Abstract

This paper, written from the perspective of systemic functional linguistics, responds to a request from Schegloff for a grammar of action. In particular, it reviews Halliday’s work on the association between types of meaning and types of structure, developing especially his notion of prosodic realisation patterns for interpersonal meaning. Prosodic structuring principles from phonology and discourse are considered, but the focus is on grammar and the marginalisation of interpersonal meaning by constituency analysis. Alternative forms of representation are considered for action-oriented grammar in English and Tagalog.

Key words: functional linguistics; prosodic structure; interpersonal meaning

1. Departure

In this paper I will explore an idea of Halliday’s in relation to a challenge by Schegloff, having to do with the shaping of a grammar that is oriented to negotiation. In Schegloff’s terms,
What is needed then, is to relax the stranglehold of predication on our understanding of language, and especially on talk-in-interaction... the counterpart to predication in talk-in-interaction is the move, the action, the activity, and it is that which gives a TCU [Turn Construction Unit] (without respect to its size or mode of realisation) its recognisable unit status, the consequentiality of its possible completion, and the omnirelevant action thematics of its analysis - why that now... in the quotidian settings of interaction, it is the parameters of action - not proposition - which need to be formative... rather than starting with propositional forms and overlaying action operators, our primary characterisations need to capture the action(s) embodied in a burst of language... (Schegloff, 1996, pp. 111-113)

Comparing Halliday (1979) (who would refer to the meaning construed by predications as experiential, and by actions as interpersonal; see also Halliday 1970a, 1982a, 1984),

The interpersonal component of meaning is the speaker’s ongoing intrusion into the speech situation. It is his perspective on the exchange, his assigning and acting out of speech roles. Interpersonal meanings cannot easily be expressed as configurations of discrete elements... The essence of the meaning potential of this part of the semantic system is that most of the options are associated with the act of meaning as a whole... this interpersonal meaning...is strung throughout the clause as a continuous motif or colouring... the effect is cumulative... we shall refer to this type of realisation as ‘prosodic’, since the meaning is distributed like a prosody throughout a continuous stretch of discourse... (Halliday, 1979, pp. 66-67)
2. Prosody around grammar

Halliday inherits the term prosodic from his teacher Firth, who used it to refer to a style of phonological analysis that concentrated on foregrounding features that could be treated as supra-segmental (prosodies), leaving localised segmental features to be specified as phonemic units at a final stage in the description (Palmer, 1970; Waterson, 1987; see also Mitchell, 1957/1975 on generic structure). Waterson (1956) for example, in her discussion of Turkish, recognises a \text{y} prosody characterising words having front vowels and consonants with some degree of palatalisation in opposition to a \text{w} prosody characterising words with back vowels and consonants which are not palatalised. Although she is dealing with what is typically referred to as ‘vowel’ harmony, Waterson treats the effect of the prosodies on phonematic units, whether vowels or consonants, as part of her phonological description — the prosodies are introduced and presented diagrammatically as affecting the phonological ‘word’ as a whole.

Halliday’s own work on rhythm and intonation in English (1967, 1970b) extends this tradition (see also Prakasam, 1987, 1992). His tone analysis is especially relevant since tone in part realises interpersonal meaning associated with the \text{mood} of a clause. Like Waterson, Halliday operates in analogue (as opposed to digital) terms - with tones described and diagrammed as continuous pitch movements ranging over the whole of a tone group. What is most significant here is the orientation in theory and representation to non-digital patterns of realisation, in contrast to the digital focus of phonemic analysis (including the segmental analysis of tone as sequences of pitch phonemes).

Turning from phonology to discourse, we can recognise comparable patterns of realisation whereby meanings sprawl across a text, establishing a mood (Martin, 1996a). In the following excerpt from the ‘snaggy’ Dad section of a parents magazine, affectual meanings are construed throughout the text, in an outpouring of feeling that makes us long perhaps for the days when men didn’t have feelings, or if they did, refrained from expressing them :-).
At last, you are in dreamland. My Goddess of Laughter, the Princess-of-all-that-is-Good. Your skin so smooth and soft. The squeals of sheer and utter joy that you unleashed only a few hours ago echo in my mind. I had to come and look at you. It is all I can do not to reach out and kiss you. But my feelings can’t afford for you to wake again. You cried so hard after we put you down. My heart hurt. It was all I could do not to rush to your side. And then you screamed your cry. I had to come to your door. You had no idea, but I was only feet away. Wanting, wanting to hold you in my arms. You would have settled within seconds - but it would have been for my benefit, not yours. [Mother & Baby June/July 1994 Sydney. The Dad Department.]

Not all texts establish a mood in this way of course. It depends on the genre. White (1997) shows that western news stories regularly begin with a splash of evaluative meaning that sets the stage for the more ‘objective’ material that follows (for related patterns see also Eggins & Slade, 1997, Horvath & Eggins, 1995, Iedema, Feez & White, 1994):

Riots sweep Tahiti
RIOTERS carved a blazing trail of destruction through the paradise island of Tahiti yesterday in a wave of fury sparked by French nuclear bomb tests. Tahiti airport was left a smouldering wreck after more than 1000 protesters attacked riot police, drove a mechanical digger through the terminal and set the building alight. France sent in tough Foreign Legion troops as riots spread to the nearby capital, Papeete. Protesters looted shops, set a perfume store on fire and stoned an office building and the Territorial Assembly building. Opposition to nuclear testing swept around the globe just a day after France exploded the first of up to eight bombs at Mururoa atoll, also in French controlled Polynesia.
Demonstrations included one by more than 10,000 people in Chile.
The riots in Tahiti are believed to have involved independence activists and trade unions.
Foreign Affairs Minister Gareth Evans said yesterday: ‘France has really reaped what it has sown.’
[Telegraph Mirror, Sydney, 8 September 1995]

