

PHENOMENOLOGY OF INCLUSIVENESS: ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES.

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ABSTRACT

The *Phenomenology of inclusiveness* characterizes itself as a new work in the area of phenomenology. Seeking phenomenological sources in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Waldenfels, the article attempts to develop inclusiveness in order to contemplate the inclusive/exclusive paradox and, moreover, to show its ethical perspectives toward an ethic that intends to be inclusive. From Husserl, we find the basis for a phenomenology of inclusiveness, which was put forth in his *Krisis*. Such inclusiveness is characterized by a latent reflective attitude, an attitude of inclusion in the *life-world*, an attitude of not closing our thesis, and, finally, an attitude that avoids the reductionism of the subjective and objective poles. With the radicality of thought from Merleau-Ponty, the text presents support for a complicity of meaning. Now, the subject sees his/herself as complicit in his/her relationship with the *live-world* thus withdrawing the heavy burden that previously was placed solely on the subject as the ultimate endower of all meaning. The constitutive process entails a radical attitude that enables an incarnate inclusiveness, conveying the inclusive scope to the horizontality of life. However, as Waldenfels investigated the progress of ethical theory, he added an ethical-practical character to the constitutive dimension. For Waldenfels, what was previously excluded from the established order appears at the threshold, providing inclusive opportunities. After these considerations, the text reveals an inclusiveness, which is open, latent, included in the *life-world*, non-reductionist, complicit in the constitutive process, and has an ethically responsive character.

Keywords: Phenomenology; Inclusiveness; Life-world; Complicity; Responsiveness

Introduction: the paradoxes of inclusivity through husserlian contribution.

In Husserl, the ontological basis has the main task of evidencing a given world as it is given, self-evident, not as the sense of tradition presents it, that is, of an order that lies behind the chaos of the world, thus revealing an order underlying all things. This ontological basis, achieved by the phenomenological *epoché*, presents us with a difficulty: How not to fall into the objectivism that it tries to avoid? After putting the world in parentheses, remembering that it is not an exit from the world, but allowing for a more original sphere to emerge, how not to enter into a subjectivism? Husserl will say that the result of *epoché* should clarify that our reflection on the objective *life-world* is only a particular mode of transcendental life that always constitutes the world, but in turn,

transcendental subjectivity will never be aware of the constitutive horizons. We live strongly within love/attracted (*verschossen*) (HUSSERL, 1976, p. 179), because in order to understand the whole constitutive essence of the *life-world* would require a complete reorientation and reflection, which is impossible, so a constant phenomenological reduction is necessary.

Husserl goes further, pointing out another difficulty: by placing the world in parentheses, why do we not move away from it? For Husserl, this is one of the worst mistakes that a misunderstanding of reduction would lead us to think. In our understanding, the reduced process makes a path just as opposed to a turning away from the world, but throws us directly to it. For this reason, we argue that the method of reduction becomes inclusive, for it leaves its theoretical rational sphere in order to direct, to reorient ourselves to what is actually given. We, by phenomenological reduction, are reformulated (*umgestaltet*) at all points through the sense of being (*Seinsinn*). In the words of Husserl: "The world is the open universe, the horizon of the termini, the universal field that exist whereby all praxis is presupposed and, continually, enriched by its results (HUSSERL, 1976, p. 180)". We do not leave the world, but we are brought to it, that is, we enter into the world itself. This method, according to Husserl, allows us a path that is given by itself (*derjenigen der Gegebenheitsweisen desselben*) (HUSSERL, 1976, p. 181), no longer the way of Cartesian doubt, but to the certainty, through reduction, that places in parenthesis our preconceptions, giving the possibility of an open universe as a gift of its original presence.

A third difficulty lies in the fact that through reduction we are not allowed to describe, by empirical experience, objective truths. In this way, it seems that we depart from a scientific method that values induction as an indispensable tool of every assertive method. Husserlian phenomenology rightly criticizes casuistic objective reasoning itself for the dangers it can cause to humankind. This third problem seems to rest on the goal for which the author of *Krisis* wrote such a work. The ways that this objectifying and ordering reason has caused humanity, does not represents at all the solution of the most burning problems of humanity. The sense of being is not contemplated by the science of facts, much less visualized in its essence. The crisis of the European sciences is the ultimate proof of the problems encountered in this kind of reason. Inductive construction that seeks to generate universal laws can have the evil consequence of the horrors of war.

The war was built on a sharp base of meticulous reasoning. The exclusion of the other proceeds from rational justification as well as false inclusion. The phenomenological method is a method that requires the conversion of this type of reason.

When Husserl says that his method is eidetic, he juxtaposes it as a phenomenon, of what appears as a gift, in which the cleavage of the *self* is the undressing of all objectivity. Such a method throws us into the horizon of life, much greater and deeper than that presented by the sciences of fact. When Husserl says that the essence is the truest one, it speaks of that which can not be objectified, for as truth it appears as an original gift, it becomes the greatest questioning of ourselves. If we could understand the phenomenon in its entirety, we would be imprisoning its value deterministically. This ontological basis allows us to rethink the very constitutive aspects of our reason. The heraclitian flow does not occur in empirical experience, nor in subjectivity, but in the gift, which guides the sense of being.

