Human rights as indicator for the differentiation of centre, semiperiphery and periphery in the world society. A Contribution to World Society Studies[1]

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Abstract: In this paper, the categories of centre, periphery, and semiperiphery are revised for the studies of world society. The centre of world society has primary functional differentiation, whilst other forms of differentiation, such as segmentary differentiation and stratification, remain dominant in the periphery. The semiperiphery may be defined as an arena in which functional differentiation struggles for hegemony against other forms of differentiation. Firstly, the centre is defined by its cognitive closeness as well as its power of definition and interpretation against the periphery, whilst the periphery can only accept the interpretations, definitions, and decisions performed at the centre. The emergence of national identity as a cultural identity outside of the centre is not understandable without relation to the centre. However, semiperipheral and peripheral cultural identities prevent some nations from further modernising toward functional differentiation. Secondly, the centre of modern world society is defined by the implementation of functional differentiation, whilst an important indicator of the border between the centre and periphery is the status of human rights. Thus, we can say that all regions are exposed to the structural effects of world society, especially that of the world economy, but all functional systems have not been implemented equally throughout the world. Whilst in the centre, access to social resources is guaranteed by individual human rights (fundamental rights), the population in the semiperiphery and periphery requires membership in particular organisations or social ties to obtain the benefits of the modern world and world economy. Thirdly, while the periphery of world society is seen in 'failed states', this paper proposes that authoritarian regimes are semiperiphery. Societies in the semiperiphery are characterised by the dominance of political and economic systems over other functional systems. The modern systems theory calls such a society an organisation society.

Keywords: Niklas Luhmann. World society. Differentiation. inclusion/exclusion.

Direitos humanos como indicadores para a diferenciação de "centro", "semiperiferia" e "periferia" na sociedade mundial: Uma contribuição para os estudos da Sociedade Mundial

Resumo: Neste artigo, as categorias de "centro", "periferia" e "semiperiferia" são revisadas por meio dos estudos da sociedade mundial. O centro da sociedade mundial tem como diferenciação primária a funcional, enquanto outras formas de diferenciação, como diferenciação segmentar e estratificação, permanecem dominantes na periferia. A semiperiferia pode ser definida como uma arena na qual a diferenciação funcional luta pela hegemonia contra outras formas de diferenciação. Em primeiro lugar, o centro é definido por sua proximidade cognitiva assim como por seu poder de definição e interpretação contra a periferia, ao passo que a periferia só pode aceitar as interpretações, definições e decisões realizadas no centro. O surgimento da identidade nacional como uma identidade cultural fora do centro não pode ser entendida sem relação com o centro. No entanto, identidades culturais semiperiféricas e periféricas impedem algumas nações de se modernizarem em direção à diferenciação funcional. Em segundo lugar, o centro da sociedade mundial moderna é definido pela implementação de diferenciação funcional, enquanto um importante indicador da fronteira entre o centro e a periferia é o status dos direitos humanos. Assim, podemos dizer que todas as regiões estão expostas aos efeitos estruturais da sociedade mundial, especialmente aquele da economia mundial, mas todos os sistemas funcionais não foram implementados igualmente em todo o mundo. À medida em que, no centro, o acesso aos recursos sociais é garantido pelos direitos humanos individuais (direitos fundamentais), a população, na semiperiferia e periferia, necessita participar de organizações particulares ou de laços sociais para obter benefícios do mundo moderno e da economia mundial. Em terceiro lugar, enquanto a periferia da sociedade mundial é vista em "estados falidos", este artigo propõe que os regimes autoritários são semiperiféricos. Sociedades na semiperiferia são caracterizadas pela dominação dos sistemas político e econômico sobre outros sistemas funcionais. A moderna teoria dos sistemas chama esta sociedade de sociedade organizacional.

Palavras-chave: Niklas Luhmann. Sociedade mundial. Diferenciação. Inclusão/Exclusão.

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According to the theory of world society from the Bielefeld School, based on Niklas Luhmann's systems theory, world society is primarily differentiated into functional systems, and the differentiation of the centre and the periphery takes on a role that is less than secondary in the modern world (HOLZER; KASTNER; WERRON 2015b; STICHWEH, 2017). Several authors have used the concept of periphery in regards to world society (JAPP 2007, p. 185-189), although the theoretical significance and definition of periphery remain often unclear.[3] In this paper, I will examine whether the categories of centre, semiperiphery and periphery play a role, and perhaps an important one, in studies of world society. I will revise what differentiates the centre from the periphery in world society and relate these concepts to the dominant forms of differentiation in local societies. To this end, I will first define the centre. The centre is marked by the implementation of functional systems that have not completely been established in the periphery (cf. NEVES, 1992). Secondly, the centre claims the power of definition and interpretation against the periphery, although the relation between the centre and the periphery, in this sense, is always relational, and contemporary world society is characterised by a plurality of centres. Thirdly, a strong and dominant centre degrades other regions to a position of dependence. The advantages achieved by greater complexity and functional differentiation can be lost if a local society is degraded to a state of dependence on a centre. For this purpose, I begin with the concepts of centre, semiperiphery and periphery according to Immanuel Wallerstein. Then, I will discuss the concept of centre and periphery by Niklas Luhmann. I will confirm that the centre holds the power of definition and interpretation over the periphery in the systems theory as well. I also discuss the relationship between the centre and the periphery in terms of an overarching metacode of inclusion and exclusion throughout world society. Furthermore, I will outline how the state of human rights in local society is a very important indicator of its status and defines its belonging to the centre, the periphery or the semiperiphery. At last, I will propose to define authoritarian regimes as the semiperiphery of world society.

