NON-CONFLICTING VIOLATIONS OF GRAMMATICAL CONSTRAINTS? LOGOPHORIC REFLEXIVES, PECULIAR PASSIVES, AND GRICEAN IMPLICATURES

Sergio Menuzzi

PUC/RS

Abstract

This paper discusses the notion of *grammatical well-formedness* in the light of certain optimality approaches to syntactic phenomena (e.g., Pesetsky 1998; Grimshaw 1997; Grimshaw & Samek-Lodovici 1995; Costa 1998). Such approaches adhere to assumptions that lead to the following theorem: a linguistic representation may violate a grammatical constraint and still be *well-formed* if and only if all other alternative candidates also violate some grammatical constraint. The point the paper makes is: if well-formedness is the theoretical correlate of *full acceptability*, this theorem is in trouble. The arguments come from the analysis of two *marked* constructions of English: logophoric reflexives (Reinhart & Reuland, 1993) and peculiar passives (Davison, 1980). The paper argues that these phenomena arise as a result of a Gricean implicature triggered by violations of grammatical constraints, and that conversational implicatures cannot be characterized as the result of competition among grammatical constraints.

1. Introduction

As is by now common knowledge, for an analysis of linguistic phenomena to qualify as an *optimality-like* approach, it has to embody

a core of assumptions (Prince & Smolensky, 1993; Burzio, 1995): (a) constraints are violable; and (b) alternative representations compete for best satisfaction with respect to the set of constraints.[1] Beyond this core of assumptions, most recent work applying optimality-like techniques to problems of syntax also appears to share a more specific set of assumptions:

(1)   Optimality in syntax:

    (a)   the input (to the set of constraints) contains a representation of some propositional content (for a sentence);

    (b   the set of candidates considered for evaluation includes the possible syntactic representations for that propositional content;

    (c)   a syntactic representation is *well-formed* if and only if it is the one in the set of candidates that best satisfies the constraints on linguistic representations.

The set of assumptions in (1) is found not only in the straightforward optimality interpretation of the GB framework (as in Grimshaw, 1997); it is also shared by proposals suggesting that the candidate representations include information about discourse functions like focus and topic (as in Grimshaw & Samek-Lodovici, 1995; Costa, 1998), or by those contending that the candidate representations are the possible phonetic representations for one and the same LF (as in Pesetsky, 1998).

One particular theorem of the assumptions in (1) is the following: a linguistic representation may violate a grammatical constraint and still be the best candidate if and only if all other alternative candidates also violate at least one (other) grammatical constraint. This theorem might, of course, be recomforting for those who hold the belief that *well-formedness* is a matter of grammatical constraints on linguistic representations. The point I would like to make in this paper, however, is the following: if well-formedness is the theoretical correlate of *full acceptability*, then the above theorem and its attending premises are in

trouble. The argument I will put forward comes from two *marked* constructions in English which acquire full acceptability in virtue of their discourse or rhetorical force: logophoric reflexives (Reinhart & Reuland, 1993) and peculiar passives (Davison, 1980). Following Davison, I will argue that the best analyses for these phenomena are those in which a violation of a grammatical constraint triggers a conversational implicature (in the sense of Grice, 1975). But such conversational implicatures are not easily characterized as the result of the interaction of grammatical constraints. Therefore, the strongest interpretation of the set of assumptions in (1) has to be abandoned: (1) cannot set the conditions that are sufficient and necessary for the theoretical concept of well-formedness to cover all cases of full acceptability. Let me start by discussing the case of logophoric reflexives.

2. Logophoric reflexives and Condition A

2.1. Logophoric Reflexives as Reflexives Exempt from Condition A
In Reinhart and Reuland's (henceforth R&R) framework for binding, the distribution of reflexives like *himself* in English is governed by the following formulation of Condition A (1993, p. 678):

(2)   Condition A:

If a syntactic predicate is reflexive-marked, then it is reflexive, where:
   (a)   a *syntactic predicate* is formed of a head P, all syntactic arguments of P, and a subject of P;
   (b)   a *syntactic argument* of P is a constituent assigned q-role or Case by P;
   (c)   a predicate is *reflexive* if two of its arguments are coindexed;
   (d)   a predicate is *reflexive-marked* if one of P's arguments is a self anaphor.

For many cases, Condition A as formulated in (2) gives basically the same results as any other formulation incorporating in some way the Specified Subject Condition (SSC). But, unlike most formulations of Condition A, (2) also entails that a predicate will not be required to be reflexive, and a reflexive-marker will be able to occur locally free (that is, not coindexed within the domain of the first predicate containing it), under the following circumstances:[2]

(3)   Reflexives not governed by R&R's Condition A:

(a)   if the reflexive-marker itself is not a syntactic argument of the predicate (in which case it does not reflexive-mark the predicate),

or

(b)   if the predicate does not have a syntactic subject (in which case the predicate does not qualify as a syntactic one).

R&R's motivation to exclude the cases characterized in (3a) and (3b) from the domain of Condition A is to distinguish what they call *logophoric reflexives* from other occurrences of locally free reflexives. Descriptively, logophoric reflexives are occurrences which appear not to require any special accommodation and are easily judged acceptable with no context (R&R, 1993, p. 673); non-logophoric occurrences, on the other hand, are those that can be locally free only if focused (R&R, 1993, pp. 672-673). Theoretically, R&R characterize this distinction as follows: since logophoric reflexives occur in environments in which no violation of Condition A arises (those falling under (3) above), they are not excluded by any grammatical condition and become an alternative to pronouns; reflexives occurring in environments governed by Condition A, however, will be grammatically excluded unless a marked operation such as focus saves them.[3]

Let us take a look at the cases R&R intended to explain with the distinction between logophoric and non-logophoric reflexives. The contrasts in (4) below are those captured by (3a):

(4)   a.   *Max* boasted that the queen invited [Lucie and{*himself/ him*}] for a drink
      b.   *Max* boasted that [the queen invited {**himself/him*} for a drink]
      c.   It angered *him* that she tried to attract [a man like {*himself/him*}]
      d.   It angered *him* that [she tried to attract {**himself/ him*}]

According to R&R (1993, pp. 670-1), what (4a) and (4c) have in common is that the reflexive is embedded within an NP, and this NP, rather than the reflexive itself, is the syntactic argument of verb: in (4a) the reflexive is a conjunct in a conjoined NP; in (4c) it is presumably within an adjunct to the NP argument. In neither case does the reflexive count as a syntactic argument of the verb, and no violation of Condition A is triggered (3a).[4] In (4b) and (4d), on the other hand, the reflexive itself is the syntactic argument of the verb, and, therefore, it reflexive-marks the predicate. Hence, the predicate will be excluded by Condition A unless it is reflexive.

Consider now the contrasts captured by (3b):

(5)   a.   *Lucie* liked [a picture of {*herself/her*}]
      b.   *Lucie* liked [your picture of {**herself/her*}]
      c.   *Lucie* said that Max saw a ghost [next to {*herself/her*}]
      d.   *Lucie* counted five tourists in the room [apart from {*herself/ her*}]
      e.   *Lucie* said that [Max explained the story to {**herself/her*}]

What the cases in (5a), (5c) and (5d) have in common, according to R&R (1993, pp. 681-683, 686-687), is that the reflexive is within a predicate that does not have a syntactic subject: in (5a), the NP headed by *picture* has no subject at all; in (5c) and (5d), if the PP headed by *next to* and the adjunct headed by *apart from* have any subject at all, this is an implicit argument rather than a subject projected syntactically. Since

neither of the predicates containing the reflexive in (5a, c, d) qualify as a syntactic one, the reflexive itself triggers no violation of Condition A ((3b) above). In contrast, the predicates containing the reflexive in (5b) and (5e) do contain a syntactic subject: in (5b) *your* is the subject of *picture*; in (5e), the PP headed by *to* does not count as a predicate itself, but rather it belongs to the predicate defined by the verb, which does have a syntactic subject, namely, *Max* (R&R, 1993, p. 664). Thus, the reflexive does trigger a Condition A violation in (5b) and (5e).

