LEXICAL FACETS AND METONYMY

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Abstract
This article compares two accounts of the type of meaning alternation exhibited by book ("physical object", as in a dusty book, and "abstract text", as in a well-written book). The first account is Nunberg's "dense metonymy" approach (Nunberg, 1995); the second is Cruse's "facet" approach (Croft & Cruse, 2004). A major difference between the two approaches is that on the metonymy account, one of the distinct readings must be derived from the other; the special character of dense metonymy then lies in the fact that the derivation can be in either direction, but the readings remain distinct. On the facet account, on the other hand, the starting point is a single rich gestalt encompassing both concrete and abstract aspects, and the specialised readings are contextual construals of this; there is no derivational relation between the specialised readings. It is argued that the "facet" approach has greater explanatory power: The absence of a unified "global" concept in the metonymy account means that significant aspects of the behaviour of book remain unaccounted for.

1. Introduction

The focus of this article is on a particular type of contextual variant in word meaning exhibited by, for instance, *book* in: *Pass me that red*

book on the top shelf and *I found this book very difficult*. Variants of this sort are labelled "facets" in Cruse (1995, 1996, 2000a, 2000b, 2002) and Croft and Cruse (2004). The facets of *book* illustrated above can be designated, respectively, as [TOME] and [TEXT]. Facets have the peculiarity that, unlike the alternative readings of standardly ambiguous words like *light* and *bank*, they appear to behave independently in some contexts, but jointly in others. They behave independently, for instance, in *two books*, which is ambiguous between two different texts and two copies of the same text. On the other hand, *This book is very interesting, but it's awfully heavy to carry around,* does not exhibit the zeugma that would be expected if *book* was ambiguous in the normal way between "text" and "tome". Nunberg (1995) describes relationships like that between the two readings of *book* as "dense metonymy". The purpose of the present paper is to examine in detail the relationship between the "facet" account of the semantics of *book* and similar items, and the "dense metonymy" account. It will be argued that the "dense metonymy" account falls short of adequacy, and that the "facet" approach has greater explanatory power.

2. Metonymy

2.1. "Standard" metonymy

Metonymy is a species of meaning transfer, which Nunberg characterises as "...productive linguistic processes that enable us to use the same expression to refer to what are intuitively distinct sorts of categories of things." (Nunberg, 1995, p. 109) The following examples are from Nunberg:

(1) I'm parked out back.

(2) I'm in the phone book.

(3) I'm in the Whitney Museum.

(4) American Express is in Singapore now.

(5) Clinton is in the phone book

Nunberg describes a process that he calls "predicate transfer": "The principle here is that the name of a property that applies to something in one domain can sometimes be used as the name of a property that applies to things in another domain, provided the two properties correspond in a certain way" (p.111). He suggests two major conditions for successful predicate transfer. One is that there must be a "functional correspondence" between the two properties. Example (1), for instance, is not literally true—it is the speaker's car that is parked out back. Here, there is a "functional correspondence" between the driver of a car and the car itself. Similarly, there is a correspondence between a person and that person's name, address and telephone number (ex. 2), and between an artist and one or more examples of his/her artistic creations (ex. 3). However, there are limits on the sorts of correspondence which license metonymic transfer. Nunberg gives the example of (6), spoken by someone whose car was once driven by Jean Gabin:

(6) ??I was once driven by Jean Gabin.

Likewise (according to Nunberg) someone whose paintings were being transported to an exhibition would not say:

(7) ??I'm in the second crate on the right.

Nunberg (p.114) suggests that predicate transfer is only possible "when the property contributed by the new predicate is "noteworthy, ...". He further suggests two relevant notions of noteworthiness. The first is exemplified in (1). "In cases like these we will say that a property is noteworthy if it offers a useful way of classifying its bearer relative to the immediate conversational interests. From the point of view of a garage attendant, a customer is usefully classified in terms of the prop-

erties he acquires from the location of his car ...", but presumably not in terms of people who may or may not have driven it in the past (6). The second type of noteworthiness is exemplified in (3) and (4). "In these cases the derived property has a more abiding interest or consequence for its bearer, beyond the immediate conversational purposes." In respect of the difference in acceptability between (3) and (7), Nunberg says: "...when a painting goes into a museum its creator acquires a significant or notable property, whereas when it goes into a crate she doesn't, at least not usually."