Centre, semiperiphery and periphery according to Wallerstein

In order to inform a differentiation of the centre, the semi-periphery and the periphery, I return to world system theory by Immanuel Wallerstein (WALLERSTEIN, 1998 [1974]). In his famous work, Wallerstein conceived the world system as a system of capitalistic and

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[3] Exceptionally, several legal sociologists as Neves (1992) discussed peripheral modernity from the perspective of the positivity of modern law and the constitution. See also Luhmann (2008 [1983]) and Luhmann (2014). I will come back to this argument later.

economic divisions of labour and introduced the concepts of centre, semiperiphery and periphery. With this concept, Wallerstein tried to describe the political and economical control of the capitalistic core states, i.e., the West, over other economically-dependent regions in global society. The differentiation between capitalistic core states and the periphery is nothing but the projection of the capital and labour scheme developed by Karl Marx (MARX 2008 [1867]) onto the relationships among different regions of the world, especially between the West and its (former) colonies.[4] The first essential point of Wallerstein is that various world regions came to form part of the periphery, dependent on the centre, and thereby, the possibility of their own modernisation and development is blocked by their very dependency. The second point is that the relationship between centre and periphery is a relational one. If new region enters into the world economy, regions once counted as the periphery may be promoted to the semiperiphery. On the contrary, a centre may also be downgraded to the semiperiphery and lose its status as a result of a war, natural catastrophe or technical innovation in other regions. Such a shift in the centre may happen continually throughout history. From the early modern age until the beginning of the 20th century, the centre was found in north-western Europe, while afterwards it shifted to the United States.

Wallerstein's observations focus mainly on the economy. He considered the world system to be essentially an economic one. However, world society – at least in contemporary form – consists not only of economic relationships, i.e., exchanges of goods and services, but also of communication through various media (HOLZER; KASTNER; WERRON, 2015b; STICHWEH, 2017)[5].

Centre and periphery in the social systems theory by Niklas Luhmann and the theory of world society by the Bielefeld School

Before we discuss the relationship between the centre and the periphery in the modern systems theory, a prior concept formulated by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels may help to

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[4] Of course, we cannot define the 'West' precisely because it is overdetermined in the sense suggested by Louis Althusser, and it always needs the otherness of itself. It depends on what is considered to be the otherness of the West (MORIKAWA, 2013, 57). The 'West' has been, however, established as a category of self-description in the cultural discourses of the central capitalistic societies. Additionally, the emergence of the concept of culture accompanied the transformation of European societies into functionally differentiated ones. Since then, the concept of culture has carried out a political function, determining who should be included in a communication space, such as a nation-state, and who should not. The concept of the West also regulates who is allowed to participate in some specified kinds of functional communication. I spoke on this issue in Vienna this year and plan to publish the text of the talk (MORIKAWA, 2018).

[5] For the old, traditional understanding of world society as the global division of labour, see Suter (2010) and Münch (2016). For more on the different approaches of Münch and Stichweh, see Münch (2010a), Münch (2010b) and Stichweh (2010).

illustrate this relationship. Marx and Engels expressed the centre-periphery relationship as follows:

> Division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labour appears. From this moment onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it *really* represents something without representing something *real* […] The greatest division of material and mental labour is the separation of town and country (MARX; ENGELS 1978 [1964], 159, 176).

With the metaphor of town and country, Marx and Engels described the differentiation between the centre and the periphery in respect of economic production and political control, but also in respect of the production of reflective knowledge, namely ideology in the broadest meaning. Therefore, symbolical control, which may be called the power of definition and interpretation (*Deutungshoheit*), is held by certain locational formations of a society. Political, economical and symbolical powers are also certainly related with one another.

According to Morikawa (2013), the centre is the place in which information from circumstances is processed, organised and systematised and in which reflective knowledge is produced. In the centre, events in the world are interpreted. The monitoring of reality is performed from the perspective of the centre. In this sense, the power of definition, interpretation and decision on the relevance of events in the world are reserved to the centre - per definition. The location of knowledge production is seldom determined only inside of epistemological systems. For this reason, it is difficult to determine the supremacy of one epistemological system in comparison with other epistemological systems. Therefore, the decision of which one holds the central position is often externalized, although implicitly.

The Luhmannian theory of world society regards world society primarily as a functionally differentiated society (LUHMANN, 1997). It is well known that no functional system can claim to be the centre and attain priority over other functional systems in a functionally differentiated society, neither regionally nor symbolically. No functional system has a right to represent the society as a whole. Luhmann did understand differentiation between the centre and the periphery in a spatial and locational sense in his early writings (LUHMANN, 1984; 1988). According to Alois Hahn (2008, 411, 418), he mainly used this concept in order to describe the epoch of the emergence of ancient empires, i.e., high culture (LUHMANN, 1984, p. 261).

Alois Hahn (2008, p. 416) suggests that this form of differentiation appears as secondary differentiation in some (not all) of the functional systems described in his later writings. This concept first appeared in his sociology of law (LUHMANN, 1993, p. 320-333). For example, the court is held as the centre of the modern legal system, and the university is

the centre of the system of science. State organs are considered as the centre of the political system, while the central bank is centre to the economic system (HAHN, 2008, p. 420; cf. BOHN, 2014). In few words, centres in functional systems are 'organisations that are dominant for the self-production of systems' (HAHN, 2008, p. 412). Luhmann himself says, 'the centre does not operate without the periphery. The periphery does not operate without the centre' (LUHMANN, 1993, p. 323, translated by the author). The relationship between centre and periphery should not necessarily be understood in a hierarchical sense, rather the periphery represents a zone of contact with other functional systems. The centre identifies itself by its own cognitive self-isolation.

