing was a product of four factors: a- the crisis of the protectionism model during the 1980s produced a significant public sensitivity in relation to Sustainable development (even when the adhesion to this ideal was very diffuse); b - the young president Collor developed a sensibility in relation to the environment because of its international background; c - the Brazilian energy matrix is mostly renewable in a context in which most of the countries are strongly dependent on fossil fuels or nuclear, in this sense Brazil is a type of world vanguard of a new energy

matrix oriented toward Sustainability; d - the Brazilian society was becoming aware of the Amazon forest (the largest world reserve of biodiversity) and consequently was moving from supporting deforestation (predominant up to 1988) to supporting preservation and conservation.

Brazilian standing in relation to the climate change regime has been full of internal tensions: Cosmopolitan-liberals views driving in the direction to support a strong climate regime and Nationalistic views and fears driving to dilute the treaty have been present simultaneously in many Brazilian positions during the whole history of the negotiations. In COP1 (Berlin 1995) and COP2 (Geneva 1996) there was some weakening of Brazilian Liberalism and some coming back of Nationalism: Brazil kept a defensive approach focusing on the historical responsibility of developed countries and stood strongly for the right to development of Emergent and Poor countries, without consideration of their proportion of new carbon emissions. (Viola 2000).

During the 1997 negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol Brazil had a very important Green initiative: the creation of the Clean Development Fund. However, in most of the issues Brazil had a highly contradictory position derived from its belonging to the G77: it manifested some support to the Nationalist non- responsible position of Emergent countries strongly dependent on fossil fuels (China, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Mexico) instead of assuming a clearly differentiated position framed by its renewable energy and its vast carbon sink tropical forests. This differentiated and pro-active approach would have implied standing on a position between Liberal and Cosmopolitan-liberal: alliance with the European Union and States-islands in the question of strong emissions reduction; alliance with USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, Russia, Ukraine and Argentina in the question of having a strong role for flexibility mechanisms (tradable emission permits, joint implementation and Clean Development Mechanism) and, alliance with G77/China with relation to technology transfer.

Until the beginning of 2000, few actors constituted the Brazilian domestic arena of the climate change regime. However, during the year 2000 there was an increasing interest in climate change coming from academia, NGOs and corporations. Recognizing this change, in June 2000 the government established the Brazilian Forum for Climate Change (with participation of government officials from the federal, state and municipal level, NGOs, academia and business).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordination with the Ministry of the Science and Technology are in charge of the negotiations in the climate regime. Until 2000 there was a poor participation of Non-government Organizations both in decision making and in the process of policy implementation. Some large corporations begin to be interested on climate change because of the influence of the Business Council for Sustainable Development. There was also participation of some scientists responsible for offering technical back up to Brazilian diplomacy in the multilateral debates. Parallel, there is also an effort of diplomacy in guaranteeing that Brazilian scientists participate in the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change. The Congress almost doesn't participate in the decision making of Brazilian policy in Environmental Regimes. Its function is restricted to the ratification of the agreements signed by the Executive that happens without a significant involvement of civil society. Brazil foreign policies in relation to climate change have been internally consistent in the last years (after the open clashes between Environmental and Foreign Policy officials at the time of UNCED): restricted number of actors, concentration of decision making in the highest steps of the bureaucracy and good articulation among the agencies inside the bureaucratic structure. This profile could be changing since 2001 due to the newly created multi-stakeholder forum.

In order to achieve the emissions reduction from developed countries, the Kyoto Protocol allows that, besides the reduction initiatives taken domestically, the developed countries accomplish that goals in coordinated action with Emergent and Poor countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) adapted from the original Brazilian proposal for a Clean Development Fund. The Brazilian proposal was formally presented during the negotiations of the Protocol (Bonn Meeting in August 1997) and after several sessions of negotiations it was inserted, with modifications, in the text of the Kyoto Protocol. During the negotiations of the Clean Development Mechanism there was, for the first time in the evolution of the climate regime, a significant convergence between the Brazilian and the American diplomacy: Brazil moved in the direction of accepting flexibility mechanism for reducing emissions, and USA moved in the direction of accepting flexibility beyond the Annex 1 countries. The Clean Development Fund had the goal of Developed countries supply of financial help to Non Annex 1 countries with strong commitment to use cleaner technologies. Without the punitive character of the Brazilian original proposal of the Fund, that established penalties for Annex 1 countries that fail in reducing emissions, almost all the countries supported CDM. The Brazilian Clean Development Fund was the most Cosmopolitan-liberal position ever assumed by Brazilian diplomacy in the formation of the Climate Change Regime (not considering as country position the strongly Cosmopolitan-liberal approach assumed by the Ministry of the Environment Lutzenberger in its confrontations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the 1990-92 Prepcoms).

