POSSIBLE APPROXIMATIONS: NOTES ON ÁLVARO VIEIRA PINTO’S AND ENRIQUE DUSSEL’S ETHICS

APROXIMAÇÕES POSSÍVEIS: NOTAS SOBRE AS ÉTICAS DE ÁLVARO VIEIRA PINTO E ENRIQUE DUSSEL

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to point to the possible approximations between the concept of Ethics by the Brazilian philosopher Álvaro Vieira Pinto and by the Argentinean Enrique Dussel. We discussed the reflections on Ethics provided by Álvaro Vieira Pinto in the books “Consciência e Realidade Nacional” and “Ciência e Existência” and glimpsed a complementarity between the two philosophers. The humanization of life conditions to the masses of underdeveloped countries is a confluent aspect in both philosophers’ reflections. We conclude highlighting the relevance of Álvaro Vieira Pinto’s thinking to the decolonial studies and the decolonization of Ethics.

Keywords: Ethics; Álvaro Vieira Pinto; Enrique Dussel; Decolonial Thinking.

RESUMO

O objetivo deste artigo é assinalar as possíveis aproximações entre o conceito de Ética do filósofo brasileiro Álvaro Vieira Pinto e do argentino Enrique Dussel. Discutimos as reflexões sobre ética oferecidas por Álvaro Vieira Pinto nos livros “Consciência e Realidade Nacional” e “Ciência e Existência” e vislumbreamos uma complementaridade entre os dois filósofos. A humanização das condições de existência das massas dos países subdesenvolvidos é um aspecto confluente nas reflexões de ambos os filósofos. Nós concluímos destacando a relevância do pensamento de Álvaro Vieira Pinto para os estudos decoloniais e para a decolonização da ética.

Palavras-chave: Ética; Álvaro Vieira Pinto; Enrique Dussel; Pensamento decolonial.
The decolonial movement can be understood as a social, cultural, political and philosophical process born from the struggle for better conditions of existence to people from underdeveloped countries, both natives and diasporic (COSTA & MARTINS, 2018). Instead of being centralized in some prominent figure, the decolonial thinking is the elaboration of various thinkers who work on and think the process of Human liberation, meaning that such movement comprises many characters and groups, amongst which the Modernity/Coloniality Group.

Congregating several intellectuals, especially Latin-American ones, the Modernity/Coloniality Group has as a conception the essential idea that Modernity was only possible thanks to Coloniality, i.e., thanks to the standards of power relationships that emerged, ruled and were established throughout this time period and that are characterized by the eurocentrism that designs, a priori, some sort of European superiority over other peoples (BALLESTRIN, 2013).

One member of the Group is the philosopher Enrique Dussel. Born in 1924 in Mendoza, Argentina, he has dedicated his life to think the philosophy of liberation, proposal which aims to describe the logic of oppression and exclusion of the systems, in the sense of allowing for awareness and organization of oppressed groups. Liberation is understood as “the act or the practical procedure thanks to which the non-free start to be acting subjects of freedom” (2017, p. 111n), enabling them to overcome their indignity. The philosophy of liberation is based on the concrete context of existence of the oppressed, sympathizing with them and interpellating on their behalf; Dussel (2017, p. 67 onwards) lists some interpellations caused by the philosophy of liberation: against sexism; against male chauvinism; for paid workers who have their earnings expropriated; for the future generations, from an ecological fight; against the cultural and philosophical eurocentrism and its North-American counterpart; for the populations to the South of the globe, underdeveloped and despoiled, in opposition to a developed and exploitative North. In the year of 1973, Dussel suffered a terrorist attack set by the Argentinian dictatorship, which led to his further exile in Mexico, where he has lived since, working at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
Another thinker with a similar biography to Dussel’s is the Brazilian Álvaro Borges Vieira Pinto. Born in Campo dos Goytacazes, Rio de Janeiro, on November 11th, 1909, his initial formation was in Medicine. After a failed attempt to work in the area, he started to dedicate his efforts to scientific research, after gathering formation in Physics, Mathematics and Philosophy, the latest within a period of study at University of Sorbonne, France. Then, in 1949, he became a professor at Faculdade Nacional de Filosofia da Universidade do Brasil, currently Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (CÔRTES, 2003). However, Álvaro Vieira Pinto is best known as one of the historical members of the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (ISEB). Founded on July 14th, 1955, aiming to study, teach and expose different social sciences and hence enable a critical understanding of the Brazilian reality, and elaborate theoretical tools that allow for encouraging the national development, ISEB gathered different thinkers who, we believe, contributed immensely to the decolonial thinking, such as Nelson Werneck Sodré, Alberto Guerreiro Ramos and Roland Corbisier (FAVERI, 2014). From the ISEBian period on, we can glimpse reflections directly related to the decolonial thinking in Vieira Pinto’s productions. We actually notice a certain proximity with the concerns and interpellations proposed by Dussel, such as when he proposes to elaborate a conception of national development that is for the improvement of life conditions of the masses, which, broadly speaking, is the process of liberation (VIEIRA PINTO, 1960); or when Vieira Pinto comments on the ideology embedded in racism (2008); in the more and more abyssal division between the North and South of the globe (1969); or in his constant denouncements of the eurocentrism that marks the intellectuality in underdeveloped countries, found in different works (1960; 1962; 1969; 2005; 2008), as well as in his proposal of critical outdoing (2008, pp. 268-280).

Another approximation between Dussel and Vieira Pinto can be seen by looking to the process of bitter exile that both underwent. As for the Brazilian, we must mention that one of the measures taken after the 1964 coup was the savage destruction of ISEB. Soon after the outbreak of the coup and a brief stay in the countryside of Minas Gerais state, Vieira Pinto is exiled in Yugoslav, where he spends a little more than a year without any formal intellectual activity, then he goes to Chile, where he settles and works as a translator and teacher, having also written some papers. In 1968, he gets a deal to come back to Brazil, isolating himself in his apartment, where he works as a translator to dozens of publications by Vozes, a publishing house, and writes many others; in the meantime, he suffers severe police harassment. In 1987, Álvaro Vieira Pinto dies from a
heart attack at Casa de Saúde Santa Maria, in Rio de Janeiro (CÔRTES, 2003).