In § 53 of *Krisis*, Husserl brings up a problem that is central to understand the true meaning and purpose of his method. The emerging paradox is expressed as follows: when I become a subject for the world, at the same time, I am an object for the world. There is a tension between the world and the subjectivity; both, the world and subjectivity, are devoured (*verschlingt*) (HUSSERL, 1976, p. 183). Although the world is the universe itself of what is pre-given as obvious, the subjectivity does not command the horizon from this pre-objectivity, precisely because of its original presence that makes any deterministic objectivity unfeasible. The emergence of this paradox leads us to an attitude of openness to the *life-world* that can be exhibited before it is constructed and conceived through mythical thinking.

This paradox extends to the dimension of the own *I*. How can the *I*, being *I*, account for the intersubjective relationship in which the *I* is an object for the other *I(s)*? How can it be evidence that we as a community give meaning to the world? Theoretically, through rational logic, we enter an objectified field full of labyrinths, whereby a blind divergence leads nowhere. According to Husserl, the first step would be to transform what can not be apprehended and ruled deterministically into phenomena, in its gift, in the way it appears to consciousness. Thus, we begin to describe the phenomenon and not determine what we can not determine. This phenomenological attitude disqualifies any attempt of a complete reduction for Husserl, because it refers to a constant description of

the phenomenon, that is, a constant reflection on what is given as it is given. The *I* loses its polarity within its own phenomenon, because it recognizes an originality that is not him, but that at same time is it, for it encounters itself as a phenomenon. The pole belongs to the phenomenon, in other words, to the world as constitutive pole. The reason is incapable of proposing an effective ethics, without being transformed into a phenomenon; if its pole is not a life in its fullness.

It is in Husserl that we take the steps to propose inclusion as the sphere of an ethics that contemplates the most burning problems of humanity, and that does not forget the ground strain that is treading. An inclusive ethic needs to contemplate the inclusive/exclusive paradox. Husserl's paradox, whereby a subject is also an object, reviews an attitude of openness to the world, which is indispensable for us to recognize our constitutive life, our phenomenological life. The objective world is precisely the one that must be placed in parentheses; the ontological one must appear. Not that it replaces the objective, but complements it and directs it to an open attitude. The ontological character has an essential structure for the constitutive processes.

Formation of the bases of a phenomenology of inclusiveness.

Husserl gives us the four elements for the inclusive/exclusive paradox. The first aspect consists of his first resolution of the paradox, which consists in maintaining a latent (constant) reflective attitude. A latent or operative reflexive attitude prevents the danger of falling into subjectivism. This attitude proposes an opening for what the *epoché* intends to reveal - the world that is presented as a gift. To prevent the inclusive attitude from becoming exclusive, we need to keep our assumptions in reflection. This process does not mean a substitution of one truth for another, nor does it find an irreplaceable truth. This return movement, supported by its reflexivity, leads to an opening presented as a gift. We could say that inclusivity in this sense is an attitude that must first be resolved in our mind, according to a conversion of the very subjective temptation to consider its truth as a substrate of the world. This first level reveals an inclusive, reflective attitude, which will need a constant effort not to use our preconceptions as a ladder, as a tool to judge the world.

The other step consists in the danger of the withdrawal of the world through the phenomenological *epoché*. We find that when we place our assumptions into parentheses, we are not getting away from the world, but we are open to all its possibilities. The first step necessarily leads to the other, when I am open to the offer of the world; I enter into its presence, to wit, to what appears as an original phenomenon. This attitude seeks not to leave the world, but enter into the world, in other words, to get out of the objectivism and subjectivism that characterize the solipsistic comfort. Inclusiveness proposed as open (open attitude) does not exclude, but opens itself to what appears, avoids our collection of personal experience overlapping the *life-world*, and avoiding our subjectivism and objectivism as the glasses by which we judge.

Husserl points out the dangers (*gefährlich*) (HUSSERL, 1976, p. 179) we can fall into when we venture into a latent open attitude. The word danger here reveals an incorrect exercise of his phenomenological method. This happens when in our open attitude, we soon close the process, thus not recognizing the dynamism of the world, or when we seek a comfort based on a sure truth. When we solve a paradox, it is no longer a paradox any more, for what it was before was a lack of an adequate method, a misunderstanding of a certain point or even a lack of character in relation to its possibilities of resolution. We would argue that it is possible to visualize the inclusive / exclusive paradox no longer as a paradox, but as a difficulty (*Schwierigkeit*) that we must face. To deny an inclusive attitude and its possibility is to deny that people can face their prejudices as well as to defend equal rights and a fairer world. Imbued with this certainty, we direct our efforts in trying to broaden our attitudes to the level of possible inclusiveness.

The third level we want to explore is also reported by Husserl as an inability to describe the latent flow of constitutive life. We are not authorized, through our intuitive experiences, to determine unquestionable generalities. From the moment that, arbitrarily, we determine generalities, we fall into the danger of excluding all the other possibilities that lie below or beyond the fences we have raised. At this level of inclusiveness, we allow ourselves an attitude of non-exclusion. Of course, we have beliefs and values, without which it would be very difficult to live in society, but in order to recognize what is originally presented to us; we must direct our attitude towards the offer that is presented in its original form.

The fourth level is related to the objective / subjective problem. At the same time that we place the world as an object for ourselves, we are an object of this world; this happens due to the fact that either we are in this world, and also, in the intersubjective problem, which presents us as another *I* before a community of *Is*. According to Husserl, our consideration must be phenomenal, displacing a polarity of the *I*, seeing it in the dimension of the *life-world*, belonging to the world as a constitutive pole (*all das gehört ins "Phänomen", in die Welt als konstituierten Pol*) (HUSSERL, 1976, p. 187). In the phenomenal dimension of the world, subjectivism and objectivism are displaced from their polarity, for the phenomenological *epoché* has transformed them into phenomena.

