

## WE CANNOT BE HAPPY IN SOLITUDE: HUME ON PRIDE, LOVE AND THE DESIRE OF OTHERS' HAPPINESS

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### ABSTRACT

Love and pride are passions related to ideas of entities capable of well-being. In the case of love, those entities are people we are related to, whose characters, qualities or traits we admire; pride, by its turn, is a passion related to the self. In spite of that, Hume is explicit in stating that love is naturally attended by a desire for the goodness and happiness of the beloved being; but it does not make sense to say that we desire our own happiness and well-being *because* we are proud of ourselves. How can we explain this asymmetry? First, I will deal with the problem of the contrast between the *unrelatedness* of the emotion of pride and the desire of our own happiness and the *relatedness* of passion of love and the desire of happiness of the beloved person. After, I will link the conclusions reached with Hume's famous claim that we cannot be happy in solitude. Our own happiness depends not only on our own well-being and success, but also on the well-being and happiness of the people we love, and both of which are related to the well functioning of society in the long run.

**Keywords:** Hume; passions; happiness; solitude

*No enjoyment equals the satisfaction we receive from the company of those we love and esteem; as the greatest of all punishments is to be obliged to pass our lives with those we hate or condemn.*

David Hume (T 3.1.2.2; SBN 470)

I

Pride and love are, for Hume, the most basic agreeable passions we feel by the contemplation of the ideas we form respectively about ourselves and other persons. Being simple and uniform impressions, pride and love are, according to Hume, incapable of definition. What we can do is only to describe their causes and objects, and the circumstances attended by them. Love, says Hume, is a passion “always directed to some sensible being external to us” (T 2.2.1.9; SBN 329). The object of love is, in effect, another person, a being with whom we are acquainted or of whose character we are capable of forming at least some idea. The object of pride, in exchange, is not an “external” object or being: it is the *self*.

One of the most remarkable characteristics of love is the desire for happiness and an aversion to the misery of the beloved person (T 2.2.6.6; SBN 367). This passion, says

Hume, is *always* followed by, or “rather conjoined with, benevolence”. Hence, even if we cannot count on that as a part of the definition of love, it would be wrong to think that someone who loves another would not be also motivated by the virtue of benevolence. This is true not because it would be properly contrary to reason not to desire the beloved person’s happiness. It is plainly possible to imagine some different possible combination of passions, and even a very different human natural constitution (T 2.2.6.6; SBN 368). “Abstractedly considered”, there is no contradiction in supposing a desire of misery attached to love<sup>2</sup>.

At any rate, the possibility of being attended with some further desires differentiates the passion of love (and hate) from the passion of pride (and humility). The explanation, again, is that love and hatred:

are [passions] not completed within themselves, nor rest in that emotion which they produce, but carry the mind to something further. Love is always followed by a desire of the happiness of the person beloved, and an aversion to his misery: as hatred produces a desire of the misery, and an aversion to the happiness of the person hated (T 2.2.6.6; SBN 367).

This conjunction of love and benevolence is thus what “chiefly distinguishes these affections from pride and humility”, which are “pure emotions in the soul, [but] *unattended with any desire*” (T 2.2.6.3; SBN 367—my italics). This is a remarkable characteristic, for the natural function of the passions is to influence actions of the will; so the question is: how could pride or humility influence the will or the agent’s actions if they are not attended with any desire? Inasmuch as pride is a passion, it would be natural to think of it, like all other passions, as also an “influencing motive of the will” (T 2.3.3.1; SBN 413). Moreover, pleasure and pain are the “chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind”, and their most immediate effects are the motions of mind diversified into volition, desire or aversion (T 3.3.1.2; SBN 574).

Love can easily influence the agent to perform actions; being attended with a further desire, the concerned agent has in the highly pleasurable passion of love a very efficient actuating principle. Well, pride is also a pleasurable passion; however, pride is not attended with any immediate or ulterior desire. As “a pure emotion in the soul” *completed in itself*, pride is not like love, a passion *not completed in itself* that carries the mind “to something further” (T 2.2.6.3; SBN 367). So, if we take Hume’s remarks on the

passion of pride seriously, we must conclude that not all passions are, at least “immediately”, active. There is at least one passion that is immediately “inactive”: pride.

