

# TWO CONCEPTS OF “LIBERAL EDUCATION”

STEFAN LORENZ SORGNER

Friedrich-Schiller-Universität

## **Abstract:**

*In this article I attempt to find out the appropriate understanding of “liberal education”. Firstly, I distinguish the two most important meanings of the notion “freedom” which I call momentary and lifelong freedom. Momentary freedom is a type of negative freedom, and lifelong freedom a type of positive freedom. Secondly, I show the consequences, which these two meanings of “freedom” have on the practice of a “liberal education”. Finally, I analyse which type of liberal education is the best.*

**Keywords:** *Education, Liberalism, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Nietzsche, C. G. Jung, Freedom, Paideia, virtues, character, pleasure, family, the Good Life, Liberal Education.*

In this article I attempt to find out the appropriate understanding of “liberal education”. I take it for granted that all human beings wish to live a good life, and attribute great importance to freedom, as they regard freedom as necessary for a good life. However, there are various meanings of the notion “freedom”<sup>1</sup>, and there are some understandings of freedom which nowadays do not normally get associated with the notion ‘freedom’. Here, I will not solely deal with the modern understanding of liberalism.

Firstly, I distinguish the two most important meanings of the notion “freedom” which I call momentary and lifelong freedom. This distinction is an analogy to Seel’s distinction between momentary (episodisches) and lifelong (übergreifendes) happiness<sup>2</sup>. Momentary freedom is a type of negative freedom, and lifelong freedom a type of positive freedom<sup>3</sup>. In the case of “momentary freedom” a person can act according to his momentary will, as long as he does not invade the freedom of anyone else. In the case of “lifelong freedom” the society helps the individual to will what is in his own interest considering the whole of his life. Secondly, I show the consequences, which these two meanings of “freedom” have on the practice of a “liberal education”. Finally, I analyse which type of liberal education is the best.

## **Momentary and Lifelong Freedom**

Firstly, I give a short historical introduction concerning the notion “liberal education”. Secondly, I explain the notion “momentary freedom”, and thirdly, I deal with the expression “lifelong freedom”.

A “liberal education” is based upon the “liberal arts”. The term “liberal arts” goes back to the expression *septem artes liberales*, which constituted the basis of education during the Middle Ages, and the notion *artes liberales* of Roman antiquity, which formed the basis of their educational ideal of

the *humanitas*. The Latin term *humanitas* can be equated with the Greek *paideia* which was pointed out by the Roman Grammarian Aulus Gellius<sup>4</sup>. In general, in Greek and Roman antiquity the purpose of education was to enable the young to become free, and noble human beings. Freedom and nobility were regarded as important as these aspects were regarded as essential for people to live a good life, or to be *eudaimonious*, as one said in Ancient Greece. However, not all types of "liberal education" include the most important aspects of the liberal education of Antiquity, which is the result of different understandings of the term "freedom". I distinguish two concepts of freedom further, whereby I start off with "momentary freedom" and then I concentrate on "lifelong freedom".

Given "momentary freedom" a person can act according to his momentary will, as long as he does not invade the freedom of anyone else. So, one aspect of this kind of freedom is that one has to be tolerant to all tolerant people, and to accept their ways of life. This type of freedom presupposes that all people are so different from another that one cannot make any general ethical judgements concerning the good life which apply to all or at least most of them, except the weak position that it is good to be free from which follows that one has to be tolerant to others. As a consequence one is either encouraged to find out what one wishes for oneself (to become who one is), or to create oneself how one wishes to be (to become who one wishes to be). Which of these options is promoted depends on ones attitude towards the essence of men. If one believes that people contain a personal ideal which makes them authentic, as Nietzsche does<sup>5</sup>, then one defends the first option. If one holds that people do not have any essence, and can make a *creatio ex nihilo* out of their personality, as Satre does<sup>6</sup>, then one is in favour of the second option. Concerning both options, it has to be stressed that this attitude is always limited by the principle of tolerance. So, one can say that "momentary freedom" is present, when self-creation or -becoming within the limits of the principle of tolerance is promoted. Next, I come to "lifelong freedom".