The *life-world* as the constitutive pole avoids reductionism, both to the subjective pole and to the objective pole, placing us within the horizons of life. This is a necessary paradox (*notwendige Paradoxie*) (HUSSERL, 1976, p. 183), which presents itself as essential to the constitutive process. The inclusiveness should also contemplate the need for pole tension in order to avoid reductions. Such tension directed to the level of life, through our attitude, promotes a life in its entire offer, reelaborating a critique of our preconceptions, from our subjectivity and objective knowledge. This reflexive process, promoted by phenomenological *epoché*, gives a possibility to an inclusive, latent, open, non-reductionist attitude that promotes life as the central pole of our existence. The displacement of the poles reveals an impossibility of an absolute judgment whether defended by objective science or by the intellectual powers of our mind. Under these circumstances, inclusiveness must find a way that contemplates life in its details, attempting to displace the reductionist polarization. This process does not happen naturally, but an attitude is needed that envisions the phenomenon as a gift.

In attempting to gain progress in our perspectives of a phenomenology of inclusiveness, we will find in Merleau-Ponty a radicality of reversibility that is intertwined in the *life-world*, whereby we will discover a definitive passage from the donation of sense to the a complicity of meaning.

Reversibility as complicity of sense in Merleau-Ponty

There is a difference between the concept of *forms of life* (WITTGENSTEIN, 1960, § 19, p. 296) in Wittgenstein and in Husserl's *life-world*. In Wittgenstein, *forms of life* are undoubtedly linked to a linguistic diversity and not to a *life-world*. Although, in all its diversity, *forms of life* suffer from a weak horizontality, in the sense of a grammatical ordering (WITTGENSTEIN, 1960, § 90, p. 337), whereby therapy (WITTGENSTEIN, 1960, § 133, p. 347) itself would be a guide to the correct use and to the employability (WITTGENSTEIN, 1960, § 43, p. 311) of language. Weak horizontality, because it leaves aside an unpredicted pre-reflexive, in other words, it lacks this ontological basis, which has a rule that it cannot identify.

In our reading, both Habermas and Wittgenstein propose a kind of solution to the paradox of the stranger in culture, whereby the language assumes a predominant role, being directed and led through reason (HABERMAS, 1983, p. 2870) or to itself (Wittgenstein), leading us to its correct use. According to Merleau-Ponty: "It is necessary that, from one or another way of seeing (a language), there is no dialectical inversion, we do not need to bring them together in a process of synthesis: both are two aspects of reversibility that is its ultimate true (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1964, p. 201)". It is not by excavating a grammar of our spoken language that we will find, through a process of analysis, an answer to our moral ethical problems, much less by a clash of ideas, or by a dialectic of confrontation, which makes possible a synthesis from the faced problems. For Merleau-Ponty, the process is continuous as in Wittgenstein, but there is a pre-rule, from which it imposes its originality.

In order to understand the problem of reversibility in Merleau-Ponty, it is necessary to understand its origin. The intertwining reversibility is called *chiasma* (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1964, p. 171) by him in his work *The visible and the invisible*. The central concept of this work is the *chiasma*, a term borrowed from genetics (biology), which is a point of coitus, that is, a meeting between the chromatids, through a cell division. Such a meeting guarantees the biodiversity through chromosomes from both the male and female genes. However, there is a necessary crossing between both arms of each chromosome providing a continuum of life in all its diversity. I do not want here to translate this crossing into a sort of unity in difference. We want to get away from some idea of necessary adjustment. In addition, we try to escape from a kind of final or even a longed-for (teleological) unity. However, we are not making this teleological meaning

unfeasible for the intentionality of the human being. The character of necessity we leave to the crossing, which, in turn, converges into intertwining, from which the biodiversity emerges.

We will defend the idea of an equilibrium in difference, in the sense of preserving an original identity that is imperative for life. We still have to consider some details regarding this original identity. It is present in being and being is everything that exists. We will not minimize this Aristotelian scope. Before introducing his conception of chiasm (intertwining), Merleau-Ponty traces a long discussion about being and non-being. In our reading, the being will be the *visible* and the non-being the *invisible*. It is not the case that the being is not the invisible and that the invisible is not the being. Precisely because it is in the own being that we find the not visible part, which turns simultaneously into non-being. Merleau-Ponty concludes:

A philosophy of negativity which puts as the principle of its research nothing as nothing (and consequently being qua being), thinks such invisibles in its purity and admits, at the same time, that knowledge of nothing is a nothingness of knowledge, that the nothing is only accessible under bastard forms, incorporated into being (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1964, p. 116).

In the sphere of being there is a certain dependence on what does not present itself to the vision, but which is also part of *being qua being*. Originality presents itself in being and non-being, that is, in *being qua being*. In the intertwining of being, there is no independence from diversity, but an original presence (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1964, p. 92) conducted as the essential characteristic of being. In the words of Merleau-Ponty: "... This world which is not I, self-maintained by myself whereby I am intertwined (*étroitement*), is, in a sense, an extension of my body (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1964, p. 82)". Although chiasm is a genetic-biological concept, meiosis is not seen in the parameters of a cell division, but in an encounter from which, in order to have life, this process of intertwining is necessary. This encounter does not occur because the being was separated from the non-being, or rather the visible separated from the invisible, but because there was a strangeness, an unthinking on the crust of the visible.