Both meanings mentioned above are common to a centre-periphery relationship in that the centre has the power of definition and interpretation, while the periphery can only accept the interpretations, definitions and decisions performed at the centre. *In this sense, the centre/periphery differentiation is not a spatial but a relational and functional one*. 'The centre possesses the power to interpret reality and decides topics of importance, sets the agenda, reproduces schemes and semantics for observation, provides official narratives and interprets events in the centre as well as those in the periphery' (MORIKAWA, 2013, p. 24; translated by the author). Legality and illegality are decided in a court – in the Supreme Court as the final authority. Similarly, scientific discourses at universities determine what is true in the scientific sense and what is not true. Hahn states, 'Actual decisions are made in the centre. The periphery shows only a reflection of the centre in this respect' (HAHN, 2008, p. 413, translated by the author). Vocations based on the division of labour emerge in the centre in order to satisfy the functional needs of the centre. 'The orientation to the leading difference that constitutes a system is found in both the centre and the periphery. However, it is only in the organised centre that the orientation to the core of the vocations that are based on the division of labour is condensed' (HAHN, 2008, p. 419, translated by the author).

The border of the functionally differentiated society: the cognitive and epistemological superiority of the centre

After the above discussion, I would like to address the cognitive and epistemological aspects of the differentiation of the centre, semiperiphery and periphery and also the so-called *cultural differentiation* inside world society.[6]

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[6] Holzer (2015) discusses on the difference between 'global' and 'local' not with the categories of 'center' and 'periphery' but with those of 'formal' and 'informal'.

We can distinguish two types of knowledge in terms of division of labour in knowledge production: 'knowledge by X' (local, practical knowledge in which X = the West, China, India, Japan, Arab countries, etc.) and 'knowledge on X' (reflective and theoretical knowledge and ideology). In the first case, the subject of the knowledge matters ('Who is the producer of knowledge?'), while the second case concerns the object of knowledge ('Who is being referred to?'). If we observe the production of knowledge in terms of division of labour, the knowledge *by* and *on* the centre flow from the centre to the periphery. Knowledge *on* the periphery flows to the centre as raw material for the production of reflective knowledge (abstraction, systematisation, theorisation and speculative philosophy), but knowledge produced *by* the periphery, i.e., as knowledge mediated or generated by the periphery, seldom flows to the centre. Also, in the division of the labour of knowledge production, the centre is characterized by its cognitive self-isolation, as mentioned above (MORIKAWA, 2013).

This issue can be clearly and empirically illustrated by the migration and movement of people. A number of young people with political, cultural and entrepreneurial ambitions flow always from the periphery to the centre in order to realise their studies and then to return to their home country with interpretative and cognitive patterns in the form of modern sciences and humanities studies as well as their corresponding philosophical, economical and sociological theories. These ideas are then turned into practice, such as in the case of Lenin, Ho Chi Minh and Deng Xiaoping. Also, since the 1980s, a great number of European, Asian and African economists have received education in the Chicago school. Such young people may often, although not always, trigger a political or intellectual revolution in the periphery. Only a small number of locations exist in which the producers of reflective and systematic knowledge and information are harboured. Mainly, these knowledge centres were located in north-western Europe from the beginning of modernity until the Second World War, and afterwards these shifted toward the USA (cf. MORIKAWA, 2013).

Asian and African studies and ethnology are also good examples of the asymmetrical relationship between the centre and the periphery in terms of production of knowledge. With the differentiation between the centre and the periphery and the asymmetrical location of knowledge production, it is implicated that self and alien images of the periphery are produced in the centre and spread by the mass media (including *academic journals*) if they are not in a fragmentary form but in a more or less systematic and consistent form generally designated by '-logy' or 'studies' – studies of the periphery. Generally speaking, the reputed 'self-image' of the periphery belongs to the stock of the knowledge production occurring in the centre. As mentioned above, the centre is the place in which the schemes of observation

(namely *theory*) are produced (see MORIKAWA, 2013). Thus, the power of interpretation lies always in the centre – per definition. This epistemological dominance over the periphery can be best expressed with the famous statement by Marx: 'They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented' (MARX, 1978 [1852], p. 608). Such ideas lead into the questions posed by Postcolonial Theory.[7] The core idea of orientalism, according to Edward Said, is also contained in this previous sentence (SAID, p. 1978). The main underlying issue is that symbol systems, i.e., cognitive and normative systems of knowledge and values, including *cultural identities* (self-images of 'peripheries'), only emerge and are reproduced in the framework of world society, i.e. here in relation to the centre (cf. HOLZER, 2015). Only in this framework people in a periphery are able to distinguish themselves from the others and to observe themselves as a segmentary unity, i.e. as a nation. In this sense, a world society is a prerequisite for the emergence of nations (STICHWEH, 1990a; STICHWEH, 1990b; HAHN, 1993). However, it is very important to note that semiperipheral and peripheral cultural identities prevent some nations from their further modernisation toward functional differentiation. I will readdress this topic in the following sections.

The border of the functionally differentiated society: fundamental rights (human rights) as well as inclusion and exclusion[8]

Most of Scholars from the Bielefelder School see the functional differentiated societies as given nowadays. If we accept the thesis of the Bielefeld School that world society is primarily functionally differentiated and we consider functionally differentiated society to be the centre of world society: How can we recognize its borders? Where does the functionally differentiated society begin, and where does it end? The centre claims the power of definition and interpretation against the semiperiphery and periphery. Thus, knowledge in the sense of the interpretative and cognitive patterns of reality and the location of knowledge production are unequally distributed in world society. Postcolonial studies have paid great attention to this issue (SAID, 1978; SPIVAK, 1999), although in the Luhmannian systems theory, there is one more criterion, described at following.