From the manuscripts elaborated during his isolation, we had access to two posthumous publications: O Conceito de Tecnologia (The concept of technology), 2005, and A Sociologia dos Países Subdesenvolvidos (The sociology of underdeveloped countries), 2008. The whereabouts of four other works are yet to be discovered: one about First Philosophy (Filosofia primeira), another titled A Educação para um País Oprimido (Education to an oppressed country), another called Crítica da Existência (The critique of existence) and a final one named Considerações Éticas para um Povo Oprimido (Ethical considerations to oppressed peoples) (VIEIRA PINTO, 1982).

Ethics occupy a relevant position in Vieira Pinto and Dussel’s thinking, topic which we will approach now. Far from an exhaustive exposition or a deep articulation, our aim is to check the possible approximations between both authors’ concept of Ethics. Since Dussel’s production has a broader reach, our purpose is to focus on the theorization and discussion of Vieira Pinto’s Ethics as exposed in his published works. Specifically, during the discussion of this paper, we will establish some approximation notes between both authors.

**Ethics in Álvaro Vieira Pinto: initial approximations to Enrique Dussel**

To start off, we would like to express some difficulties we found regarding the task of exploring Ethics in Vieira Pinto’s thinking and our justification to persist on this study. The main hardship comes from the fact that the book Considerações Éticas para um Povo Oprimido, as aforementioned, is nowhere to be found. However, in the interview where Pinto mentioned the works he had written while in isolation, the philosopher made short comments about it (VIEIRA PINTO, 1982). What would, then, enable us to carry on with this paper, that is, what would justify maintaining our intentions? We found in other works some more-or-less deep and systematized reflections on the topic, which would allow for us to glimpse some principles or general lines on Ethics as digested by the author. Despite that, the fact that most encouraged us to do this research was the possibility of mutual contribution between both authors’ reflections. That said, we now start the exploration of the Brazilian philosopher’s Ethics and the initial approximation with the Dusselian production. Our main reference to this analysis will be some initial reflections found in the book Ética da Libertação: na idade da globalização e da exclusão (Ethics and liberation: in the age of globalization and exclusion) (2012), for it is a book that updates,
restructures, radicalizes and develops new founding aspects of the classic in five volumes *Para uma Ética da Libertação Latinoamericana* (For an ethics of Latin-American liberation) (1982) by the same author. We emphasize that our proposal is not to approach the possibility of approximation between Dussel and Pinto’s ideas exhaustively; we are glad, nonetheless, to offer some starting points to this wide research field.


Due to the limitation of this paper’s extension, we divided it in two parts. This, which is the first, deals with the two first works, while the second will deal with the two other.

In *Consciência e Realidade Nacional*, the reflections on Ethics are divided into three texts and come from a discussion about activity as an existential human feature. The philosopher starts the first text, *Caráter histórico e social dos valores* (Social and historical nature of the values), pointing that the ethical problem is essential in every philosophical meditation and consists of wondering on “the foundation of the judgements we make before things and facts, from where we draw a code of rules for every possible action” (1960, vol. II, p. 220). The philosopher emphasizes that his intention is not to approach the topic in its complexity nor broadness, considering the existence of a wide philosophical chronicle on the topic, but to indicate the two ways to deal with the issue: according to a naïve or critical consciousness. He states that the difference in treatment happens “especially due to two factors: the value ascribed to activity, as a human way of being, and the consideration into which the historical and objective process is taken” (1960, vol. II, p. 220).

Regarding the first factor, the value of activity, the philosopher believes that the naïve consciousness conceives the ideation, understood specifically in its intellective capacity, as being the essence of humankind, relegating the human activity seen in its authentic comprehension. Thus being, such thinking rises various ethical systems characterized by their immutable, complete and eternal structuring, and by the belief that humans need to learn them by contemplating, therefore, a deductive Ethics.

In another work, the same author associates the deductive character of Ethics to Spinoza (1969, p. 256). Vieira Pinto (1960, vol. II, p. 222) also reports that such conceptions, which treasure the “inner action” at the
expense of the effective work done in the world, are explained by the historical and cultural processes of their followers and their respective material and ideological resulting interests. On the other hand, the critical consciousness, when it appreciates the ethical problem, is guided by the principle that “it is in action, while executing its social relations and creating others, that humankind finds its real value” (1960, vol. II, p. 220), unfolding, from there, an open Ethics, inductive in nature and built by the ensemble, which is always uncompleted, of operational rules and evaluative guidelines to human actions themselves. According to the philosopher, “every moral rule originates in the society where it must be followed and reflects the structure of the relations where people in it exist, the system of production of goods, the connection with other different societies” (1960, vol. II, p. 221).

As to the second factor, the historical aspect of the ethical problem, the philosopher highlights that the naïve consciousness does not believe in the existence of the historicity of the codes of value, conceived by them as being timeless, eternal and independent on the historical course, which repels the idea of the objective foundation of social and moral laws. The only transformation they accept is that of the social transformation of said code, which by gradual revelations is shown to the civilization. Such comprehension is based on the idea that humankind must act in conformity to a ”must be” established a priori. The critical way of thinking, on the other hand, actively seeks the “entwinement between the modes of the predominant moral judgement and the general conditions of the society where they are acknowledged” (1960, vol. II, p. 226), rejecting, then, the previous conception, for their dogmatic affirmations from there derived are nothing more than concrete ideological answers to certain national or socio-cultural realities.

In the second text, A ética do desenvolvimento [Ethics of development], the first thing is to demonstrate the existence of said Ethics. Starting from the etymological examination of the term, the author states that “ético” is, firstly, the usual, the habitual, the customs, the consuetudinary which certain society sanctioned as admitted behavior. Posteriorly, it becomes a criterion of value and judgement, for the social sanction is coercive, there being a nexus between use and merit or demerit. According to the thinker, the notion of custom is only authentically understood when the objective foundations of the idea of social habit are reestablished, for “there are only uses and customs that were or have been originated from real life interests of the community” (1960, vol. II, p. 231). The author, then, lays out that which we understand as being the dialectic of transformation of uses, that is, the objective movement of transformation
in behaviors, interactions, customs and habits particular to the human activity, which stems from the very transformation of the world:

the historical-objective process consists of the physical course of phenomena, some spontaneous, others caused by human ingenuity, to which the political and cultural course is bound, where the occurrences are product of the societal activity as a response to challenges and defense of interests (1960, vol. II, p. 232).