In the case of "lifelong freedom" the society helps the individual to will what is in his own interest considering the whole of his life. As distinct from the aforementioned type of freedom here a stronger account of the good<sup>7</sup> comes in, as lifelong freedom is supposed to be promoted. If one wishes to help the individual to will what is in his own interest considering the whole of his life, then one has to have a picture of what is important for all people at the various stages of their lives. If one knows what is important for people at the various stages of their lives, then one can make them aware of the consequences of their actions. One can show people lines of consequences, which might stop them from doing things, which they would probably regret later on. In addition, advice can be given of how one can reach the best possible consequences for ones own life. Here it is best to stick to Democritus' position which proposes that education is done best by means of friendly encouragement, and the art of convincing, but not by means of law and oppression<sup>8</sup>. Such advice is based on a stronger concept of the good. In philosophy the best and most detailed account of this type of freedom was given by Aristotle in the "Nicomachean Ethics"<sup>9</sup>. After having distinguished the two most important meanings of freedom, I can now show the consequences, which these two meanings of "freedom" have on the

practice of a “liberal education”.

## **Two Types of Liberal Education**

Firstly, I further clarify three conditions which are important for a human being, and which are relevant for educational purposes. Secondly, I explain which of these aspects are considered by the two types of education.

There are three aspects which are important for every human being. Firstly, there is character, secondly, interests, and thirdly, conditions. A character can either be strong or weak. Some people also distinguish between people with a character, and those who have none. However, I prefer the first distinction, as I regard a character to be the human constitution which is responsible for all acts, conscious as well as unconscious. As everybody has to act at each moment, it is impossible not to act at all. As a consequence, all people have to have a character. However, one can either have an ordered or a chaotic character. In addition, the character can be either strong or weak. The weak/strong distinction refers to the stability of someone’s character. Someone has a strong character, if he remains the same no matter what the circumstances are in which he is. A Christian monk remaining chaste and virtuous, even if he lived among hippies, or a Janis Joplin like person who continued to drink and indulge herself in the basic pleasures, even if she lived in a monastery, represent strong characters. Someone has a weak character, if he is easily influenced by his surroundings. A person who is a Buddhist in India, and a capitalist in New York represents a weak character<sup>10</sup>.

Next we come to the ordered/chaotic distinction with respect to a character. An ordered character is constituted out of virtues which are based on a detailed world view. The above mentioned Christian monk and the person being a Buddhist in India represent ordered characters. However, the first has a strong, and ordered character, whereas, the second has a weak, and ordered character. A chaotic character does not include values, or virtues, which bring about reliable types of acts, but aims at things like money, or pleasure, which do not bring about reliable types of acts, as with these goals anything can get justified<sup>11</sup>. The above mentioned Janis Joplin like person, or the Wall Street capitalist<sup>12</sup> represent cases in question. However, the first has a strong, and chaotic character whereas the second has a weak and chaotic character. The ordered/chaotic distinction with respect to character can be found in the ethics of all the great Greek thinkers. Plato, Aristotle, as well as Plotinus regard an ordered character as essential for a good life<sup>13</sup>. In contemporary philosophy MacIntyre defends a comparable ethical position<sup>14</sup>, as he is in favour of a revitalisation of an Aristotelian neo-thomistic kind of Christianity<sup>15</sup>.

After having analysed various aspects of a character, the notion “interests” has to be clarified further. Someone with a strong, ordered character remains the same during all of his life. However, this does not mean that this person does not change. Even though, he is always, brave, wise, moderate, and just, what he is interested in changes. Our most important interests are sex, and age dependent. There is a time for becoming interested in the other sex, for finding ones own way in society, for establishing

oneself in ones occupation, for being interested in marriage, and kids, for dealing with the meaning of life, for having a mid-life-crisis, for facing the problem of death. Our interests usually change when other important changes take place. Most of these changes are biological and therefore also sex dependent. Others, for example, are related to ones age. When we are leaving school, we need to find our way in life, to find out what we wish to become, ask ourselves how we wish to live, and find a way to find a partner. A general, but appropriate description of the various stages of life was given by C. G. Jung<sup>16</sup>.

The third area which is important for a person is his conditions. These conditions can get distinguished into external, bodily, and mental conditions. A similar distinction was made by Aristotle within his "Nichomachean Ethics"<sup>17</sup>. Firstly, there are the external conditions of a person. Among these one can count a house, a job, a wife and children, parents, relatives, a good reputation, friends, wealth, and many others. The area of external conditions refers to ones relationship to others, and the world. Secondly, there are the conditions of the body, like health, beauty, and strength. Thirdly, one needs to consider the conditions of the mind. Here again we can refer to a Jungian categorization which is the most rewarding, according to my mind<sup>18</sup>. He enumerates: Intellect, feeling, sensation, and intuition. The intellect encloses the faculty of understanding, and reason. Feeling refers to such phenomena as sympathy, love, hate, or anger. Sensation covers our five senses, seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, and tasting. Last, but not least intuition refers to ideas which simply come up in our minds. In addition, to these four areas by means of which we can get knowledge, memory and imagination are also important.