Segmentation and stratification are older forms of societal differentiation that predated functional differentiation of society.[9] In the premodern world, these forms of differentiation were primarily dominant. Nowadays, these forms still remain dominant and powerful in the

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[7] However, we can find this concept in Systems Theory from time to time.
[8] For the following argument see Luhmann (1989) and Luhmann (1995, p. 237-264).
[9] For the various forms of the societal differentiation see Luhmann (1997, p. 634-736).

semiperiphery and in the periphery. In such societies, individuals are totally included within a subsystem, such as a kinship or clan system (in a segmentarily differentiated society) or a status group (in a society differentiated by stratification). In this sense, individuals experience total inclusion, which means firstly that they are unable to belong to two subsystems at the same time. If you are a member of the aristocracy, you are not a citizen (*Bürger*). If you are a member of the Smith clan, you do not belong to the Millers. Secondly, the identity of individuals is determined by his or her membership and his or her position in the segmentary or stratificationary subsystem. Thirdly, individuals are allowed to obtain social resources only as members of a segmentary or stratificationary unit (subsystem). These systems decide what is allocated to him or her as well as what is obliged or prohibited. In such a society, laws are a bundle of privileges, obligations and prohibitions that are given in accordance with one's position (WEBER, 1966; LUHMANN 2014). They regulate the distribution of possibilities for an individual to obtain social resources. It is not possible for individuals to move or live outside of their subsystem, even though there may be marginal groups, outcasts or places for the refugees of these systems (BOHN; HAHN, 2006).

Meanwhile, the modern, primarily functionally differentiated society is differentiated into various functional systems like politics, economy, law, intimacy, art, religion, etc. Accompanied with the functional differentiation, three levels of communication are differentiated – i.e. interaction, (formal) organisation and society (functional systems) (LUHMANN, 1997, p.813-847; cf. HEINTZ, 2015). Functional systems are specified to only take on one task. Likewise, in the modern world individuals are principally excluded from the society. They are not totally included within any one subsystem (LUHMANN, 1995a, p. 258). Individuals can, however, access each functional systems as required. They are only partially included into the society (functional systems).[10] The modern functionally differentiated society no longer determines thus the identity of the individual, but rather individuals construct their identities by their own choices and decisions over the course of their lives. Fundamental rights (human rights) guarantee the access of individuals to social resources via different functional systems.[11]

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[10] Stichweh (1988) describes various forms of inclusion in different functional systems.

[11] I am very conscious of my law-centric interpretation of the theory of Niklas Luhmann. More and more, however, when I consider how limited my access to functional systems is without a legal status, I must embrace the opinion that the legal system plays a special role in his theory against a critique by an evaluator of this journal. To a large extent, we can find the correspondence of functional systems with the human rights listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. This correspondence is not limited to the first generation of human rights (in Karel Vasak's division). We can argue that the emergence of a new functional system is marked by a new human right. In this sense, social security, sport, medical treatment and health care have their own functional systems now, even though Luhmann himself did not write about those functional systems. The

The centre of world society with primary functional differentiation is defined by individualisation (exclusive individuality) and compliance with the human rights that are attributed to each individual (LUHMANN, 1981; 1989; 1995a; 2009 [1965]). Human rights regulate the access to social resources for each individual. Meanwhile, other forms of differentiation such as segmentary differentiation (in large families, clans, cliques and so on) and stratification (social hierarchy, including the dominance of men) remain dominant in the periphery (NEVES, 1992; JAPP, 2007; LUHMANN, 1995b). I suggest that the semiperiphery be defined as an arena in which functional differentiation struggles for hegemony against other forms of differentiation. The result of this competition is that two forms of individuality, inclusive individuality and exclusive individuality (LUHMANN, 1989), compete against each other in the semiperiphery. Because functional systems and their own symbolically generalized communication media have not been completely differentiated, abuses relating to the inadequacy of the media are often observed in the semiperiphery. Corruption – input of the medium 'money' into the political system – is a typical example. Since access to every functional system and thus every sort of social resource is granted by human rights, violations of human rights are typical not only in the periphery but also in the semiperiphery of society (see WIMMER, 2009). The identity politics – construction and reinforcement of "traditional" group identity such as ethnic and religious ones – is also typical phenomena in the semiperiphery. It reduces individuals to only a member of some collective (see DRAKULIĆ, 1992; KALDOR, 1999; KALDOR, 2003).

While communication is generalised and mediated with symbolically generalised communication media in the functional differentiated society that may be considered to be impersonal and cold by the inhabitants in the periphery and semiperiphery, communication in the periphery is often considered to be personal, warm and direct. Meanwhile, from the perspective of the inhabitants of the centre, the behaviour and customs of the periphery and the semiperiphery are wild and uncivilized or perhaps when interpreted positively, to be virtuous. Civil liberties implemented with the functional differentiation of the centre free actors of old and traditional conventions. These actors thus appear as immoral and arbitrary in the eyes of the inhabitants of semiperipheral and peripheral societies. If we understand this difference as 'culture', nation states in the semiperiphery may establish their collective identity as cultural identity, distinguished from that of the centre (the West). They turn

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emergence of a new human right is very interesting in regard to socio-cultural evolution. In future research projects, I will follow this interpretation further.

orientalism upside down, wherein occidentalism emerges (SAID, 1978; SPIVAK, 1999; MORIKAWA, 2013).

The function of fundamental rights

According to Luhmann, functional differentiation is not stable or probable by itself even if it emerges as a means of processing the increasing complexity inside and outside of a society (cf. LUHMANN, 2009 [1965], p. 72). Generalised and functional specified communications are essential prerequisites for the modern society with functional differentiation. Communication is generalised by means of subjective rights and symbolically generalised communication media. In this sense, communications are dissolved away from a concrete and particular context and integrated again into functionally specific ones. Individuals are integrated as subjects of human rights into the society. This implies that for the emergence of the modern society, the old borders among segmentary and stratificationary units should be broken down, or at least weakened so that generalized communication across their borders becomes possible. In such a scenario, ethnical and religious identifications and the duties of members for such a primordial 'gemeinschaft' as clans should have been weakened because they block generalized and functionally specific communications. '[T]he possibilities of communication should have been emancipated from narrow, personal, group-oriented and emotional expressions' (LUHMANN, 2009 [1965], p. 23, translated by the author). Luhmann called this historical change the civilization of communication (2009, [1965], p. 22; see also JAPP, 2015, p. 69).[12]