The dialectical sense is different from a final teleological unity. Although in Hegel the identity of opposites is synthesized in the unity of consciousness, the original presence, indelible to being, sees the stranger as a possibility and not as an overcoming resolved by a return-to-self. This overcoming, which aims at some adjustment through a

return to consciousness, according to Hegel, and which was transposed into an adjustment to society in Mead (JUNGLOS, 2013, pp. 138-156), is questioned by Merleau-Ponty. The *chiasm* does not possess absolutist pride; the interrogation itself impels new possibilities (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1964, p. 81). The being will never be totally visible, and never will become a pure nothingness; it will be openness (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1964, p. 76). The paradox of the stranger is not resolved by the return to consciousness or to society, but becomes the possibility of biodiversity. In this perspective, there will be no concern about what would be a people less or more civilized or that has already come to an end or near the end of history, from which we would find an overflying thought, giving the economic and moral guidelines so that the others could likewise to drink from the superiority of that people.

The Ontological Deficit

There is an ontological deficit, which needs to be revised whereby there is no separation between the being in the world and the possibilities presented to it. Merleau-Ponty shows that the vision is also tactful, because it celebrates its corporeity being sentient/sensitive. Merleau-Ponty remarks: "There is a double and crossed rehabilitation of the visible in the tangible and the tangible in the visible, the two maps are complete and yet not confused. The two parts are total parts and yet they cannot overlap one another (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1964, p.175)". What binds the eye to the body is the flesh. It would not be so difficult to understand it if Merleau-Ponty had not used such a concept to embrace the inseparability between existence and transcendence. Existence, here, should not only be understood as human existence, but as a lived horizon, that is, in the perspectives of the *life-world*, which is not restricted only to consciousness/world, but open to all biodiversity. Merleau-Ponty, according to our reading, was the first to understand the scope of the *life-world* proposed by the maturity of Husserl's thought, claiming in the *Phenomenology of perception* that before a consciousness already existed the world.

The flesh is its own original presence (*Urpräsenzbarkeit*) conceptualized by Merleau-Ponty in a footnote of his work *The visible and the invisible*. Such an original presence reminds us not just of a co-presence in the world, but, also, of all co-presentified

difference and strangeness. Now, we find not just an indefinability of consciousness as observed by Herbert Mead, but we find it in the *being qua being*, in the invisible and visible diversity that already presents itself to a pre-objective consciousness, that is, before any established thesis determined by us. Such invisibility is supported by flesh, rendering some objectification unfeasible, for a flesh represents paths that Mead privileges only to consciousness. As we cannot determine the exact place of the emergence of thought, we comprehend many intertwined ways for its emergence, likewise, the flesh presents paths of entanglement in being, enabling an openness of being, favoring multiple possibilities. Merleau-Ponty writes: "It is that the thickness of the flesh between the seer and a thing is constitutive of its visibility for it, as of a corporeity for him; it is not an obstacle between both, but the means of communicating (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1964, p. 176)".

Our research does not minimize or suppress rational capacity, but sheds light on an ontological rehabilitation that can be extremely important for the constitutive processes, for it portrays an original structure, which gives sustenance and nourishes our existence, whereby we reflect, construct values and project our future. Merleau-Ponty brings a sensitive, latent layer, sustained by flesh, bringing all originality as a possibility. Such a philosophical view does not foresee only what is conspicuously attached to rational discourses, as if it was seen from a communicative action, where reason would be an imperative.

Here again, the pole becomes evolutionary-teleological. Such ethics with the pretense of politicization presents a danger to the future we want, since a simple majority does not guarantee a future without exploitation. The aggravation of not recognizing the reality and the feelings of a nation can be catastrophic. A common example is the use of the burqa. Use and non-use is not a condition of slavery or freedom. In our view, reason would tend for one of the two, but it would not be able by itself to consider the human being who is inside a burqa. We could easily consider an oppressive system and characterize it only by its visible (apparent) side, disregarding that taking a burqa from women, only, will not solve their slavery, as only taking a prisoner from prison will not restore his freedom. Merleau-Ponty and Michel Foucault, both show that the worst form of slavery is suppressing being in its creation and spontaneity (JUNGLOS, 2011, pp. 138-

156). Here is the nucleus for an entire ethical basis, considered as possibility and not as an adjustment or as a docilized form.

The prostitute will not find freedom only by arresting her pimps, nor will the homosexual find freedom just by the recognition of marriage, much less the black race having more accessibility to the universities through some specific laws, as is prescribed in Brazilian laws. What will guarantee freedom is their original presence; is being certain that they are intertwined in the same flesh of the world as we are. What should be evident in all our research, is that we do not intend to detract reason, but restore it to the ontological basis, allowing it greater openness and inclusivity, avoiding exploitation, - the source of all exclusion. This ontological basis will bring about twists in the field of ethics as in the example of the hand that touches and feels touched (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1964, p. 130). Such reversibility that touches and feels touched, that sees and can be seen as a person, who loves and feels loved, will bring deep ethical contributions. This reversibility (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1964, p. 184) is found in my relationship with the other person. Thus, the other is seen from an ethical possibility. There are no ethics without the other. Therefore, there is an ethical co-process that needs to be fostered. Reason, in turn, plays a very important role in this process, once it recognizes this ontological basis, finding ways for the exercise of freedom in its diversity. In other words, reason must be embodied. According to Merleau-Ponty:

[...] the ideas we are speaking of would not be better known to us if we had no body and no sensibility; it is then that they would be inaccessible to us. The "little phrase," the notion of the light, are not exhausted by their manifestations, any more than is an "idea of the intelligence"; they could not be given to us as ideas except in a carnal experience. It is not only that we would find in that carnal experience the occasion to think them; it is that they owe their authority, their fascinating, indestructible power, precisely to the fact that they are in transparency behind the sensible, or in its heart (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1964, p. 194).