We have some plausible reasons for thinking that this conclusion is coherent with Hume’s moral psychology. One is that pride has a different psychological function in the economy of mind compared with love. Being active, love pushes the agent to go further; it is a passion convergent to desire. Pride, on the other hand, is a non desire-convergent passion. Nonetheless, why does Hume not say that pride is always followed by a desire of our own happiness too, in analogy with what happens in the case of the passion of love? The answer that pride and humility are passions “completed in themselves” does not seem a good initial answer. After all, are not love and hatred, similarly to pride and humility, also “simple and uniform” impressions? Apart from that, why is one regularly followed by a desire and the other is not?

One possible response is that it is not the passion of pride that we feel towards ourselves that produces in us the desire for our own happiness. This desire plausibly *needs* to come before. Hume does not make this point literally, but it is certainly compatible with his views.

Anyway, the more direct response Hume gives for the contrast between love and pride is related to the alleged natural association between pride and the self; for it is the emotion of pride that produces in us the idea of self (T 2.1.5.6; SBN 287)<sup>3</sup>. It is the phenomenon of the double relation between ideas and impressions that, in the first place, explains the natural connection between pride and the self:

In a word, nature has bestowed a kind of attraction on certain impressions and ideas, by which one of them, upon its appearance, naturally introduces its correlative. If these two attractions or associations of impressions and ideas concur on the same object, they mutually assist each other, and the transition of the affections and of the imagination is made with the greatest ease and facility. (...) It is after this manner that the particular causes of pride and humility are determined. The quality which operates on the passion produces separately an impression resembling it; the subject to which the quality adheres is related to self, the object of the passion (T 2.1.5.11; SBN 289).

Here, we have an explanation for Hume’s view that pride, in contrast to love, is associated not only with an ultimate idea, the self, but with an idea without any other attendants. In the first part of this paragraph, Hume asserts that when two ideas with their respective impressions are, in a pair, strongly associated in the mind, an effect *naturally* follows. If an idea produces an impression, related by its turn to some other impression connected to

another idea related to the first, this cluster of impressions and ideas becomes inseparable in the mind.

Pride, then, is always connected to the self. Nevertheless, in opposition to what occurs with the passion of love whose objects are acquaintable *external* beings, the self is not “some sensible being external to us” (T 2.2.1.2; SBN 329). The self is an idea whose cause is not something we see or feel as an *external* object. It is not, hence, something whose traits are, all of them, observable. We can observe the object, whose impressions cause in us a particular idea, and this, by its turn, being agreeable, causes in us the pleasurable feeling or passion that we call ‘love’. However, the “mental qualities” of the object of pride are not, in contrast with the “bodily qualities”, observable traits. The self, hence, as an idea connected to pride, is not related to a *typical* external experience, not in the same sense that love is connected to people or sensible entities. We must suppose, therefore, a different natural intimate connection between our mind and our own self (or the idea we form of it), an intimacy that we do not and cannot have with the objects of love.

To say that we have a kind of intimacy with our self can appear, at first sight, incompatible with Hume. As Mackie points out (1980, p.159-60), the self is not for Hume any individual object of which we have an intimate awareness, but only a “succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness” (T 2.1.2.2; SBN 277). If some unique impression would give rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, through the whole course of our lives. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and they never exist united at the same time. Hume concluded, at least for Mackie, that the idea of self cannot be derived from any of these impressions, or from any other impressions at all; consequently, there is no such idea.

We can agree with Mackie’s interpretation that the Humean self is not a Cartesian *ego* of which we have any awareness that can solve the problem of personal identity (1980, p.160). The Humean self comprises “the qualities of our mind and body” (T 2.1.9.1; SBN 303). Nevertheless, other people are also identified by bundles of ideas and impressions successively connected and located in our memory; and esteem, admiration and love can be passions attached to them. We know that they are *other* persons (probably naturally); nevertheless, there is no “essential” difference in those bundles of perceptions related, respectively, to us and to others. All of them are of the same “matter”, that is,

*perception*. It is rather mysterious, if this would be the entire story, how could we discern “ourselves” from the “others”.

