

FOREIGN POLICY AND POLARIZATION: A CASE STUDY ON THE BRAZILIAN DIPLOMATIC DISCOURSE

POLÍTICA EXTERNA E POLARIZAÇÃO: UM ESTUDO DE CASO SOBRE O DISCURSO
DIPLOMÁTICO BRASILEIRO

POLÍTICA EXTERIOR Y POLARIZACIÓN: UN ESTUDIO DE CASO SOBRE EL DISCURSO
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Frederico Rios C. dos Santos Tostes de Arantes*

Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais

ABSTRACT: This article investigates how frequently and in what ways the so-called Rhetoric of Culture Wars influences Brazilian diplomatic discourse. As part of a broader study covering 20 years of official speeches by Brazilian foreign ministers—from the first Lula administration to the Bolsonaro government—this publication focuses on the case of Celso Amorim. It examines whether and how Amorim adopted elements of the Rhetoric of Culture Wars and to what extent his discourse aligned with or diverged from the traditional principles of Brazilian diplomacy, such as universalism, autonomy, and the pursuit of international integration. The analysis relied on pre-established theoretical categories, which were used to catalogue the speeches in a spreadsheet and support a systematic data analysis. The findings indicate that Amorim did not adopt the rhetorical constants typically associated with the Culture Wars. Instead, his discourse consistently leaned toward the political left, while remaining both qualitatively and quantitatively aligned with the traditional Brazilian diplomatic tradition.

KEYWORDS: Rhetoric. Culture wars. Brazilian diplomacy. Diplomatic discourse; Celso Amorim.

RESUMO: O presente artigo procura investigar a frequência e a maneira como incide a chamada Retórica da Guerra Cultural no discurso diplomático brasileiro. Parte de uma pesquisa mais vasta, que inclui 20 anos de discursos oficiais dos chanceleres brasileiros do primeiro governo Lula até Bolsonaro, esta publicação se concentra no caso de Celso Amorim, perguntando-se em que medida e como o diplomata adotou ou não as constantes da Retórica da Guerra Cultural, bem como se se distanciou ou não, como e com que

* Postdoctoral researcher in Text and Discourse Linguistics (UFMG/CNPq/Capes PIPD). PhD in Text and Discourse Linguistics (UFMG/Sorbonne/Capes sandwich program) and International Relations (USP/SciencesPo Paris/Capes). Researcher at the Retorar group (UFMG) and NEAC-USP. E-mail: frederico.rioscurydossantos@sciencespo.fr.

frequência, do discurso diplomático brasileiro tradicional, pautado pelo universalismo, pragmatismo, autonomia e desejo de inserção internacional. As constantes ou variáveis pré-estabelecidas teoricamente serviram de parâmetro para catalogar os discursos em uma planilha, fornecendo informação para o cruzamento de dados que possam responder às perguntas de pesquisa. O que se observou foi que Amorim não encampou as constantes da Retórica da Guerra Cultural, apesar de ter claramente pendido para a esquerda do discurso político. Além do mais, o referido chanceler se mostrou consoante, qualitativa e quantitativamente, ao que se entende por tradicional discurso diplomático brasileiro.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Retórica. Guerras culturais. Diplomacia brasileira. Discurso diplomático. Celso Amorim.

RESUMEN: El presente artículo busca investigar la frecuencia y la manera en que incide la llamada Retórica de la Guerra Cultural en el discurso diplomático brasileño. Parte de una investigación más amplia, que incluye 20 años de discursos oficiales de los cancilleres brasileños desde el primer gobierno de Lula hasta Bolsonaro, esta publicación se concentra en el caso de Celso Amorim, preguntándose en qué medida y cómo el diplomático adoptó o no las constantes de la Retórica de la Guerra Cultural, así como si se distanció o no, cómo y con qué frecuencia, del discurso diplomático brasileño tradicional, pautado por el universalismo, pragmatismo, autonomía y deseo de inserción internacional. Las constantes o variables preestablecidas teóricamente sirvieron como parámetro para catalogar los discursos en una hoja de cálculo, proporcionando información para el cruce de datos que puedan responder a las preguntas de la investigación. Lo que se observó fue que Amorim no adoptó las constantes de la Retórica de la Guerra Cultural, a pesar de haber inclinado claramente hacia la izquierda del discurso político. Además, el referido canciller se mostró acorde, cualitativa y cuantitativamente, con lo que se entiende por discurso diplomático brasileño tradicional.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Retórica. Guerras culturales. Diplomacia brasileña. Discurso diplomático. Celso Amorim.