In his book on fundamental rights (human rights), Luhmann argued from the perspective of a nation state – West Germany at that time – , but his argument is applicable to discussions on world society. Luhmann saw the function of fundamental rights in the protection of individual liberties for communications in functional systems from the dominance of the political system (PHILIPPOPOULOS-MIHALOPOULOS, 2011, p. 154 [label the latter as 'colonisation']). The political system has a strong internal tendency to politicise all other communications and to expand itself once established (LUHMANN, 2009 [1965], p. 24; see also SCHMITT, 2009 [1932], p. 35). In order to maintain the functional differentiation of a society, institutions are needed to correct, block and work against this dangerous tendency. We can regard the separation of powers as well as the separation between politics and administrations as means of prevention. Luhmann especially emphasized

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[12] Identity politics in the semiperiphery and the periphery drives this development backwards.

human rights (fundamental rights) in the German constitution (LUHMANN, 2009 [1965], p. 24). The function of fundamental rights (human rights) is to maintain the autonomy of each functional systems and to stop the dangerous tendency of the overpoliticisation of communication via the protection of individual human rights. 'The guarantee of liberties is nothing but the guarantee of the opportunity to communicate'. (LUHMANN, 2009 [1965], p. 23, translated by the author; see also JAPP, 2015, p. 66).

Mainly, Luhmann further discussed the (possible) "invasion" of the political system into other functional systems, wherein "invasion" of one system by another system is indeed possible. Every functional system has a tendency to dominate other functional systems and to gain control over society as a whole. Today, we can see the expansion of the economic system over other systems in the form of neoliberalism and of the religious system in the form of religious fundamentalism (STICHWEH, 2010a, p. 184; PHILIPPOPOULOS-MIHALOPOULOS, 2011, p. 154). Rudolf Stichweh (2010a) labels the dominance of functional systems by *one* functional system as 'fundamentalism' (STICHWEH, 2010a, p. 184). In this definition there are not only religious fundamentalisms, but 'technocratic-scientific fundamentalisms' may also be spoken of in which 'structural conditions must be connected with a scientific proof or technical rationality, and the external limitations of science and technology are scarcely wanted to be seen' (STICHWEH, 2010a, p. 185; translated by the author). We can speak of 'economic fundamentalism' whereby 'a plurality of aims is managed and governed in a territorial state only by elementary economic figures like money supply influence' (STICHWEH, 2010a, p. 185).

Without protection of human rights, functional differentiation does not work in long run (LUHMANN, 2009 [1965], p. 72). According to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2011), 'Rights are instrumentally linked to functional differentiation because they emerge as answers precisely to the problems posed by the process of differentiation, and more specifically the threat of dedifferentiation' (PHILIPPOPOULOS-MIHALOPOULOS, 2011, p. 154). From this we can conclude that *the situation of human rights is an indicator of the situation of functional differentiation in different countries and regions.* Moreover, it shows the border between the centre and the periphery of world society. *If human rights are under threat or violated, functional differentiation is also threatened and violated.*

Inclusion and exclusion as the metacode of world society

The functional differentiation is implemented in the centre of the world society and people are given a chance to be included into functional systems by the guarantee of human rights. On the contrary, in the periphery of world society, communication has not been generalized enough and freed from particular interests. Japp (2007, p. 189) labelled the 'peripheral region' as 'developing spaces' in which 'temporal, objective [sachlich] and social pressures overlap with structurally weaker generalization of communication media' (JAPP , p. 189, translated by the author). Older forms of differentiation remain strong as well as dominant, retaining the power to decide the allocation of social resources. This means that the guarantee of human rights is not enough; a great number of people are actually excluded from communication in functional systems. In comparison, in the countries of the periphery and semiperiphery of world society, only the elite, if anyone, have access to functional systems (JAPP, 2007, p. 190-191). In such countries membership with an elite company or government party is often the prerequisite to accessing social resources provided by functional systems. Other qualifications for belonging to the elite may be based on the possession of a certain amount of money or property, a degree from an elite university or membership in certain organisations, clans, etc. It means that the differentiation of interactions, formal organisations and functional systems remain undifferentiated. The classic study on Brazil by Neves (1992) shows an applicable example of this issue. According to him the population in Brazil is integrated in two different ways, the upper class is 'overintegrated' and the lower class is 'subintegrated' (NEVES, 1992, p. 79). Exploitative landlords and abusive spouses, police officers or state bureaucracies are confronted with challenges and demands by ordinary citizens, in particular by members of the lower class (O'DONNEL, 2005, p. 57-63). The relation of the centre to the periphery is reproduced inside the nation itself (NEVES, 1992, p. 74). Lacking in generalised communications and societal expectations, there is no autonomy of law. According to Luhmann (2009): 'Institutionalization of a system's boundaries means that one can assume with sufficient certainty in daily intercourse that other people accept the same boundaries' (Luhmann, 2009 [1975], p. 76). So, if different social classes have different expectations of the law, unity of the system does not exist. The Brazilian people consider law to be an instrument of domination for and by the upper class. The logical and factual consequence is autocracy and 'symbolical' democracy (Scheindemokratie) (NEVES, 1992, p. 88). This dualism and 'dualistic development of the justice system' (O'DONNEL, 2005, p. 73) accurately reflects

the legal consciousness of Latin America. O'Donnel (2005, p. 65) ascertains that the legal state is usually absent in so-called authoritarian regimes (cf. HOLZER, 2015).

Faced with such situations in the semi-periphery and periphery of world society, Niklas Luhmann discovered the difference of inclusion and exclusion to be the metacode of world society in his later works (LUHMANN, 1995a, p. 237-264).