Every transformation in reality performed by the human being reflects on the change of the human itself, because its representation of reality is also transformed, change which propels the new consciousness of reality and hence a new comprehension of possibilities of action upon this new reality. Up next, Vieira Pinto signalizes that, considered the practical consequences that each ethical conception has, it is necessary to understand the logic of development and induce Ethics that help to accelerate it, as development, according to the author, is not mere economic growth, which many a time acts as a concealer to social inequality, but a process of improvement of life conditions to the masses (1960, vol. II). That is why the national development, for many, is a matter of life or death. The author postulates that the decision “of our behavior face to the development of the country and the contribution to give to it, is not indifferent to the theoretical Ethics that we adopt, in view of the consequences over our understanding of the facts” (1960, vol. II, p. 233). Subsequently, opposing the anti-historical and idealistic concept of “must be”, the author postulates that the actions demanded by the ethical subject find a new conceptualization, as being those responsible for the transformation of the current real into a better real that is superior in development.

Then the author states that for some values which define the civilized character of humankind and its humanity, there will not be any modification, because the practical interests deny and reject “lie, debauchery, murder” (1960, vol. II, p. 234). The search for human wellbeing, which is a collective interest of a country in development, must be done by replacing traditional norms and concepts with new ones; and, in this process, “the feeling of social solidarity, of human sympathy, enlightened by a logical, revealing reflection of the mandatory nexus between mankind and its national framework, contributes to build the new reasons of moral activity” (1960, vol. II, p. 234).

Vieira Pinto believes that the critical consciousness, when creating Ethics sensitive to the current state of reality in which it is inserted, must,
firstly, renounce exterior values and, secondly, recognize that there is not a socially generalized way of acting that is devoid of value. And that is why the tragic deficiencies of underdeveloped countries serve as a support for the new Ethics to be adopted:

this, so to speak, is forcefully imposed upon us, because the humiliating facts are there, showing us the way to material actions that must suppress them, and criticizing, for its way of existing, the system of values that complacently enabled them to be produced and conserved, without more effective protests. The valuation of progressive actions has to be drained from the state of the world, and only be converted into system if by doing so it will help the transformative movement of that state (1960, vol. II, p. 234, emphasis added).

The Ethics of development, such as expressed by Vieira Pinto, demands that the thinker be engaged in the same fight for development, requiring from them the social sensibility to grasp the expression of the masses as well. The author finishes this text approaching the issue of imperialism, condemning it and explaining that these reflections somehow serve to justify the imperialistic posture, because it comes from the interest of governing classes, and not from the masses’.

The third and final text of the work under examination that deals with Ethics is called Responsabilidade individual na ética do desenvolvimento [Individual responsibility on the ethics of development]. It starts like so: “nationalism, as suppression of international alienation of work, is in itself a social ethic” (1960, vol. II, p. 237). From this citation, the author expresses the need for discussions around this concept, which is important to the ideology of development, a theme approached by him in another work (VIEIRA PINTO, 1960). After pointing out the relevance of the topic and emphasizing that he would only bring general discussions, the author observes the reality of underdeveloped countries, which are led to export the material “good” extracted from their lands to import the spiritual “good” produced abroad. This reception engrains in the consciousness of underdeveloped countries partially ruling ethical conceptions, because they surge as context different from that lived by Brazilian masses, and masses from underdeveloped countries. The author denounces the hoax of metropolitan philosophies, which proclaim the universality of ethical criteria, and not only that, but also the “uniformity of social theory, the impartiality of the economical science, the equity of jurisprudence etc.” (1960, vol. II, p. 239), trying to “charm” the consciousness of subdued
nations in order for them to submit to the belief that they arrived “too late” at the stage of History and hence there is nothing left for them but to incorporate to the procession of the victors, i.e., they must follow the kind lead of metropolitan natures, or, in current terms, of groups and other forms of representation that originate there, instead of developing consciousness and finalities of their own. The subdued nations, for that very reason, end up with an obscured notion of their own reality.

Up next, Vieira Pinto points that “the ethics of development is not a theoretical artifact *a priori*, work of illuminated thinkers, but it is made in the practice of the actions that transform reality, according to the nationalist guidelines” (1960, vol. II, p. 239), coming from there the reflection on the concept of responsibility, debated by the philosopher, who considers the great discussion of the philosophy of existence at that time and the meditations around said concept. At this point, the author differentiates the two forms of reflections; the metropolitan philosophy of existence, which comes amidst well-defined historical conditions, such as social fights evoked by the two great European wars and the pessimistic dismay that determines it; and the philosophy that must be built on and by underdeveloped countries, which comes from completely different experiences. The author explains that responsibility “is primordially about accepting the collective social task of promoting the development of the country and the humanization of our people’s life” (1960, vol. II, p. 240). Eliminating the personal and subject experience of guilt, responsibility is something objective and socially shared, being subject to public expression and to the defined social criteria. In a reality like ours, the consciousness of responsibility “is given to the individual by the situation they occupy and by the way how he acts in the course of events” (1960, vol. II, p. 241). Still according to the philosopher, responsibility, in an underdeveloped country, consists of the realization of mostly elementary actions, responsible for the humanization of people’s life conditions. The text ends through an enunciation of ten escape modalities face to the responsibilities over the ethics of national development: mysticism; symbolic work; irrational and desperate revolution; political omission and opportunism; futile art; and enrichment. We highlight, due to their flagrant currency, knowledge for the sake of knowledge and symbolic work. Knowledge for the sake of knowledge is the intellectual escape, considered particularly nefarious by the author, because it camouflages itself with legitimate and dignified reasons. The idle and uncommitted study of social sciences is also highlighted. It is impossible not to recall the author’s existential analysis of pedantry, of the features of the naïve consciousness (VIEIRA PINTO, 1960, vol. I, p. 193). Symbolic work, in turn, is considered the gravest of all escapes, for it is about the
hoax concretized by several actions, which, from a distance, seem useful and resolving, but only mask fruitless actions. The author reports that such actions come from the public power’s necessity to employ representative sections of the intelligence who cling on doing subsidized activities paid for with public resources, such as useless inquiries, publications without readers and idle social and pedagogical research etc. This is the end of the main reflections on Ethics in Consciência e Realidade Nacional.

In Ciência e Existência, we elected three points in which the issue of Ethics was debated, or at least some of its aspects, as in this work the systematic reflections dedicated to the topic are sparse. In the beginning of the chapter, the author elaborates a reflection that will posteriorly be retrieved in other works. We refer to the transformation that the concept of “good” has been through while being entertained by different disciplines. We clarify that humankind makes its own existence, for, unlike the animals that simply survive off of what nature has to offer, humans are capable of dominating it and producing the resources necessary to their existence, and the philosopher points that the idea must not be treated only psychologically or subjectively. As humankind works, because it must work to survive, it unveils new ideas about the beings and the phenomena, relations and occurrences upon which its actions reflect; the idea, then, must also be seen existentially as a good, concept which has a primordially existential meaning, and only posteriorly, and in a derivative sense, acquires economical meaning (1969, p. 48).