   We have just seen, then, how R&R account for the fact that locally free reflexives appear to be more easily available in environments like (4a, c) and (5a, c, d) than in environments like (4b, d) and (5b, e). As they note, however, 'the use of an anaphor in [contexts not governed by Condition A, like (4a, c) and (5a, c, d),] may appear more marked than in the reflexivity environments, where the anaphor is the only grammatical option (R&R, 1993, p. 672). But they claim that this markedness is due to discourse considerations rather than to syntax: in contexts where the syntax allows both a pronoun and a SELF anaphor to be coindexed with a given antecedent [like (4a, c) and (5a, c, d)], the choice between them is motivated by discourse considerations, as is often the case when there is more than one syntactic option to express the same proposition. That is, logophoric anaphors may look marked out of context, but become fully acceptable given appropriate discourse justification.

   As regards the discourse justification of logophoric anaphors, R&R have a few brief remarks. They say that, although in [examples like (4a, c) and (5a, c, d)] they are used as perspective logophors, other, perhaps, more crucial, discourse reasons exist to prefer a logophor over a pronoun (1996, p. 673; *perspective logophors* are those whose antecedent has the point of view of the report). R&R do not discuss the reasons why a logophor might be preferred over a pronoun in their (1993) paper, but they suggest, in a footnote, that a promising approach would be the one argued for by Ariel (1990) (1996, p. 673, note 17). According to R&R, in Ariel's view anaphors are used to signal that the antecedent is the most accessible of the available discourse-entities

candidates, accessibility of an antecedent being defined in terms of sentence topics (ibid).

In sum, under R&R's approach, the occasional markedness of logophoric reflexives does not have the same source as the strong unacceptability of other occurrences of locally free reflexives and, in particular, of the standard violations of the SSC: the unacceptability of the latter is attributed to a violation of Condition A, while the markedness of the former is due rather to circumstantial lack of discourse justification.

2.2. Problems for exempting logophoric reflexives from Condition A

However, even assuming that R&R's distinction between logophoric and non-logophoric reflexives is well-motivated empirically, there would still be some reasons to believe that their theoretical account is not satisfactory.[5] One of the problems is that their theory does not explain why reflexives, rather than pronouns, may appear to be marked out of context.[6] They claim that logophoric reflexives appear marked because they might lack discourse justification out of an appropriate context. The problem with this line of explanation is that, as has been amply demonstrated by the literature on the discourse distribution of NPs, *any* NP's choice requires discourse justification (for a detailed review, see Ariel, 1990). To have a glimpse of the evidence presented by this author, consider the following table (from Ariel, 1990, p. 18; sample: 4 English texts of about 2200 words):

Table 1. *Distribution of NP types in English Texts according to the Distance between Anaphoric Expression and Antecedent*

Expression	Same Sentence	Previous Sentence	Same Paragraph	Previous Paragraph	Total
Pronoun	**110=20.8%**	**320=60.5%**	75=14.2%	24=4.5%	529
Demonstrative	4=4.8%	**50=59.9%**	**17=20.2%**	13=15.5%	84
Def. Descr.	4=2.8%	20=14.1%	**65=45.5%**	**53=37.3%**	142

Table 1 shows that the distribution of pronouns, demonstrative NPs (like *that girl*) and definite descriptions (like *the boy*) strongly correlates with the distance between the anaphoric device and the antecedent: around 80% of the occurrences of pronouns find their antecedent within the same sentence or in the previous one; around 80% of demonstrative NPs, on the other hand, find their antecedent either in the previous sentence, or within the same paragraph; finally, around 80% of occurrences of definite descriptions find their antecedent either in the same paragraph or in the previous one.

When we look at the distribution of NPs in discourse, it becomes clear that they are all highly specialized forms. Table 1 indicates that, for different types of NPs to adequately perform their discourse function, they have to find their antecedent in specific places in the discourse (other factors, like the topicality of the antecedent, may occasionally conflict with distance and, eventually, overrule it). In other words, the use of pronouns, demonstrative NPs and definite descriptions requires specific discourse justification, just as the use of logophoric reflexives does. And, yet, this does not cause definite descriptions, demonstrative NPs and, in particular, pronouns to be marked in out-of-the-blue sentences:

(6)   a.   *The boy* asked his mother to bring him some chocolate
      b.   *That girl* loved John
      c.   *She* loved John

The sentences in (6) are just fine, despite the fact that their subjects might lack an appropriate discourse justification (there is no discourse in the first place). This is, of course, also true of the pronouns in the sentences in (4a, c) and (5a, c, d) above, in which, to repeat R&R's words, the use of an anaphor [...] may appear more marked than in the reflexivity environments (1993, p.672). Thus, it seems to me, the claim that logophoric reflexives require discourse justification is rather insufficient to account for their markedness in out-of-the-blue sentences: this

claim, in itself, cannot distinguish logophoric reflexives from other NP types.[7]

A second, perhaps more serious, problem for R&R's approach to logophoric reflexives is raised by cases which conform to R&R's descriptive characterization of logophoric reflexives, but not to their theoretical account. One such case is that of predicates whose subject is an expletive *it*: as Kuno (1987, p. 99) observed, such predicates occasionally enhance the acceptability of a locally free reflexive (example (7a) is Kuno's; example (7b) is my own):[8]

(7) a. ?*They* made sure [that it was clear to *themselves* that this needed to be done]
     b. ?*Paul* wanted to believe that [it would be good for *himself* if Mary left]

Notice that the relevant predicates in (7) are syntactic because they have a syntactic subject, namely, the expletive: since the expletive is assigned Case in (7) just like any other subject is, it satisfies R&R's definition of a syntactic argument ((2b) above). Thus, cases like (7) are real violations of R&R's Condition A, but, more like logophoric reflexives, they do not seem to lead to strong unacceptability.

A case similar to (7) is that of Safir's (1991) *uninformative predicates*, predicates implying non-coreference between its arguments. According to Safir, this is so because reflexivity yields either a tautological or a contradictory interpretation for such predicates, that is, interpretations which are not relevant pragmatically (examples adapted from Safir, 1992; Safir uses '#' to signal the semantic oddity evoked by a literal interpretation of such predicates):

(8) a. #*Mary* is similar to *herself*
         ?*Mary* considered [her brother similar to *herself*]
     b. #*The veterans* are very much like *themselves*
         ?*The veterans* thought that [the new recruits would be very much like *themselves*]

c.   #*The veterans* are more qualified than *themselves*
      ?*The veterans* thought that [the new recruits would be more
      qualified than *themselves*]

Just like in (7), the relevant predicates in (8) also count as syntactic, since they do have a syntactic subject. Thus, cases like (8) are also real violations of R&R's Condition A, but again they are violations that do not seem to lead to strong unacceptability. That is, the cases in (7) and (8) do not fit R&R's theoretical account of logophoric reflexives. But they do look like logophoric reflexives descriptively: as Kuno (1987) has shown, cases like (7) are subject to the same sort of discourse conditioning as other logophoric occurrences; and, as Safir has argued, cases like (8) do not seem to 'require any special accommodation', that is, they do not need to be focused to circumvent Condition A effects.[9] Moreover, they do not trigger the strong unacceptability characteristic of SSC effects, as we can see by comparing the cases in (7) and (8) with structurally similar environments, except for the subject or the predicate, respectively:

(9) a.   ?*Paul* wanted to believe that [it would be good for *himself* if
           Mary left]
     b.   **Paul* wanted to believe that [Mary was trying to be good for
           himself]
     c.   ?*Mary* considered [her brother similar to *herself*]
     d.   **Mary* considered [her brother hostile to *herself*]
     e.   ?*The veterans* thought that [the new recruits would be more
           qualified than *themselves*]
     f.   (?)**The veterans* thought that [the officers would rather rely
           on the new recruits than to trust in *themselves* again]

Thus, if the distinctive feature of logophoric reflexives is their mild 'markedness' in absence of discourse justification, vis-à-vis the unacceptability of comparable SSC violations, then cases like (7) and (8) should fall under the same rubric.

There is another remarkable property which the sentences in (7) and (8) share with R&R's logophoric reflexives: they are all cases in which the predicate is somehow incompatible with (syntactic) reflexivity. Consider (7) and (8) first. In (7), a reflexive interpretation is simply impossible because expletives are not referential at all, for which reason they cannot be coindexed with any denoting phrase. Thus, they cannot be coreferential with any co-argument. In (8), the incompatibility is also related to the semantics of the predicate: coreference seems to be rejected because it results in tautology or contradiction, and, hence, it is pragmatically irrelevant (see Safir 1992 and below for discussion). Cases like (7) and (8) appear, then, to support a generalization that might be stated as:

(10) If reflexivity (i.e., coindexation between co-arguments) is somehow disallowed, the acceptability of a locally free reflexive is enhanced.