Having further clarified, the meaning of the notions character, interests, and conditions, it can be shown on which of these areas and to which degree the two types of education dedicate themselves. For the sake of convenience, I call liberal education based on momentary freedom "type M education" with a capital M for momentary, and I refer to liberal education based on lifelong freedom as "type L education" with a capital L which stands for lifelong<sup>19</sup>. By education I refer to both what takes place in families as well as what happens in school, as education is the general transmission of culture, whereby culture has to be understood as in the culture/nature distinction but not in the culture/civilisation distinction<sup>20</sup>. I start with type M education.

The aim of type M education is to help the people to be free. Freedom here refers to "momentary freedom" according to which a person is free, if he can act according to his momentary will, but does not invade the freedom of anyone else. Which effects does this have with respect to the aforementioned three aspects which are important for a human being. Firstly, there is the character, and we have distinguished, four character types: The strong and chaotic type, the weak and chaotic type, the weak and ordered type, and the strong, and ordered type. In an ordered character, the soul is constituted out of virtues which comprise all aspects of human existence so that all of ones acts are virtuous. The only virtue which is valid for everyone according to type M education is tolerance. Tolerance does not help one to act distinctively with respect to all aspects of human existence. Therefore, tolerance alone is not sufficient to bring about an ordered character. Most likely type M education is responsible for chaotic characters. Whether these are strong or weak depends on the natural disposition of the person in

question. It can be the case that ordered characters come about due to type M education, as people have the option to have an ordered character. Still, it is not very likely that many ordered characters come about, as virtues need to be taught. According to Aristotle<sup>21</sup>, one becomes virtuous by acting virtuously which means that one has to force oneself to repeat virtuous acts, so that one eventually becomes virtuous. Not many people are so disciplined that in their childhood they habitually repeat virtuous acts by themselves.

The next aspect is one's interests. According to type M education a person is free, if he can act according to his momentary will, but does not invade the freedom of anyone else. This implies that it is seen as good by this type of education that people choose whatever they consciously think they wish at the moment, even if it goes against the faculty of understanding, and reason, or traditional practice. One example could be a teenage girl wishing to enjoy herself and have sex with as many men as possible. Another example could be a man in his forties abandoning his job, his wife and his three children to go on a trip around the world all by himself. As type M education does not *a priori* attribute any value to all these options, they are all justified, if they correspond to the momentary wish of the person in question. This also means that no general interests can be described or general help can be given in type M education. A statement like, “Dear son, concentrate on your education in order to be able to nourish a family”, could not be made within type M education. If help for one's life is expected within a type M educational system, then the helper is supposed to question the help seeker so that the help seeker can become aware what is truly in his interest. The helper should not give any positive advice.

Next, we reach the aspect of conditions. With respect to what counts as a good external condition, type M education does not say anything, as one has to find out for oneself what one values. Nothing can be said with respect to one's bodily conditions as well, as this again is up to one's own choice. However, as one wishes to show the pupils what can be done, which roads can be taken, and which choices are available, type M education is obliged to bring the pupils in contact with the various options. This implies for example that the pupils are made familiar with sport which again promotes health, and strength. However, it is not their intention to say health or strength are good, but they merely wish to offer their pupils the option of becoming familiar with various types of sport and of choosing one for themselves.

Next, we come to the mental conditions. To these applies the same we have said concerning sport. The pupils are being offered various subjects in order to bring them in contact with the realms of mental engagement, yet, this is done, merely for the sake of making the pupils familiar with the choices they have. The intellect is trained by mathematics, the visual sense and imagination by fine art, memory by history, and intuition by theology. In type M education one trains the various aspects of the mind, in order to enable the pupils to choose what is good for them.

Given these thoughts, it becomes clear that in type M education very little can be done with respect to ones interests. People are encouraged to concentrate on themselves, and to find their way in life. A bit more important is the aspect “character”. Here, at least, it is demanded to promote the virtue

of tolerance. However, due to the characteristics of this virtue, it is usually not sufficient to bring about an ordered character. The most important aspect of type M education is that of the conditions. It tries to make the pupils familiar with the various mental and bodily conditions, in order to enable them to decide for themselves what aspect they wish to concentrate on.