On another occasion, still in Consciência e Existência, Vieira Pinto states that:

the supreme concept of every humanistic ethical conception, that humankind must work for itself, is absolutely and unfathomably deep, because it is not limited to indicating the demand for elimination of all alienation of work, which spoils it economically, only, but also the expression ‘for itself’ means that it must work to make itself human (1969, p. 343, emphasis not added).

Further ahead, the author indicates that work should be responsible for generating the integral humanity of humankind, which demands access to social and material conditions responsible for the plenary development of their potentialities, “due to the moment of the historical process and of the development of the productive forces” (1969, p. 343). Work must not be only economically devoid of alienation, but must be taken existentially as an activity capable of assuring possibilities of human transformation in a way to reach true humanization, which is pointed by the philosopher as
being constituted “in the development of wellbeing capacities, moral comprehensiveness, individual happiness and cultural creation unsuspected so far [...]. Humankind has no other source of help to improve its existence and expand itself in the comprehensiveness of its being than the work it is capable of doing” (1969, p. 343).

Finally, the last reflection on Ethics that we would like to highlight in Ciência e Existência can be found in chapter XXI, where the author proposes a discussion on the social foundations of the researcher’s consciousness. The final four items listed in the summary of the chapter are exactly “The ethical and social ethics of a researcher. The consciousness of being an instrument to society. The social responsibility of a researcher. Need for their philosophical preparation” (1960, p. 478). In this chapter, the philosopher starts the discussion on ethics pointing that consciousness is not built through gnosiological aspects, but from ethical and social ones, bringing up again the reflection that could already be found in another work (1960, vol. II), when the impossibility of a separation was evidenced, except in the formal or didactic field, between cognoscitive and moral consciousness.

In Ciência e Existência, the philosopher, dedicated to the scientific formation on a critical perspective, emphasizes that it does not suffice for the researcher to devote themselves to the project of knowing and working to cross the boundaries of current knowledge, they must also imagine how reality from over the borders will be. Then, he states that “the truth is a gnosiological value, but respect to the truth is a moral one” (1969, p. 511). Such assertion, which makes explicit the progressive and endless approach to the inexhaustible intelligible content of the physical scientific object, was made to support his argument that a researcher should be judged in the integrity of their personality, as a moral and psychological person, stemming from there the need for reconsidering Ethics in scientific research. About the latter statement, he explains:

It is identified as a general ethics, of existential basis and social-historical support, which we cannot develop in this essay, but we take the liberty to sum it up in a single precept: that of the formation of a researcher of the authentic sense of self, due to which they acquire the notion of their existential reality. That consciousness implicates the knowledge of why they act how they act, not only on account of the subjective situation where they live, as an individual obliged to constantly overcome the contradiction of ignorance, which can also be indistinctly referred to as the contradiction of knowledge (1969, p. 512).
Other than the ethical consciousness, and being part of it in a sense, a researcher must develop the consciousness of their social responsibility, which is founded on the identification of their personal consciousness with the collective one. A researcher, far from being an outstanding specimen of their society, is an agent used by it to think and solve the problems and contradictions that rise from its bosom, both social and primordial contradictions, that is, those based on that which opposes human interests to the forces of nature. We must reinforce, however, the existence of a structuring of power relationships, crystalized in groups and classes with antagonistic interests. This structure ends up influencing the whole process of scientific studies and put researchers in a contradictory situation where they are forced to decide, in their moral consciousness, whether they will abide to the interests and finalities of the specific group in which they believe to belong, or to the task they are executing, or “if they judge them in conflict with a compound of moral ideas that they cultivate due to deeming them indispensable and respectable values” (1969, p. 513). The historical development of the scientific enterprise resulted in an ever-growing agglutination of common efforts. If there were secluded researchers before, working isolatedly and dedicating themselves to researching from the free election of their finalities, despite them not standing out in the society where they belonged nor amid the knowledge produced until then, we can say that, today, such procedure is rare, for research is, more and more, carried on in groups interconnected in a complexly elaborated network.

Being a part of those groups that determine their work, Vieira Pinto explains, a researcher must face the moral crisis that emerges when they awake to the critical perception of their existential reality. The escape, justified through indifference or refusal of the problem, is pointed as an ingenuous posture, which refers back to the already mentioned reflections on escaping the ethics of development. The issue of consciousness is brought up again when the author emphasizes the importance of the masses’ considerations in scientific research, which is done through critical consciousness, and when he mentions the difficulties risen by certain concepts originated in the naïve thinking, such as the “indeterminism principle”, applied to the study of subatomic particles behavior, or the concept of “demographical explosion”, which the author debunks in another work (Vieira Pinto, 2008, p. 94 on).

At the end of the text, Vieira Pinto states that a researcher is led to cultivate their critical consciousness for two reasons: first, not to be deceived by the idols of their time, in a Baconian sense (RÖD, 2014, vol. I,
p. 642); second, “not to become a spokesperson to mistaken conceptions that will be spread in society and become a dead weight contradicting the progress of culturally reigning ideas, jeopardizing both present and future researchers” (1969, p. 514). The need for an intellectual “state of alert” is pointed, procedure executed by the critical consciousness and which establishes that every intellectual action, every imagined project, any operation realized or interpretation conceived will always be a product of the naïve or the critical consciousness. In this context, the epistemological position adopted by a researcher, the theory of knowledge that founds their work, the values that guide their actions etc. are all basilar aspects of the scientific practice, and not useless discussions held by philosophers.

Discussion

We understand that Vieira Pinto, by elevating the ethical problem to the real of philosophical existentialities, indicates that every philosophical meditation, respecting, of course, some limits of topic and textual extension, must be done with the awareness that every judgement and action guideline results from some objective fundament. If it is not explicit, at least the author should be aware of this fact and made responsible for their reflections, just like scientists are responsible for the results of what they produce (VIEIRA PINTO, 1969).