1 INTRODUCTION

The origin of the term “culture wars,” although subject to debate, is commonly attributed to James Davison Hunter’s 1991 publication *Culture Wars*. In this work, the American sociologist describes the clash between two opposing worldviews: one conservative (also referred to as orthodox or traditionalist), aligned with right-wing political ideology, and the other progressive, predominantly associated with leftist movements. The culture wars involve the mobilization of social and moral issues—such as sexuality, behavior, race, and religiosity—alongside broader political and economic disputes.

The concept gained further traction in the 1990s through the conservative Republican politician Patrick Buchanan. During his 1992 presidential campaign, Buchanan urged his supporters to engage in a “culture war for the soul of America,” framing it as a moral crusade between “good citizens” (conservative and religious) and the so-called enemies of the nation (liberal and secular) (Buchanan, 2004).

From a linguistic standpoint, as discussed in our previous work, cultural clashes are often expressed through a distinct rhetorical pattern. This includes features such as conspiratorial thinking, dichotomization within sociodiscursive imaginaries, and verbal aggression. While the intensity and form of these rhetorical features vary depending on the context and historical moment, they exhibit recurring tendencies typical of what we call the language of culture wars, as discussed in Section 2.

As outlined in Section 1, this article draws on a broader postdoctoral research project funded by CNPq. The project analyses a corpus of 20 years of official speeches by Brazilian foreign ministers, from the first Lula administration to that of Jair Bolsonaro. The main objective is to examine the presence and nature of the Rhetoric of Culture Wars in these speeches, and to determine whether and how such rhetoric aligns with or deviates from the traditional principles of Brazilian diplomatic discourse—defined here as emphasizing universalism, autonomy, and international engagement (see Section 2).

This article, however, focuses exclusively on the speeches of Celso Amorim, who served as foreign minister during Lula’s presidency from 2003 to 2010. The analytical procedures are described in Section 3.

Through this investigation, we aim to make a modest yet meaningful contribution to the study of diplomatic discourse, an area that remains relatively underexplored within language sciences. We also hope to offer insights into contemporary Brazilian diplomacy, a domain that plays a critical role in national development and, ultimately, in improving the quality of life for the population.

2 THE RESEARCH DESIGN

As stated in the introduction, this article is part of a larger post-doctoral study aimed at understanding the Rhetoric of Culture Wars¹ (RCW) in Brazilian diplomatic discourse. These were the research questions: a) Which the RCW constants may be observed and in what frequency considering each Brazilian chancellor? In which political discourse ideological group² (right or left) is the RCW most often depicted, and in what way? Given the answers to the aforementioned questions, which political group has displayed the most adherence to the Brazilian diplomatic tradition³ of pragmatism, universalism, autonomy, and willingness to internationalize?

The object of analysis consisted of all the chancellor's official speech from the first Lula's government to the Bolsonaro's one, including government of different ideological groups, which is important when it comes to analyse culture disputes. This work resulted in 322 speeches. The texts could not be processed by a computer program for analysis due to the complexity of some analysis categories and specific theoretical presumptions; so we had to manually read every single intervention and enter the results into a catalogue.

The time-lapse of 20 years of these 322 speeches included 8 chancellors: Celso Amorim (2003-2010), Antônio Patriota (2011-2013), Luiz Alberto Figueiredo (2013-2015), Mauro Vieira (2015-2016), José Serra (2016-2017), Aloysio Nunes (2017-2018), Ernesto Araújo (2019-2021), and Carlos França (2021-2022), excluding those who were in their post for a short temporary period, such as Eduardo dos Santos and Marcos Galvão.

The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' official website provided primary sources for the research, with the chancellors' speeches organized in a chronological order.

Considering the large amount of information due to the extent of the research corpus, we are publishing our work in parts. *This article presents the results only for the Celso Amorim's case.* In this sense, the object of the paper is showing:

- 1) Which categories of the Rhetoric of Culture Wars were observed or not in Amorim's speeches, and in what manner;
- 2) How we can describe Amorim's interventions as conforming or not to the traditional diplomatic discourse of Brazil.