Nunberg draws a subtle distinction between two manifestations of predicate transfer. The first concerns examples like (1), repeated here for convenience:

(1) I'm parked out back.

It might be thought natural to suggest that *I* is to be re-interpreted here as "my car", and that *parked out back* applies literally. However, several types of fact suggest that it is *parked out back* that has the transferred meaning, and that it is *I* that is to be interpreted literally. First of all, the form of the verb *be* agrees with the subject in all such cases:

(8) I am/you are/he is parked out back.

If two people share a car, then the correct form is (9):

(9) We/they are parked out back.

And if one person has two cars, the form of (1) is still correct. In other words, as far as the grammar is concerned, the subjects in (1-3) have to be taken literally. Furthermore, we can conjoin any other predicate that describes the speaker, but not necessarily one that describes the car:

(10) I am parked out back and have been waiting for 15 minutes.

(11) *I am parked out back and may not start.

How, then is 1 to be interpreted? Well, Nunberg never spells it out, but it seems that *parked out back* is to be interpreted as something on the lines of "someone whose car is parked out back". Similarly, (2) is to be interpreted as "I am someone whose name, etc. are in the phone book", and (3) as "I am someone with artistic work exhibited in the Whitney Museum". (Incidentally, Nunberg gives several examples from Italian, but in spite of extensive questioning, in Italy and elsewhere, I have not found a single native speaker who accepts these examples, at least with the readings that Nunberg gives them.)

Cases like (1) are to be contrasted with cases like (12) (also from Nunberg):

(12) The ham sandwich is at table 7.

In this case, there are reasons for saying that it is the subject NP *the ham sandwich* that undergoes predicate transfer, being interpreted as "the customer who ordered a ham sandwich", and the VP that is interpreted literally. First of all, whether the item ordered is singular or plural does not affect verb concord:

(13) That (*those) french fries is (*are) getting impatient.

(However, there are concord mysteries that Nunberg does not mention—why is (14) not possible if a number of people jointly ordered a bottle of wine?:

(14) *The red wine are at table 7.

Secondly, predicates that describe the ham sandwich cannot be conjoined to (12), but predicates that describe the customer can:

(15) *The ham sandwich is at table 7 and is ready to serve now.

(16) The ham sandwich is at table 7 and is getting impatient.

Nunberg argues convincingly that the interpretation of *the ham sandwich* in (12) does not work by indirect reference via an existing ham sandwich (which, according to him, would not be a case of predicate transfer). Example (17) (not from Nunberg) would support this claim:

(17) Tell the ham sandwiches we've run out of ham — they'll have to order something else.

In some cases, the same sentence form *NP VP* can be interpreted either with predicate transfer acting on the subject NP or on the VP (not both together—this is true ambiguity). An example is (18):

(18) Yeats is widely read.

Disambiguation in favour of NP predicate transfer is shown in (19) (*Yeats* is interpreted as "Yeats's oeuvre"):

(19) Yeats is widely read even though most of it is out of print.

VP predicate transfer appears in (20) (*is widely read* is interpreted as "is an author whose works are widely read"):

(20) Yeats is widely read although he has been dead for over 50 years.

In both (19) and (20), predicate transfer gets round the restriction on what Nunberg calls "sortal crossing", which is the underlying cause of zeugma. Notice, however, that zeugma appears in (21):

(21) ?? Yeats is the second book from the right on the top shelf, if we still have him.

Nunberg explains the anomaly of (21) in two ways. First, "The restriction on sortal crossing rules out the possibility that the pronoun could refer to the poet while its antecedent refers to his works."(p.124). In 21, *is the second book on the right ...* establishes that *Yeats* refers to a book by the poet, but *we still have him* refers to the poet himself, hence we have zeugma. However, according to my intuitions, (22) (spoken by some future speaker) is acceptable:

(22) Sperber and Wilson is still widely read, although both have been dead for 50 years.

This violates both the sortal crossing rule and the concord rule. Both pronominal reference and verb concord are apparently more flexible than Nunberg allows (cf. also:

(23) We used to have Yeats on the top shelf, but now he is lower down.)

Let us assume for the moment that Nunberg's account of metonymy is essentially correct.