Notice that the proviso that 'locally free reflexives are enhanced' is intended to make room for the logophoric nature of the reflexives in (7) and (8): though better than the comparable cases in (6), they are still marked with respect to pronouns, and require some discourse justification, such as the antecedent's point of view (see Kuno, 1987, pp. 95-101, 123-125).

As we have seen above, the cases in (7) and (8) violate R&R's Condition A because the reflexive reflexive-marks a predicate which is syntactic. It should be noticed, furthermore, that (7) and (8) cannot be conciliated with R&R's Condition A by any straightforward reformulation of the definition of syntactic predicates.[10] This is so because in either case we would have to refer to a semantic property of the predicate, which would add suspicion to the claim that Condition A applies to syntactic predicates.

Let us briefly reconsider the logophoric cases covered by R&R's approach, that is, those occurrences that do not trigger a violation of R&R's Condition A. Recall that these cases arise under the following circumstances:

(11) *Reflexives not governed by R&R's Condition A*:

    (a)   if the reflexive itself is not a syntactic argument of the predicate, in which case it does not reflexive-mark the predicate, or

    (b)   if the predicate does not have a syntactic subject, in which case the predicate does not qualify as a syntactic one.

Notice now that the cases covered by (11) can all be subsumed under the generalization in (10) above. Consider (11a): according to R&R, the reflexive can be logophoric because it is not a syntactic argument of the predicate containing it. But, if the reflexive itself is not a syntactic argument, syntactic reflexivity is not possible either, and (10) applies to this case. Consider now the cases for which (11b) was devised: R&R argued that (11b) applies to *picture* NPs when they have no subject (as in (5a) above), or to predicates with an implicit subject (as, for example, the locative PP in (5c) above). In other words, these predicates escape Condition A because they have no syntactic argument to be coindexed with the reflexive. But, if the predicate has no syntactic argument other than the reflexive itself, then syntactic reflexivity is not possible either, and the generalization (10) applies to these cases as well.

In short, the generalization (10) above succeeds where R&R's Condition A has failed: it can explain not only why the cases covered by (11) have a logophoric behavior, but also why the cases in (7) and (8), which are not covered by (11), do so as well. Suppose we follow R&R and assume that what all these cases have in common is that they should not count as a violation of Condition A. Then, we would have to incorporate (10) somehow into the formulation of Condition A in (2) above. One possibility would be to readjust the definition of syntactic predicate; but, as we have seen above, this move does not seem conceptually sound. Another possibility is to add (10) to Condition A as an exclusion clause, as in (12):

(12) *Reflexivity Condition A* (2nd version):

> If a syntactic predicate is reflexive-marked, **and if it can be syntactically reflexive**, then it has to be syntactically reflexive.

If formulated as in (12), Condition A allows us to extend R&R's approach of logophoric reflexives to (7) and (8) above.[11] But we also inherit one of the problems of R&R's account: we can explain why logophoric reflexives are better than non-logophoric ones, but we cannot explain why, out of context, logophoric reflexives are marked with respect to pronouns. Here we have two options. We may stick to R&R's line of reasoning, and assume that the markedness of logophoric reflexives is due to functional factors (or discourse considerations, as R&R put it). The other possibility is to reverse this strategy: rather than make logophoric reflexives exempt from Condition A and explain their markedness functionally, we might instead take them to be marked *because of Condition A*, and try to explain their occasional acceptability functionally. This is the possibility I would like to explore here. The account I want to propose for (10) is similar in spirit to the one Alice Davison proposed a long time ago for *peculiar passives* (Davison, 1980). Let me briefly discuss Davison's analysis before we come back to logophoric reflexives.

3. Peculiar Passives as Gricean Implicatures

3.1. Peculiar Passives

Davison calls peculiar passives cases of pseudopassivization out of 'adverbial' PPs, that is, potential counter examples to the generalization that pseudopassives are possible only out of oblique objects (Chomsky, 1965; Lakoff, 1971; Hornstein & Weinberg, 1981; among others). Adverbials and oblique objects, she seems to suggest, can be distinguished on the basis of two criteria. (i) Prepositions that can be substituted productively are unlikely to be subcategorized by the verb,

for which reason they qualify as adverbials (e.g., *fly under/over/be-hind/above/below*, etc., vs. *laugh at*; Davison, 1980, pp.48-49; cf. Johnson, 1974). (ii) Adverbials, but not oblique objects, can be preposed without disturbing the acceptability of the sentence significantly, as in (13) below (Davison, 1980, pp. 47-48; cf. Chomsky, 1975):

(13) a.   On this chair, John sat for hours after dinner
     b.   With a fork, Gwen poked me in the ribs
     c.   ??On the boat, John decided in the bank
     d.   ??At the clown they laughed long and hard

Regarding peculiar passives, Davison starts by noting that not all adverbials are equally likely to allow pseudopassivization (Davison, 1980, pp. 45-46). With locatives, directionals, instrumentals and accompaniment phrases, pseudopassives are generally well-formed:[12]

(14) a.   This chair has been sat on by Fred
     b.   That bed has been slept in today
     c.   The bridge has been flown under by George
     d.   The valley has been marched through in two hours
     e.   I hate being leaned over by people buying popcorn
     f.   I don't want to be sat next to by an over-friendly stranger
     g.   Chicago has been driven to in an hour and a half
     h.   This rock used to be slid down when we were kids
     i.   Being tiptoed behind makes me nervous

(15) a.   That knife has been cut with too often without being sharpened
     b.   This spoon has been eaten with
     c.   Freddie consented to being tagged along with

Time adverbials and expressions of cause, on the other hand, do not seem to allow pseudopassives:

(16) a.   John and Sue quarrelled {before/during/after} dinner
      b.   *Dinner was quarrelled {before/during/after} by John and Sue

(17) a.   John arrived {by/at/before/after} 6 o'clock
      b.   *Six o'clock was arrived {by/at/before/after} (by John)

(18) a.   Susan typed through the night
      b.   *The night was typed through by Susan

(19) a.   Laura usually sleeps up to twelve hours in a day
      b.   *Twelve hours were slept up to in a day by Laura

(20) a.   John ran away {from/because of} cowardice
      b.   *Cowardice was run away {from/because of} by John

(21) a.   The city surrendered under siege
      b.   *Siege was surrendered under by the city

(22) a.   John quarreled with his publishers {because of/on account of/over} important principles
      b.   *Important principles were quarreled {because of/on account of/over} by John with his publishers

Thus, passivization out of adverbials is possible, though not always.

Furthermore, Davison claims that passivization out of adverbials is subject to restrictions that do not apply to the passivization of direct and oblique objects: for an NP to be passivized out of an adverbial, it has to be definite or specific in reference and, preferably, it denotes an individual or concrete entity (Davison, 1980, pp. 46, 50; sentences (23a, c, d) are mine):

(23) a.   {This/*A} chair has been sat on by Fred

b.   {This/*A} cup was drunk out of by Napoleon
c.   {This/*A) bed is usually slept in by more than one person when we have guests
d.   {That/A} man was arrested this morning by the police
e.   {The/A meeting} was called for by the chairman himself
f.   {This/A deputy} is usually voted for by people who don't know him

She notes that specificity of reference is also a common property of sentence topics (Davison 1980, p.46):

(24) a.   As for {this/*a} chair, someone has sat on it
b.   As for {this/*a} cup, Napoleon has drunk out of it
c.   As for {that/*a} man, the police arrested him this morning
d.   As for {the/*a} meeting, the chairman himself called for it

On the basis of (23) (and (24)), Davison concludes that peculiar passives are subject to a requirement for topichood (of the passivized NP) stronger than the one active in normal passives (Davison, 1980, p. 57). But this is not the only discourse requirement that peculiar passives must meet.