According to the philosopher, the critical consciousness rejects the distinction between an alleged moral consciousness and the cognoscitive consciousness. Although that difference is commonly used, it is acceptable only didactically, because it is inadmissible for the correct examination of the ethical problem as it neglects the conditionings of reality to the human consciousness and also severs it. It is in the objective human action, directed to the physical or social world, that one must seek the fundamentals for a moral legislation, because there we find the principles of the merits and sanctions that humankind receives. The human activity, while promoting a change in reality, makes reality different to someone else, affecting them in turn, even if not immediately (CÔRTES, 2003). Vieira Pinto states that “what each time period sees as ethical norm is what the previous historical society erected as an ideal life, because it expressed their project of being, which they tried to accomplish, always incompletely” (1960, vol. II, p. 224), showing the importance of the concept of project to the debate of an ethical problem6. Here it is impossible not to recall Paulo Freire’s (2017, p. 76 on) reflections on the need for denouncing the inhumane status, frequently found in underdeveloped countries, and announcing the
new reality, transformed thanks to the untested feasibility that allowed for humane life conditions to those communities.

Vieira Pinto clearly distinguishes the naïve Ethics, based on metaphysical precepts, from the critical Ethics, stemming from social fundaments. Not that the metaphysical schemes are dissociated from social interests, much to the contrary: it is intrinsically tied to them, often conservative and reactionary, for they are dedicated to the maintenance of the dishonorable condition of the current reality. What we meant to say is that the social basis of critical Ethics is actively and directly dedicated to the concrete interests of the masses, and here we see a great proximity to Dussel. When he proposes an Ethics of liberation which considers not only the center of the modern system-world, but also the outskirts, that is, Ethics thought from the victims, the outcast, the Other, the oppressed (DUSSEL, 2012), or when he reinforces that the main point of the Philosophy of Liberation is to describe the logics of oppression and exclusion of the systems, considering, for example, that the richest 20% in the world consume 82% of the goods in the world, while the other 80% consume only 18% (DUSSEL, 2017), the philosopher ends up setting, from the start, the philosophy within the context of a concrete life, committed to the oppressed.

The underdeveloped countries strive in this scenario, because they are incapable of doing work for themselves (VIEIRA PINTO, 1960, vol. II), therefore we should have clarity in the understanding of work as a compound of material and social actions developed aiming at the suppression of the deplorable life conditions in which the masses in these countries exist. Such reflections come close to Enrique Dussel’s (2012) Ethics, especially considering the emphasis given by the Argentinian to the material criterion of an Ethics of liberation, which is susceptible to the fulfilling of life’s basic needs: eating, drinking, clothing, living etc., affirming the unitary dignity of an ethical-corporal subject. The material actions, essentially progressive, convert into an ethical system only later, reminding us of Dussel again, when he signals that the philosophy of liberation comes from a concrete presence within social movements, having praxis as an initial act and reflection as a second act (2017, p. 126). Vieira Pinto, in turn, signals that a philosopher dedicated to the suppression of the pitiful life circumstances of spoiled masses must divide themselves in their existential condition. He(she) must “become, at the same time, the subject who creates liberating ideas, and the audience, who must execute them” (2008, p. 30), being such duplicity the touchstone in the process of situating oneself with this “canyon of suffering”, the “valley of tears” which is an underdeveloped country.
The transformation of life conditions of the masses in underdeveloped countries can only happen through work, but, according to what we have pointed, a kind of work oriented to oneself. At this reflection point, we are led to discuss Vieira Pinto’s concept of nationalism, for, in the philosopher’s thinking, it is about a notion directly turned to the humanization of the masses in preyed countries. In another work (COSTA & MARTINS, 2019), we discuss the issue of nationalism according to the Brazilian philosopher’s thinking. We consider such enterprise to be important to clarify possible misconceptions that might come from the confusion between his and others’ conceptions of nationalism, simply due to both concepts being represented by the same lexical item. As can be seen in different moments of Consciência e Realidade Nacional (1960, vol. I, p. 247, 367; 1960, vol. II, p. 141-142, 166, 209, 214, 513), Vieira Pinto’s nationalism must be understood in all of its nuance and conceptual peculiarity. The philosopher, explicitly repelling any kind of totalitarianism, fascism or xenophobia whatsoever, understands that “[...] nationalism is fundamentally an ideology of the masses because it aims to free them from oppressions and spoliations that they are victims of” (VIEIRA PINTO, 1960, v. II, p. 446), which allows us to characterize his nationalism as a project to improve the life conditions of these masses. In this sense, he associates the policy of national development authentically based on nationalism with that which he calls “the true humanism”, which integrates underdeveloped countries with the fight for better life conditions to their populations (Vieira Pinto, 1960, v. II, p. 471-513). Álvaro Vieira Pinto’s nationalism boils down to the fact that nationality emerges as a critical category, as he demonstrates throughout Consciência e Realidade Nacional (1960, vol. II).

The concrete acts, therefore, a fundamental components of a critical Ethics which proposes to contribute to the national liberation. Furthermore, in his reflections on responsibility, where the author distances himself from other existential philosophers’ ideas, a methodological attitude which we call decolonial self-situating is justified. We believe that, more than a field of study, the decolonial thinking should stimulate and be stimulated by effectively decolonial practices, which can be based on a certain method, here understood as being a procedure, but also result from a method, understood as a way of seeing reality (Vieira Pinto, 1969). The “decolonial standing”, utterly important aspect of the decolonial turn, is the acknowledgement of the surrounding reality, considering its historical, economic, cultural and social situation, and emphasizing its distinctions face to other societies, usually at the North of the globe, to which we are forced to be contrasted with when we make an effort that is intended to be decolonializing. We believe that, in other words, different exponents of the
decolonial movement and other thinkers oblivious to this enterprise performed the decolonial standing, which now we rise to the category of fundamental methodological component of the fight for decolonialization. Enrique Dussel, for one, never ceases to reinforce that his critique on Modernity is made “from the outskirts”, that his production is made with the oppressed, the victims, the outcast (2012; 2017).