2.2. Dense metonymy

Nunberg notes that predicate transfer generally has a uni-directional character. That is to say, given that A and B have a functional correspondence, if A acquires a noteworthy properties derived from properties of B, it is not usually the case that B acquires noteworthy properties derived from properties of A. For instance, "Shoes acquire noteworthy properties from the properties of their laces, meats from the properties of the animals they are derived from, and drivers from the properties of their cars, but not, in general, vice versa."(p.125). This point is illustrated in the following:

(24) (a) Billy's shoes were tied.

(b) *Billy's laces were dirty.

(25) (a) corn-fed chicken

(b) *sautéed chickens

(26) (a) I am parked out back.

(b) *This car is tall and fair.

Nunberg also notes, however, that there is a smaller class of cases where "extensive bi-directional property transfer" is possible. His principal example is *newspaper*, in its readings as "token of the publication", and "publishing organisation":

(27) A: Which newspaper did Mary burn?

B: The one John works for.

(28) A: Which newspaper does John work for?

B: The one Mary burned.

As Nunberg puts it, we find

> ...widespread predicate transfer from the properties of one of its denotations to another: publishers acquire a number of noteworthy properties from copies of their publications or from editions of their publications, and each of these acquires many noteworthy properties from the publishers, and so on. (p.126)

This state of affairs is what Nunberg calls "dense metonymy". He defines this as follows:

> Given several disjoint sorts of things A, B, ... and several classes of predicates *F, G, ...* such that members of *F* literally apply only to things of sort A, members of *G* apply literally only to things of sort B, and so on, a word W is densely metonymous if:
>
> (a) W has distinct uses to refer to things of sorts A, B, ...and
>
> (b) When W is applied to something of sort A, it often happens that predicates belonging to *G* can be applied to W under transferred readings, and when W is applied to something of sort B it often happens that that predicates belonging to *F* can be applied to W under transferred readings, and so on. (ibid).

Notice that the Yeats examples (19) and (20) do not qualify as dense metonymy by this definition, first, because neither *Yeats* nor *widely read* are, in the normal sense, ambiguous (thus condition (a) is not satisfied) and second, the possibilities of predicate transfer are not "widespread" (this is not mentioned in the quoted definition, but is emphasised in the preamble). It may be noted in passing that Nunberg does not spell out what he means by "distinct uses" in condition (a) in the definition.) Another feature of dense metonymy which does not appear in Nunberg's formal definition, but is mentioned in the preamble is that the two distinct notions involved are "interdefined" (p.125). This is not a normal property of standard metonymy. For instance, while shoe-laces are defined in reference to shoes, shoes are not defined as "footwear with laces", or whatever; that is, the defining relation is one-way.

2.3. Problematic aspects of Nunberg's account of metonymy

Nunberg's account of metonymy has a certain superficial plausibility, but there are a number of worrying aspects. Here, I will concentrate on one of these, namely, the adequacy of the notion of "noteworthiness" to fulfil the central role it plays in Nunberg's account. Recall that noteworthiness means, briefly expressed, either (i) current conversational relevance or (ii) lasting significance. (This implies that (ii)

licenses predicate transfer even when (i) is not satisfied (otherwise, there would only be one condition). We may note in passing that many of Nunberg's queried examples can be improved by exploiting (i), that is to say, by specifying a suitable conversational setting:

(29) [A and B are engaged in setting up an exhibition]

A: [points to a wall] I'm going to be on this wall.

B: Right. Let's get the pictures out.

[B starts to open a crate]

A: Not that one —I'm in the other crate.

Let us return to example (1), repeated below:

(1) I'm parked out back.

Nunberg says that this is not anomalous because the location of the car is an important way of classifying the customer for a garage attendant. I find this an odd way to express the relevance of 1 for the garage attendant. Surely what (1) does is to provide relevant information about the car, i.e., where it is. One can, however, easily think of situations where something on the lines of (1) would much more clearly give information about the person:

(30) I'm parked three streets away and I'm already 15 minutes late.

(31) A: Are you sure you can make it? I'll fetch your car, if you like.

B: No, I'm fine. I'm parked just out back.

But a more disturbing case is (32), marked as unacceptable by Nunberg:

(32) *This key is parked out back.