3.2. Rhetorical effects in Peculiar Passives

Davison also observed that, unlike normal passives (like (23d, e, f), for example), peculiar passives always implicate that the new subject has some quality resulting from the event described (Davison, 1980, pp. 53-55). She describes three rhetorical effects triggered by peculiar passives. They can have an adversative flavor, suggesting that the subject shows a bad effect resulting from the event (also passives in Japanese, Kuno, 1973; and McCawley, 1975):

(25) a.   This chair has been sat on by Fred
b.   This chair has had Fred sit on it
c.   Fred has sat on this chair

(26) a.   That glass has been drunk out of by someone
     b.   That glass has had someone drink out of it
     c.   Someone has drunk out of that glass

(27) a.   The cave has clearly been lived in by woodchucks
     b.   The cave has had woodchucks live in it
     c.   Woodchucks have lived in the cave

The passives in *a.* are similar to the sentences in *b.* in that they have the same topic and predicational structure (the *b.* sentences are non-causative *have* constructions), and both *a.* and *b.* entail the active sentences in *c.* Yet, the 'passive sentences of [(25)-(27)] convey something rather different from the *b.* and *c.* sentences. In absence of specific information, one assumes in [(25a)] that Fred did the chair no good by sitting on it, and that the effects of his sitting on it are perceptible. Likewise, it would be reasonable to assume that the glass in [(26a)] is dirty, rather than used and then washed, and that the cave in [(27a)] is littered with signs of occupancy'(Davison, 1980, p. 53).

The adversative flavor can be turned off if the agent is a famous person, in which case 'the passive sentence conveys the suggestion that the subject-topic has the quality of being interesting, at least to the speaker, by virtue of its connection with that person' (Davison, 1980, p. 54, reporting an observation by Riddle et al., 1977):

(28) a.   This porch was walked on by Teddy Kennedy
     b.   ?This porch had Teddy Kennedy walk on it

(29) a.   This chair was sat on by Adolf Hitler
     b.   ??This chair had Adolf Hitler sit on it
(30) a.   That cup was drunk out of by Napoleon (and carefully preserved for 150 years afterwards)
     b.   ???That cup had Napoleon drink out of it

Finally, there is a third use of peculiar passives: 'in contexts where the subject topic is not likely to bear perceptible traces of an event ...

[the passive] indicates that the event is possible' (Davison, 1980, pp. 54-55):

(31) a.   That bridge has been flown under by Smilin' Jack
       b.   The enemy base has been flown over several times
       c.   The valley has been marched through in two hours

The rhetorical effects described above can, of course, also be expressed by active sentences and normal passives; but Davison's point is that active sentences and normal passives do not need to implicate them in order to be felicitous, while peculiar passives do. In other words, the rhetorical effects described are a requirement for the appropriate use of peculiar passives.

Let me sum up at this point Davison's descriptive observations concerning peculiar passives:

(32) *Peculiar Passives in English*:
       a.   peculiar passives are possible out of locatives, directionals, instrumentals, and accompaniment phrases, but not out of temporals and cause phrases;
       b.   unlike normal passives, peculiar passives require the sub ject to be a topic;
       c.   unlike actives and normal passives, peculiar passives always implicate that the subject has acquired some quality by vir tue of the event described.

3.3 Peculiar Passives as Gricean implicatures

For Davison, the generalizations in (32) above show that neither a purely structural approach, nor a purely pragmatic one is sufficient to account for passivization in English. Davison's argument against a purely structural approach is that a unitary characterization of the passivization rule is bound to miss some distinction. If passive is defined to apply only to objects, direct and oblique (as in Chomsky, 1965; Lakoff, 1971; and many others since then), then it cannot explain (32a).

If the notion of 'object' is extended to apply to locatives, instrumentals, etc. (as in Johnson 1974), then what is left unexplained are (32b, c), that is, the fact that peculiar passives are more restricted than normal passives. And the same objection arises for a pragmatic approach which makes no reference to structural conditions (as in Riddle et al., 1977).

Under Davison's analysis, 'the basic factor which determines the well-formedness of the promotion of a given NP by Passive ... is its role in underlying structure ...': grammatical roles are organized in a hierarchy, and the higher an NP's role is in this hierarchy, the more accessible the NP is for Passive (as in Keenan & Comrie, 1977; Davison, 1980, pp. 49-50). Taking into account the contrasts discussed above, the relevant hierarchy for English would be the following:

(33) *Hierarchy for Passive Accessibility*:[13]

> Objects > (Adverbials 1:) Locatives, Directionals, Instrumentals, Accompaniment > (Adverbials 2:) Temporals, Cause

Thus, the successful passivization of an NP is a matter of degree: 'the further to the right a NP is, the less accessible it will be to (well-formed) promotion by the operation of Passive, and the greater will be the restrictions imposed on the NPs which do get promoted' (Davison, 1980, p. 50).

The crucial point to pay attention to, argues Davison, is that peculiar passives are marked structures: they are marked not only because passives themselves are marked with respect to actives (both grammatically and functionally); peculiar passives are, additionally, marked in the sense that the promoted NP is not an optimal candidate for promotion (which is expressed by the hierarchy in (33)). And this markedness of peculiar passives is, according to Davison, what explains the additional restrictions it is subject to.

For her, 'the conversationally conveyed meanings described above are all inferences which might be made from active sentences, or from passive sentences of the more ordinary kind involving direct objects.

Given the right context, such inferences are quite usual... But if [a peculiar passive] is used, the conversationally conveyed meaning is normally the rhetorical point of the sentence'. This is so because 'information that the topic is an underlying non-subject and the fact that the construction is marked, i.e., subject to greater restrictions than ordinary passives, together narrow down the range of possible entailments which the speaker intends to convey as the point of the utterance'. Thus, 'the application of Passive in a marked context serves a communicative purpose, which might be subsumed under Grice's Maxims of Relevance and Manner. The Maxim of Relevance takes note of the NP is in topic position, while the Maxim of Manner takes note of the marked application of Passive' (Davison, 1980, p. 50).

In other words, what Davison proposes is that passivization of a candidate which is non-optimal grammatically (for her, according to (33)) can be tolerated if it can achieve a communicative purpose:

(34) A violation of the Maxim of Manner - grammatical markedness
      - can be compensated if it can lead to a conversational implicature.

In the specific case of peculiar passives, the implicature (i.e., the non-literal meaning acquired by the utterance) arises through the Maxim of Relevance. (I'll be more specific about the triggering of this implicature in the next section; for brief presentations of the Gricean pragmatics, see Grice, 1975; Schiffrin, 1994, chapter 6; and Sperber & Wilson, 1986, chapter 1).

I think Davison's account of peculiar passives in English is essentially correct, though one might be suspicious about the fact that it relies on the hierarchy in (33). (33) was devised to solve the dilemma faced by previous accounts of pseudo passives: a unitary characterization of the passive operation could not be achieved because it would either exclude some cases (namely, peculiar passives), or be unable to make relevant distinctions (between normal and peculiar passives). In a sense, this problem is solved with (33): Passive can be a general operation of NP promotion, constrained by the hierarchy. But, if no justification is provided for

the specific ranking in (33), the hierarchy itself becomes just a description of the restrictions found, rather than an explanation.

Actually, Davison does seem to have an explanation for the rankings in (33). She suggests that the relevant distinction between objects and locatives, instrumentals, etc., is structural (Davison, 1980, pp. 47-49, 52). But she also believes that a purely structural account of (33) is not feasible because no difference in constituent structure between the two kinds of adverbials would appear to be justified on independent grounds (Davison, 1980, p. 52).[14] Rather, she suggests, what distinguishes adverbials 1 from adverbials 2 is that the former may have definite NPs referring to concrete entities as objects, while the latter usually have NPs referring to abstract, non-specific entities as objects. That is, the problem with time and cause adverbials would lie in the fact that they cannot easily satisfy the topicality requirement on the passivized NP. And, as we have seen, this requirement is necessary for peculiar passives to be able to trigger a conversational implicature. Thus, there would be independent motivation for the hierarchy in (33).[15]

Let me now show how Davison's proposals can help us understand the 'markedness' of logophoric reflexives.

4. Violations of grammatical constraints, Gricean implicatures, and 'Well-Formedness'

4.1. Extending Davison's account to logophoric reflexives

I would like to suggest here that Davison's general approach to peculiar passives can be extended to account for the generalization in (10) above, which I repeat below:

(35) If reflexivity (i.e., coindexation between co-arguments) is somehow disallowed, the acceptability of a locally free reflexive is enhanced.