3 CATEGORIES OF ANALYSIS AND THEORETICAL-METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS⁴

3.1 CATEGORIES OF THE RHETORIC OF CULTURE WARS

To answer the first question raised in the previous section, we drew on findings from earlier research to characterize the Rhetoric of Culture Wars (RCW). Those earlier studies focused on different types of discourse—namely, Brazilian parliamentary debates and

¹ See Section 2.

² See Section 2.

³ See Section 2.

⁴ Since we are publishing the results of the research in parts, this theoretical part is common to other papers.

the French media's coverage of immigration. In this article, we adapt those theoretical assumptions to the specific features of diplomatic discourse.

A common element in the RCW is what Danblon (2004) calls the “rhetoric of denunciation.” This involves making accusations without providing evidence, thereby reversing the burden of proof: the accused must defend themselves, while the accuser is not held accountable for substantiating their claims (Santos, 2020c). Danblon explains: “In the rhetoric of denunciation, emphasis is placed more on the citizen’s protection than on their responsibility or capacity to act. Yet those who pass judgment must introduce new elements and justify their reasoning. The burden of proof lies with those who make the argument and seek the audience’s approval in accordance with social norms” (Danblon, 2004, p. 67-70, our translation).

A second feature of RCW is what Angenot (2008) describes as the “rhetoric of conspiracy,” a notion also referred to by Poliakov (1980) as the “rhetoric of diabolic cause.” This rhetorical pattern seeks hidden enemies, scapegoats that supposedly explain all forms of suffering or social decay. It is not necessarily grounded in evidence, but in the intellectual pleasure of unveiling secret mechanisms behind moral decline.

This conspiratorial tendency also gives rise to several related traits:

- A) **Resentment pathos**⁵ (Angenot, 2008): RCW frequently conveys a sense of victimhood or systemic injustice. As Angenot notes:

The theme of resentment implies that the dominance of certain individuals or groups is a symptom of moral decline. The values of the privileged should be rejected. The ideologue of resentment speaks from the perspective of an oppressed subject, elevating complaint into a hermeneutic framework. Their victimhood legitimizes an untranscendable moral stance and leads to a privatization of civic and ethical universals (Angenot, 2008, p. 344, our translation).

- B) **Expert ethos**⁶ (Danblon, 2010) and ethos of credibility (Charaudeau, 2005; Donot & Emediato, 2015): The speaker often presents themselves as someone capable of uncovering hidden truths—sometimes with the aura of an academic, but often as a self-styled outsider. Danblon writes: “The conspiratorial ethos is both hypercritical and precise yet simultaneously endowed with a supposed intuitive access to hidden causes. This figure is both a modern free thinker and an archaic prophet.” (Danblon, 2010, p. 70, our translation).

A fifth recurring trait in the RCW is **dichotomization**, as described by Amossy (2014). While antagonism is inherent to all critical argumentation, dichotomization goes further by dividing the public sphere into mutually exclusive ideological camps. It no longer concerns disagreement over a specific topic but over entire regimes of truth. In such polarized settings, compromise is no longer possible, and discourse becomes Manichean (Amossy, 2008): one side claims moral purity, while the other is demonized. The speaker positions themselves as unequivocally aligned with the “right side of history” (Angenot, 2008; Danblon, 2004).

⁵ The *pathos* category of analysis has been for a long time relegated among rhetoric studies (Lima, 2006). Aristotle, opposing to his preceptor Plato, devoted a whole book of his *Rhetoric* to the study of emotions, arguing that it is not an obstacle to conquer the truth, but an effective instrument to attend this goal. After Descartes (1996), with his cogito (“I think, therefore I am”), attributing the essence of human being the capacity of thinking, the *logos* category attended its paroxysm in rhetoric studies. According to Lima (2006), even after the Second World War, when passional elements had been largely used by totalitarian regimes in Europe, rhetoric studies still presented a platonic and cartesian rancidity. Nowadays, nonetheless, some researchers have been acknowledging the importance of emotions in argumentation, such as Amossy (2006), Charaudeau (2008), Lima (2006), and Plantin (1996). According to Amossy (2005, p. 179), [...] if the knowledge of human passions is represented in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* as indispensable, that is because this conscience improves our action by words [...] (our translation).