This was Merleau-Ponty's tireless attempt to intertwine what had been so long separated from the history of humankind, that is, body and mind. Such an attempt had already begun in his first works, mainly in the *Phenomenology of the perception* and culminating with the idea of reflective body in his work *The Philosopher and his shadow*. Ideas can not be deprived of their ontological basis, because we run the risk of an ideologization proclaimed on the artifice of an objectifying reason. Thus, the proposal

from this perspective does not mean a certain atrophy of reason, but the restitution of an ontological basis that will prevent reason from suffering the very reductionism it tries to avoid.

As an example, we could mention the self-deception of the drunkard. Nevertheless, such self-deception can be rationally justified. The drunkard decides to stop drinking because he is convinced that the drink is damaging both his health and his marital relationship. His wife asks him to go to the bakery to buy milk and bread; he gets ready immediately. However, the bakery is right there in a straight line, and the bar, where he used to drink, is much further away, and he needs to take another path. With no apparent reason and without even realizing it, he begins to reason as follows: I must take a walk, and I will take another route or I will take advantage and visit a friend, so that various justifiable reasons could multiply. However, through the path taken, the recent converted drunkard is seen in front of the bar. His reasoning now begins with other justifications such as: just a little bit will not make much difference or just today, tomorrow I promise to stop drinking. All these reasonings are not incorrect, in fact, only a glass does not kill anyone, if he stop drinking tomorrow, it would not make so much difference either. However, the problem is that he failed to keep the first promise and found rational justifications for it. Reason alone cannot solve ethical problems, for it formulates coherent and logical justifications for its own ends. One group, one nation, can also justify their ends through a fully coherent rational framework.

Kant already in the *Critique of pure reason* spoke of the problems of theoretical reason that necessarily leads to inevitable errors and saw the necessity in the *Critique of judgment* to speak of pure feeling, mediator of theoretical and practical reason. The categorical imperative of the drunkard could be formulated like this: just a single drink would not cause evil for me and for anybody else. We could quietly conceive a world in which everyone who drinks a glass of alcohol would not harm anyone. Whether he will stop drinking or not, no one knows, what is certain is that our fellow has vowed sincerely to drink only a glass of alcohol. The passions that moved him, were accompanied by reason. What may make him stop drinking is perhaps not the conviction of a reasoning driven by a universal law, but perhaps feelings of love for his family and for everything he has conquered. We do not want to disregard reason in our conjectures, but to enlarge

it within the conviviality of being. In addition, we do not want to rationalize feelings, nor to hierarchize them, but to perceive them within their limits.

Another example that the category imperative would not be a better option, would be the current example in our Brazilian emergency aid. A nurse finds herself in a dilemma, succoring everyone (that is impossible due to a substantial demand) or saving as many people as possible. We believe that the categorical imperative would be evil for the intended universality. However, the proposal from Stuart Mill is more appropriate to the moment. Nevertheless, the greatest possible welfare for as many people as possible may not be advisable for our everyday use, whereby the ends justify the means and promote a series of wars through very well justified reasons.

As we have seen, reason devoid of its ontological basis is at the mercy of the dangers arising from a logical-mathematical formalism, depriving the human being of its phenomenal essence. The radicality of the reversibility proposed by Merleau-Ponty goes beyond a donation of meaning constituted by Husserl. Now the possibility of meaning becomes complicit, it is intertwined in the same flesh of the world. The ethical implications of this passage, from the donation of meaning to a complicity of meaning, challenge any unilateral presupposition aimed at aesthetic (visible and invisible) as well as moral exclusion (reason and ontology). This thesis that marks the passage from Husserl's thinking to Merleau-Ponty, will lead us to an extension of our concept of inclusiveness. In this way, inclusivity will be seen as a certain radicalism, in order to contemplate the inclusive/exclusive paradox, in the sense that reversibility, together with an attitude towards the possibility generated by our being in the world, embodied in its essence, envisions a complicity which includes us at a level not of equality or difference in relation to the constitution of meaning, but of co-presence.

This stage, for the understanding of a phenomenology of inclusiveness, is related to an attitude that seeks the complicity of meaning. Such an attitude follows the four previous points raised from a husserlian contribution. We do not want to present an inclusive linear proposal of the respective stages mentioned, but we want to seek to solve the problems that a phenomenology of inclusivity presents in the course of its discoveries. Therefore, this fifth discovery broadens and shares with the others, in other words, all other points will be illuminated by a complicity of meaning, and thus what we are aiming at now is a phenomenology proposed by Merleau-Ponty with his husserlian baggage, for

we are envisioning a breadth that allows our inclusive proposal to be more secure and evident.