Conversely, a writer may delay explicitly evaluating text until the meanings to be evaluated have been established. Here is an excerpt from the field notes of Ong Tot Oppong, Investigator, of the first Ekumenical landing party on Gethen/Winter, Cycle 93 E.Y. 1448 - a planet where people assume a biological gender irregularly, and only for purposes of lovemaking. It is not until the end of the passage that the Investigator offers an explicit appraisal of this state of affairs to share with readers:

The following must go into my finished Directives: When you meet a Gethenian you cannot and must not do what a bisexual naturally does, which is to cast him in the role of Man or Woman, while adopting towards him a corresponding role dependent on your expectations of the patterned or possible interactions between persons of the same or opposite sex. Our entire pattern of socio-sexual interaction is nonexistent here. They cannot play the game. They do not see one another as men or women. This is almost impossible for our imagination to accept. What is the first question we ask about a newborn baby?

Yet you cannot think of a Gethenian as ‘it’. They are not neuters. They are potentials, or integrals. Lacking the Karhidish ‘human pronoun’ used for persons in somer, I must say ‘he’, for the same reasons we used the masculine pronoun in referring to a transcendent god: it is less defined, less
specific, than the neuter or feminine. But the very use of the pronoun in my thoughts leads me continually to forget that the Karhider I am with is not a man, but a manwoman. The First Mobile, if one is sent, must be warned that unless he is very self-assured, or senile, his pride will suffer. A man wants his virility regarded, a woman wanted her femininity appreciated, however indirect and subtle the indications of regard and appreciation. On Winter they will not exist. One is respected and judged only as a human being. It is an appalling experience.


In either case it seems reasonable to argue that the initial and final evaluations determine the tone of the text as a whole, prospectively as a kind of higher order Theme (where I’m coming from) or retrospectively as a kind of higher order New (what I’ve had to say) (Martin, 1992a, 1995a, 1996b, 2002). The effect in part is perhaps not unlike that of the Firthians’ juncture prosodies, which demarcated boundaries in phonological analysis; even more to the point is Halliday’s prosodic analysis of the Chinese syllable (1992), which uses a complementarity of initial and final prosodies to progressively and regressively determine medial vocalic values.

In other genres the tone may be established in a central stage, percolating through a text from this anchoring hub. Labov and Waletzky’s 1967 description of evaluation and narratives of personal experience is of this kind (cf. Labov, 1972, 1982, 1984; Martin, 1997; Martin & Plum, 1997; Rothery & Stenglin, 1997), with a possibly non-discrete Evaluation stage making the point of the story, perhaps with reinforcement elsewhere, particularly in the Orientation and Coda:

Abstract
They’re very gentle [Staffordshire bull-terriers; GP]. For arguments sake, like the big boy is an example.
Prosodic 'structure': grammar for...

Orientation
We walked through the middle of Fairfield back when he was about two years old. And there was a fellow in the middle of the street, whacking his little boy. The boy was about four or five years old and he was whacking the daylights out of him. And I thought to meself, "Poor little bugger", you know.

Complication
And as I walked past, the dog went ‘whack’ and grabbed the bloke on the hand. Never broke the skin or anything; just grabbed him on the hand.

Evaluation
I said, "Sorry, mate." I says, "It’s you smacking the kid; he doesn’t like you smack kids." He said, "I’m not smacking the kid." So I pat the dog on the nose; I said, “Let go, let go.” I says, “Come on. Sorry, mate, forget it.” He said, “I’m not going to smack the kid, don’t worry.”

Resolution
And as I walked away, the dog kept walking and all he was doing was walking and looking back at the bloke to make sure he wasn’t going to touch the kid again.

Coda
He just sensed that it was unnecessary because the bloke was... Like smacking a kid is smacking a kid, but when you whack the living daylights out of him, it’s a different sort of thing. [Plum 1988; Vol. II, 213.]

Labov’s own diagram (Figure 1 below) is a reflection on the prosodic nature of realisation of this kind.

This quick tour of some relevant phonological and discursive patterns could not have been more brief. Hopefully it simply makes the point that prosody is a common structuring motif across strata in language, and that some linguists have tried to deal with it in its own terms (as opposed to digitalising it) with respect to both theory and
representation (for discussion of prosody in exchange structure see Martin, 2000b). What about grammar?

Figure 1: Dispersed evaluation in narrative (Labov, 1972, p. 369)

3. Prosody in grammar

In drawing attention to the significance of prosodic realisation in grammar, functional linguists have typically turned to systems involving modality or attitude for exemplification (Halliday, 1979, Poynton, 1984, Martin, 2000a, b). In a response move like *I suppose he might possibly have, mightn’t he?*, low probability is anchored in the modal verb *might* (which is echoed in the tag - *mightn’t*), reinforced through the modal adjunct *possibly*, and anticipated by the first person process of cognition *I suppose* (which is not the source of the tag, precisely because it is part of the construal of modality; see Halliday,
1982a, 1985a/1994; Martin, 1995b on interpersonal metaphors of this kind).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I suppose</th>
<th>he</th>
<th>might</th>
<th>possibly</th>
<th>have</th>
<th>mightn't</th>
<th>he</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>projecting</td>
<td></td>
<td>modal verb</td>
<td>modal adjunct</td>
<td></td>
<td>modal verb (+neg)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mental process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, at group rank, Poynton (1984, 1985, 1996) draws attention to amplified attitudinal groups:

‘That,’ said her spouse, ‘is a lie.’
‘It’s the truth,’ said she.
‘It’s a dirty rotten stinking lousy bloody low filthy two-faced lie,’ he amplified. (Rohan 1963 Down by the Dockside)

Amplified indeed! Similar phenomena are attested at word rank, with respect to naming; from Poynton (1984), using an example from British English - Gregsypookins involves five steps of ‘diminutive’ endearment (Greg-s-y-poo-kin-s).