By situating themselves in the context where they live, thinking about the resolution of the problems they come across and projecting a new reality which is more humane and developed, philosophers in underdeveloped countries will be able to elaborate an authentic thinking, instead of idle copies of foreign thoughts – almost always originated in the global North. Only then will we see a scientific production that is treasured as a national good, and not the unskilled productions that thrive in the context of an alienated, hollow science full of platitudes. It is necessary to fully commit to the community that surrounds the thinker, where social responsibility is not only a bureaucratic obligation, a mere requisite to obtain any sort of financial compensation. In this sense, we should consider the limiting situations that people in underdeveloped countries live in. Álvaro Vieira Pinto does a decolonial examination of this scenario and shows how, in the Brazilian context, it has a collective character and refers to the boundary between the being and the “being more”, and not between the being and the nothingness, according to the original wonderings of Karl Jaspers (1960, vol. II, p. 283-287). This topic was also mentioned by Dussel, when he defined these as limiting situations:

the ones that interest the Philosophy of Liberation (the wars, the revolutions, the processes of liberation of women, of oppressed races, of popular cultures, as well as the liberation of majority groups that find themselves in a situation of non-right, the Outskirts or a colonial world that, by definition, finds itself subdued by a structure of oppression etc.) (2017, p. 117).

We believe that the discussion on wellbeing, observed in two previous occasions, when we approached Vieira Pinto’s ethical thinking, deserves to be better explored. Wellbeing is a search into which humans venture. Here it is necessary to consider two things regarding the terms “search” and “venture”. We understand that, despite of having to constantly maneuver himself to keep a certain coherence with his philosophical matrices, João Augusto Pompéia (2014, p. 156 on) brings us extremely fertile discussions on psychotherapy, when he suggests that it is a search activity. The author states that psychotherapy is pro-cura (a play on words: procura means
“search” in Portuguese; *cura* by itself means “healing”), meaning that it is an activity done to care, because the word *cura* comes from Latin and means, primarily, “care”. It does not matter to us, however, in this text, to approach issues of psychotherapy; instead, it is extremely fruitful for us to evoke the interpretation that Pompéia gives to the word *procura* when he dissociates and extends its meaning. Wellbeing is a search, for humans must constantly take care of their own beings in order to achieve it. It is a process in which the “being-being” must occupy themselves with the contradictions that oppose themselves to the primordial nature, or to the society and the contradictions that already exist in it. As to the “venture” we mentioned, it must be understood under the horizon of Vieira Pinto’s reflections on the concept, which, as he shows, holds a deep existential meaning. The author explains (2005, vol. II, p. 697 on) that the concept is used banally to express human’s intimidating decision to do something challenging, dangerous or apparently impossible. Despite that, going back to the original Latin roots, the term composed by the preposition *ad*, “moving towards”, plus past participle of the verb *venire*, “come”, “arrive”, indicates the basic character of being human, which is “the being defined by the adventure of being, that is, to turn the things the ‘shall be’, the *ventura*, into the object of their search, into the projection of consciousness […]. For that reason, the yearning to achieve the time that is yet to come makes the most intimate structure of consciousness” (2005, vol. II, p. 698, emphasis not added). Wellbeing is a search that humans venture into, for they are the creatures who constantly live in the occupation, consciously or not, of achieving wellbeing, an affective experience concreted with the social and material conditions that comprise their existential situation.

These reflections on wellbeing are important, because we deem them to be about a fundamental concept in different areas of knowledge and human activity when a critical perspective is adopted. The concept of economic development, for instance, may take the wellbeing of the people in a country as a reference, avoiding, thus, the developmentalist fallacy (DUSSEL, 2012, p. 82; VIEIRA PINTO, 2008, p. 174) and other ideologies and incorrectnesses born from an inept or unscrupulously ideological concept of development (VIEIRA PINTO, 1963; 2008). Wellbeing and, in a certain way, its antipodes — discomfort and suffering — may also assume a position of reference in psychotherapy, in general psychology and in mental health, outdoing the fanciful conceptions, such as the one that sees becoming aware of the intrapsychic conflict that generates the symptom as a therapeutic goal (BRABANT, 1977), and products of ideological procedures being used in this field, such as the concept of adaptation, as unveiled by Vieira Pinto (2008, pp. 43-54). We advocate that even for its existential
concretion and concreteness in case where patients look for psychological services, such concepts must assume a central position in the clinical practice, like we had the chance to expose in another work (COSTA, 2017).

Back to our discussion on Vieira Pinto’s ethics; by bringing forward his reflection on the ethics of scientific research, we highlight the influence that the structuring of power relationships has over the scientific process, becoming concrete through the class groups with opposing interests in the bosom of a certain society, as one of the factors responsible for the torpor of a researcher’s consciousness. Having huge intellectual lucidity, Álvaro Vieira Pinto emphasizes that, although Brazil’s main contradiction, and that of other underdeveloped countries too, we understand, is that which opposes its interests to the interests of preying nations (1960, vol. II), there is another specific contradiction which deserves attention: the aforementioned contradiction in interests of different classes. In other works (1982; 2005), the philosopher shows how such societies develop, and, from there, so do different forms of education; one for the leading groups and another for the exploited classes. This explains the distinct valuation of the intellectual work is done; many a time equivalent to the intellectual idleness, practiced by the elites, and the manual, rude, exhausting, but extremely devalued, labor practiced by the masses (1969; 2005). It also explains the belief that there is an erudite, superior, elevated, universal culture proper to the leading classes, and the culture deemed popular, rudimentary, regionalist, to which people have access (1982; 2005). Here we have social features that express the division of the society in antagonistic classes. But in the case of underdeveloped countries, this issue assumes a grave character, because it conceals the presence of the main contradiction we mentioned previously. The ones who have the power in underdeveloped countries affiliate with exploiting foreign groups. Álvaro Vieira Pinto (1960, vol. II, p. 236, 321; 1969, p. 328; 2008, p. 265) and other authors (FANON, 2005, p. 60, 61, 79, 206; FAORO, 2012, p. 113; MBEMBE, 2018, p. 38), connected or not with the decolonial movement, point to that as a trivial observation, something obvious to whoever proposes a critical approach to the national reality. Generally speaking, we can say that “economical elite” and “saboteurs” are nearly inseparable terms. It is from that complicity, that alliance between the leading groups and the preyed countries and the foreign dominators that, doing what Frantz Fanon (2005) calls “rear combat”, which is nothing more than the oppressed people’s battle against cultural submission, it is from that complicity that we find a painful aspect of the national reality: Brazilian public universities, which are our main scientific institutions, are temples of intellectual alienation, of idle production, of platitudes, reiterating the
reinvention of the wheel in the most varied intellectual areas to which they dedicate, caring, as denounced by Vieira Pinto, only to import knowledge from others instead of producing knowledge that matters, i.e., knowledge together with the people, relating to people and thinking about the life conditions of these people (1962).