> 'Large parts of the world population are excluded from nearly all functional systems: no work, no money, no ID Card, no rights, no education, or often minimal schooling, no satisfactory medical treatment. Again, they have no access to work, to the economy, to testify against the police or in the courts. The exclusion is intensified spirally.' (LUHMANN, 2000, p. 242, translated by the author; cf. LUHMANN, 1992, p. 03).

In functional differentiation, each functional system has its own code. Inclusion and exclusion is the metacode regulating the chance to access the whole of societal resources. The excluded stay outside of society or are denied participation to a large extent. The outer regions of world society should not necessarily be understood in a spatial sense, although a kind of spatial differentiation may become apparent in the form of slums, banlieue or favelas, as well as refugee streams, etc. (cf. LUHMANN, 1995a, p. 260; for example of Brazil see also Torres 2013, p. 253-328).[13] An important precondition for the functional differentiation, i.e. a monopoly of violence by the state does not exist there. Japp refers to failed states as the periphery (JAPP, 2015, p. 67): 'Inside of the regions in failed states the hole of exclusion vacuums redundant people from the liberal regimes oriented toward the principality and indispensability of human rights (on democracy, market liberation and generalised of communication) into the wildness of the ghettos, militia, streams of refugees and refugee camps' (JAPP, 2015, p. 85, translated by the author). The excluded represent, according to Japp (2015), the other side of the modern art of inclusion. Not only are they not recognized as the subjects of human rights but are also often stripped down to *nothing more than a biological body* without any rights. We may define the periphery of world society as 'the contact zone' with the outer reaches of civilisation and with the *excluded* who are *deprived of all rights and downgraded to the status of wild beings*.

The construction of ethnic-tribal differences, the formation of elite without civilising and generalising communication, the lack of institutionalisation of fundamental rights and a

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[13] In the face of world's contemporary political and social situation, we exaggerate if we believe that everyone *can* access each functional system. The potential and formal possibility of accessing functional systems as a matter of principle – some days – does not contradict the fact that a great number of people nowadays live *factually and persistently* in exclusion from functional systems.

lack of a monopoly of violence[14] by the state are characteristic of regions of the periphery and semiperiphery. These phenomena are not signs of underdevelopment but are created and enforced by the effect of some global functional systems (NEVES, 1992). According to Japp (2007):

> those regions in world society that are not deviations from the channel of functional differentiation are the self-feeding results of the synchronism between the centre and the periphery and the inclusive and the exclusive operation of systems; the preconditions of functional differentiation are lacking in these regions but the results [of global functional systems] affect them (JAPP, 2007 p. 193, translated by the author).

According to Verschraegen (2005, p. 120-121, translated by the author), '[A]ll regions are exposed to the effects of world society, and especially to the world economy'. Construction of ethnic groups as well as nations is one of most important structural effects of world society, which is almost always crystallised by political and economic interests (ELWERT, 1989; KREILE, 1997; KALDOR, 1999). It is true that we can speak of a high pressure of irritation on peripheries on behalf of the centres (LUHMANN, 1997, p. 789), and it is also true that '[a] lot of regions have only partially taken over the preconditions of functional differentiation' (VERSCHRAEGEN, 2005, p. 120-121; see also JAPP, 2007, p. 192). Indeed, this process is highly selective. However, it is not correct to suppose there are ethnic criteria for selection, as imagined in neoinstitutionalism with the concept of 'decoupling'. Ethnic (and national) identities and values are not assigned but rather constructed *in the dynamics between the centre and the periphery*. The very idea of cultural identity is an intellectual product of Western modernity, as mentioned above. At following, I discuss the adverse effects of the national, cultural identity politics in the semiperiphery.

Semiperiphery and authoritarian regimes

Fundamental rights are not well-protected not only in 'failed states' but also in several existing and newly industrialised states. Here, I introduce the term 'semiperiphery' to call such regions where industrialization has taken place, the gross national income is relatively high in international comparisons and more or less affluent mass-consumption has been reached; however, human rights are not well maintained. As mentioned above, the situation of

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[14] The lack of a monopoly on violence by the state is a typical phenomenon, especially in areas of ethnic and religious conflicts like former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, Latin America, Afghanistan and Somalia today (WIMMER, 2000; KALDOR, 2003; MÜNKLER, 2003). See also Wimmer (2009). The very existence of criminal bands such as mafia and yakuza (in Japan) or in some regions of industrialised countries such as southern Italy, Japan and Russia indicate a weak implementation of functional systems (LUHMANN, 1995a, p. 257).

human rights reflects the implementation status of functional differentiation. The political sciences call such states authoritarian or totalitarian regimes as well (LINZ, 2000).

A typical phenomenon in countries of the semiperiphery is so-called 'symbolic constitutionalism' (NEVES, 1992). Constitutionalism presupposes that functional differentiated is well entrenched in society. If functional differentiation is not implemented enough, the constitution remains superficial and is not effectively put into practice (Neves 1992). In this sense not only the authoritarian states of Latin America but also Russia, Turkey, China and Singapore belong to the semiperiphery (cf. VANDERHILL; ALEPRETE JR. 2013; SÖYLER, 2015). Japan may become part of this sphere in the near future. Functional systems can function in a stable manner only if human rights are protected. If the boundaries among functional systems are not maintained, this means, for example, that economic and religious communication in addition to artistic expression, mass media broadcasting and other kinds of communication and actions can arrive to be interpreted politically and will have political consequences (LUHMANN, 2009 [1965]). From the view of functional differentiation, if one system gains control and domination with respect to the other systems, this is called *dedifferentiation* or *fundamentalism*, as above discussed. In such states of the semiperiphery, a constitution with human rights laws may exist, although these are not put into practice effectively (see e.g., NEVES, 1992; CASE, 2010; VANDERHILL; ALEPRETE JR. 2013; SÖYLER, 2015; HEINTZ/LEISERING 2015).