Typologically, the range of interpersonal meanings involved in prosodic realisation is of some interest. The relevant ‘clause’ meanings would seem to include modality, polarity, mood, honorification1 and attitude - at this stage, I’d prefer not to close the list. Prosodic modality was illustrated for English above; the prosodic nature of English polarity is foregrounded in nonstandard dialects where negative polarity conditions the realisation of indefinite deixis as no (instead of standard any):

I can’t get no satisfaction (from no-one no-where...).

This pattern of opportunistic realisation recalls vowel harmony in phonology — the ‘affect anything you can’ motif. With metaphorical modalities like the I suppose illustrated above, the prosody of negation may in fact be initiated in the projecting mental process clause2 (since
it is the move as a whole that is negative, and the projecting clause is not actually a predication; Halliday, 1970c, 1985a):

I don’t suppose I’ll get any satisfaction (from anyone anywhere...).

Prosodic honorification can be illustrated from Tagalog (cf. Bautista, 1979). In the following example deference is manifested through the ‘polite’ form of imperative mood (paki-), the respect enclitic ho, the use of 2nd person plural for singular address (ninyo instead of singular mo) and the title plus last name vocative (Mang Romano).

Paki- libing ho ninyo ang bankay, Mang Romano.
polite prefix bury respect you-pl T3 body Mr
‘Please bury the body, Mr Romano, sir.’

Mood distinctions (declarative/interrogative/imperative) are also commonly reinforced across segments. Tagalog wh- interrogatives for example commonly contain both a fronted wh-word and the enclitic ba used for polar interrogatives:

bakit ba siya tumakbo nang mabilis?
why ? s/he ran fast
‘Why did she run so fast?’

Similarly the modulated nature of English tags for imperatives reinforces the imperative mood signalled earlier in the clause by the non-finite verbal group (and, typically, the missing Subject) — Come here, won’t you? Similar mood and tag reinforcement is found for Australian polar interrogatives — Is that for me, is it? Tone of course reinforces these prosodic contours across languages.

Resources for construing attitude are concentrated at group/phrase rank, especially in nominal groups, but may be prefaced clausally by expletives which flag the intensity of the evaluation to come, and
possibly its positive or negative disposition (cf. Goodwin, 1996 on response cries):

Christ those fucking bastards are really shitting me right off.

Their reinforcement of exclamative mood might also be interpreted as a clause prosody:

Wow, what an amazing sunset that is!

As noted, at lower ranks prosody is strongly associated with attitude. Endearment affixation at word rank was noted above. In nominal groups attitude may affect deixis (my vs you), along with description and classification:

positive: my lovely little bundle of a boy [hugging]
negative: you naughty little bugger [admonishing]

The intensity of gradable items may be prosodically strengthened (Martin, 1992a, 2000a):

you really really shit me
a very very stupid shot

Superlatives can be further uniquified, using any to construe prosodic domain (cf. English polarity above):

the best six I seen anyone hit anywhere at any time

And measure can be maximised through qualification in a related fashion - recalling Bogart:

Of all the gin joints in all the towns in all the world, she walks into mine.
Attitudinal prosodies colour the nominal group as a whole as positive or negative (a lovely home/a grotty hovel) and tell us how to read descriptions and classifications which aren’t explicitly attitudinal (Martin, 1992a): a spacious/cavernous house with twenty rooms. The prosody may even force us to reread an item which might otherwise be expected to carry opposite connotations — you dear old bastard, how the hell are you?

Also of typological interest is the precise nature of prosodic realisation (Caffarel, Martin & Matthiessen, in press)—what are the mechanisms that languages use to construct prosodies? Iteration\(^1\) is perhaps the most prominent strategy, either of the same item (very very tired) or the same meaning (certainly must go).

Another resource involves realisations that make use of more than one segment. Caffarel (1995) notes the discontinuous realisation of polarity in French (ne...pas) - il n’est pas arrivé; in addition there is the inversion of Subject with part or all of the verb to signal interrogative in French - il est arrivé/est-il arrivé/arrive-t-il. As with English, the parts of the prosody are bonded through number and person - with ‘agreement’ interpretable as a grammatical strategy for showing that the parts are one interpersonal meaning as well as two experiential ones. Beyond this of course we have the relation of interpersonally charged segments such as Subject in English to reflexives, floating quantifiers, tags and the like; and various constraining interactions among mood, modality, polarity and tags to account for (i.e. which moods go with which modalities with which polarities with which kinds of tag). So perhaps the second motif we need to recognise is the construal of prosody through multi-segmental and possibly discontinuous forms of realisation - through dispersed realisation\(^5\) shall we say?