Such a contextualization will be absorbed by Bernhard Waldenfels and intertwined within an ethical-practical context by which Waldenfels brings a new and profound problematic to the parameters of an inclusive reflection on the stranger. Thus, our aim, now, will be turned to a responsive practice; we will seek to raise the phenomenology of inclusiveness to its frontier stage by which we live responsively. Our biggest question will be: How can I respond ethically to the demand coming from being in the world within an attitude proposed by the phenomenology of inclusiveness?

Conclusion: responsible reversibility

Constantly answering simple questions that are addressed to us, that do not require a great deal of intellectual work, nor very long answers, like: Do you want a cup of coffee? Did you like the movie? Generally, we answer them with a yes or a no. Within this scope of answers, only precise information is needed from the respondent. We find answers in their broadest sense with a larger challenge of the questions. Why are you so insensitive to moral problems? What do you think of the body-thought relationship? For such questions, answers are more challenging. Answers, both in the strict sense and in their broad sense, rule out the possibility of a non-response. Let us say I make a choice for silence, believing I am not answering anything. My own silence will allude to an attitude, it becomes meaningful, that is, it represents a responsive attitude exercised bodily.

Our attitude in the *life-world* is a responsive attitude by which we are commissioned to a response by character of challenge (*Aufforderungscharaktere*) (WALDENFELS, 2000, p. 372). That way, I cannot not respond to these challenges. As Waldenfels says: “No answer is also an answer (WALDENFELS, 2000, p. 336)”. Such challenges appear as claims (*Anspruch*), that is, it demands a response that we cannot escape, for they are there, insistent (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1960, p. 228), claiming its possibility. It is on this aspect that there is a reversibility already proposed by Merleau-Ponty and that, now, we will return precisely to comprehend this moment of possibility, coming from the claim that imposes challenges on us and that makes a no answer impossible. This reversibility will put us on a level as beings essentially

responsive/interrogative. According to Waldenfels: “The answer is not higher or lower in relation to the claim, especially to the interrogative claim which we answer (WALDENFELS, 1994, p. 193)”. Waldenfels will seek a reversibility concerning responsiveness, for it emerges (*hervorgehen*) already as interrogative, becoming a claim itself. Waldenfels does not mean that the answers are not wrong, especially in their strict sense, by which we can easily find mistakes, but even when giving some wrong information, this information is provoked by a reaction, by a claim, a questioning to the interlocutor who now becomes the receiver.

Waldenfels's purpose is to show that some reversibility is intertwined into the *life-world*, where we can turn a claim to ourselves. An answer is not above or below, for it is itself a claim. When Waldenfels interposes responsiveness in the phenomenological context, there is no sense of an adjustable responsiveness as in Mead (MEAD, 1934, p. 79), whereby we assume common responses; instead, through a threshold sense, we need to justify ourselves, not only rationally, but as incarnate beings. In Husserl, although the subject interrogates the world, as a phenomenologically presented gift, it loses its polarity to a polarity of the *life-world* that, through this constant interrogation, the subject is, in the final analysis, even so, the endower of sense.

Husserl works on a matter of implication (HUSSERL, 1973, §20, pp. 83-85) rather than an incarnation elaborated by Merleau-Ponty. Husserl presents an implication represented by a transcendental subjectivity in relation to the flux of consciousness (HUSSERL, 1973, §18, p. 81), to the process of passive and active genesis in the constitution (passive synthesis) (HUSSERL, 1973, §17, pp. 79), to the dynamism of constituted and by the constituent of consciousness (noetic/noematic) (HUSSERL, 1973, §17, p. 78), to the horizontality of the world with its constancy and claims, and the implication of the other (*alter ego*) (HUSSERL, 1973, p. 34) and a community (community of selves). Such implications involve a transcendental subjectivity by its constitutional intentionality.

In Merleau-Ponty, the subject becomes no longer an endower of sense, because imbricated in the flesh of the world, it is now a complice of sense. Clearly, we see a transition from an endowed meaning in Husserl to a complicity of meaning in Merleau-Ponty. The questioning of both philosophers demands an incessant and latent attitude toward what is originally presented as a gift. The interrogation throws us all as

possibilities that the *life-world* presents to us on its horizon. The interrogation presents itself as the opening of the being.

Waldenfels, reflecting on responsiveness, inserts a responsive character to the questioning, showing its reversible appearance. Now the hand that touches and feels touched is not only two hands questioning each other, but also there is a responsiveness that gives rise to interrelatedness within an ethical perspective. According to our view, responsiveness gives an ethical-practical character to the phenomenology that Husserl and Merleau-Ponty did not give, lacking precisely the responsive shock.

With Waldenfels, phenomenology is immersed in ethics, in which responsiveness embraces the *Ethos* of a people. We not only question the world, but also respond to it and we need to justify our answers, not justify them rationally but corporately, for that is the meaning of a phenomenological attitude.

The attitude (*Einstellung*) has three essential characteristics: It is an awareness, therefore the need for a conversion (*Umstellung*), it is a body positioning, so its an intertwining between body and mind and it is directed to an action, hence the need for ethical responsiveness that moves the questioning to an ethical perspective. The responsive character (interrogation/response) leads us to consider an open/closed character of the phenomena that impels a new ethical glimpse that challenges my claims. The original presence in the *life-world*, which is a gift, challenges us. There is a provocative threshold of new possibilities, of which we are involved. Waldenfels says that the responsive attitude will constitute our personality and not that it will be adjusted to a generalized other (WALDENFELS, 1980, p. 228) as Herbert Mead pointed out. In this way, we find a passage from the donation of meaning in Husserl to a complicity of meaning in Merleau-Ponty and, now, of this complicity for a *fronteirization of the senses* in Waldenfels. The phenomenological attitude is amplified through responsiveness to an ethical-practical dimension that sees phenomena as possibilities.