⁶ According to Maingueneau (2006, p. 53), “the *ethos* proof consists of causing positive impression by the speech construction, offering a self-image capable of convincing the auditorium and conquering its reliability”. Besides, for Donot and Emediato (2015), the notion of *ethos* transcends the notion of proof able to acquire auditorium’s confidence, since this practice also evolves mobilizing values enshrined in society.

The sixth feature is **verbal violence**, which can be examined through Brown and Levinson's (1997) theory of politeness, itself rooted in Goffman's (1974) sociology. According to this framework, verbal exchanges are governed by social norms that aim to protect the speaker's and hearer's "face":

- *Negative face* refers to autonomy and personal space.
- *Positive face* refers to self-image and desire for approval.

Verbal violence occurs when either of these faces is violated—typically through labeling, judging, or attacking a person's identity, behavior, or beliefs (Santos, 2020d; Andrade & Fávero, 2015).

The seventh feature is the use of **doxical⁷ values**—common-sense beliefs that underpin ideological divisions between left and right political discourses. Charaudeau (1995) proposes the term *sociodiscursive imaginaries* to describe these shared systems of representation. Unlike traditional uses of *doxa*, which often imply uncritical consensus, Charaudeau emphasizes that stereotypes can express both truth and falsehood. A cliché may reduce complexity, but it also reflects real values and perceptions circulating in public discourse.

According to Charaudeau (2016), the **right-wing ideological matrix** is grounded in a belief in the natural order of things. This worldview sees inequalities as natural and immutable. It valorises:

- *Family*, seen as a hierarchical institution embedded in patriarchy.
- *Work*, structured as a vertical relationship between employers and employees.
- *Nation*, imagined as an inherited identity that justifies resistance against external threats.

This ideological stance often leads to attitudes such as:

- Conservatism (preserving family and labour traditions).
- Segregationism (dividing society by race, ethnicity, or religion).
- Patriarchalism (upholding naturalized hierarchies in education and social roles).

By contrast, the **left-wing ideological matrix**, as Charaudeau describes, assumes that humans are not bound by nature but can shape it. Inequalities are not seen as inherent but as constructed and therefore reversible. This matrix promotes:

- The deconstruction of social hierarchies and privileges.
- Solidarity across racial, ethnic, gender, and sexual divides.
- Secularism and the questioning of religious norms.
- Political contestation through unions and civil associations, all in pursuit of the common good.

Although these ideological frameworks manifest differently across specific texts—with varying intensity or in combination with other ideas—they become **radicalized** in the context of the RCW. In such cases, communication between opposing sides breaks down entirely (Santos, 2020a). This breakdown is precisely what we sought to observe in our analysis of Brazilian diplomatic discourse.

3.2 CATEGORIES OF THE BRAZILIAN TRADITIONAL DIPLOMATIC DISCOURSE

⁷ The concept of "doxa" is controversial. In accordance with the Plantin's (2018) *Dictionary of Argumentation*, the word presents a Greek etymological origin, meaning reputation, opinion, or something widely said about people or things. It is the majority representations broadcasted in the public sphere. This sense can also assume a negative perspective, leading to the idea of "cliché", "stereotype", "common place", etc. (Gracio, 2010). In a non-dogmatic approach of discourse analysis, though, there is no pejorative connotation of these words, due to the importance of the awareness of the *doxical* elements to understand the values enshrined in society (Amossy, 2018).

Taking into consideration the second research question enounced in the Section 1 ("How we can describe Amorim's interventions as conforming or not to the traditional diplomatic discourse of Brazil"), it is important to primarily understand the traits of this tradition. Considering the literature revised until here, such as Cervo and Bueno (2002), Doratioto and Vidigal (2014), and Bandeira (1998), for example, one could conclude that Brazilian diplomatic discourse is traditionally grounded in pragmatism, universalism, autonomy, and international insertion.