On the theme of discontinuity, we should perhaps also note in passing here the lack of respect that interpersonal meanings may display for the integrity of syntagms realising other kinds of meaning. English swearing provides well known examples: fan-bloody-tastic and the like. Martin (1990) exemplifies various types of interruption in Tagalog, including:
interrupted parataxis (co-ordination):

\textit{mabuti daw, malakas at masaya siya}

well report strong & happy s/he

‘Reportedly she’s okay, strong and happy.’

interrupted nominal modification:

\textit{ilan bababababa namannamannamannamannaman kayokayokayokayokayo -ng magkapatid}

how many ? contrast you-pl LK sibling

‘But how many siblings (do you have)?’

Although we are concentrating on the grammaticisation of prosody here, we shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that in dialogue the ranging scope of interpersonal meanings is ongoingly being reinforced by intonation and other ‘paralinguistic’ features — which we should probably not be marginalising by calling them paralinguistic. Indeed, in sign language (Johnston, 1992/1996), the face rather than the hands may be the primary site for the construal of interpersonal meaning throughout a move; and in early spoken language development (Halliday, 1975, Painter, 1984) gesture or voice quality may be used instead of grammar — as when my younger son, just two, used to shake his head or use a whining tone to distinguish ‘I want it’ from ‘I don’t want it’ (realised identically in his grammar as \textit{i like it}).

Finally, it is of some typological interest where in a clause languages ‘anchor’ their interpersonal meaning, establishing a centre from which iterated realisations may reverberate prosodically as illustrated above — something which seems sensitive to the location of the process in the textured unfolding of the clause (initial, medial or final; VO/S, SVO, SOV if you will). The affinity between interpersonal meanings and this experiential segment seems a natural one across languages — the more so perhaps if the language uses verbs across process types, including relational clauses (of existentiality, attribution, possession and identification). Mood, modality, polarity and honorification are commonly realised through verbal affixes, enclitic
particles, dependent ‘auxiliary’ verbs and/or the participation of the process or part of it in a distinctive syntagm - associations which have been exemplified above.

This affinity may be in part related to the utility of associating meanings which range across the clause with its experiential hub, the process (thereby rendering it the ‘nub’ of the argument). Beyond this, there is a natural association between instantiation and arguability, so that if a clause is made finite to register the manifestation of an event, it is at the same time rendered a negotiable interact. In other words, if we take a Tagalog nominalisation like the following:

(ang) pagkaintindi ng babae ng tanong (sa klase)
T understanding woman question class
‘a woman’s understanding of questions (in class)’

And make it finite to show that the process took place:

naintindihan ng babae ang tanong
understood woman T question
‘The woman understood the question.’

Then we simultaneously construe the event as an interact which can function as a move in dialogue. In some sense then instantiation and negotiability harmonise, so the natural place to realise them together is on the process (a clause’s main verb).

Thus process initial languages like Tagalog tend to favour first position as far as realisations of interpersonal meaning are concerned. Aspects of mood and modality are affixed on the process, which if actually initial will attract enclitic particles realising mood, modality, honorification and evidentiality. The process may however be preceded by a clause initial segment realising wh, modality, negation or exclamation, and enclitics will tend to be attracted away from the process towards these earlier interpersonally charged meanings (enclitics in Tagalog include textual particles, such as the pa rin below):
‘Didn’t Cory win (come through) anyway, ma’am?’

Process final languages like Japanese on the other hand tend to favour last position, with interpersonal meanings piling up at the end of the clause. An example from Teruya (1996, in press):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amerika ni</th>
<th>ik-</th>
<th>ana-</th>
<th>kereba-</th>
<th>narana-</th>
<th>katta-</th>
<th>noshoo</th>
<th>ka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>go</td>
<td>neg.</td>
<td>conditional</td>
<td>must</td>
<td>past</td>
<td>emphasis; formal; suppositive</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘Did he have to go to America?’

From a grammatical perspective then first and last position are being exploited to establish interpersonal meanings as meanings whose domain is the whole of the clause. From a discourse semantic perspective first and last position are attractive since from a dialogic perspective first position announces where a speaker is coming from (possibly in response to another) while last position (potentially) hands over the move for repartee. We should note here that the predisposition to first and last position in process initial and final languages is only a tendency, perhaps because from a discourse perspective the other end of the clause always has some pull. Thus Tagalog uses final position for tags (which can however be realised initially!), vocatives (which may be realised elsewhere) and a handful of interpersonally oriented sentence final particles (for an outline of interpersonal meaning in Tagalog see Martin, 1990). Perhaps the turn-taking pull of final position is stronger, so that process final languages will have a stronger concentration of interpersonal meanings in final position than process initial languages do in first.

Process medial languages like French and English present a less clear picture (cf. medial Evaluation in narrative; Figure 1 above).
Interpersonal meanings will cluster around process — Caffarel (1995) offers a functional account for French of interpersonal affixation, enclitics, modal verbs and mood oriented syntagms involving the process. In addition, there may be a mix of clause initial (vocatives, wh interrogative and exclamative...) and clause final (tags, particles...) elements. Of course there are other variables to take into account. In a recent presentation Halliday introduced the relatively large number of sentence final particles in Cantonese (up to 50 on one reckoning, not including combinations; cf. Gibbons, 1980), a quantity which seems related to the fact that Cantonese uses up so much pitch movement experientially to distinguish words that it has very little intonation left over for interpersonal use. And we should keep in mind amidst this tour of ‘citation’ forms that relative position becomes something of a moot point in moves which consist entirely of interpersonal meanings. The Tagalog response below is first, medial and last:

\[
\text{k-um-ain ki na} \\
\text{ate you begun}
\]

‘Have you eaten \text{(already)}?’

\[
\text{hind p na nga ho eh} \\
\text{neg not begun intensive respect contrary to expectation}
\]

‘Certainly not yet ma’am.’