That is, I would like to suggest that (35) is better conceived as the result of a conversational implicature triggered by a violation of Condition A (rather than part of Condition A itself, as in (12) above). The first step to achieve this goal is to have a formulation of Condition A which applies to all occurrences of reflexives, including logophoric ones:

(36) *Condition A:*

If M is a reflexive-marker, M reflexive-marks a reflexive syntactic predicate.

Condition A as formulated in (36) incorporates the insight behind R&R's Condition A in (2): that the function of reflexives is to reflexive-mark syntactic predicates. The difference between (36) and (2) is that (36) is formulated as a condition on (occurrences of) reflexives, rather than on predicates. According to (36), any reflexive which is not an argument of a reflexive syntactic predicate violates Condition A: hence, logophoric reflexives violate Condition A, just like, say, the cases that fall under the traditional SSC.

Under this view, locally free reflexives, including logophoric reflexives, are like peculiar passives in that they also violate a grammatical condition. As Davison suggests, from the perspective of Grice's Maxims, violations of grammatical conditions can be seen as violations of the Maxim of Manner, that is, of the Maxim governing 'HOW what is said is to be said' (Grice, 1975, p. 46). The rationale behind the suggestion is, I think, quite simple: among the many code-related expectations people have about a speaker's performance, there is one which is that the speaker will comply with the conventions of his language, that is, its grammar. Any violation of a grammatical constraint will, therefore, be pragmatically infelicitous because it will not fulfil this expectation.[16] If logophoric reflexives and SSC violations both count as violations of Condition A, they violate the Maxim of Manner as well, just as peculiar passives do because they violate the constraint embodied in the hierarchy in (33) above.

Davison also suggested that the violation incurred by peculiar passives can be rescued when it triggers a conversational implicature through the Maxim of Relevance. According to this Maxim, the speaker is expected to convey information, through his performance, that contributes to the point he wants to make.[17] Consider a peculiar passive from this perspective: (a) a violation of grammatical restrictions on passives has been used to promote an NP to a topic; (b) but there are alternative constructions (like Topicalization) which may express the topic character of an adverbial without violating any grammatical constraint; (c) thus, if all the speaker wanted was to express the meaning that the passivized NP is a topic, he would be conveying information (grammatical markedness) that does not contribute to his point; (d) hence, a peculiar passive would violate not only the Maxim of Manner, but also the Maxim of Relevance.[18]

In such a situation, 'the hearer', says Grice, 'is confronted with a minor problem: How can [the speaker's] saying what he did say be reconciled with the supposition that he is observing the overall Cooperative Principle?' (Grice, 1975, p. 49) In the case of peculiar passives, the question becomes: how can such utterances be compatible with the Maxim of Relevance? According to Davison, by the speaker's intending the hearer to assume as relevant the fact that a marked structure has been used to express a literal meaning which could be expressed otherwise. More specifically, by virtue of their structure, peculiar passives serve as an instruction to the hearer to select a specific, marked, meaning among the many ones implicated by what is literally expressed. Thus, in order to satisfy the Maxim of Relevance, peculiar passives must be taken as implicating a non-literal meaning; in other words, because of the Maxim of Relevance, a violation of the Maxim of Manner triggers a conversational implicature.

Interestingly, there is a sense in which logophoric reflexives differ from other violations of Condition A with respect to the Maxim of Relevance. It seems plausible to interpret Condition A as in (36) as saying that the function of reflexives is to mark a (syntactic) predicate

for reflexivity, that is, for a reflexive interpretation. Thus, as far as Condition A is concerned, reflexives are relevant only to the extent that the predicate can be reflexive – there is no point in using a reflexive-marker unless the speaker wants to mark the predicate as reflexive. Consider now the standard cases of SSC violations, as in (37a): since they involve predicates that might have been reflexive, as in (37b, c), uses like (37a) can be said to be *relevant* as far as Condition A is concerned:

(37) a.   *_John_ said that [Mary saw _himself_] on TV
     b.   Mary said that [_John_ saw _himself_] on TV
     c.   John said that [_Mary_ saw _herself_] on TV

In other words, with SSC violations there is always an interpretation which would be compatible with and, hence, relevant for the reflexive-marker. Recall, however, that logophoric reflexives fall under the generalization in (35) above: they occur in predicates which could not possibly be reflexive. That is, there is no way in which a Condition A violation like, say, (38a) or (38b) below could be consistent with the Maxim of Relevance, since in no circumstances could the speaker actually have intended the predicate containing the reflexive to be reflexive:

(38) a.   John saw [a picture of _himself_]
     b.   John said [that it would be good for _himself_ [if Mary left]]

Thus, with logophoric reflexives there is no interpretation which would be compatible with and, hence, relevant for the reflexive-marker. That is, as far as Condition A is concerned, logophoric reflexives, but not SSC violations, also violate the Maxim of Relevance.

As in the case of peculiar passives, we may ask again how the speaker's use of a logophoric reflexive can be reconciled with the Maxim of Relevance. And the answer, it seems to me, is the same as the one Davison provided for peculiar passives: by means of a conversational implicature. In the case of logophoric reflexives, we might infor-

mally characterize the relevant pattern of implicature as follows (Grice, 1975, p. 50): (a) the speaker has used the reflexive inappropriately (i.e., he has violated the Maxim of Manner by violating Condition A); (b) but this is senseless for there is no use for the reflexive there, unless the speaker wants to signal something else (that is, he would also violate the Maxim of Relevance if trying to signal reflexivity); (c) thus, there must be something being marked by the reflexive 'there'. In other words, what I am suggesting is that the interaction of Condition A with the Maxim of Relevance leads to the following general implicature:

(39) If a reflexive-marker M cannot be reflexive-marking a predicate P (because P cannot be syntactically reflexive), then M marks something else.

Given (39), the hearer will be prompted to search for what is being marked by the reflexive, probably guided by the principles that govern discourse anaphora (say, Ariel's accessibility principles referred to by R&R).

Let me briefly summarize the approach I am proposing for the markedness of logophoric reflexives: Logophoric reflexives may appear marked out of context because, just like other occurrences of reflexives, they violate Condition A. They are significantly better than other occurrences, however, because of (39) above, which implies that they can be justified in discourse. This explains why the (relative) acceptability of logophoric anaphors, rather than their relative marginality, emerges with an appropriate discourse: with no backing discourse, the listener will not find the relevant justification; in an appropriate context, he will. The approach also explains the difference between pronouns and logophoric reflexives: unlike the latter, locally free pronouns violate no syntactic condition whatsoever and, hence, are the unmarked option, which is the appropriate one when the context is null. Pronouns may become disfavored, however, in a specific discourse, because then, and only then, discourse conditions properly speaking start to play a role.

We can now finally come back to issues concerning optimality theory.

4.2. Gricean implicatures, non-conflicting violations of grammatical conditions, and the notion of well-formedness

We have seen so far that both logophoric reflexives and peculiar passives seem to support Davison's generalization in (35) above, which I repeat below as (40):

(40) A violation of the Maxim of Manner - grammatical markedness - can be compensated if it can lead to a conversational implicature.

There are two crucial things about (40). The first one is that conversational implicatures can lead to felicity and, hence, full acceptability of an expression, despite this expression's grammatical markedness. Now, there are two current meanings for the notion of well-formedness of an expression, a theoretical and a pre-theoretical one. Theoretically speaking, an expression is well-formed if it is the output of a grammar. Pre-theoretically, it is generally assumed that an expression that is (or can be, under appropriate circumstances,) fully acceptable is also well-formed and, hence, should be theoretically characterized as such. Suppose we accept the pre-theoretical intuition that, in general, expressions that may become fully acceptable are well-formed. Then, it would follow that at least some of the expressions that become fully acceptable through a conversational implicature - like logophoric reflexives and peculiar passives - would count as well-formed.

And here comes the second crucial thing about (40). Suppose we also accept the second meaning of well-formedness and assume that everything which is well-formed in the pre-theoretical sense should also be well-formed in the theoretical sense. Thus, expressions which become well-formed in the pre-theoretical sense through a conversational implicature should also be characterized grammatically as well-formed. But, if the analyses we have seen above for logophoric reflexives and peculiar passives are somehow correct, then such a character-

ization is clearly unachievable under the standard assumption that a grammar is formed by a set of absolute constraints. As I tried to show, both logophoric reflexives and peculiar passives are better seen as involving the violation of a grammatical constraint, and, as such, they support a theory in which grammatical constraints are violable, and not absolute.