Having described, what type M education is like, I can now deal with type L education. Type L education tries to help the pupils to become free. However, freedom here refers to lifelong freedom, and in the case of "lifelong freedom" the society helps the individual to will what is in his own interest considering the whole of his life. This presupposes that the members of the respective society agree upon a stronger account of the good. Which effects does this have with respect to the aforementioned three aspects which are important for a human being? Firstly, there is the character, and we have distinguished, four character types: The strong and chaotic type, the weak and chaotic type, the weak and ordered type, and the strong, and ordered type. In order to have an ordered character, the soul must be constituted out of virtues which comprise all aspects of human existence so that all of ones acts are virtuous. As type L education presupposes a stronger account of the good, it is in favour of a certain set of virtues which enclose all areas of existence. As one regards these virtues to be essential for a good life, one helps the pupils to integrate these values into their personalities. In the Christian tradition the virtues of love, hope, and faith<sup>22</sup> are supposed to be established, according to Plato the virtues needed are wisdom, courage, moderateness, and justice<sup>23</sup>. One way of helping people to become virtuous is by helping them to repeat virtuous acts, as Aristotle explained<sup>24</sup>. As a consequence of type L education, most of the pupils establish ordered characters for themselves, and depending on the natural dispositions these could be either strong or weak.

Secondly, there is the aspect of ones interest. A stronger account of the Good is presupposed in type L education, and thereby also a description of the various stages of life and the corresponding interests. In general, in life there are phases of change and others of rest, and these alternate, as Jung convincingly shows<sup>25</sup>. In each phase of rest a determined set of interests is important for human being. Phases of change come about when one loses ones former interests, and develops new ones. One has to realise that one has to get rid of ones old interests and develop new ones. As the most important interests depend on ones sex, and age, the interests for the various phases of rest are identical for the people of the same sex, according to Jung. In a society in which one finds type L education, these changing interests are taken into consideration, and the educators help their pupils to get rid of their old interests, and develop new ones. This can happen for example by means of initiation rites<sup>26</sup>.

Lastly, the aspect of the conditions needs to be checked concerning its relationship to type L education. Firstly, there are the external conditions. What is regarded as good depends on the view of the good presupposed. In most cases, if not in all, it is regarded as good for a man to have a wife, and children, a family, and friends. Besides these, one can by closer inspection find a lot of other conditions. In most, if not all established, strong views of the good, it is also seen as good, if ones family and friends, as well as oneself are healthy, which is a positive account of a good bodily condition. Next, there is the

area of mental conditions. These are also to be trained given type L education, not in order to show the pupils which options they have, but because the truth is seen as important, and one needs to use ones mental conditions to improve ones understanding of the world which is supposed to improve ones lives as well<sup>27</sup>.

Type L education, therefore, does not focus its attention on the development of the pupil's mental, and bodily conditions in order to show them which options in life they have, but trains the pupils in these areas in order to improve the quality of their lives. In addition, type L education does not abandon its pupils in the desert without a map, so each of them can create or find the map for himself, but helps them to find the appropriate external conditions, to develop the right interest at each stage in life, and to develop a good character by basing the strong account of the good on long established traditions which have proved to be appropriate by experience for a long time. This summary of the consequences of type L education brings us to the next part, in which it is discussed whether type M education, or type L education is better for a human being. Once this is done, one can apply the answer to ones own society, and draw the appropriate consequences.

### **The Best Type of Education**

Finally, we can ask which of these two types of liberal education is more appropriate in fulfilling its task. Both types of education aim at liberty for the pupils, as liberty is regarded as a necessary constituent of the good life. By analysing some of the basic constituents of a good life, we can clarify which of these types of liberal education best promotes the good life. I am aware that neither of the two types can actually correspond to reality, as they represent ideal extremes. Still, these extremes help one to become aware of where a real society can be placed, which again enables one to grasp what can be improved in any society. I begin with an analysis of some of the basic constituents of a good life, and I concentrate on the three aspects which are important for human beings.