If we take, following Halliday (e.g. 1979, 1985a) first and last position in the clause as peaks of textual prominence, and the process as experiential nucleus, then it looks as if languages tend to establish interpersonal meanings as prosodic by associating them with centres of meaning of other kinds (textual and experiential). The domain of the interpersonal meaning is thus in a sense established by implication — the meaning ranges over the whole clause because it comes before the other meanings or after them, or at their hub. Iterated realisation can
then be deployed where needed, to make explicit and reinforce this implied domain.

An alternative strategy for making explicit the scope of interpersonal meanings is deployed in Tagalog for a range of interpersonal meanings, including modality, negation and exclamation (Martin, 1995c). This involves setting up the interpersonal meaning in question as head of the clause and explicitly depending the rest of the clause on it through Tagalog’s hypotaxis particle (the linker *na*/-*ng*):

```
ayaw na nga sana -ng mag-opisina
not want begun intensive optative LK office
'I really don’t want to go to work any more.'
```

English metaphorical modalities, such as *I suppose* above, work in the same way, establishing the modality as dominant and the ensuing projected clause as its dependent domain. In this case, what Halliday (e.g. 1985a) refers to as a logical structure has been deployed for interpersonal ends.

In sum then it appears that prosody in grammar tends to establish itself through association with centres of other kinds (textual peaks, experiential nucleus, logical head). This happens because interpersonal structure has to reconcile itself with structures of other kinds (textual, experiential and logical). Unlike phonology, there is no separate band of phonation (i.e. intonation) alongside segmentation (syllabic structure). So in the unmarked case domain has to be implied — and possibly amplified through iteration and dispersal, in the marked case, as required.

4. **Representation**

Firth (e.g. 1957a) is well known for his rhetorical positioning of phonemic analysis as the work of linguists who have taken alphabetic writing systems as the basis of their own phonological theory. And some linguists have wrestled with the writing based constituency
metaphor whereby morphemes are described as consisting of phonemes (Hockett, 1961, Lamb, 1966) — just as written words consist of letters on the page. Those side currents of linguistic theory which have preferred realisation to consistency as a model of relations between levels have done little to dislodge the dominance of constituency metaphors in grammatical analysis, with the result that grammars are by and large built up around constituency. Following Halliday (1979), who associates constituency with one kind of meaning, the experiential, this means that meanings of other kinds, including interpersonal ones are likely to be marginalised (Ochs, 1989, Poynton, 1990, 2000). The stranglehold of predication, referred to by Schegloff above, is in fact the stranglehold of constituency — of part-to-whole metaphors of language in theory and thus representation.

Let’s look at just one example of this and one avenue of renovation. Schachter and Otanes (1972) propose the following constituency structure for what they term basic sentences in Tagalog.

A basic sentence consists of the terms of a Predicate (which may be verbal, nominal or adjectival) and a Topic (which typically follows); and it may include as well a Movable Adverb whose position, as its name implies, is not fixed. Additional constituency is introduced via the Predicate; the structure for a transitive verbal Predicate for example is developed as in Fig. 3.
This constituency analysis provides the basis for the overall organisation of Schachter and Otanes’s grammar. A chapter on pronunciation is followed by one on basic sentence structure. Subsequently nominals are considered (potential Topics or Predicates), then adjectivals (potential Predicates without case affixes), verbals (potential Predicates with case affixes) and adverbials (non-Topics and non-Predicates). The final chapter is concerned with derived and minor sentence structures:

1. Pronunciation
2. Basic sentence structure [introducing constituency]
3. Nominals and their expansions [potential Topics (certain Predicates)]
4. Adjectivals and their expansions [Predicates without case affixes]
5. Verbals and their expansions [Predicates with case affixes]
6. Adverbials and their expansions [non-Topics/Predicates]
7. Derived and minor sentence structures [left-overs]
The effect of a constituency based organisation of this kind is to disperse discussion of interpersonal meaning throughout the grammar, and further, to marginalise it so that it enters the discussions near or at the end of each chapter:

1. Intonation (section 28 - out of 30)
2. Interpersonal adverbs (section 14 - out of 15)
3. Enclitic behaviour of pronouns (section 29 - out of 29)
4. Exclamatives (section 24 - out of 24)
5. Imperatives (section 30 - out of 30)
6. Sentence final particles (section 13 - followed by adverbial clauses)

In order to pull these meanings together and give them some integrity, it is necessary to move beyond constituency. One strategy for this is build into our grammatics methods of analysis that are structurally neutral. In SFL this is done by modelling paradigmatic relations as networks of options from which syntagmatic configurations are derived. Interpersonal meaning can then be modelled as systems of choice as naturally as experiential, textual or logical meaning — as in Fig. 4 below. This strategy differs from the one generally adopted in linguistics which tries to solve problems with constituency representation by providing additional layers of constituency representation — in tandem or at a deeper level in the grammar, or on another stratum (semantics, or even pragmatics). Adding more of something that doesn’t work may not be the best solution in the long term, especially where different kinds of realisation construing different kinds of meaning are at the heart of the difficulties.