The only response Hume actually gives to this problem is that, in one case, “mind and body qualities” are associated with the passions of pride and humility, and, in the other, what arise are love and hatred. The problem is that “self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are *supposed* to have a *reference*” (T 1.4.6.2; SBN 251—my italics). We do not have any intimacy with the self, in the sense of an intimacy with a uniform and identical impression of ourselves, but we do have a bundle of impressions and ideas, in other words, “qualities of mind and body”, and we do relate them to the self. Yet this “self” is not “external” mind and body, that is, another person; it is *we*. I do not see how Hume can explain that capacity of discerning other persons from ourselves, except by pointing out that feeling pride is best explained by the hypothesis that we are naturally designed for discerning ourselves from others. It is an *instinctive* capacity:

I find that the peculiar object of pride and humility is determined by an original and natural instinct, and that it is absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the mind, that these passions should ever look beyond self, or that individual person, of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious (T 2.1.5.3; SBN 285).

This is also a natural psychological fact. All of us develop by nature a peculiar passion (pride) which is very different from other passions, as love, and this is best explained by the hypothesis that we are naturally equipped with a basic capacity of discerning ourselves from the others<sup>4</sup>. The combined fact that pride is not attended with any further desires and that love is a passion “not completed in itself” amount to that.

A second explanation is that Hume explicitly avoided conflating the desire for our own happiness and self-love. Self-love and pride are very different notions. Actually, “self-love” is a misleading expression for Hume. Since love is always directed to “some sensible being external to us”, we cannot talk properly of any kind of “self-love”, for self is not any being “external”. The same applies obviously to hate: “We may be mortified by our own faults and follies; but [we] never feel any anger or hatred, except from the injuries of others” (T 2.2.1.2; SBN 329).

For Hume, self-love theories are actually bad explanations. Consider, for example, Hume's comparison between his own theory and the self-love approach to the problem of our esteem for rich people:

It is obvious, that, though riches and authority undoubtedly give their owner a power of doing us service, yet this power is not to be considered as on the same footing with that which they afford him of pleasing himself, and satisfying his own appetites. Self-love approaches the power and exercise very near each other in the latter case; but in order to produce a similar effect in the former, we must suppose a friendship and good-will to be conjoined with the riches. Without that circumstance it is difficult to conceive on what we can found our hope of advantage from the riches of others, though there is nothing more certain than that we naturally esteem and respect the rich, even before we discover in them any such favourable disposition towards us (T 2.2.5.9; SBN 360).

It is not self-love, but sympathy towards the other the actual source of our esteem and admiration. Esteem or respect for rich people is, coherently, independent and prior to the desire of becoming proximate or favored by them; and our hope of taking advantage of their friendship presupposes this. In effect, if a person has a good disposition towards us it is likely that she can desire our own happiness. Hence, even if I am a self-interested person, if I think that someone else has a good disposition towards me, I can reasonably expect that she will desire also my well-being. Pride has nothing to do with that, at least until the personal attachment to the person we admire or love becomes accomplished in reality. In that moment, pride becomes real as a final sentiment, not as the motive of all the previous movements. Having “found instances”, hence, “in which private interest was separated from public”, and instances “in which it was even contrary”, in spite of observing that “the moral sentiment to continue, notwithstanding this disjunction of interests”, we must “renounce the theory, which accounts for every moral sentiment by the principle of self-love” (EPM 5.2.2; SBN 219).

However, a problem for the Humean view on the asymmetry between pride and happiness is that it is very plausible that pride can be a source of our own happiness. If I am proud (of myself), why cannot this sentiment plausibly produce in me a productive motivation for actions in the direction of my own happiness? If it is not “self-love” but sympathy that leads us towards a life with qualities capable of reinforcing our own pride, why do not accept that the emotion of pride could also reinforce the desire to have an entire life of noble personal realization?

The difference in love and pride directions of fit can explain that. Love can be a reason for action; we do something good for our friends *because* we love them. Here, sympathy is the source. Sympathy with another person endowed with noble and agreeable qualities excites our admiration. If a person with whom we are friends, or whom we care about, is in known difficulty or trouble, *love* functions as the main cause for our assistance—we do not need to promote things or states we believe are good *for us* in order to decide to help *her*. Someone could think that pride can be cited also as a source of a similar action if, in thinking about the alternatives, being one of them does not help the loved person, one feels annoyed for just imagining the kind of person she would be if she eventually decides not to help her. However, this feeling is not necessary to take the right course of action. The only feeling we need is the compassionate feeling towards the beings we love. Pride can be at most an extra-component<sup>5</sup>.