A person is leading a good life, if he is content with himself<sup>28</sup> and the world during all stages of life<sup>29</sup>. This definition is a tautology, and therefore, it cannot be falsified. Its status is comparable to that of Darwin's principle of selection, according to which the fittest survive. Arguably fitness has to be defined by reference to survival. Darwin has often been criticized on the grounds that therefore the principle of selection is a tautology, and cannot be regarded as a scientific theory, as it cannot be falsified. For many people, this was reason enough to doubt that principle. However, Nicolai Hartmann thinks that the obviousness of this principle does not show that it is invalid or that it therefore has to be doubted but he regards this fact to be a confirmation of this principle. For him the plausibility of this principle reveals its status as *a priori* knowledge. Before Hartmann, Spencer already stressed the *a priori* status of the principle of selection<sup>30</sup>. The same line of reasoning applies to the above statement concerning the good life. If someone claims that people sometimes wish to be discontent, then one can always respond that this discontentment is aimed at in order to achieve a higher contentment with

oneself. As this line of argument can always be applied, the above position cannot be falsified. Of course, it has to be admitted that a fully good life has to be seen as an ideal which can never be achieved, yet this does not imply that one can never lead a good life, it only means that the closer one gets to this ideal the better is one's life. In addition, it needs to be stressed that contentment with oneself and the world does not imply that one is not active. The state of contentment does not exclude the possibility that one does not have any further goals, which one wishes to reach at later stages in life. As a content person can know that in order to remain content, he needs to be active, and to continue working to reach his further goals, the state of contentment does not exclude the possibility that one remains active once the state of contentment is reached. Now, it has to be asked with respect to all three aspects which are important for human beings, what is needed in order to be content with oneself and the world during all stages in life.

Firstly, there is the character. Contentment with oneself and the world implies some stability. If one rues what one has done in the past, then it is difficult to be content with oneself<sup>31</sup>. In order not to have to rue one's past acts, it is best, if one's character always brings about the same type of informed acts. However, the character only brings about the same type of acts, if it is ordered, and strong. In addition, one is content with one's friends, if they do not act randomly. The same applies to them with respect to oneself. Therefore, friendship is best promoted, if characters do not change, as described in Aristotle's theory of friendship<sup>32</sup>. In both cases we have seen that a strong and ordered character best promotes contentment with oneself and the world. The most important virtues which need to be and are considered in every great account of the good, are the virtues of moderateness, and wisdom. Moderation has to be held especially with respect to one's attitude towards such basic pleasures as eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse. This virtue can be found in any great religion, and is therefore well established. Wisdom refers to one's understanding of the meaning of life which is a reason via which one can justify the whole of one's life, i.e. afterlife, family tradition. According to Jung, most people in their forties consult the psychiatrist, as they are lacking a meaning in life, and in his famous BBC interview he explicitly said: „Man cannot stand a meaningless life.“<sup>33</sup>

The character is the most important aspect of a human being with respect to the good life, as it is responsible for the contentment with oneself. If one is content with one's character, then one is content with who one is, and without being content with oneself, one cannot be content with the world<sup>34</sup>, so contentment with oneself, is the basis of all other forms of contentment. As a consequence, it is essential for living a good life to have an ordered character, as such a character promotes contentment with oneself, and if the character is also strong, then this contentment is even secured in a stable, reliable form. So for the contentment with oneself, the aspect of the character is the most important. For the contentment with the world, we need to consider the other two aspects.

Secondly, there are the interests. According to Jung, life can be divided up into main phases, which are determined by rest, and transitional phases, which are determined by change. The transitional phases come about, if one's old interests no longer appeal to oneself. As a consequence, one has to



abandon them, and find out what one is interested in at the moment. As transitional phases are generally linked to aspects of a human being which are independent of their individuality, but come up in most human beings who are similar to oneself with respect to especially sex, and age, it is possible for the educators in a society to help the pupils at these stages by showing them that it is time to abandon one's old interests, and what is appropriate for one's current stage in life, so that the transitional phases can be as short as possible. As people become discontent with themselves and the world during transitional phases, this discontentment can be abbreviated by abbreviating the transitional phases<sup>35</sup>.