Pragmatism means, when it comes to foreign policy, establishing international relations with different actors in the world, even if it presents a government ideology opposed to the one's international partner. In the perspective of language, a pragmatic discourse may display concessive conjunctions, giving the idea of a flexible interlocutor, able to cede in the name of the success of a negotiation that could bring investments and development do the diplomat's country. It is important to highlight that "pragmatism" in international relations does not imply necessarily lack of values. For example, negotiating with an autocracy country doesn't signify contempt for democracy or human rights values, but flexibility to establish a cooperation that could bring benefits to both parts of an agreement.

The universalist foreign policy, in its turn, is a corollary of the pragmatic discourse, referring to a conception according to which, international relations of a country must be the larger as possible, not confined in a region, a group, or a specific political regime. This perspective has become traditional in Brazilian diplomatic discourse at least since Getúlio Varga's presidency in the 1930's, when he pended to both sides of the Second World War to bargain, until he finally decided to become part of the allies. Other important moments (not excluding others) of universalism in Brazilian foreign policy were the Juscelino Kubitschek's OPA (Pan American Operation, 1958), the Jânio Quadros' and after João Goulart's PEI (Independent Foreign Policy, 1961), and the Geisel's "ecumenic and responsible pragmatism" (1974).

An autonomous foreign policy, for its turn, means, as suggested by its name, a perspective according to which the negotiators must show independence in their action, mostly guided by their country's interests, and not aligned to a great power intention.

Finally, the desire for international insertion manifests the diplomat's concern of not being isolated in the world, which is materialized by their attitudes, for example, of mediating conflicts, participating in multilateral forums, cooperating to international institutions, and to the accomplishment of the principles of the international law.

This diplomatic paradigm of pragmatism, universalism, autonomy, and international insertion was observed during the most part of the Brazilian diplomatic history. Nonetheless, there were few moments in which Brazilian diplomatic discourse incorporated an ideological approach, revealing some aspects related to the Rhetoric of Culture Wars (RCW). This was the case of the immediate post Second World War context and the advent of the Cold War, when Gaspar Dutra was the Brazilian president, and Neves da Fontoura, his chancellor. The Brazilian foreign policy was turned to the interests of occidental nations winners of world conflict, especially the United States, in a posture known with the expression "automatic alignment". According to Doratioto and Vidigal (2014), symbols of this alignment were: a) the orientation from the Brazilian delegation at ONU to follow Washington's positions, even when it conflicted with Brazilian interests, such as closing its embassy in Popular China, supporting the intervention in the Greek civil war, voting favourably to the Resolution 377 of the UN General Assembly called "United for Peace" to displace troops commanded by the American general McArthur in the Korean peninsula; b) diplomatic relations rupture with the USSR in 1947; c) the closure of the Brazilian Communist Party, and opposition to communist regimes initiatives in the world, especially in Latin America; d) the advocacy of power equilibrium in South America; e) no resistance to the power structure conceived by the powerful nations (US, UK, France, Russia, and China), including their right to veto in the UN Security Council.

Another exception of the traditional pragmatism of the Brazilian diplomatic discourse was what historians name "course correction" (Cervo; Bueno, 2002) during the period right after the military coup d'état in 1964. The then President Castelo Branco and his chancellor Vasco Leitão da Cunha, followed by Juracy Magalhães, implanted in Brazil a foreign policy that even the next military presidents would interrupt in the future from 1967, with Costa e Silva. Doratioto and Vidigal (2014) highlight a paradigmatic moment of automatic alignment during Castelo Branco's government during the Dominican Republic crisis, in which Brazil corresponded to US's interests. There was a strong presence of left movements in the Caribbean country's political life,

motivating US direct invasion in 1965. The Organization of American States (OAS) approved the creation of an Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), under the Brazilian general Hugo Penasco Alvim's command. This situation created an environment of criticism in Brazil neighbour countries since Brazil was perceived as a US representative in the region. Besides, for ideological reasons, the diplomatic relations with Cuba were discontinued in 1964, and bilateral cooperation with Latin American countries was placed on the back burner (Bandeira, 1998). However, this coherent and servile Brazilian attitude didn't see its counterpart from the US or other occident power countries, in terms of aide to the Brazil development

5 PROCEDURES OF ANALYSIS

As stated in the Section 1, where we defined the *corpus* and the research questions, we analysed transcripts of 322 official interventions on the site of the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs. It comprises 20 years of speech of governments of different ideological spectrum, from the first Lula's mandate (January 2003) to the end of Bolsonaro's one (December 2022).