We might then ask ourselves whether optimality-like frameworks, in which grammatical constraints are violable, could provide us with a 'grammatical' characterization of the expressions that become 'well-formed' through a conversational implicature. Recall that, under current assumptions, 'optimality grammars' have the following basic properties:

(41) *Optimality in syntax:*

    (a)   the input (to the set of constraints) contains a representation of some propositional content (for a sentence);

    (b)   the set of candidates considered for evaluation includes the possible syntactic representations for that propositional content;

    (c)   a syntactic representation is 'well-formed' if and only if it is the one in the set of candidates which best satisfies the constraints on linguistic representations.

From the perspective of (41), 'well-formedness' arises from the interaction of grammatical constraints: a 'syntactic representation' or expression may violate a grammatical constraint and still be 'well-formed' if and only if all other alternative expressions for the same meaning also violate at least one (other) grammatical constraint. But, if the analyses of peculiar passives and of logophoric reflexives presented above are correct, they pose a problem for this conception of 'well-formedness': conversational implicatures do not seem to be characterizable in terms of the interaction of constraints on possible expressions for one and the same 'meaning'.

As I tried to show above, conversational implicatures arise from the interaction of pragmatical constraints (the Gricean Maxims) on possible meanings for one and the same linguistic expression: conversational implicatures are precisely the non-literal meanings selected for an expression when a literal interpretation for this expression is incompatible with some Maxim. Consider, for example, the case of logophoric reflexives again: a violation of the Maxim of Manner is triggered by a violation of Condition A, and a conversational implicature, by the fact that such a violation cannot be conciliated with the Maxim of Relevance unless the reflexive is marking something other than the predicate's reflexivity. In other words, a violation of the Maxim of Relevance is actually avoided by reinterpreting a violation of the Maxim of Manner as suggesting that a non-literal interpretation is to be chosen. In the case of other violations of Condition A (say, of SSC violations), the corresponding violation of the Maxim of Manner is consistent with the Maxim of Relevance (the predicate could actually have been reflexive); thus, no conversational implicature arises, and the literal interpretation is to be chosen; but then the sentence violates Condition A and is, therefore, excluded.

The situation as described above might actually be interpreted as a search for an optimal candidate in the following way: Suppose we take as the set of candidates the set of possible interpretations for a sentence, and Grice's Maxims as conditions on these interpretations.[19] Then, in the case of logophoric reflexives, the optimal interpretation would be the non-literal one, since this is the only one compatible with the Maxim of Relevance. In the case of other Condition A violations, the literal interpretation is compatible with the Maxim of Relevance and, therefore, it is an optimal interpretation, too. The case of peculiar passives can be understood along the same lines as well: a violation of the Maxim of Manner is triggered by the marked status of passivization out of adverbials (the hierarchy in (33)). As we have seen above, a literal interpretation for such an utterance would also violate the Maxim of Relevance; but, precisely because of that, a conversational implicature is triggered; that is, a

non-literal meaning, which is consistent with the Maxim of Relevance, is selected.

Notice, however, that, even if we interpret conversational implicatures as resulting from a search for an optimal candidate, the situation is still different from the one depicted in (41) above: conversational implicatures are chosen because they are optimal interpretations for an expression. That is, an appropriate characterization of conversational implicatures will have to compare and evaluate meanings for one and the same expression, rather than different expressions for one and the same meaning. But, then, if conversational implicatures can make an expression well-formed, this means well-formedness of an expression may arise by comparing alternative interpretations for it, rather than by comparing it with other expressions for the same interpretation.

In sum, (40) above appears, at first, to be characterizable as an optimality-like effect - an expression becomes acceptable despite the fact that it violates a grammatical constraint. But, because conversational implicatures are the result of the interaction of pragmatical constraints on possible interpretations for an expression, (40) cannot be subsumed under the assumptions in (41) above. Moreover, under the assumption that acceptability corresponds to well-formedness, it would seem that (40) actually refutes the assumptions in (41). To see this, let me summarize again the reasoning I developed above:

(42) *If*: (a) full acceptability corresponds to well-formedness; and (b) full acceptability can be a result of conversational implicatures; and (c) conversational implicatures arise by a comparison of possible interpretations for an expression; *then*: (d) well-formedness can be a result of a comparison of possible interpretations for an expression.

The point is that the conclusion (42d) is incompatible with the conception of well-formedness expressed in (41c) above. In particular, when well-formedness (i.e., full acceptability) arises from a conversa-

tional implicature, it does not seem to be important to know whether the relevant expression is better (with respect to grammatical constraints) than other expressions for the same meaning. What matters is whether that meaning makes the expression compatible with Grice's Maxims.

If (42d) is correct, an expression may violate a grammatical constraint and be well-formed regardless of whether alternative expressions for the same meaning violate some other grammatical constraint. This, of course, goes against one of the crucial theorems derived from the assumptions in (41) above: that an expression may violate a grammatical constraint and still be the best candidate if and only if all other alternative expressions for the same meaning violate another grammatical constraint. This theorem allows optimality systems to preserve the traditional assumption that well-formedness is a matter of grammar. Though in optimality well-formedness does not necessarily mean absolute satisfaction of grammatical constraints, it still means best satisfaction of such constraints. If (42d) is accepted, however, even this weaker statement would have to be abandoned: well-formedness may occasionally arise from best satisfaction of pragmatical constraints on possible interpretations for an expression, rather than from best satisfaction of grammatical constraints on expressions for a meaning.

Of course, there may be many ways out of the problem posed by (42d) above. For example, we might reject the premise in (42a), and assume that the theoretical concept of well-formedness may not cover all cases of full acceptability. We might also reject Davison's analysis of peculiar passives, and the analysis I proposed for logophoric reflexives, and assume that such cases are actually well-formed with respect to grammatical constraints. This would allow us to reject the consequences of taking (42a, b) together (namely, that well-formedness might be achieved through a conversational implicature regardless of grammatical considerations proper). We might incorporate the mechanisms responsible for conversational implicatures into our grammar, in which case (42d) would be, at least terminologically, a matter of grammar still. For any of these possibilities, there would be problems to be faced. For

example, suppose we reject (42a). Then, the problem which arises is a methodological one: how can we draw the line between what we think has to be treated as well-formed and what falls outside this concept? This and the other issues raised by (42) are, it seems to me, extremely difficult and, as far as I can see, no easy decisions will brush them aside. At this point, however, I myself have no positive contribution to make to them.

Notes

1. This is an updated version of a paper presented at HIL's Workshop on Optimality Theory, held on the 4th of December of 1996. That paper was, in turn, an offshot of section 3.7 of my dissertation (Menuzzi 1999). I'd like to thank João Costa for his comments to the first version of this paper, and Michael Redford, who had to put up with my endless request for judgements. I am also grateful to this journal's reviewer for all his suggestions and corrections.

2. As far as I know, the only other proposal in which reflexives may be exempt from Condition A is Pollard & Sag's (1992). I will concentrate my attention in R&R's approach, though my main objections extend to Pollard & Sag's proposals as well.

3. R&R (1993, pp. 672-673) claim that contrastive or focused reflexives do not violate Condition A because focused elements undergo movement at LF. That is, the LF representation of a sentence like (ia) would be something like (ib), in which the reflexive is no longer a syntactic argument of the predicate defined by *rebound* ((ia) is quoted in Zribi-Hertz, 1995):

(i)   a. *Bismark*'s impulsiveness has, as so often, rebounded against *himself*
        b. *Himself* [*Bismark*'s impulsiveness has, as so often, rebounded against
        t]

If Condition A applies to LF representations, R&R reason, then no Condition A violation arises in (i). Notice that this proposal requires that the contrastive reflexive in (iia) below be represented as in (iib) at FL (example from B. Shaw's *The Doctor's Dilemma*, cited by Baker 1995, p. 69):

(ii)   a. As a good many people countenance vivisection [because *they* fear that
        if the experiments are not made on rabbits, they will be made on
        themselves], it is worth noting...
        b.*Themselves* [*they* fear that the experiments will be made on *t*]

The problem with an LF like (iib), however, is that it qualifies as a case of strong crossover, just like (iiia) below, or like (iiib), whose LF is (iiic):

(iii)   a. *Who did [he say that Mary likes t] ?

b. *Who did [he say t likes $whom$] ?

c.*Who_i $Whom_j$ [he_j said t_i likes t_j] ?