The conclusion is not only that self-love does not constitute a noble reason for action; for pride simply is not a source reason for action at all. This is plainly captured by the following contrasts, that we desire the happiness of our friend because we love him or her, but we simply do not desire or own happiness *because* we are proud of ourselves. The problem now is that we've got a plausible explanation of why we desire the happiness of the beloved persons (it is because we like them), but we do not yet have a good "Humean" explanation<sup>6</sup> as to why we desire our own happiness (any more than the simple fact that we desire it). Could it be that the desire of our own happiness, in fact, is a passion that we develop by ways of some sophistication of the simplest passion we have for pleasure and the avoidance of pain? Why simply accept that, that is the way we are naturally constituted? After all, we are not naturally constituted to desire the happiness of other persons in any plausible account, for that desire is something we develop only when we become attached, by the sentiment of love, to another person. Hume's view is, anyway, that we simply cannot avoid desiring our own happiness; but, in the case of another person, there is a condition: we only earnestly desire the happiness of someone else if we love, admire or like him or her in some special way<sup>7</sup>.

## II

Hume's skeptical contributions on the issue of Happiness begins with the notion that there is nothing "valuable or despicable, desirable or hateful, beautiful or deformed" *in itself*. That is to say, there is nothing good or bad *as such*, but only something good or bad for

us, humans beings equipped by nature with some peculiar “sentiments and affections”. The positive view is that moral and aesthetical qualities pertain not to the object itself, but rest on our frame and constitution and our “internal” natural affections. This explains why we cannot describe the valuable and the beautiful only by describing the object’s characteristics:

Desire this passionate lover to give you a character of his mistress: He will tell you, that he is at a loss for words to describe her charms (...). He will then say, that it is impossible for you to form a conception of such divine beauties as those which his charmer possesses (...). You can infer nothing, however, from all this discourse, but that the poor man is in love; and that the general appetite between the sexes, which nature has infused into all animals, is in him determined to a particular object by some qualities, which give him pleasure. The same divine creature, not only to a different animal, but also to a different man, appears a mere mortal being, and is beheld with the utmost indifference (ESY 1, E18.9; GG 216).

One conclusion is that the acquaintance with some object is naturally capable of exciting, without any inference, some peculiar sentiment in the mind. The analogy with the contemplation of a goddess or an angel only serves in Hume’s story as an illustration of the well-known philosophical view that there are some perfect kinds of forms that can engage the mind without inference<sup>8</sup>. That is not, however, Hume’s own explanation for the phenomenon: for he states that what we can only say without doubt about the man’s attempt on the above story is that he is actually in *love* with someone or something.

Love is undoubtedly viewed by Hume as a strong cause or motivation for action. He does not explicitly list love as a “reason for action”—he does not actually use this very new philosophical jargon. He prefers to assert that we have a natural tendency to benefit people near or related to us without committing himself to the view that passions, like love or hate, could be literally seen as “practical reasons”<sup>9</sup>. Nonetheless, the connection between those passions and virtues is clear<sup>10</sup>. Assuming benevolence as a natural motive, Hume considers it as a natural virtue. Motives are causes, but we certainly have virtuous and non-virtuous motivations. A motivation is virtuous if it stimulates in an observer (and, of course, the very agent) a pleasurable sentiment. Some of those motivations are natural; if the sentiment aroused is also immediately pleasurable or agreeable to a spectator, the motivation is called a natural virtue.

Some virtues, nevertheless, are not natural. Hume, as we know, called them “artificial”<sup>11</sup>. Political virtues, like justice and honesty are “artificial”; benevolence is the plainest example of a natural virtue for Hume. He says that there is something naturally

virtuous in our sentiments of “friendship and regard” (EPM 5.2.28; SBN 230). What about “fidelity”? It is reasonable to conclude, however, that fidelity to friends and lovers, besides fidelity to promises and fidelity to the authorities (or allegiance) are mainly artificial<sup>12</sup>.

What I want to point out, at this juncture, is Hume’s stressed view that to live in society involves not only the natural sentiments but also “artificial motivations”. Nevertheless, it seems, at least *prima facie*, that what people really need is only to live with *some* company:

Every pleasure languishes when enjoyed apart from company, and every pain becomes more cruel and intolerable. Whatever other passions we may be actuated by, pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge, or lust, the soul or animating principle of them all is sympathy; nor would they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others. Let all the powers and elements of nature conspire to serve and obey one man; let the sun rise and set at his command; the sea and rivers roll as he pleases, and the earth furnish spontaneously whatever may be useful or agreeable to him; he will still be miserable, till you give him some one person at least with whom he may share his happiness, and whose esteem and friendship he may enjoy (T 2.2.5.15; SBN 362).