The variables of analysis, as depicted in Section 2, are based on specific theoretical categories, rendering it difficult to use a software during the process of describing the *corpus*, merely counting words or expressions. Consequently, it required reading every single text, and cataloguing them manually in a spreadsheet for a first quantitative analysis (before the qualitative one). For that, we elaborated the following legend⁸.

Legend				
Catalogue	Registration number of the speech in the catalogue saved in PDF			
Date	Date of the publication of the discourse			
Chancellor	The chancellor author of the speech			
RD	Rhetoric of Conspiracy	1 = yes	0 = no	
Dichot.	Dichotomization	1 = yes	0 = no	
VV	Verbal violence	1 = yes	0 = no	
Imag.	Imaginaries	1 = right	0 = esquerda	Null = without marks
Univ.	Universalism	1 = universalism	0 = occidentalism	Null = without marks
Prag.	Pragmatism	1 = pragmatism	0 = idealism	Null = without marks
Al.	Alignment	1 = alignment	0 = autonomy	Null = without marks
Int. inser.	Internation insertion	1 = yes	0 = isolation	Null = without marks
Access	Date of the last access to the speech			
Link	Electronic link to the official transcription of the speech			
Note: null (in red) = ambivalent text, presenting different aspects of a variable				

Table 1: Legend

Source: author's elaboration

Describing with more details the spreadsheet, we have:

a) Catalogue: we numbered every transcription of the speeches in a chronological order, so that they can be identified in a dossier with a security copy in PDF if the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs discontinues providing information on its side in the future.

b) Date: it refers to the date of the publication of the transcription, facilitating reference when it will be cited in a paper.

c) Chancellor: the minister of foreign affair author of the speech. Discriminating by chancellors, we can construct graphics comparing speeches among different public actors.

d) RC (Rhetoric of Conspiracy): we marked with the number 1 if there was this type of rhetoric in the speech, and with 0 if not, according to the theoretical assumptions we developed in the Section 2.

e) Dichot. (Dichotomisation): based on Amossy's (2014) criteria explained in the Section 2, we scored 1 if there was a presence of this constant of the Rhetoric of Culture Wars, and 0 if not.

f) VV (Verbal violence): according to Brown and Levinson's (1997) categories, we marked 1 for the presence of verbal violence, and 0 for not.

g) Imag. (Imaginaries): we noted 0 for left wing imaginaries, 1 for right, and null if there weren't objective signs of any of them, considering the Charaudeau's (2005) criteria, portrayed in Section 2.

⁸ The reproduction of the entire spreadsheet is in the Annex.

h) Univ. (Universalism): if the chancellor's speech presented a universalist foreign policy conception, we marked 1; if, on the contrary, his intervention was westernising, we marked 0.

i) Prag. (Pragmatism): we scored 1 for a pragmatic discourse, and 0 for an ideological one.

j) Al. (Alignment): we marked 1 for a discourse that presented automatic alignment to a great power, disdaining national interests, and 0 for an autonomous discourse.

k) Int. inser. (International insertion): we scored 1 for speeches that show a chancellor's desire to participate in the international society, and 0 if, conversely, he demonstrated an isolationist perspective.

l) Access: the date of the access to the transcription of the speech, so we can protect ourselves in case of future amendment of the text.

m) Link: the electronic link to the transcription of the speech, so that academic peers can verify the original source.

n) Null (in red): since some discourses were ambivalent, presenting contradictory traits, rendering impossible an objective classification, we decided to discriminate these interventions in red.

6 RESULTS

As stated in the Section 1, in this article we are focusing on the results related to Amorim's speeches. Before that, it is important to contextualize his arrival to his post. Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim, who was born in Santos in 1942, is a professor, researcher, and Brazilian career diplomat affiliated with the Party of the Workers (PT) (Domingos, 2009). In 1965 he graduated from Instituto Rio Branco (IRBr), the institution conceived to prepare career diplomats in Brazil, and, in 1967, he graduated in International Relations from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. He was Portuguese Language professor at the IRBr in 1976, and Political Science and International Relations professor at the Universidade de Brasília (UnB) from 1977 to 1979 (BRASIL, s.d.).