Since Kyoto the CDM started to have a prominent place in the Brazilian agenda, in reason of its voluntary character, and its capacity to be a catalyst for new sustainable foreign investments. The combination of Developed countries obligation to domestic reduction of emissions and the CDM produced a shift in the Brazilian diplomacy that has been previously militant against the join implementation mechanism. For Brazilian diplomacy, the CDM should be consider just as an auxiliary instrument capable to offer increasing in emissions reduction at a cheaper cost, and consequently beneficial for everybody as a market mechanism of resource transfer to Emergent and Stagnated countries and capable to establish cleaner development patterns.

In spite of the growing support for the Clean Development Mechanism, most Emergent countries have kept its stands against assuming themselves voluntary commitments, and consequently increasing the rejection of Kyoto among American Senators. Brazil and Argentina are very important emergent countries not highly dependent in fossil fuels and consequently in favorable situation for assuming commitments for reducing the rate of increase of their carbon emissions. In COP 4, in Buenos Aires, Argentina proposed that Emerging countries should assume voluntary commitments. This proposition was done without previous consultation to Brazil (something non-expectable because of Mercosul) that reacted against following the G77/China position. In October 1999, Argentina formally announced that was assuming commitments for reducing its carbon emissions in 12% by 2010, this in comparison with what would be its business as usual profile of emissions in that year. According to the announcement, most of the emissions reduction would come from strengthening energy efficiency. There are many doubts about the precision of the Argentinean calculations and about its readiness to effectively implement the commitments, but there is consensus that the formal announcement has had strong political and symbolic impact. Brazil is on a more difficult situation than Argentina for assuming voluntary commitments: from one side, the energy matrix is more based on renewable than Argentina, but, from the other side, the rate of deforestation and land conversion is strongly higher than Argentina.

There is always a major opportunity for Brazilian global leadership in the climate change regime dynamic derived from the acceptance of voluntary commitments. The Brazilian standing on voluntary commitments is derived from a combination of vulnerability and ideology. In order to assume voluntary commitments Brazil would have to shift to a policy of cracking down deforestation. Likely, in order to be significant in the national carbon balance, deforestation in the Amazon should be reduced in around 70% of the present annual rate (from around 0.45% of the Amazonian forest to around 0.15%). Though there is strong support in public opinion for curbing deforestation, it is difficult to assess how deep that support could go if there is a need of strong confrontation with the coalition of interests supporting deforestation in the Amazon. These Amazonian interests form a powerful network that defends the deforestation status quo (even if they are confronted in other issues): most of the timber industry, big and small landowners, land-less people movements, goldminers and urban ruling elites. Because of the peculiarity of the Brazilian Federative Arrangements those interests are strongly represented in the Brazilian Congress.

A second major implication of a potential shift in Brazilian policy related to voluntary commitments would be to go away from the G77, in the United Nations arena. There is significant support for this change in the Brazilian society because of the moving from a Nationalist to a Liberal economic policy in the 1990's. However, there is a significant sector of the Foreign policy decision makers that still support the continuity of the belonging to the G77, because of ideological reasons (to continuous being a leader of the South in negotiating with the North) and because they suppose that, continuity in G77 would be crucial for getting a Brazilian permanent place in the Security Council, in case there is reform of the UN. The opposite happens with Argentina (country in which Environmentalism is significantly weaker than in Brazil): its environmental Foreign policy is shaped by its non-belonging to the G77 and its commitment to be as convergent as possible with Western countries in any global multilateral forum. Most of the Argentina ruling elite supposes that the alignment with the West would favor their role in the global arena. The Brazilian situation is very dynamic and two driving forces push in the direction of following Argentina in the climate regime standing: because of the continuous trend of huge foreign direct investment and strong development of the new information economy, Amazonian deforestation is becoming more and more dissonant with the mainstream of the Brazilian economy; and, the support for curbing deforestation continuous growing in public opinion as was showed in 2000, during the high profile debate about the new Forestry Law. The Cardoso administration is a very complex and unstable coalition among Liberals, Cosmopolitan-liberals and some Nationalists. The leaving of Nationalists and the strengthening of the Cosmopolitan-liberals in the governmental coalition, is likely a prerequisite for a shifting in the Brazilian standing in favor of voluntary commitments.

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