Thus, R&R's account of focused reflexives requires an explanation for the fact that LF movement in (iib), unlike other cases of LF movement, does not trigger crossover effects (Rooth 1985). See note 9 for further discussion of focused reflexives.

4. This account of (4c) does not seem to be correct: it predicts the reflexive in (i) below, which is structurally like (4c), to be as good as the reflexive in (4c), contrary to fact (Safir 1992):

(i) It angered *him* that she tried to attract [a man proud of {*himself/him*}]

It is more plausible that the relative acceptability of the reflexive in (4c) has to do with the inherent properties of the predicate *like*, as I will discuss shortly. Notice, also, that the fact that adjuncts like the one in (i) trigger Specified Subject Condition effects suggests that: either (i) *a man* counts as a syntactic subject for *proud of*, although it is not contained by this predicate; or (ii) the (implicit) subject of adjuncts does count for Condition A. In case the latter option is the right one, then we have a problem for R&R's account of locative PPs (R&R 1993, p. 686-9; see also Menuzzi 1999).

5. R&R's characterization of logophoric reflexives certainly has some truth to it, since it captures most of Kuno's (1987) examples of locally free reflexives. I will discuss shortly the only case noticed by Kuno which does not fit R&R's approach, the case of predicates whose subject is the expletive *it*. But it should also be noticed that the distinction between logophoric and non-logophoric or contrastive free reflexives has been objected, most prominently by Baker (1995). The argument Baker adduced against this distinction (at least in British English) is this: (i) pronouns can be used when the antecedent has the point of view (hence, point of view is not sufficient to decide between a pronoun and a free reflexive); (ii) pronouns can also be used contrastively (hence, contrast is not sufficient for the anaphoric choice either). He goes on, then, to argue that free reflexives are used when two discourse conditions are met: when they are contrastive *and* their antecedent is somehow prominent (for example, either when it has the point of view, or it is the topic of the discourse). See also Zribi-Hertz (1995) and notes 8 and 9 below for discussion of this issue.

6. There is a context in which both logophoric reflexives and pronouns are seemingly possible, but in which pronouns would be marked: according to Safir (1992)

(citing Keenan 1988), this happens with *exclusion predicates*, like in [*no one apart from* {*him/himself*}], [*everyone except* {*him/himself*}], [*someone other than* {*him/himself*}], [*Mary, rather than* {*him/himself*}], etc. But notice that in all his examples, the whole phrase is within the same predicate as the antecedent, as in *John will criticize* [*anyone except* {*himself/??him*}]. In these cases, pronouns violate R&R's Condition B ("semantic reflexive predicates must be reflexive-marked", R&R 1993, p. 676): since they are coindexed with a semantic co-argument, they turn their semantic predicate into a reflexive one; but this predicate is not reflexive-marked.

7. One possibility would be that out-of-the-blue sentences somehow meet the conditions required for the discourse justification of pronouns and other types of NPs, but not of reflexives. There is one problem with this line of reasoning: a quick look at the discourse typology of NPs would reveal that out-of-context sentences would meet the conditions for the discourse justification of almost any type of NP - except for anaphors and a few other empty NPs. It seems to me that it is not accidental that these are precisely the NPs whose distribution has been claimed to be determined by some grammatical requirement for identification.

8. Pollard & Sag (1992, p.292-3) claimed, on the basis of examples like Kuno's, that anaphors should be free from Condition A in predicates with an expletive subject. But, as Kuno himself noted, there are cases in which such predicates do not seem to enhance the chances of a locally free reflexive:
(i) *They made sure that [it wouldn't wear *themselves* out to invite their friends to dinner]
Precisely on the basis of examples like (i) R&R claimed, on the other hand, that predicates with expletive subjects should count as syntactic predicates and, hence, be governed by Condition A (R&R 1993, p. 679). I have no particular explanation for the contrast between (i) and (7a,b) (see Kuno 1987, pp. 95-101 for some discussion). But I would like to point out two things. First, taking either (i) or (7a, b) as the typical case will solve only half of the problem. Second, the very contrast between (i) and (7a, b), and the one in (9a, b) below, suggest a different conclusion: that reflexives within predicates with an expletive subject are 'marked', but their markedness is such that it can be overcome more easily than the markedness of violations of the SSC.

9. It has been suggested that comparatives and *like* phrases enhance the chances of a locally free reflexive because these predicates are 'inherently contrastive' and, as such, would create a context where the reflexive marks focus (see, for example, Ferro 1993:73, and 78, note 3). Though this observation might be somehow correct,

Safir (1992) notes that it is not sufficient to explain why reflexives in these predicates are easily acceptable even when they are not focused in any obvious sense (the example in (i) is Safir's; those in (ii) are mine):

(i) *John* thinks that Mary really HATES people like *himself*, but in fact she LOVES them.

(ii)   a.   ?*John* always thought that Mary, and not Susan, was like *himself*
        b.   *John always thought that Mary, but not Susan, was proud of *himself*

Sentence (i) shows that, even if contrastive stress falls on another element in a sentence, this does not significantly affect the acceptability of a reflexive within a *like* phrase. The argument based on (i) may not be completely convincing, since the *like* phrase is an NP adjunct (which might be a contributing factor: see discussion of (4) above and, in particular, note 4). But (iia) makes the same point as (i) (except that contrast does not need to be prosodically marked in this case). Moreover, (ia) is significantly better than (iib), which is structurally parallel to (iia) except for the predicate.

10. This is the strategy R&R have used whenever any readjustment of Condition A seemed necessary. For example, they included the requirement for a syntactic subject in the definition in order to exclude subjectless predicates from the domain of the condition; additionally, their definition makes reference to event-roles, to account for reflexive-marking in ECM structures (R&R 1993, pp.707-710; see also Menuzzi 1999 for discussion). In every case, the simplicity of Condition A is saved by a complication in the definition of syntactic subjects.

11. Incorporating (10) somehow into the workings of Condition A also makes room for some conceptual gains. Recall that R&R's motivation for the subject requirement on syntactic predicates rests on contrasts like those in (5) above. For R&R, what characterizes those environments is the fact that the reflexives occur within subjectless predicates. But, given (10), an explanation for some cases exists that does not resort to the subject requirement. For example, according to (12), a reflexive-marked syntactic predicate has to be reflexive only if it can be; but none of the relevant predicates in (5) can, since they contain only one syntactic argument, the reflexive itself. If the only motivation for the subject requirement on syntactic predicates are the cases in (4), adopting (12) makes that requirement unnecessary. A syntactic predicate can, then, be defined simply as follows:

(i)   A *syntactic predicate* is formed of a head P and all its syntactic arguments (that is, those constituents assigned a syntactic role by P).

If (i) can be maintained, the definitions of syntactic and semantic predicates become parallel, suggesting that they are derived from a more general notion of predicate:

(ii)   A *semantic predicate* is formed of a head P and all its semantic arguments (that is, those constituents assigned a semantic role by P).

(iii)   A *predicate* is formed of a head P and all its arguments (that is, those constituents assigned a role by P).

See Menuzzi (1999) for some discussion of these issues.

12. Davison (1980) notes examples in which directionals and accompaniment phrases seem unacceptable:

(i)   a. The faithful should pray toward Mecca
        *Mecca should be prayed toward by the faithful
        b. John doesn't like people to drive with him to New York
        *John doesn't like being driven with to New York (by people)

It seems to me, however, that the unacceptability of the pseudopassives in (ii) is due more to the infelicity of the examples than to some inherent property of the structures: the same cases can be considerably improved if the rhetorical point of the sentences becomes clearer (examples are mine):

(ii)   a. Mecca is too often prayed towards by unfaithful people
        b. ?John does not like to be driven with for long journeys

13. The actual hierarchy proposed by Davison (1980, p.50) was:

(i)   Direct Object > Indirect Object > Locative, Instrumental > Accompaniment, Time > Cause, Purpose, Manner

'Direct object' also includes the case of oblique objects (, e.g., Davison 1980, p. 52). I will be discussing the hierarchy in (33) above, rather than (i), mainly because Davison provides empirical justification only for (33), but also because it is unclear what the basis for (i) is (the discussion which follows).