Between 1995 and 2003, Amorim was a Brazilian representative in many international organizations, in a large variety of themes, from the multilateral commerce system to humanitarian cooperation. In 1995, the then president of the Republic Fernando Henrique Cardoso nominated Amorim to command the Brazilian Permanent Mission in the United Nations, in New York, a function that would be accomplished in 1999. During this period, he assumed the presidency of the UN Security Council, having an essential role in the discussions related to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime (Brasil, s.d.). He actively joined the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapon (Sampaio, 2012). Besides, it was during Amorim's representation at UN that Brazil signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1997). In 1998, Amorim was one of the negotiators of the New Agenda Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament (NAC) (Souza, 2013).

From 2003 to 2010, Amorim was the Lula's chancellor (the time on which we focus in this paper), being responsible for a humanist direction of the Brazilian foreign policy, which includes fighting against hungry, poverty, and unilateralism (Brasil, s.d.). He formulated coalitions with the southern hemisphere countries, such as G-20 (for the reduction of the agriculture commercial distortions at the WTO); G-4 (attempt to turn the UN Security Council more legitimate and representative); G-3 (Forum IBAS – India, Brazil, and South Africa – for coordinating positions in the international scenery); institutionalization of the BRIC (originally Brazil, Russia, India, China), for cooperation in different fields; South America-Africa Summit (ASA); and South America-Arab Countries Summit (ASPA) (Entrevista, 2010).

On October 7th, 2009, David Rothkopf, a columnist for the American magazine Foreign Policy, indicated Amorim as the best chancellor in the world (Rothkopf, 2009). On October 29th, 2010, the Brazilian diplomat received in Miami the prize "Bravo Business", conceded by the Latin Trade magazine, in the category "Innovative Leader of the Year" (Amorim, 2010).

On August 4th, 2011, Amorim was invited to succeed Nelson Jobim as a minister of defence, during Dilma Rousseff's presidency, staying in this function until 2015 (Jobim, 2011). After Lula's ascension to power in 2023, Amorim has been the commander of the Special Advisory of the Republic Presidency, becoming one of main Lula's counsellor (Mazui, 2023).

Regarding the period from 2003 to 2010, when Amorim was Lula's chancellor, the analysis of the *corpus* showed that this diplomat didn't encompass Rhetoric of Culture Wars. In fact, there was no occurrence of Rhetoric of Conspiracy, dichotomisation, and verbal violence, as shown in the Graphic 1:



Graph 1: Variables of analyses

Source: author's elaboration

In relation to dichotomisation, we could even find a counterexample, emphasizing an opposition to this type of rhetoric. It was the Amorim's intervention on September 03rd, 2007, during the Ministerial Meeting about Environment and Sustainability in Brasília:

It is a pleasure for me to welcome you to Rio de Janeiro. The initial idea of this Meeting arose from a conversation I had with Minister Marina Silva about improving international environmental governance.

We understood that we could contribute to the advancement of the discussions by inviting to an open and informal dialogue our fellow Ministers from countries that have been actively involved in these debates, as well as senior United Nations officials.

In our view, this Meeting should mark the beginning of a process of approximation of positions. *Our goal is to contribute to the discussion becoming less polarized* and to point out more clearly the possible paths [...] (Catalogue 31, Annex, our italics, our translation).

One perceives in this extract an explicit opposition to dichotomisation, when Amorim calls for a less polarized discussion. According to Villar (2006), this is the tone and the posture that one expects in general about the diplomatic discourse: open, flexible, non-dogmatic, showing a disposition to argue and to change the one's own opinion.

It is important to distinct between what Amossy (2014) calls antagonization and dichotomisation. The former is inherent in any type of dispute, relating to a specific opposition between two points of view in a concrete topic. Dichotomisation, on the contrary, refers to a general scission that determines *a priori* both sides of the culture wars in different topics. The following extract is a sample of antagonization. It refers to the Amorim's intervention in a G-90 meeting on July 13th, 2004, in Republic of Mauritius:

[...] We understand the hopes and concerns of each of us. We see trade as a vehicle for economic and social development. We had no past colonialism. We never exercised colonial rule. Paternalism and condescension are not part of our worldview. In view of our common starting points, we dispense with third party mediation to communicate.