What could be more relevant to the key than the location of the car that it fits? What is it, then, that blocks the operation of predicate transfer on *this key*? Similarly, while subject NP predicate transfer can circumvent anomaly in (33) and (34), it apparently cannot do so in (35), even though the fact that its author took his own life is at first sight a noteworthy property of a book on suicide:

(33) Sperber & Wilson is on the top shelf.

(34) The french fries is getting impatient.

(35) *That book on suicide committed suicide himself.

It would be hard to believe that noteworthiness plays no role in metonymy, but it seems clear either that Nunberg has missed a crucial additional feature, or that his characterisation of noteworthiness is faulty. My intuition, for what it is worth, is that both of these are true: a key piece is missing from the jigsaw, and at the same time, some hard thinking is needed on the notion of noteworthiness.

3. Lexical facets

Before considering the adequacy of a "dense metonymy" account of the behaviour of *book*, it is necessary to examine this behaviour more closely. In what follows, the term *facet* will be used simply to refer to "distinct uses" of *book* in reference to a physical object ([TOME]) and an abstract text ([TEXT]): a more developed characterisation will be given later. First of all, let us look at evidence that facets are "distinct" (what follows is based on Croft & Cruse, 2004).

3.1. Distinctness of facets

The distinctness (or "autonomy") of the facets of *book* shows up in various ways.

(i) Predicates applied to *book* may attach themselves to one facet to the exclusion of the other:

(36) (a) a red book, a dusty book, a damaged book, a faded book, a thick book, a large book

(b) an exciting book, a well-written book, a lengthy book, a history book

A predicate which can attach itself to either facet yields an ambiguous phrase:

(37) a new book (new text or new tome)
a beautiful book (beautiful text or beautiful tome)
two books

Related to these is the fact that in appropriate contexts, certain questions containing *book* can be truthfully given answers of opposite polarity:

(38) A: Do you like our latest book?

B: (i) Yes, it's most interesting.
(ii) No, the cover's a mess.

(ii) The facets contract different sets of sense relations:

(39) A novel is a kind of book. (*novel* is a hyponym of the [TEXT] facet)

(40) A paperback is a kind of book. (*paperback* is a hyponym of the [TOME] facet)

The two facets of *book* head different taxonomic hierarchies. Notice that *novel* and *paperback* are not incompatibles, but *novel* and *biography* are, as are *paperback* and *hardback*.

(iii) A book appears to have two distinct "essences", or "conceptual cores", corresponding to the two facets:

(iv) Facets can be independently extended metaphorically (*a book of matches*, *the book of life*) and can have exclusive proper names (*David Copperfield* is a book by Dickens, but strictly, it is the name of a [TEXT].)

3.2. Non-distinctness of facets

Although facets display autonomy in some circumstances, there are also situations where such signs are absent; indeed, there are signs that the facets jointly form a conceptual unity. The following is based on Croft and Cruse (2004).

(i) Prototypical co-occurrence

The prototypical book has both facets: although textless tomes and unembodied texts are possible, partnerless facets are, to say the least, peripheral to the category BOOK.

(ii) Joint compositional properties

There exist predicates applicable to *book* which attach themselves to both facets simultaneously:

(41) to publish a book

It is not possible to publish something which does not comprise both a text and some physical manifestation.

Another aspect of joint compositional properties has already been mentioned, namely, serial composition without zeugma. In other words, facets do not show antagonism in circumstances where full ambiguous senses would:

(42) This is a very interesting book, but it is awfully heavy to carry around.

In (42), *interesting* modifies the [TEXT] facet, and *heavy to carry around* the [TOME] facet.

(iii) Joint lexical relations

Facets, as we have seen, have their own sense relations. However, they also participate jointly in sense relations. An example of this is the hyperonym/hyponym relation between *publication* and *book*. (also, between *educational establishment* and *school*, and *tourist accommodation* and *hotel*, and the incompatibility relation between *building society* and *bank*).

(iv) Joint extensions

There are extensions of sense which require both facets to be taken into account for them to be intelligible:

(43) I can read him like an open book.

To interpret *read* in (43), we must access our knowledge of how texts are processed; to interpret *open*, we need to access knowledge of books as physical objects.

(v) Global reference

Definite noun phrases such as *the red book*, or *that friendly hotel* arguably refer to the relevant global entity, rather than purely to the facet targeted by the adjective.