Modelling interpersonal meaning in a system network doesn’t solve the problem of representing its realisations, which becomes an important issue where text analysis is concerned.
Prosodic ‘structure’: grammar for...

positive negative

affirmative

interrogative

exclamative

declarative

polar

‘wh’

probability

indictative

modalised

intensity

usuality

appearance

imperative

speaker (oblative)

speaker & addressee (hortative)

addresssee (jussive)

non-interlocutor (optative)

modulate

inclination

obligation

ability

Fig 4: Tagalog mood (as a system of options)
Halliday (1985a) fudges the issue by using a kind of constituency representation for interpersonal structure, dividing a clause into Mood and Residue; his Mood element includes the Subject, Finite (realising tense/modality) and Modal adjuncts — just those parts needed to negotiate a move in dialogue:

Well an argument isn’t just contradiction.
- It can be.
- No, it can’t. [from Monty Python’s Flying Circus]

His Residue constitutes the domain of the meanings established in the Mood segment. This can be made explicit diagrammatically as in Fig. 5, by drawing the prosody as a line ranging over the Residue and instantiated at appropriate points of reverberation. The potential of this imaging is probably limited, since in effect what we are doing is renovating constituency representation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mood</th>
<th>Residue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Finite: neg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you don’t get no publicity for no fights

Fig. 5: Negative polarity as a prosody

Van Valin’s (1993) representational strategy for interpersonal kinds of meaning is similar (for discussion of comparable approaches in European functional grammar see Dik et al., 1990; Harder, 1999). Basic clause constituency is established on experiential grounds and the domain of operators is projected across the appropriate experiential segment (core, nucleus, clause). This is certainly an improvement on purely compositional accounts which treat interpersonal meanings as deep immediate constituents of the unit over whose meaning they ranged, but, as with Halliday, the representation remains basically a segmental one, with operators modifying units.
A few years ago (Martin, 1990), out of exasperation with the lag between theory and representation in SFL work on interpersonal meaning, I experimented with diagramming which might be used to represent interpersonal structure in Tagalog (for SFL work on images which got me thinking more clearly about representation see Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996; Lemke, 1998). I’ll review a few of these crudités here. **Enclitics**, both interpersonal and textual since they function as a group, were treated as an interpersonal prosody (potentially discontinuous) represented through a horizontal line with an arrow indicating the pre-enclitic element they were attracted to.

\[
\text{naglaba na ako sa labas}
\]

‘I’ve already done the laundry outside’

---

**Mood** was represented through traditional orthographic markers for the indicative: . ? ! ; for imperatives a + sign was appropriated (symbolising that an exchange of goods or services is expected to ensue). These markers were placed after the last point at which enclitics were or could have been realised, by which point the MOOD of the clause will have been established. This is illustrated for interrogative mood below.

\[
naglaba ba ako sa labas
\]

‘Have I already done the laundry outside’
ii. MOOD (?! + •)

Interpersonal pre-enclitics lend themselves to a more segmental labelling, once a directional enclitic prosody is established marking them as pre-enclitic. It also seemed useful by this point to group together the interpersonal meanings positioning the clause, which I undertook with a wedge (which would accordingly get taller the more interpersonal meanings were involved and thus gives a rough measure of the degree to which the front of the clause is interpersonally charged).

hindi ako naglaba sa labas

neg. I washed outside

“I didn’t do the laundry outside.”

iii. interpersonal pre-enclitics

Finally I used a dependency arrow for cases in which a pre-enclitic constructed itself as head of the clause, hypotactically depending its domain.
iv. taxis

Other classes of interpersonal meaning which are not pre-enclitic (i.e. vocative, interjection, modulation) can be added to the picture, increasing the 'volume' of the interpersonal charge.

Taking into account the possibility of additional interpersonal meanings at the end of the clause, the diagramming presents the interpersonal structure of a move as a prosodic wave:
Perhaps exasperation got the better of me... I don’t know. But the challenge to find more natural forms of representation for interpersonal meaning remains. It may be that we need something less static than diagrams — moving images perhaps — even more so once we take the to and fro of these meanings in dialogue into account. Concerning this I hope Matthiessen and his computational colleagues will soon have more to say (Bateman, 1989; Matthiessen & Bateman, 1991).

Semantically, the challenge is to develop a grammatics in which interpersonal meaning is neither marginalised, nor construed as riding the back of predication, but as a text driving meaning in its own right. Shifting our horizons to discourse for a moment, consider the following panegyric proffered by Liz Taylor for Michael Jackson during a period when charges concerning his sexuality were becoming very expensive to off-load.


Michael Jackson is, indeed, an international favourite for all ages, and incredible force of incredible energy. In the art of music, he is a pacesetter for quality of production, in the vanguard for high standards of entertainment. What makes Michael more unique may be the fact that all of his accomplishments, his rewards, have not altered his
sensitivity and concern for the welfare of others, or his intense caring and love for his family and friends, and especially all the children of the world over. He is filled with deep emotions that create an unearthly, special, innocent, childlike, wise man that is Michael Jackson. He is so giving of himself that, at times, he leaves very little to protect that beautiful inner core that is the essence of him. I think Michael appeals to the child in all of us. He has the quality of innocence that we would all like to obtain or have kept.

I think Michael is like litmus paper. He is always trying to learn. He has one of the sharpest wits, he is intelligent, and he is cunning — that is a strange word to use about him, because it implies deviousness and he is one of the least devious people I have ever met in my life...