An innovative approach proposed by Waldenfels will broaden our inclusive theme. Revealing a reversibility between question/answer, from which arises his idea of responsiveness, celebrating a practical passage in which my attitude moves from the latent constitutive questioning sphere to a responsive justification. In this context, the place from which we respond (*worauf*) (WALDENFELS, 1994, pp. 227-280), emerges an imbrication between question and response.

Waldenfels will use two key concepts to develop his responsive ethics: *demand* and *response* (WALDENFELS, 2007, p. 25). From them, he will conduct his research in the direction of how to respond to the claims of the other. From this perspective, Waldenfels will find that the claim of the other comes from *elsewhere*, before we can make any determination. Waldenfels will characterize this moment of responsive time, looking for the people involved in that time, no sense *to whom* something happens (WALDENFELS, 2007, p. 43-48). As Waldenfels writes:

Through this event, something becomes visible, audible, sensitive, in such a way that it presents itself to our mind, invades us, attracts us or repels us and displaces us from our knowledge and will, without imputing a subject that would function as the author or driver of acts and actions (WALDENFELS, 2007, p. 45).

This what happens (*Widerfahrnis*) (WALDENFELS, 2007, p. 48), also called the intermediate realm (*Zwischenreich*), is an attempt to elucidate that such an event cannot, nor can be achieved by a generalization, nor by a unifying process. He is without position, happening, coming from somewhere, giving rise to the responsive movement, being responsible for the experiences that happen between us. It is not possible to establish the beginning or the end of this event, there being a kind of deviation caused by the event itself that brings the responsive movement to the surface, bringing all possible/impossible experiences that *happen between us*.

An accident, an illness, depressive moments happen without wanting them and profoundly changes our experience, so that there is a clear deviation in our history. To whom something happens makes all the difference, we can live unconcernedly about certain problems, but when the event happens to us there is an eminent deviation from which I cannot not respond. Waldenfels does not want to prove a fatalism or casuistic determinism, but to demonstrate that what happens, the responsive event, by itself, causes a split in the *self* (WALDENFELS, 2007, pp. 75-81). We are affected (*pathos*), stimulated, surprised, violated in our *static self*. Responsive time happens without our wanting or not, for it does not depend on our will or knowledge, but depends on our body that bears the event of what happens as a whole.

The responsive event not only performs a split of the *self*, but also a doubling of the *self* (WALDENFELS, 2007, pp. 81-85), characterized by the *alter Ego*. Such duplication means that the event that happens between us, is not confined to a particular

person involved. As such, an event comes from somewhere; we do not have the first or the last word. We are part of a constitutive interweaving. We are seen through other eyes, touched with affection or dislike, we share the same space that sharpens our experience, the event happens in our body. It is not a choice, not a fatality, it is simply an event that happens between us. The event does not happen first in our consciousness, but to our body, because the body is always there before anything and what affects us first affects the body - the zero point. Waldenfels writes:

There are no individuals already made, but there is only one process of individualization that presupposes certain anonymity and typicality of the body itself. What we feel, perceive, do, or speak is intertwined with what others feel, perceive, do, or say (WALDENFELS, 2007, p. 84).

The intercorporeity here implies that the *self* and the stranger are intertwined. Otherness (alienness) is not only for the other (*alter ego*) that intertwines itself in a constitutive complicity, in which it presents itself to us as a non-self, but also otherness happens to us in the split of our own being. Such internal/external otherness takes place in the responsive event that is not the object of choice and will.

For Waldenfels, the problem of otherness plays a very important role in our ethical conceptions, especially when we exclude or include our fellow man in the world in which we both live. What happens between us will give us the possibility of going to the threshold that is capable of diverting us from the constituted order taken for granted by the history of humanity. Responsive movement is not something that begins in our consciousness, being controlled by it, but as a possibility for our consciousness. In these terms, to whom something happens does not belong to our choice, but our attitude toward what happens makes all the difference.

Waldenfels analyzes the Greek word *pathos* (WALDENFELS, 2008, p. 129), revealing its triple meaning. First, it means an experience that happens (*Widerfahrnis*) with us. Such an experience has a certain peculiarity. It does not mean a data set, an objective occurrence, a personal experience or a subjective condition. *Pathos* is something that happens, that is, something touches us, exerting some influence on us, going beyond our efforts, suppressing our will. Secondly, *pathos* means something adverse, something allied to the suffering that strikes us severely. Finally, *pathos* designates the exuberant passion that allows us to leave the regulated and habitual and

directs us to the sublime. Waldenfels uses *pathos* to express what we normally understand by feelings in its three-dimensionality, being sensory, affective painful and affectionate passion. For Waldenfels, this sentimental dimension causes a temporal displacement (WALDENFELS, 2008, p. 133), which allows otherness to effect the split of the *self*, of what is familiar, binding us to the other by the rupture itself. Recalling the strong influence of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty's thinking on Waldenfels, such a split is neither a separation of the world nor of the other as we had already expressed in the process of reduction (*epoché*) in Husserl, but a deeper immersion in the *life-world* and in the constitutive interweaving between us and the other. For Waldenfels, otherness should not be considered a stigma (*Makel*) that we should rule out, but a sting (*Stachel*) that continually awakens us from normative drowsiness (WALDENFELS, 2010, p. 81). The constitutive paradox reveals an essential ontological structure that allows reflective latency. Both Husserl's unreflecting, Merleau-Ponty's chiasm and Waldenfels' otherness are not factors to be eliminated, but possibilities to be explored.