14. Davison does not discuss the distinction between adverbials 1 and 2 in any detail, and, in particular, she does not provide any argument against a structural distinction. However, the application of standard tests for VP/sentence constituency (e.g., those found in Reinhart 1983, pp.61-67) did not reveal a significant difference between those adverbial types. This, of course, supports Davison's suggestion.

15. Davison's explanation for the rankings in (33) has at least two problems, both conceptual. The first one is that the hierarchy in (33) is suspicious, because different criteria is used to establish the rankings: the distinction between objects and passivizable adverbials is structural, while the difference between adverbials 1 and 2 is functional. As such, (33) seems more like the statement of a complex interaction of different factors than a natural generalization. We might try to solve this problem by clearly distinguishing the two constraints involved, the structural and the functional one. Structurally, we would have the ranking in (i) below, and the distinction between the two types of adverbials would be drawn by the constraint in (ii) (which is, actually, derivable from Grice's Maxims, as we have seen above):

(i)   *Hierarchy for Passive Accessibility*:
         Objects > Adverbials
(ii)   In peculiar passives, the subject must be a topic.
         (derives: Adverbials 1 > Adverbials 2)

The problem with this way of stating the hierarchy in (33) is empirical. Since the distinction between the two types of adverbials is now derived from the requirement in (ii), the prediction is that, if adverbials 2 can occasionally satisfy (ii), then they should result in a passive as good as passives with adverbials 1. But this is not true: even when the object of a temporal or of a cause phrase is a topic, the passive does not improve significantly (*b* sentences are my own):

(iii)   a. *Dinner was quarrelled {before/during/after} by John and Sue
         b. ?*The dinner was a complete disaster. It was quarrelled before, during and after by John and Sue
(iv)   a.*Six o'clock was arrived {by/at/before/after} (by John)
         b. *Several times John promised Mary that he would arrived {at/before} 6 o'clock, but it never happened: 6 o'clock would never be arrived {at/before}
(v)   a. *The night was typed through by Susan
b. *Susan's boss told her that he wanted the report next morning, even if that meant she would have to work through the whole night, which she did: the whole night was desperately {worked/typed} through, and yet Susan couldn't finish the report.
(vi)   a. *Twelve hours were slept up to in a day by Laura
b. *Mary often says that she doesn't like to spend her time doing nothing, but every day twelve hours are slept up to by her, and this doesn't strike her as a waste of time
(vii) a. *{Mary/Cowardice} was run away {from/because of} by John
b.*Mary has always given a lot of trouble to John, by she would never be run away because of by him: she was the only person he cared for in this world.

(viii) a. *Siege was surrendered under by the city

b.*Rome's sieging strategies were almost always successful. Yet, they were not surrendered under by the Etruscans.

(ix)   a. *Important principles were quarrelled {because of/on account of/over} by John with his publishers

b. *There were a few principles that John thought too important to be neglected. They would be quarrelled {because of/on account of/over} even with his dearest friends, if necessary.

Thus, the sentences above show that (i)-(ii) cannot do the job the hierarchy in (33) does: the requirement in (ii) is not enough to distinguish adverbials 1 from adverbials 2. But this reveals the second conceptual problem with Davison's explanation of (33): since she also resorts to requirement (ii) to justify the distinction between the two types of adverbials in (33), we have to conclude that her justification is not enough either. In sum, it seems that we need the hierarchy in (33) as such, but the relevant distinction between adverbial types has still to be understood.

16. According to Grice, the Maxim of Manner includes a supermaxim, 'Be perspicuous', and several submaxims: (1) Avoid obscurity of expression; (2) Avoid ambiguity; (3) Be brief (Avoid unnecessary prolixity); (4) Be orderly (Grice 1975, p.46). It is clear that grammatical violations should count, pragmatically, as violations of the Maxim of Manner; what is not so clear is of which of its submaxims. I will not try to be more specific on this issue here.

17. Neither Davison, nor Grice himself tried to characterize the notion of *relevance*, relying on its pre-theoretical understanding. Sperber & Wilson (1986), on the other hand, argue that a proper characterization of this notion is not only feasible, but also allows it to subsume much of the work done by the other Gricean Maxims. I will follow Grice and Davison's strategy, however, since I am not concerned with the proper characterization of relevance in this paper.

18. Davison (1980, pp.56-57) actually argues that peculiar passives are not justified if the rhetorical effect is merely to take the NP as a topic. According to her, if that were the case, a peculiar passive should be able to be coordinated felicitously with another topic-marking construction, which is not the case:

   (i) a. ??The big chair, John sat in on Friday, and the sofa in the corner was sat on by Fred

   b. The big chair, John sat in on Friday, and Fred sat on the sofa in the corner

19. By 'interpretation' of a sentence I mean here only the relevant semantic/pragmatic object related to a sentence by means of which the implicatures of that sentence can be characterized. For instance, since implicatures are actually propositions 'implicated' by a sentence in a context, we might think that the relevant notion of 'interpretation' is, actually, that of a possible world compatible with such an 'implicated' proposition. See Sperber & Wilson (1986) for extensive discussion of these issues.

References

Ariel, M. (1990). *Accessing NP Antecedents*. London: Routledge.

Baker, C.L. (1995). Contrast, discourse prominence, and intensification, with special reference to locally free reflexives in British English. *Language, 71* (1), 63-101.

Burzio, L. (1995). The rise of optimality theory. *Glot International, 1* (6), 3-7.

Chomsky, N. (1965). *Aspects of the theory of syntax*. MIT Press.

Chomsky, N. (1975). *The logical structure of linguistic theory*. New York: Plenum.

Costa, J. (1998). *Word order variation: A constraint-based approach.* The Hague: Holland Academic Graphics.

Davison, A. (1980). Peculiar passives. *Language, 56*(1), 42-66.

Ferro, L. (1993). On SELF as a focus marker. *In ESCOL '92.* (pp. 68-79).

Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan (Eds.), *Speech Acts* (pp. 41-58). New York: Academic. (Syntax and Semantics series, vol. 3)

Grimshaw, J. (1997). Projection, heads, and optimality. *Linguistic Inquiry, 28,* 373-422.

Grimshaw, J., & Samek-Lodovici, V. (1995). Optimal subjects. *UMOP, 18,* 589-605.

Hornstein, N., & Weinberg, A. (1981). Case theory & preposition stranding. *Linguistic Inquiry, 12,* 55-91.

Johnson, D. (1974). Towards a theory of relationally based grammar. Distributed by IULC.

Keenan, E., & Comrie, B. (1977). Noun phrase accessibility and universal grammar. *Linguistic Inquiry, 8*, 63-100.

Kuno, S. (1987). *Functional syntax: Anaphora, discourse and empathy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lakoff, G. (1971). *Irregularity in syntax.* New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Menuzzi, S. (1999). *Binding theory and pronominal anaphora in Brazilian Portuguese.* The Hague: Holland Academic Graphics. (LOT Dissertations series, vol. 30)

Pesetsky, D. (1998). Some optimality principles of sentence pronunciation. In P. Barbosa, et al. (Eds.), *Is the best good enough?* (pp. 337-383). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Pollard, C., & Sag, I. A. (1992). Anaphors in English and the scope of binding theory. *Linguistic Inquiry, 23*, 261-303.

Prince, A., & Smolensky, P. (1993). *Optimality theory: Constraint interaction in generative grammar.* Unpublished manuscript, Rutgers University/University of Colorado.

Reinhart, T. (1983). *Anaphora and semantic interpretation.* Kent, UK: Croom Helm (Croom Helm Linguistic series).

Reinhart, T., & Reuland, E. (1993). Reflexivity. *Linguistic Inquiry, 24*, 657-720.

Riddle, E., Sheituch, G., & Ziv, Y. (1977). Pseudo-passivization: On the role of pragmatics in determining rule unity. *Studies in Linguistic Sciences, 7*:1, 147-156.

Rooth, M. (1985). *Association with focus.* Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Safir, K. (1991). Implied non-coreference & the pattern of anaphora. Ms., Rutgers University, appeared in *Linguistics & philosophy*.

Safir, Ken (1992) Implied non-coreference and the pattern of anaphora. *Linguistics and philosophy 15*, 1-52.

Schiffrin, D. (1994). *Approaches to discourse*. Oxford, England: Blackwell.

Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986). *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Zribi-Hertz, A. (1995). Emphatic or reflexive? *Journal of Linguistics, 31*, 333-374.