There should be some conditions that account for authoritarian societies in the semiperiphery. Firstly, these societies have reached a certain degree of complexity in their political and communication structures, on one hand, and have maintained relatively strong familial and clan structures, on the other hand, although these have begun to lose their old power. This dissolving process is often stimulated by intensified contact with the functional systems of world society.[15] In such a situation, nostalgia for the past can be a core part of national and cultural identities. It is common for such societies to have constructed their collective identity in regards to their *otherness* in comparison to the West. The cultural code of collective identity emerged in Western and Central Europe to mobilise and include all population of local societies in functional systems beyond the old boundaries of segmentary and stratificationary differentiations (GIESEN, 1999; MORIKAWA, 2013). In this sense national identity as cultural identity is inspired by European romanticism and was a functional necessity for the emergence of functionally differentiated modern societies (HAHN, 1993; STICHWEH, 1990a; STICHWEH, 1990b). However, cultural identity may be dysfunctional

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[15] For the case of Japan, see Morikawa (2015, p. 207).

in societies of the semiperiphery. This breed of identity may block access to functional systems via human rights for some population groups because human rights are observed as 'Western'. [16] This may have become possible in the semiperipheral states in order to successfully mobilise social resources, especially work forces in favour of industrialisation; accordingly, these societies may have reached high levels of mass consumption to maintain their capitalistic and industrial economy alive, once it is released. That does not encompass, however, all aspects of modernity.

Niklas Luhmann once noted in regards to developing countries that: "Many developing countries follow the path of politicisation. Political movements are used as levers in order to set the transition into motion from a traditional life style into a technical and civilized one. This movement is attempted by force via the politicisation of all public spheres – what is all too understandable, [because they are] faced with immeasurable difficulties due to such a transition. Mobilisation of all resources can be accomplished only by the political system. On the other hand, modernisation does not lie in reaching numerically higher levels of production and mass consumption by affluence. Basically, it seems that the most effective instrument of development, the political mobilisation of society, is not adequate for achieving the final goal of realising a more strongly differentiated societal order […] But there is a big danger that the instrument of politicisation will result in undifferentiated institutions that will turn into an obstacle for progress after a certain point if all of the non-economical aspects of the social system remain undifferentiated and fused politically" (LUHMANN, 2009 [1965], p. 101-102, translated by the author).

It seems that in such societies the emergence of some functional systems that are well known in Western Europe or of completely novel and innovative ones is prevented. The unsatisfactory implementation of human rights is one symptom. Due to the lack of implementation of human rights, permanent learning mechanisms to adapt to newly emerging situations in circumstances, to recognise qualitative totally new wants of inhabitants as new human and social rights and to generate new functional systems in accordance with these rights, are also lacking. To inhabitants of the West, a variety of rights and desires are well known, including those for romantic love and intimacy, as well as those governing the inclusion of sexual minorities, food and nutrition security, clean environments, etc.

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[16] There are seldom such discourses in semiperipheral states as China, Russia, Turkey and Japan. For the Japanese case, see Befu (1993) Buruma and Avishai (2004) and Morikawa (2013). For the post-soviet Russian case, see e.g. Müller (2009), Blum (2016).

Societies in the semiperiphery are characterized by the dominance of political and economic systems over other functional systems in order to mobilise industrialisation that took place in the past, recently or is in progress. The modern systems theory has an applicable term to describe such a society, i.e., an *organisation society* (*Organisationsgesellschaft*; cf. KIESERLING, 2004, p. 215; KÜHL, 2010). Accompanied with the emergence of the functionally differentiated society, three levels of communication have been differentiated in the modern societies: interactions, (formal) organisations and society (functional systems) (LUHMANN, 1997; HEINTZ [ed.] 2015). If a society identifies itself as being a large, overarching organisation, consisting of many single organisations and institutions that are organized and controlled as a whole by a single or a small number of entities in the dominant centre, it is called an 'organisation society'. (KIESERLING, 2004, p. 215; KÜHL, 2010). This concept was originally used to describe the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe. However, it is also applicable to other societies in the semiperiphery, in my opinion. Moreover, we can consider socialist countries to have been an example of the semiperiphery insofar as they defined themselves in relation to their *otherness* in comparison to the West and to the extent that human rights are implemented in an unsatisfactory manner in favour of political control and industrialisation.

Similarly, in the semiperiphery the members of dominant organisations and networks of belongings to them enjoy the privilege of full inclusion, while nonmembers suffer from unsatisfactory inclusion in functional systems (cf. NEVES, 1992). Because inclusion in society in these cases is not well enough guaranteed by human rights but rather is only enabled via membership in some organisations or personal networks (social ties), the more furious the struggle becomes for such a membership[17]. Thus, communication remains personal and concrete, and more significance is attributed to face-to-face interactions in social communications. In order to please elite members, various resources – money, sexuality, etc. – are necessary, often without moral limitations and outside the context of functional systems. This scenario can become a nurturing medium for nepotism, corruption and scandal (WIMMER, 2000; NEVES, 1992).

Generally speaking, in the states of the semiperiphery, there is also a lack or short of generalised communication as well as the idea of abstract rights, i.e. rights that are free from

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[17] The so-called tiger mothers and the competition of children to attend elite schools and universities in some eastern Asian countries are a good example.

any concrete purpose and attributed to every individual.[18] The differentiation of these three levels – interaction, (formal) organisation and society (functional systems) – is vanished in an organisation society. Membership in an elite company or status, such as that of state bureaucrats (e.g., in Japan) or of governmental parties (e.g., communist party in China), is often regarded as the only way to access societal resources. Holding acquaintances with small, personal networks, such as special elite organisations, is seen as the master key for influencing all types of functionally specified communication.