Waldenfels sees that feelings can not be separated from morality, because, as inseparable, they exert their moral and cultural history in the bosom of our civilization. Feelings always come very early and too late, so that what happens between us makes all the difference, because the moment of experience is anterior to what is familiar, surprising us. Rather, experience begins somewhere in the otherness that emerges from what happens between us.

The place of feelings (WALDENFELS, 2008, p. 133-135) is not a place, but rather a happening. It is not found only in the flesh nor in the spirit, but in the lived-body. In Waldenfels, the non-static lived body is the zero point, it is reflexive, bringing a responsive reversibility that transcends the constitution to a guiding ethical inclusiveness against all objectivism, reductionism and subjectivism. The sense that emerges from a latent *epoché* reveals the *life-world* in its original latency. This was the whole effort of Husserl's thought and later of Merleau-Ponty's.

A responsive *epoché* (WALDENFELS, 1994, p. 195-197), which goes beyond the questioning (*What*) and the intentional act from which (*Worauf/Werefrom*) we respond, imbues it as the source of all possibility arising from the event (experience) itself. Responsiveness is not seen without the process of a constitution of meaning that is intertwined in the *life-world*, not only by an inevitable fatality that strikes us, much less

remaining at the level of an insoluble disorder. A responsive ethics deviates us from subjectivism/objectivism that leads to exclusion, absolutizing closed concepts, determined by a certain logic demanded by the sciences of facts.

Responsiveness brings an ethical-practical context, forgotten by the phenomenological reduction, due to its preoccupation with the process of constituting sense. The sense now needs to emerge within a responsiveness that comes from somewhere, happens and challenges us to an ethical attitude. The difference between an inclusive ethical attitude and an exclusive ethical attitude will depend on our understanding of splitting as separation or splitting as intertwining, including ourselves in the carnality of the other.

The ethical-practical attitude proposed by Waldenfels is attributed, first, to the recognition of the event that happens, independently of our objectification or subjectification, causing a displacement in the constitutive process, for which a response is inevitable. In the responsive process, we can give an objective answer to something, but not necessarily, because we can also, through a responsive attitude, move any objectification to its threshold, finding new possibilities. Secondly, there is a responsive attitude that leads us to the threshold, in which the determinate/undetermined, the open/closed, the visible/invisible receives a responsive character.

We arrive at the sixth and final aspect of a phenomenology of inclusiveness - which is revealed at a responsive threshold, throwing us to an ethical attitude that contemplates thresholds as possibilities and not as an already predetermined space. Within a phenomenological tradition, seeking resources in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Waldenfels, we come to what we shall call the phenomenology of inclusiveness. These six aspects will form part of our study of the expansion of the concept of attitude as a necessary conversion, not unrelated to reason, but itself incarnated ontologically, giving possibility and openness to every inclusive attitude. Thus, we will present the six aspects necessary for an inclusive ethical attitude. Not that we should follow them in order, rather, they must be regarded as a responsive whole. As the table below shows:

Phenomenology of inclusiveness	
Inclusive attitude	1- to possess a latent reflection.
Inclusive attitude	2- Inclusion in the life-world.
Inclusive attitude	3 – to avoid closing our theses.
Inclusive attitude	4 – to avoid the reductionism of the subjective and objective poles.
Inclusive attitude	5- to promote the reversibility of complicity of meaning.
Inclusive attitude	6 – to promote the frontierization of the senses as an ethical-responsive possibility.

The method is phenomenological and, as such, open to the horizontality of life, enabling possibilities and not closed objectifications. This opening will take place through an attitude that contemplates the original phenomena arising from the phenomenological reduction. Such a reduction, proposed by Husserl, will take a more radical perspective on Merleau-Ponty. Now, the subject is not the only one responsible for meaning, but is an accomplice of signification. Such complicity of meaning is expressed by a radicalization of the constitutive processes already worked out by Husserl. Thus, in Merleau-Ponty, we find a complicity that links us to a sharing of meaning in the *life-world*. Husserl, however, works on the issue of implication. For Husserl, the other and the world are involved in the constitutive processes, being involved in a transcendental subjectivity, of which, ultimately, the subject is the only endower of meaning.

Extending the paths followed by a phenomenology of inclusiveness, the complicity of meaning will, henceforth, reveal its threshold zones in Waldenfels, by which we will find an ethical-practical character, indispensable to the whole inclusive attitude.

Is ethics not inclusive? Obviously not. Therefore, if there is a need for ethical inclusiveness, there is a need for an inclusive attitude towards ethics. Thus, if ethics develops an inclusive character, it would be possible for an inclusiveness that did not maintain a latent reflection, that was not included in the world of life, that did not avoid

the closing of our theses, that did not avoid reductionisms, that did not promote the reversibility, and that did not promote the frontierization of the senses? No. Consequently, the phenomenology of inclusiveness appears as a new ethical proposal, revealing inclusive attitudes indispensable to any ethics.

Note:

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