The point of a text of this kind is to praise. Appropriate predications are selected to accommodate the positive evaluations. It’s saying something nice that drives the text along. This is why the term cunning gives us (and Liz Taylor) pause. We know from the genre and the prosody of positive appraisal that it is to be read positively... so Taylor could have slipped it in and left things at that. But she stops to clarify that she didn’t mean ‘devious’... a timely manoeuvre, given the doubts as to Jackson’s credibility at the time; she plays against the prosody to create an opportunity to publicly testify on behalf of her friend. In this kind of text evaluations are more than connotations; they comprise the telos of the text — a telos for which predications are merely a vehicle, pegs to hang appraisal on (cf. Lemke, 1992, Martin, 1995b, 1996a, in press, Thibault, 1992, 1995).

The complementarity of action driven and proposition driven text is foregrounded in a well known scene from the first Monty Python film, where a client expects an argument and the server offers contradiction. The client, in other words, has paid for ideational telos and gets interpersonal telos in return - as Halliday’s Mood function is deployed to parry complaints (from Martin, 1992b).
- I came here for a good argument.
- No, you didn’t. You came here for an argument.
- Well, an argument isn’t just contradiction.
- It can be.
- No it can’t. An argument is a connected series of statements intended to establish a proposition.
- No it isn’t.
- Yes it is...

As long as we model interpersonal meanings as simply modifying or operating on experiential ones, we’ll marginalise their telos (Martin, 2000b), and the power and solidarity they negotiate across texts, whatever their mode.

5. Types of structure

Schegloff (1996, p. 13) comments that “there is every reason to suspect that grammar for talk implementing action is quite different from grammar for talk expressing propositions. That we may not yet have much of a clue as to what such grammar(s) look(s) like does not change the suspicion, but may encourage the sort of reaching that promotes the possibility of grammars rather than a grammar.” His call for different grammars for action and propositions recalls Firth (1957b), who felt that grammars should be proposed on a register specific basis. Halliday’s response to this was to build grammars for Chinese, and later English, which generalised across contexts (as Firth’s phonological descriptions had done), but which could be made sensitive to registerial differences by building context into the model as a more abstract level of social semiotic organisation (e.g. Halliday, 1978; for exemplification see Caffarel, 1992 on tense in relation to register in French).

More to the point perhaps is Halliday’s suggestion that action and proposition not be construed as different registers, but as simultaneous dimensions of every register — of every clause in fact. It is this that gives rise to his theory of metafunctions, the generalised uses of language whereby action (interpersonal meaning) and proposition
(ideational meaning) are woven together as a wave of information (textual meaning) in every move we make (Matthiessen, 1988, 1992, 1995, McGregor, 1990). In a model of this kind, interpersonal meaning negotiates social reality, ideational meaning construes the picture of the world around us we see as natural, and textual meaning phases these together into consumable packages of relevant information (Martin, 1991).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERPERSONAL</th>
<th>‘reality construal’</th>
<th>‘work done’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDEATIONAL (logical, experiential)</td>
<td>‘natural’ reality</td>
<td>(observer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXTUAL</td>
<td>semiotic reality</td>
<td>(relevance)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beyond this, as outlined above for interpersonal meaning, Halliday has suggested that these different kinds of meaning engender different kinds of structure (Halliday 1970b, 1974, 1979, 1981a, 1981b, 1982b). Various terms have been used for these - I’ll adopt the alliterative prosodic, particulate and periodic here (cf. Pike, e.g. 1982, on particle, wave and field):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>terms here</th>
<th>Halliday 1985a</th>
<th>Halliday 1979</th>
<th>Matthiessen 1988</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>prosodic</td>
<td>prosodic</td>
<td>prosodic</td>
<td>prosody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>particulate</td>
<td>segmental</td>
<td>elemental/constituent</td>
<td>constituency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>periodic</td>
<td>culminative</td>
<td>culminative/periodic</td>
<td>pulse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Halliday (e.g. 1979, 1985a) has associated particulate meaning of the experiential kind with constituency and that of the logical type with interdependency (cf. Beaman, 1984, Matthiessen & Thompson, 1989, Torsello, 1996). In my own work (Martin 1995a, 1996b, c), mainly as a result of working on generic structure in English and case relations in Tagalog, I have preferred to associate experiential meaning with what might be called orbital structure — structure with a nucleus and arrays of more or less dependent satellites (cf. the nucleus, core, periphery trajectory of Role and Reference Grammar or Dik’s layers). On this basis we can treat orbital (mono-nuclear) and serial (multi-nuclear) as
the appropriate complementarities for ideational meaning (see also Iedema, Feez & White, 1994; Iedema 1995, 1997):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of structure</th>
<th>Type of meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>particulate</td>
<td>ideational meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- orbital</td>
<td>- experiential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[mono-nuclear]</td>
<td>- logical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- serial</td>
<td>interpersonal meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[multi-nuclear]</td>
<td>textual meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prosodic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>periodic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perhaps a metafunctionally organised model of this kind represents a kind of compromise position between Schegloff and Firth’s call for distinct grammars for different registers, and the contemporary hegemony of constituency based grammars formulated in strictly particulate terms (and the attendant propositional bias this entails). And it argues perhaps for models of language (such as SFL or tagmemics) which generalise architecture across levels of abstraction (phonology, lexicogrammar, discourse semantics, context) but which allow for different kinds of ‘structure’ on each level so that divergent types of realisation can be accommodated — as opposed to models which deploy different types of architecture across levels (phonology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics) but tend to focus on just one kind of structure at a given level of abstraction from phonic substance.
6. Grammar for interaction

Thus far in life I’ve consumed more grammar than I’ve made, since I’ve spent more time working on English texts than on the Tagalog clause. As a discourse oriented consumer of English grammar I want something I can use to analyse texts — something rich and revealing and also something practical. My experience of grammarians over the years, however, is that needs of this kind are not a priority. Grammarians tend to be idealists... they like to run a tight ship. This makes them exporters... if something doesn’t fit, ship it out - send it to semantics, or pragmatics or performance or wherever. At worst, this reduces grammar to a concern with form, with all meaning elided; in this guise you don’t need a grammar for discourse analysis — you have to turn elsewhere. Where meaning is let in, it’s propositional meaning that runs the show since it lends itself to constituency representation and is easier to associate with small manageable segments like words (in a lexicon); in this guise you don’t have a grammar for talk, as Schegloff (1996) complains. Either way it’s constituency that’s locking the gates, and institutional politics determines the extent to which we’ve thrown away the key.