Thirdly, and lastly, there are the various conditions. Concerning the external conditions it is clear that for a man it is good to have a wife, children, a family, friends, a job, and to have always been embedded in a family. For a woman similar conditions apply. There might be some differences between men and women which are based on their different biological constitution. All traditions, and world religions support this position, and Aristotle in his "Politics" gives a plausible philosophical account of this fact, i.e. when he convincingly explains that only a "bad man" or "someone beyond humanity" can permanently exist by himself<sup>36</sup>. Besides the aspects mentioned, more can be named, however, a longer study is needed to clarify this point further in detail. Contentment with the world, presupposes that one is content with oneself<sup>37</sup>. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to be content with the world without being embedded in a loving family, and group of friends. Secondly, there are the bodily conditions. If one is ill, and has to lie in bed, then it is difficult to be content with the world, which shows the importance of health with respect to contentment. The same applies to other aspects of the body as well. Therefore, it is clear that many bodily conditions are important for a good life. It also needs to be pointed out that it is important to grasp one's limits. This also applies to the mental conditions. Some natural dispositions can only be changed within certain limits. And one has to grasp one's limits and accept them, otherwise one will never get rid of one's discontentment. This applies to bodily beauty, as well as one's intellectual capacities, which brings us to the next point - the mental conditions. No matter which aspect of the mind we analyse, intellect, feeling, sensation, intuition, memory, or imagination, a lack of capacity is always a possible source for discontentment. So the enhancement of one's mental conditions is important for a good life, and as already mentioned, it is essential to understand one's own limits so that one does not demand something of oneself, of which one is utterly unable<sup>38</sup>. Having grasped the essential elements of a good life, we can finally apply our insights to the question concerning the best type of education.

We have already found out in part two that in type M education very little can be done with respect to one's interests. However, it is important for a good life to receive some help for realising what is appropriate for one's age and sex. One gets this help with type L education.

A bit more important in type M education is the aspect of character. Here, at least, it is demanded to promote the virtue of tolerance. However, due to the characteristics of this virtue, it is usually not sufficient to bring about an ordered character. However, it is hardly possible to be content with oneself and the world for longer periods, if one has a chaotic character<sup>39</sup>. As we have seen a strong and ordered character is essential for being content with oneself, and contentment with oneself is the basis

for contentment with the world. Therefore, this should not be risked by helping the young to develop chaotic characters. It would be better, if type L education was applied, as it helps the pupils to develop an ordered character based on a strong account of the good which proved to be working because of a basis with a long and established tradition.

The most important aspect of type M education is that of the various conditions. This type of education tries to make the pupils familiar with the various mental and bodily conditions, in order to enable them to decide for themselves what aspect they wish to concentrate themselves on. However, firstly, this aspect of a life is far less important than that of the character for a good life, secondly, one only shows the pupils the various options without defending their value, and thirdly, this aspect is not neglected by type L education either but rather implies the demand for the importance of both bodily, as well as mental conditions.

Given this final argument, it becomes clear that type L education is far superior basis for helping the young to lead good lives. Type L education wins in all categories, and especially the great importance type L education puts on an ordered character is an important reason for the superiority of that type of education, as the aspect of the character is particularly important for a good life. Of course, one might wonder where the basis of the stronger account of the good, which is presupposed by type L education, comes from. The examples mentioned in the text represent possible elements of a stronger account of the good, as they are common elements of all great religions and worldviews. Pico della Mirandola was also right when he pointed out that there is a grain of truth in each great religion<sup>40</sup>. And some grains are present in all of the great religions. By extracting these aspects one can reach quite a strong account of the good, which is a suitable basis for type L education. It might be that the four Platonic virtues, and the values "family" and "friendship" represent such a common basis<sup>41</sup>. A community which focuses on the value of the "virtues", "family" and "friendship" might also bring about a truly liberal democracy, for people with these values have the best prerequisites for realising their own potential, and expressing their own individuality. Having values in common does not imply that all people will have the same interests, and personalities. It only implies that closer bonds will be established between human beings<sup>42</sup>. So it has become clear that only an education based on lifelong freedom can help us to lead a good life. We are free, if we consider each time before we act, if the respective act is in ones interest, given that we live a normal life, which passes through all its various stages.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> A good survey of various notion of freedom gives Jean-Claude Wolf in his “Freiheit-Analyse und Bewertung” [Wolf (1995)].

<sup>2</sup> Seel (1995): P. 62-65. See also Bien (1999): P. 98-99. Bien also refers to Wolf Schneider who is in favour of momentary happiness. Most Ancient Greek concepts of happiness are based on lifelong happiness.

<sup>3</sup> The distinction between positive and negative freedom stems from Isaiah Berlin [Berlin (1969)].

<sup>4</sup> Routledge (Ed.) (2000): P. 365.