However, if that would be the complete answer, why not simply seek the company of the people we love and trust, of our beloved relatives and friends, but outside the limits of society? If it were possible, would it not be the best alternative? The fact is that even those “natural” communities must be guided by some rules and artifices. Their people would develop at least *some* artificial virtues. Hence, when Hume says that happiness is only attainable in society, he could not be suggesting that what we need is merely companionship.

The desire to live in a political community is a passion that only springs up due to the intervenience of further ideas. In this sense, sociability is an “artificial” disposition. Solitude is a miserable condition, but the problem is that the remedy is not immediately exciting, for it seems to involve the subjection to rules and authorities, with all the inconveniences of its constraints on our present interests and actions. It is a predicament since, to be happy, we need more than the mere companionship of the people we love; we must live in a society governed by rules and even with people we do not like or are not personally attached to, within a broad community of strangers. Within society, the political obligations and all the legal constraints are almost completely outside our voluntary control. We can voluntarily live with the persons we love (if they, of course,

want the same), but allegiance does not arise from voluntary compacts. The predicament, hence, is ineradicable.

The conclusion we have reached from Hume's literal remarks is that love and benevolence, as we have seen above, are naturally related; as the connection between love and benevolence is *natural*, if we actually love someone, we naturally desire his or her own happiness. Of course, we can also love someone else by a simple natural impulse or disposition (like mothers naturally love their babies and children). Nevertheless, a further fact is that our own happiness is only possible if we live in a commerce and relation with others; and it is a further fact that this form of living is enhanced if we live *within* a well-ordered society. Hence, we need to develop some complex sociable virtues, beyond friendship, for the sake of attaining true happiness. In other words, the plain artificial virtues like trust in social occupations and professions, and even political virtues, like commitment to social goodness, are important and even essential for attaining happiness.

Some conclusions are straightforward. First, the connection between love and the desire of other's happiness is a *natural* connection. We do not need to be helped by any artifice (rule or principle) to pass from the first to the other. Second, we are naturally designed to desire our own happiness (that is, we cannot but desire it; as remarked, we would be insane if we do not). Desiring both our own happiness and the happiness of the persons and beings we love is a consequence of our natural dispositions, a consequence of the frame and constitution we have as Humans. Society is, anyway, an artifice that secures, promotes and enhances them both.

Anyway, it is not necessary that we reach the last assertion by way of some chain of reasoning:

To reduce life to exact rule and method, is commonly a painful, oft a fruitless occupation: And is it not also a proof, that we overvalue the prize for which we contend? Even to reason so carefully concerning it, and to fix with accuracy its just idea, would be overvaluing it, were it not that, to some tempers, this occupation is one of the most amusing, in which life could possibly be employed (ESY 1, E 18.55; GG 231).

Hence, even if it is true that we praise the global and general fact that society is good for the success of our more important and persistent desires, living in society forms a crucial and well established characteristic of human behavior. In fact, peoples' behavior, as a group behavior, evolved that way. Therefore, the desire for happiness and for living in companionship with people we love are not things we need to reason about.

## Notes

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<sup>2</sup> In fact, Hume is thinking of a rather different situation than that of the coexistence of contrary desires, for the internal association between love and benevolence is plainly compatible with having ambivalent desires, since we can love and hate the same person, though not usually with the same intensity.

<sup>3</sup> It is controversial, anyway, if Hume's view is that the internal perception of pride actually *produces*, that is, *creates* the self, putting hence its very idea into existence, or if the idea of the self is merely *called upon* by the idea of pride (being the self, then, presupposed). Terence Penelhum famously remarked on the apparent discrepancy between Hume's approaches to the idea of the self in Book I and both Books II and III of the Treatise (PENELHUM, 1992, pp. 281-292). It is in Book 2 that Hume presents the "strange" claim that "the idea of the self is the *product* of the passion" (PENELHUM, 1992, p. 285). Penelhum cites Nicholas Capaldi (Hume's place in moral philosophy, 1989) as arguing that in Book II Hume sustains a non-skeptical and positive view on the problem of the other selves. Penelhum disagrees. His view is the following: "[W]e have to read the account [Hume] does give in a way that makes it clear that although the idea of the self is 'produced' by pride in the sense that it *is called up* by it, it has in every instance to be an idea that we have and use already. It needs to be *in our repertoire*. There is no way in which the mechanism of pride and humility could be the *origin* of our consciousness of the distinction between ourselves and others; for it requires us already to have that consciousness" (p. 286). I agree with Penelhum, so I use "produce" in the sense of "called upon", as a mechanism of natural association, but as a mechanism that not merely calls upon another idea but also develops and enhances it.