Since it’s Schegloff’s challenge I’m responding to here, let me say that I think there is a good deal to be gained from opening dialogue in this area. From a CA perspective it opens up exploration of dialogue as an exchange of meanings, so that we can move on from the mechanics of turn-taking to better accounts of the dynamics of power and solidarity in conversational interaction. Our work on the discourse of CA as a register show it to be a technological discourse rather than a scientific one. When I suggested to the resident CA practitioner in my department that this kind of deconstruction positioned CA more as a technology for analysing conversation than a theory of conversation, he said “Yes!”, proudly. We could be proud of more than this if we could work together. Eggins and Slade (1997) present a relevant SFL perspective on conversation (cf Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998); but we need better
grammars to work with - especially importing ones that manage meaning of different kinds.

The only grammar I've found which is both rich enough to be of use and practical enough to use is Halliday's (1985a) metafunctionally organised grammar (and its elaboration by Matthiessen, 1995)\(^\text{16}\), which includes a relatively rich account of different types of meaning inside the grammar per se. This implies to me that we need to give more attention to grammars which are organised around functionally motivated tiers\(^\text{17}\) involving different kinds of meaning and different kinds of realisation. In grammars of this kind the central problematic has to do with **reconciliation** — how is it that these different kinds of meaning are mapped onto each other? Where do they harmonise? At what points do tensions appear? In our post-colonial world reconciliation is arguably a more than timely theme.

**Notes**

1. I'll set aside here discussion of the ways in which choices in these systems interact, so that the realisation of one is conditioned in part by the realisation of another - which is then another dimension of their realisation as prosody.

2. Note that the negative prosody may be further extended and reinforced with *at all*: *I don't suppose I'll get any satisfaction at all*.

3. I'll use 'T' to stand for Theme marker (or Topic if you will — or, grudgingly, Subject if you must).

4. Overwhelmingly, iteration intensifies meaning — against the grain, Tagalog can downgrade by repeating the stem of a process: e.g. *mag-walis-walis* 'sweep a little'.

5. Dik et al. 1990 discuss correlations between operators and satellites, which at higher levels of structure involve interpersonal meanings (modality, comment); cf. Halliday (1985a/1994, pp. 200-201) on mirror concord between tense selections and time adverbials, and Matthiessen (1995, pp. 279-181) on emotive mental processes in relation to manner adverbials.
6 Whining was also used to add urgency to a positive request, which at times led to escalating confusion as to whether my son wanted or didn’t want something.

7 We have also simultaneously textured the clause as a wave of information (note that ang tanong is now Theme).

8 Cf. Nichols (1986) on ‘head’ marking and ‘dependent-marking’ — in SFL the notion of ‘head’ would be factored out metafunctionally, as experiential nucleus, textual peak, interpersonal nub or logical dominant (technically Head).

9 I won’t explore position at group rank here; note however that in languages like English first position is not without significance and disturbs constituency based accounts of sequencing: a hell of a hell of a hell of a hell of a hell of a stupid thing to ask, quite the best part I’ve been to, that silly an answer, so stupid a response, such a dumb reply, what a foolish question.

10 Actually the process and ‘Medium’ for Halliday (1994) (i.e. the process and the participant through which the process is actualised).

11 I’ll restrict myself to issues of grammatical representation here; but related issues vex transcription. Our tools for creating a ‘written’ record of spoken language need to be refined in ways that display its verve, elegance and the dialectic of its repartee (Halliday 1985b/1989).

12 Matthiessen and his students work with a closely related function, Negotiator, across a range of languages including Chinese, French, Japanese and Vietnamese.

13 Compare Dik et al (1990) on proposition and illocutionary satellites; and Hengeveld (1990) on operators and satellites.

14 Van Valin’s operator projection is in fact given relatively little attention in Van Valin (1993), as symbolised perhaps in the name of the theory (Role and Reference Grammar) and reflecting perhaps the inspiration of Schachter (1977) on role and reference related properties of Tagalog ‘Subjects’, which unlike English ones, are not interpersonal charged with modal responsibility (for discussion of which see Halliday 1985a, Martin 1992b).

15 For discussion of this lag between theory and representational resources see Matthiessen (1988).
16 As a cautionary note, although Halliday and Matthiessen’s description of English grammar is arguably the most extravagant ever produced, from the perspective of social discourse analysis it is absolutely minimalist.

17 I recently attended a talk by a graduate student in my department on Balinese which involved four tiers of grammatical analysis plus linking rules, with clauses parsed by class (C-structure), by function (f-structure), by argument (terms and non-terms) and by case (q roles) - all for the purpose of sorting out constraints on anaphoric reference inside the clause; this kind of proliferation of tiers with a single constituency defined problematic of long standing in focus is the opposite of what I have in mind.

References