Here we can resort to Dussel again, when he criticizes the project of so many philosophical schools, in the center, but also, and worse, on the outskirts, that is, in Latin-America, Africa and Asia, which lock themselves in an ivory tower of “Eurocentric and sterile academicism” (DUSSEL, 2012, p. 66). We emphasize, thus, the need for the decolonial alternative (MALDONADO-TORRES, 2007; 2018), to overcome coloniality towards a transmodernity, which also means a transformation in our ancient and outdated university structures. In this sense, we would like to express our agreement with José Jorge de Carvalho (2018) when he proposes an Encontro de Saberes [Gathering of Knowledge] as an alternative understood to be decolonial. The author develops reflections considering the need for an ethical, racial and epistemic restructuring of our universities. From his reflections we can wonder: what is the meaning of having racial quotas in universities if they do not follow a radical questioning of the very Eurocentrism found in the curricula? What is its meaning other than to serve as one more means of domination, of questioning whether students of color can follow these curricula carved by coloniality and so alien to the social functions they must carry out? Carvalho proposes, considering the task of restructuring the universities, epistemic quotas as being a process of transformation of university structures in the sense that they offer greater porousness to the knowledge once subdued by a North-American or Eurocentric matrix.

At this point, once again, we call forth Enrique Dussel (2016) and the notion of transmodernity; that is, the explicit overcoming of the Eurocentric concept of post-modernity, which is nothing more than a final moment of modernity. Also pointing to a fact approached by Álvaro Vieira Pinto, namely the fact that “the economic battle of the exploiters and the powerful has never been separated from another, the battle for the cultural submission of the poor world” (2008, p. 63), Dussel states that millennial and universal cultures, such as the Chinese, the Japanese, the Korean, the Vietnamese, the Hinduist, the Islamic, the Byzantine-Russian, the Bantu, or the Latin-American and so many others, despite having different composition and structure, were, in part, colonized, “but most of the structures of value were excluded, belittled, denied, ignored more than annihilated” (2016, p. 62). The validity of the Colonialisit-European system-world causes such cultures to be historically interpreted as worthless, insignificant, pointless and
useless; as if all the wisdom or culture different from the European was folklore, popular belief, common-sense, regionalism etc. Such disregard, however, allowed them to last in silence, in the form of resilience, surviving the disdain of the dominators, the accomplices to the exploitation in benefit of foreign interests. Still according to Dussel, “for they are not modern, those cultures cannot be [considered] ‘post’-modern. They are pre-modern (previous to Modernity), although contemporary to Modernity and hence they will be trans-modern” (2016, p. 63), expressing the argument towards the concept of transmodernity, all of this happening despite the asymmetry that they present face to the Eurocentric system-world, a reflex of the economic, political, scientific, technological and military conditions that interact with them. Transmodernity, thus, projects a rich pluriversality, coming from an authentic intercultural dialogue, which takes into account the asymmetries that exist among the multiple cultural forms. The proximity between the concept of transmodernity and the Gathering of Knowledge can be expressed from the following assertion: “the intercultural dialogue must be transversal, that is, it must come from another place, beyond the mere dialogue between intellectuals of the academic or institutionally dominant world” (DUSSEL, 2016, p. 63-64), situating itself in the direction of the overcoming of the authentic modernity.

Another point that draws our attention is that in another work (VIEIRA PINTO, 1969, p. 328) the philosopher brings back the reflections on the process of reciprocated action which can also be called dialectic of domination (VIEIRA PINTO, 1960, vol. II, p. 145). Underdeveloped countries export their goods, usually as close to raw material as possible, nowadays referred to as commodities, and import manufactured goods, technological high-end artifacts and spiritual goods, including the theories that explain the scenario of poverty, misery where the masses of preyed countries dwell. Such combination does not result in greater benefits to the underdeveloped countries, for, despite being economically subdued to an extremely uneven balance, they are philosophically, culturally and academically subjected to the various ideological ploys that aim to conceal the reasons behind the deplorable situation that masses in underdeveloped countries endure. In A Sociologia dos Países Subdesenvolvidos, the philosopher outlines the route run by the notion of “good”, which is initially material, economical good, a product of society in behalf of its subsistence, but then turns into the ethical “good”, as an evaluative appreciation in behalf of a production for its existence (VIEIRA PINTO, 2008).

To end this brief discussion, let us deal with a quotation from the text Responsabilidade individual na ética do desenvolvimento, on which we
commented above, and which has the power to disclose, according to our vision, one of the main needs of Brazilian people nowadays:

when a society is inorganic, in it crossing countless varied projects, with relative freedom to operate, amongst which of course is included the governmental project, as one of a leading class or group, the individual responsibility over the execution of the transformations of reality admits a broad range of indetermination, with each individual being able to participate in the project where their private interests sit better (1960, vol. II, p. 243).

Here we are, as Brazilian people, more than ever forced to think about a project of national development that, in other words, is a project of national liberation. Vieira Pinto’s denouncement (1960, vol. II) that underdeveloped countries export raw material and import manufactured and spiritual goods serves us as an argument to the philosopher’s most basic assumption: although there has been abandonment in the formal academic world, characterized by philoneism and Bovarsme, of the terminology development/underdevelopment, the essential conditions that such concepts aimed to uncover remain. Dussel offered us the basis to point to the discursive evolution of the center-outskirts relationship, which was first metropolis-colony, then neocolonial, Third World and First World at the time of Cold War, “until we understand the structural underdevelopment or the sheer and simple ‘exclusion’ of the market or the global capitalist system after the so called ‘1989 Revolution’” (2017, p. 84). An aspect of the ideology of domination that must be considered is the existence of semantic concealment, which establishes the use of many terms that cover with more or less promptness the deplorable reality of spoiled nations (VIEIRA PINTO, 2008).