Digression: love semantics

Studies of world society do not pay much attention to Luhmann's work *Love as Passion* (LUHMANN, 1982). Yet, this work has a great relevance to his theory of societal differentiation and sociocultural evolution. He pointed out that the evolution of love semantics and the differentiation of the functional system for intimacy are the pacesetter for the emergence of the modern, primarily functional differentiated society. Indeed, the implementation of romantic love is hardly possible if older forms of differentiation like segmentary differentiation and stratification via kinship or blood relationships still remain dominant (MORIKAWA, 2014). In his latest book on the theory of society, Luhmann spoke of the patterns of partner selection in every differentiation form and its release from the old authorities (LUHMANN, 1997).

The most important moments in the semantics of romantic love and the implementation of intimacy are passion and a happy ending. It matters whether an acquaintance by chance – i.e. without and beyond the control of any traditional authorities like family, church, tribe, clan, etc. – leads to a happy ending. For a happy ending to occur in a story (narrative), so must social recognition, while a bad end implies some sort of penalty on behalf of society. People should do what leads them to a happy ending, and they refrain from whatever leads to a bad ending. The emergence and implementation of the functional system for intimacy can be measured by the particular state of love semantics – this was the assumption of Luhmann in '*Love as Passion*'. Accordingly, these notions are empirically detectable. Historically, the state of love semantics is a very important indicator of the differentiation of a society and its movement toward functional differentiation. Spatially, we can conclude that the state of love semantics in different countries or regions reveal which

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[18] According to the draft of a new constitution in Japan by the ruling LDP, duties would be introduced for Japanese nationals in order to access their national rights (LDP, 2012). It shows that the Japanese politicians have no idea of modern abstract rights but they consider rights as award for contributions to 'gemeinschaft'.

forms of differentiation are more dominant or stronger there than other forms. An edited volume by Morikawa (2014) aims to achieve a cross-cultural comparison of the implementation of romantic love in various cultural areas, demonstrating the difficulty of romantic love in regions of the periphery and semiperiphery in which old kinship structures remain dominant, such as in China, Japan and Latin America.

Conclusion

In this paper I have aimed to revise the categories of the societal differentiation of the centre, the periphery and the semiperiphery and to demonstrate their usefulness for the study of world society based on the systems theory of the Bielefeld (Niklas Luhmann) School. Firstly, the relationship between the centre and the periphery emerges in modern functional systems again. The centre is defined by its cognitive closeness and superiority as well as the power of definition and interpretation against the periphery. The systems theory shares this definition of the centre-periphery relationship with the early writings of Karl Marx and the post-colonial theory. In this sense, these categories should not be understood as genuinely spatial, but the societal differentiation of the centre, the periphery and the semi-periphery results in the emergence of special spaces.

Secondly, we can discuss the border between the centre and the (semi-)periphery with the metacode of the world society, namely inclusion and exclusion. If we define the centre of modern world society by the implementation of functional differentiation, we get an indicator for the border between the centre and (semi-)periphery in world society. That indicator is the state of human rights. All regions are exposed to the structural effects of world society, especially that of the world economy. However, all functional systems have not been implemented equally throughout the world if we consider the state of human rights (NEVES, 1992; HEINTZ, 2016; LUHMANN, 1995b). According to this indicator, the centre, semiperiphery and periphery may also be distinguished. While in the centre the access to social resources is guaranteed by individual human rights (fundamental rights), the population in the semiperiphery and the periphery requires membership in particular organisations or social ties to obtain the benefits of the modern world and the world economy. If we can define the periphery as 'failed states', we can label authoritarian regimes as the semiperiphery of world society.

The concept of 'culture' emerged in the West and Central Europe during the transition to modernity. Political units were organised as modern nation states in which the members of

the entire population of a state territory were considered to be citizens and able to be included into functional systems. In this sense the correlation of national identity with cultural identity has a functional necessity for the emergence of the modern functionally differentiated society. However, this concept is dysfunctional in the semiperiphery. It is common for nations in the semiperiphery to acquire their national identity as 'otherness' of the 'West'.[19] In the name of 'national (cultural) identity', the concept of culture prevents societies from becoming totally functionally differentiated in which individual human rights are both necessary and respected. In the name of Asian (Chinese, Hindu, etc. not forget Japanese) cultural identity, tradition and virtues, for example, a large portion of the population, especially women, is implicitly or explicitly exploited and are unable to obtain the protection of human rights and social rights.

Since a collective identity of 'otherness' in comparison to the 'West' has emerged in certain regions, it may be very difficult to overcome and to implement human rights. Similar to the position of economic dependence in Wallerstein's theory, the semiperiphery and the periphery are held as such and outside the centre due to the cultural identity of these societies as non-Western. Authoritarian regimes define also themselves in relationship to their otherness with the West. One prominent variant in this definition is the way in which socialist and communist societies define themselves in terms of their otherness in comparison to capitalism. In this sense, these societies may be regarded to participate in the meaning system installed by the 'West'. Their 'self-image' as the otherness of the 'West' has been produced and reproduced as a part of 'Western modernity'. Orientalism thus has its origin in Western Romanticism (SAID, 1978). In this sense, the self-images of the periphery and the semi-periphery are not possible without the centre. The centre owns the power of definition and interpretation to define reality, to decide the discussion topics of importance (agenda setting), to reproduce the codes, schemes and semantics for observations and to supply the official interpretation of events that occur within both the centre and the periphery. The normative image of the collective self and the collective others of every culture are moulded by asymmetrical political, economical, technical and military relationships and in the production of knowledge. Thus, cultural differentiation is not a cause but a result of the asymmetrical differentiation between the centre and the periphery of world society (MORIKAWA, 2013).

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[19] Japp (2006; 2015, p. 91) pointed out the diagonal, exclusive construction of the cultural identity of Muslims in relationship to the West.

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