(vi) Joint nameability

The Lindisfarne Gospels (a mediaeval text) is the name of a global [TEXT]+[TOME] entity.

To qualify as facets, readings of a word must display both autonomy and unity to a significant degree. With this brief account of the

properties of facets we can proceed with a comparison of dense metonymy and facets.

4. Dense metonymy and facets

4.1. Does the behaviour of book *qualify as dense metonymy?*

Nunberg does not actually mention the word *book*, so perhaps we ought to begin by asking whether it is a genuine example of dense metonymy according to the definition quoted above. Attempting to apply Nunberg's definition throws up a number of interesting points. (In the discussion below, extracts from the definition are repeated for convenience.) The definition begins with the following:

> "Given several disjoint sorts of things A, B, ... and several classes of predicates *F, G, ...* such that members of *F* literally apply only to things of sort A, members of *G* apply literally only to things of sort B, and so on, ...".

In the case of *book*, the "several disjoint sorts of things A, B, ..." would be represented by, for instance, (a) physical objects in the form of books and (b) abstract texts. Are these "disjoint"? Perhaps less obviously than newspaper publishing organisations and tokens of their publication. However, they do belong to quite distinct ontological categories. For instance, they have different criteria for individuation: the same [TEXT] can be embodied in a range of different [TOME]'s. Furthermore, they can exist separately: something in the form of a book, but with blank pages, still qualifies (marginally) as a book, and in theory a writer can compose a text in his/her mind before writing it down. Nonetheless, the fact that we hesitate to describe [TEXT] and [TOME] as "disjoint sorts of things" is significant, and will be taken up again in a moment. If we accept that the facets of *book* are disjoint, then the next question is whether anything corresponds to the "classes of predicates *F, G…"*. Let us assume that the items in 43 above are

adequate illustrations of this. We can therefore take it that condition (a) is satisfied, with W represented by *book*:

> "(a) W has distinct uses to refer to things of sorts A, B, .."

We now turn to condition (b):

> "(b) When W is applied to something of sort A, it often happens that predicates belonging to *G* can be applied to W under transferred readings, and when W is applied to something of sort B it often happens that that predicates belonging to *F* can be applied to W under transferred readings, and so on."

Two-way predicate transfer between the readings [TOME] and [TEXT] parallel to that observed in the case of *newspaper,* can easily be illustrated with *book*:

(44) A: Which is the most interesting book?

B: The red one on the top shelf.

(45) A: What do you think of that red book on the top shelf?

B: It's very interesting.

There is a problem concerning the meaning of "often" in the definition, but we can assume that it would be easy to construct further examples on the lines of the above. We shall assume provisionally that examples like (46) and (47) also exemplify condition (b), in that in (46), *awfully heavy to carry around* has a transferred reading, and in (47), *very interesting* has a transferred reading:

(46) This is a very interesting book, but it is awfully heavy to carry around.

(47) This book is awfully heavy to carry around, but it is very interesting.

It seems, therefore, that the facets of *book* do qualify as an example of dense metonymy as Nunberg defines it. The characteristic of interdefinedness, not mentioned in the definition, is also satisfied, that is, *book* [TEXT] is prototypically an abstract entity embodied in a [TOME], and *book* [TOME] is a physical object of a certain form that prototypically embodies a [TEXT]. Let us now turn to the question of whether this gives an adequate account of the behaviour of *book*.

4.2. Does the notion of dense metonymy give an adequate account of the behaviour of book*?*

First of all, there are undeniable resemblances between facets and metonyms:

(i) There is a similar associative relation within a domain between sister facets on the one hand and literal and metonymic readings on the other. Facets show a particularly close association, but this is at least partly captured by bi-directional predicate transfer and interdefinedness.

(ii) Metonymically related readings are frequently of different ontological types, and there is usually no superordinate reading, or even viable superordinate concept. (There is no superordinate concept of which people and cars are sister subordinate concepts, likewise for artists and paintings, and even shoes and laces.) The same is true of the facets of *book*. The metonymic account therefore predicts the appearance of autonomy in the readings.

However, there are significant respects in which the behaviour of *book* is not well explained by the dense metonymy approach.