<sup>5</sup> Nietzsche (1967-1977): Vol. 3, P. 519.

<sup>6</sup> Satre (1958): P. 553-554.

<sup>7</sup> I am referring to Nußbaum’s terminology [Nußbaum (1999): P. 28] here.

<sup>8</sup> Capelle (Ed.) (1938): P. 462, fr. 181.

<sup>9</sup> Aristotle (1984): Vol. 2, P. 1729-1867.

<sup>10</sup> Here, I refer to people who are Buddhists because they live in India. Of course, it is possible for someone to be a Buddhist and to live in India, who would also be a Buddhist, if he lived in France, but I am excluding this possibility here. The examples I give are merely there to describe fictional ideal characters, so that tendencies can be revealed.

<sup>11</sup> Compare Aristotle (1984): Nicomachean Ethics 1156a7-1156b12.

<sup>12</sup> Someone whose prime goal is the gain of money necessarily has to have a chaotic character: Acts depend on ones prime aim. The maximisation of the financial gain is the prime aim of a Wall Street capitalist. What brings about the maximum financial gain changes according to circumstances. Therefore, the acts of a Wall street capitalist change according to circumstances. Someone whose acts do not depend on stable rules of action has a chaotic character. The acts of a Wall Street capitalist change according to circumstances. Therefore, a Wall street capitalist has a chaotic character.

<sup>13</sup> See Horn (1998).

<sup>14</sup> Reese-Schäfer (1995): S. 65.

<sup>15</sup> MacIntyre, Alasdair, ‘Which Gods ought We to obey and Why’ in Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 3, N. 4, Oktober 1986 & Mylor (1994): S. 44.

<sup>16</sup> Jung (1995): P. 427-442 & Stevens (1990).

<sup>17</sup> Aristotle (1984): Vol. 2, P. 1736.

<sup>18</sup> Fordham (1953): P. 29-46.

<sup>19</sup> If one compares the two types of education with the traditional distinction between anti-authoritarian and authoritarian education, there are links between “type M education” and anti-authoritarian education, and “type L education” and authoritarian education. However, I will not deal with this comparison within this paper.

<sup>20</sup> Krings/Baumgartner/Wild (1973): vol. 3, P. 823-832.

<sup>21</sup> Aristotle (1984): Vol. 2, P. 1742-1743.

<sup>22</sup> 1 Kor 13, 13.

<sup>23</sup> Plato (1961): Politeia 4, 427 d - 435 c.

<sup>24</sup> Aristotle (1984): Nicomachean Ethics 1114a6-10.

<sup>25</sup> Jung (1995): P. 427-442 & Stevens (1990).

<sup>26</sup> It needs to be stressed that here we have a wide understanding of the notion “initiation rites” whereby e.g. an A level exam can also count as an initiation rite.

<sup>27</sup> Compare Nietzsche (1967-1977): Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen, Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben, 1.

<sup>28</sup> It needs to be stressed that the contentment needs to be actual. Someone can believe that he is content with himself, but he is not. In that case, he is not actually content with himself. However, it can be assumed that an informed contentment in most cases corresponds with the actual contentment.

<sup>29</sup> Compare Kant (1974): P. 133 & 247.

<sup>30</sup> Gadamer/Vogler (Ed.) (1972): Vol. 1 P. 333-334.

<sup>31</sup> Richardson (2001): P. 190.

<sup>32</sup> Aristotle (1984): Vol. 2, P. 1825-1852.

<sup>33</sup> Stevens (1994): S. 126.

<sup>34</sup> Jacoby (1985), P. 85.

<sup>35</sup> See Sorgner in (Ed.) Reschke (2001): P. 249-254.

<sup>36</sup> Aristotle (1984): Vol. 2, P. 1987-1988.

<sup>37</sup> Jacoby (1985): P. 86.

<sup>38</sup> Jacoby (1985): P. 88.

<sup>39</sup> Hobbes (1991): P. 88-89 & Wilde (1996): P. 17-159.

<sup>40</sup> Pico della Mirandola (1997): P. 115.

<sup>41</sup> The elements mentioned were all dealt with in Micha Brumlik's „Bildung und Glück“ [Brumlik (2002)].

<sup>42</sup> A more detailed account of that point can be found in my article: Community, Multiculturalism, and the Good. [Sorgner (2003): P. 257-269].

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e-mail: sorgner@gmx.net