<sup>4</sup> Compare this with Penelhum's conclusion: "So I think that [Hume] merely holds it to be natural and original that pride calls up the idea of the self [,] not that the associative mechanism of pride is the origin of that idea's existence in our minds" (PENELHUM, 1992, p. 286).

<sup>5</sup> The conclusion is that pride does not have the same place as love has as a reason for helping or assisting persons about whom we care the most. This is probably related to the reason Hume found for explaining why the transition from love to pride is easier than from pride to love: "[P]ride or humility is not transfused into love or hatred with the same ease that the latter passions are changed into the former. If a person be my brother, I am his likewise: but though the relations be reciprocal, they have very different effects on the imagination. The passage is smooth and open from the consideration of any person related to us to that of ourself, of whom we are every moment conscious. But when the affections are once directed to ourself, the fancy passes not with the same facility from that object to any other person, how closely so ever connected with us" (T 2.2.2.16; SBN 339). The circle of passions has, then, a flow naturally directed from love to pride; the reverse, though not an impossibility, would be an upstream flow.

<sup>6</sup> That is, an explanation anchored in one of Hume's conceptual schemes, like the famous approach about the "double relation of ideas and impressions".

<sup>7</sup> We can add here that a person who does not desire his own happiness is insane, but a person who does not desire the happiness of others cares about nobody except himself. This latter person is not properly insane, although he is in some sense unreasonable and insensible. It is likely that he or she will not attain happiness (even if he or she truly desires it).

<sup>8</sup> A view sustained, for example, by the philosophers who believe in the existence of some "intellectual intuition" as a best explanation for our incapability to define what we feel simply by describing what we see or are aware of—an answer given by the intuitionists for a problem nowadays known, after Moore, as the "naturalistic fallacy"

<sup>9</sup> Here I emphasize the similarity between Hume's view and the views expressed by Harry Frankfurt, who sees love (and other affections) as reasons for action (see: Harry Frankfurt. *The reasons of love*. Princeton University Press, 2006).

<sup>10</sup> The Humean solution to the apparent contradiction of seeing virtues as passions is solved by his final assertion that virtues are in fact “calm” passions. The ancient distinction between “passion” and “reason” becomes a new distinction between the “violent and sensible emotions” and the “calm” ones: “By reason we mean affections of the very same kind with the former, but such as operate more calmly, and cause no disorder in the temper: which tranquility leads us into a mistake concerning them, and causes us to regard them as conclusions only of our intellectual faculties” (T 2.3.8.13; SBN 437). However, later in the *Enquiry*, Hume preferred to exclude only “pure reason” from the moral distinctions.

<sup>11</sup> Hume did not present any exhaustive list of the “artificial virtues”. In presenting “justice” as an “artifice”, he tried to accommodate his view that moral distinctions are not “conclusions of our reason” with the view that reason has an important role in the establishment of our political obligations (On this issue, see Annette Baier’s *A progress of sentiments*, pp. 176-7).

<sup>12</sup> The point, as I see it, actually concerns the role of reason in the case of the artificial virtues. Some people can be, for example, naturally prone to obey the authorities (hence, exhibiting natural loyalty). It is also probably true in the case of friendship and even in the case of justice. With respect to some differences in quality and degree, we can see the same kind of behavior in some animals. Fidelity (promises, authorities, friends, etc.), as a *political* virtue, though, implies something more than a mere proneness towards action, for in those cases we think in actions in conformity to known or presupposed rules. Being guided by rules and principles is the essence of the activity that exhibits the sort of virtue Hume called “artificial”.

**List of Abbreviations**

[EPM] *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* (followed by numbers indicating the section and paragraph of the Clarendon Edition of the *Works of David Hume*)

[ESY] *Essays: Moral, Political, Literary* (followed by the number of volume and, after [E], the number of the essay and paragraph in the original edition)

[GG] T.H. Green & T.H. Grose Edition (followed by page number)

[SBN] Selby-Bigge & Nidditch editions (followed by page number)

[T] *A Treatise of Human Nature* (followed by numbers indicating the book, chapter, section, and paragraph of the Clarendon Edition of the *Works of David Hume*)

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