(a) Facets must be of different ontological types. (This is not obvious from the behaviour of *book* alone. However, it is a clear feature of all the examples of facets examined in Cruse & Croft.) This is not true of standard metonyms. For instance, in (48), shoes and laces do not belong to distinct ontological types:

(48) Billy's shoes were neatly tied but dirty.

It is true that (48) is not an example of dense metonymy. However, there is no obvious reason why bi-directional transfer should entail ontological difference.

(b) There is a problem with sortal crossing. According to Nunberg, sortal crossing is avoided in metonymy by predicate transfer. However, this can only occur if the transferred predicate is noteworthy for its transferee. This entangles the notions of relevance and sortal crossing, so that it is not absolutely clear whether, for example, Nunberg's example (49) exemplifies sortal crossing or not:

(49) ??Yeats is the second book on the right on the top shelf, if we still have him.

However, the following quote (p.124) suggests that both are present (it occurs in a discussion of the example *Yeats is still widely read, even though most of it is out of print*):

> "..here the restriction on crossing forces the analysis of the subject as a mass term. But we don't have to rely only on the hypothesis about sortal crossing to make this point; we can also appeal independently to the requirements of noteworthiness ...". I take it that the same applies to:

(50) ??The newspaper Mary works for fell off the table.

Hence, dense metonymy does not automatically rule out sortal crossing. However, sortal crossing never occurs with facets, although failure of relevance does. (As Nunberg suggests, the oddness of (50) can be considerably reduced by contextual manipulation: suppose there is an argument as to which newspaper fell, and the speaker momentarily has forgotten the name of the one he claims fell.)

(iii) The biggest problem concerns certain of the manifestations described above of unified behaviour in the facets of *book*. We have seen that the dense metonymy account deals with the non-appearance of zeugma on co-ordination and interdefinedness. However, other properties such as joint composition, joint sense relations and joint extensions are not explained at all.

There is another approach, which gives a more satisfying account of all the properties of *book*. The evidence taken as a whole points strongly to the existence of a unified concept BOOK, a single gestalt, which embraces both facets and is more basic. This entails a completely different conceptualisation of facets. They are not autonomous conceptual entities associated in a domain: Their primitive state is undivided, but in certain situations, a sense boundary is construed between them which confers a degree of autonomy. It seems likely that ontological distinctness is a pre-requisite for a construal of autonomy. When they are co-ordinated, as in (46) and (47), there is no "transfer" — they belong together, they are parts of the same concept, in the way that notions of "male" and "young" and "human" belong jointly to the concept BOY (the structural relations between "male" and "young" and "human" are not the same as those between "text" and "tome", but the "belongingness" is the same). The notion of "transfer" needs a source and a target. This is a problem for the dense metonymy account, as Nunberg notes (p.126): "One problem with truly dense metonymies is that we may not be able to assign one or the other use a prior place in the lexicon, or to say in which direction the transfer operates." This particular problem does not arise if *book* is basically a unified concept and facets are context-dependent construals.

5. The problem of *novel*

The nouns *novel* (along with similar items such as *biography*, *thesis*, *textbook*) and *paperback* (along with similar items such as *hardback*) exhibit behaviour which is interestingly different from that of *book*, and is also different from both standard and dense metonymy. This example is discussed at some length in Croft and Cruse (2004), but is not explicitly compared with metonymy. The characterisation offered here differs in some respects from that presented in Croft and Cruse (2004). Let us assume for the moment that *novel* basically designates an abstract text, and that *paperback* basically designates a physical object. On this basis, (51) and (52) can be seen as standard examples of metonymy:

(51) These novels are all yellow and frayed.

(52) These paperbacks are all in French.

However, the normality of (53) and (54), in which the [TOME] and [TEXT] interpretations are apparently co-ordinated without zeugma, would not be expected if we were dealing with standard metonymy; it is, on the other hand, consistent with dense metonymy:

(53) These novels, besides being yellow and frayed, are all in French.

(54) These paperbacks, besides being yellow and frayed, are all in French.

