Conexões sociais e rotatividade involuntária do CEO: evidências do mercado brasileiro
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/2175-8069.2021.e76116Resumo
Este estudo teve como objetivo investigar se as conexões sociais entre os membros do conselho de administração (CA) e o Chief Executive Officer (CEO) diminuem a probabilidade de rotatividade involuntária do CEO no contexto brasileiro. A partir dos dados do Formulário de Referência entre 2012 e 2018 das empresas listadas na Bolsa Brasil Balcão [B]3, desenvolveu-se um Índice de Conexão Social (ICS). Os resultados da regressão logística indicam que a probabilidade de rotatividade involuntária do CEO diminui quando o ICS aumenta, consistente com estudos precedentes. O resultado se manteve mesmo na presença de indicadores de governança corporativa e de demais controles. Os resultados evidenciam, assim, que as conexões sociais afetam o monitoramento do CA quanto à rotatividade, bem como que a análise agregada dos dados através do ICS proposto captura melhor este efeito no mercado brasileiro.
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