Therefore, an issue to which we have dedicated and would like to highlight, due to it being one of the most serious problems in current Brazil, is the restructuring of the main means of exploitation of humans by humans. If there was a colonial enterprise initially, paved in the practice where a European state held the power to reign over another people or territory overseas, there came, later, the Imperialism that, most times, depended directly and explicitly on the intervention of a nation over another to carry on their exploitative activities. In the final decades of the first half of the 20th century and in the beginning of the second half, however, there was a transition where the ploys became more and more ideological and hazed by other discourses and subtler ploys. It was the time when the “hybrid wars” appeared, opposing what Andrew Korybko (2018) believes,
something of which Brazil and all of Latin-America, in a brief examination strictly focused on this region of the world, are connoisseurs. The very concept of hybrid war made by Korybko is quite poor, but has the merit of exposing the most recent domination maneuvers employed by the United States mainly. Finally, and now we refer to our current situation, we need to unveil the transfiguration of this odious process of submission of a nation by another through the most recent methods that the dominating groups revealed. Flávio Casimiro (2018) touches the subject partly, although he is incapable of moving forward, for he finds himself in a very restricted zone due to being too intoxicated with “class-centrism”. Class-centrism consists of ascribing conceptual primacy to conflicts of interest of opposing social classes in the bosom of the same society, even if said phenomenon conceals another, originating and founding, that ends up being shaded by class struggles. Other authors, such as Ana Manuela Chã (2018) and Luiz Carlos de Freitas (2018) make the same mistake. They touch on important issues, which involve class struggles, but are transfixed by the foreign domination being their main and primordial determiner.

Since the beginning of the 1960s, when Álvaro Vieira Pinto published Consciência e Realidade Nacional, his enunciation that our main contradiction is that which opposes our interests as a nation to those of nations which spoil us economically and influence us politically in order to maintain or intensify this scenario, remains true. However, if, previously, we could speak clearly of the imperialism practiced by the dominating States, now it is vital to interpret this process in the horizon of cultural and academic influence, and in the political discourse that has been made, directly or indirectly, by the exploiters of Brazilian people. Casimiro’s book (2018) helps us to notice the dynamic of this process: Brazilian entities, to which he refers as “private devices of hegemony”, are financed by Brazilian businesspeople or foreign entities to produce consensus and thoughts of interest for the projects of domination, economical submission and maintenance of the deplorable scenario of Brazilian masses’ life conditions. Such foreign entities, in turn, are directly financed by the dominating governments, such as the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the International Republican Institute (formerly known as National Republican Institute for International Affairs). Both institutes come from the United States and are connected to the Democratic and Republican Parties of said country, respectively, which leads us to think that the thieving attacks coming from “uncle Sam” come both from the colors red and blue. Those entities are also financed by foreign companies that will benefit directly from the influence that will be generated by their subordinate entities in Brazil. It is, therefore, important to pay attention to
these nuances in order to study our national reality and that from the other underdeveloped countries. It is also important to mind the productions, intellectual or discursive, which do not intend nor are capable of being intellectual, which come from groups such as Movimento Brasil Livre [Free Brazil Movement], Fundação [Institute] Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Instituto Misses Brasil, Instituto Millenium, Estudantes Pela Liberdade [Students for Freedom], Movimento Brasil Competitivo, Grupo de Líderes Empresariais [Business Leaders Group] and many others, for they are all financed by external agents who are interested in maintaining the status of underdevelopment in Brazil and are formed inside influential groups.

Concluding this discussion, we would like to point out that Brazil and Venezuela face the same contradiction that oppose their interests as nations to the interests of dominating groups. However, while here it sufficed to have a subtle attack to take down a government which was the closest to a national-developmentalist leadership we had ever had, Venezuela drags itself resisting to that possibility and sees itself closer and closer to having to live an intervention used as second resource by dominators of all times: violence.

**Conclusion**

Although we absolutely do not wish to tire the reader with repetitions, we feel compelled to reiterate that this work does not aim to be an exhaustive or systematic study of Dussel’s work in contrast with Vieira Pinto’s. We acknowledge that we merely made initial approximations, which shall be further reformulated and complemented, between the works of the Argentinian and the Brazilian philosophers. Nonetheless, we see great fertility in these reflections that contribute to the disclosure of such a relevant issue raised by Vieira Pinto and that usually goes unnoticed even by researchers devoted to his thinking.

The approximation we propose in this paper is to show that there is great complementarity and interpenetration between Dussel’s and Vieira Pinto’s reflections on Ethics, reinforcing the concept over which we have been working, the relevance of Vieira Pinto’s thinking for the decolonial movement (COSTA & MARTINS, 2019a; 2019b). Something which draws our attention is that the philosopher precedes, complements and enriches the decolonial productions and works.

Throughout this paper, we envision the relevance and centrality of the categories of work and existence for the reflections retrieved and developed here. With effect, it is only through work that humankind is capable of becoming master of the goods necessary to produce its existence and...
humanizing its life conditions. Work, however, should be done for oneself, as an activity where the worker, knower of their condition of being situated in a national outline, must be capable of doing it in the common process of production of existence, instead of being alienated through unfair work relations.

Instead of the exploitation of humans by humans, work should be characterized by the collective action capable of congregating efforts for the common good. Only work, as a material action that promotes untested feasibilities, allows for the transformation that underdeveloped countries need. Actually, work is the one responsible for change in the life conditions of masses in the South; while “the North does not need to radically change the society where they exist; on the other hand, the South needs to do that, urgently” (DUSSEL, 2017, p. 59n, emphasis not added).

Álvaro Vieira Pinto brings, as a great contribution, a conception of concrete ethics to the debate, the real Ethics, thought to develop underdeveloped nations. In the second part of this work, we are going to approach other available works by Vieira Pinto which deal with the ethical issue and that are part of his posthumous production, O Conceito de Tecnologia (2005) and A Sociologia dos Países Subdesenvolvidos (2008). We will finish this paper with another quotation from the Brazilian philosopher, where he states that “every manifestation of cultural and ideological alienation is based on and caused by economical alienation [...]. The effective advance in the process of national liberation depends on the reciprocal action between the nationalist thinking and nationalist economic policies” (1960, vol. II, p. 388).
**Notas**

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3 The word ética, in Portuguese, is widely used as a countable noun, preceded by the articles uma (a) or a (the), in philosophical discussions without great change in meaning. Although we try to balance this in this paper, the reader may find unusual employments of "the Ethics" throughout the text, as we attempted to stay faithful to the term as used in Portuguese.

4 All the translations are ours.

5 Humanity here refers to the quality if being humane, not human. It is connected to "the tenor of humane realization, [the] state of effectiveness of the possibilities of man[kind], which the level of progress of [its] community allows [it]." (Vieira Pinto, 1960, vol. II, p. 139).


7 Here we identify the various ploys mentioned by Viera Pinto as ideological resources: the concept of race, the belief in a disadvantageous characterology, the use of Psychology, Law, Sociology and other human and social sciences to numb the authentic consciousness of the national reality, the lexical covering of underdevelopment and so on (Vieira Pinto, 2008).
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Received/Recebido: 13/06/20
Approved/Aprovado: 08/10/20