It is not entirely clear, however, whether (53) and (54) are valid examples of dense metonymy. There are several reasons for doubting this. First, it is not clear that either *novel* or *paperback* has "distinct readings" (in the normal sense). Second, if we look at the putative distinct readings of e.g., *novel*, we find that they are not "interdefined":

While *novel* [TOME] is defined in terms of the type of text it embodies, *novel* [TEXT] is not defined in terms of its embodiment, but independently. Furthermore, it is clear which reading is basic and which is derived. It therefore does not seem satisfactory to regard these cases as examples of dense metonymy.

Another possible analysis is that *novel* and *paperback* basically designate global concepts, and that autonomous facets can be construed as needed in context. The normality of (55) and (56) is consistent with this analysis:

(55) They only publish novels.

(56) A: Has he any publications?

B: Yes, a couple of novels.

(One cannot publish a purely abstract entity.) However, the case for facet behaviour in *novel* and *paperback* is also weak. There is evidence of a unified concept with interpretations which can be construed as autonomous in suitable contexts, but the degree of autonomy is markedly less than that which is observed in typical facets. For instance, 57 and 58 are both odd out of context, which suggests that the [TOME] facet of *novel* and the [TEXT] facet of *paperback* are relatively inaccessible. This is in contrast to (59) and (60), which are perfectly normal:

(57) ?a red novel

(58) ?a well-written paperback

(59) a red book

(60) a well-written book

Notice, too, that *novel* does not seem to have two "essences" (cf. ex. 41 above):

(61) (a) *I'm not interested in the story, I'm interested in the novel itself. ([TOME])

(b) I'm not interested in the binding or the cover design, I'm interested in the novel itself. ([TEXT])

The oddness that appears in (57) and (58) tends to be more acute when the epithets are in attributive position, and less when they are in predicative position:

(62) The novel I am looking for is red.

(63) He gave me a paperback and a hardback. I particularly enjoyed the paperback — it was extremely well- written.

As Kleiber points out (1996, pp. 12-13), an epithet that normally applies to the "wrong" facet does not give rise to oddness if it allows information to be inferred about the "right" facet:

(64) a thick novel, a novel of 100 pages

(A thick novel is likely to embody a long text, whereas a novel of 100 pages is likely to be a short one. Examples involving *paperback* are harder to come by.) The behaviour of *novel* with numerals also indicates that the putative [TOME] reading does not have the degree of autonomy of the corresponding reading of *book*. For instance, (65) is not perceived as ambiguous without considerable cognitive effort (compare *two books*):

(65) two novels

The clear direction of transfer observed in (51) and (52) was cited above as evidence against the dense metonymy solution; it counts equally against a solution based on facets.

The behaviour of *novel* is thus not adequately explained by either the global-concept-with-facets approach or the dense metonymy approach. An approach which seems to account for most of this behaviour is based on the assumption that *novel* basically designates a type of text (and *paperback* a type of book format), but can be extended in two ways, both of which can probably be accommodated under the heading of metonymy. One way involves a standard metonymic transfer from "text" to "embodying tome" in the case of *novel*, and from "tome" to "embodied text" in the case of *paperback*. This would explain the relative inaccessibility of the "tome" reading for *novel* and the "text" reading of *paperback*. But as we have noted, it would not explain the normality of examples (53-6). This is accounted for by the second extension, from either "text" or "tome" to "global text-tome", on the analogy of the global concept BOOK. It is interesting that *dictionary* behaves more like *book* than like *novel* (Nunberg makes a similar observation, but does not elaborate on it). For instance, *two dictionaries* is ambiguous between two copies of the same dictionary-text and two distinct dictionary-texts. It appears that *dictionary* (similarly, *encyclopædia*, *telephone directory*, etc.) basically designates a sub-type of (global) book, not a sub-type of text; items which behave like *novel* (*biography*, *thesis*, etc.) must apparently have as their primary designation texts which are intended to be read through from beginning to end, rather than dipped into. It is not at present clear why this should be so.

6. Conclusion

It has been argued that the behaviour of *book* and similar items is not adequately characterised as a type of metonymy, not even of the close-knit variety that Nunberg calls dense metonymy. What Nunberg's account does not allow for is the notion of a global concept in which the "tome" and "text" aspects are fused into a single gestalt. This notion is

also necessary to explain certain aspects of the behaviour of items like *novel* and *paperback*, which in other respects behave like typical metonymy. It is not clear at present whether there are items whose behaviour qualifies as dense metonymy (as defined) but where the global concept is absent.

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