Traditionally, the benefits of free trade have been enjoyed in areas where developed countries have maintained comparative advantages, such as the manufacturing industry and sophisticated services. But when it comes to areas of special interest to developing countries - such as agriculture - the argument of comparative advantage no longer holds - the logic of free trade being reversed. Instead of being compensated for their competitiveness, efficient agricultural exporters from the South are punished with a system of exceptions and Waivers that deprives them of trade opportunities crucial to their development. Those familiar with GATT and the WTO are unfortunately aware that the areas in which developing countries have a strong production and export capacity - such as textiles, steel, and

agriculture - are the same that have been subject to derogations and special schemes for decades [...].
(Catalogue 4, Annex, our translation).

This kind of opposition is not the one that characterizes the dichotomy related to the RCW, but an antagonization that only establish a division in a specific topic, that is, the dispute amid rich and poor countries, post-colonized and post-colonialist nations. Amorim supposes (but in a subtle way to avoid unnecessary conflicts) a hypocrisy of rich countries that use the economic concept of “comparative advantage” (Mankiw, 2009) to advocate the opening of poor countries market to manufactured products, but, reversing the argument, adopting protectionist actions (Lima, 2018) when it comes to open rich countries market to primary goods.

This emphasis on the inequalities in global market could be explained by the conditions of the auditorium, the G-90, an alliance among the poorest and smallest developing countries, many of them part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Brazil is not a member of this group, but, being invited to join this specific meeting, there was maybe a concern to emphasize in the Brazilian chancellor’s speech the estimated themes of these countries. Nonetheless, Amorim’s argument cannot solely be attributed to the conditions of the auditorium; it also appears to stem from his prevailing leftist perspective, commonly defending the oppressed or weaker part of a social relation, as seen with Charaudeau (2016) in the Section 2.

Considering the Graphic 1, only 40% of the speeches were scored as being bluntly leftist. Nonetheless, if we analyse the other 60% of the speeches, all were marked as not showing explicit traits of ideological discourse, and 0%, then, was considered as right-wing, as represented in the Graphic 2.



Graph 2: Political ideology

Source: author’s elaboration

An example of a left-wing discourse is the Amorim’s speech during the solemnity of the transmission of the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 2nd January 2003, in Brasília.

With the election of President Lula, the Brazilian people expressed unequivocally the desire to see a profound political and social reform carried out, within a peaceful and *democratic framework*, with *broad popular participation* in the conduct of state affairs. Consistent with the aspirations expressed at the polls, Brazil will have a foreign policy focused on development and peace, which will seek to *reduce the gap between rich and poor nations*, promote respect for *equality among peoples* and the effective *democratization of the international system*. A foreign policy that is an essential element of everyone’s effort to improve the living conditions of our people, and that is based on the same ethical, *humanistic and social justice principles* that will be present in all the actions of the Lula Government. [...]

Foreign policy is not only the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry, or even the Government. It involves society as a whole. To define the national interest in each concrete situation, *I will force coordination with other governmental bodies and with the various social sectors* - workers, entrepreneurs, intellectuals - and civil society entities. [...]


The Brazilian people gave a great demonstration of self-esteem by expressing their belief in the ability to *creatively change reality*. We must take this posture of responsible and confident activism to the plane of external relations. [...]

Despite the uncomfortably tight timeframes of some of these negotiations, *we intend to discuss broadly* with entrepreneurs, workers, and other social sectors and with the National Congress the positions we must take, in view of the wide range of interests involved and the complex articulations that are necessary, starting with the MERCOSUR. [...]

Fundamental to the recovery of MERCOSUR is the revitalization of the Economic-Social Forum. We must also promote the Joint Parliamentary Committee *to strengthen the participation of society* in the integration process [...] (Catalogue 1, Annex, our italics, our translation).

One perceives the mobilization of estimated values of this ideological perspective, according to the criteria explained in the Section 2 such as: a) the value of democracy in general and popular participation; b) egalitarianism, concreted, for example, in the advocacy for reduction of disparities among nations, and for social justice; c) humanistic values; d) horizontalization of social relationships; e) progressive concept of changing the *status quo*; f) willingness to discuss and to change one's own opinion.

Regarding the variable “universalism”, to answer the question 2 mentioned in the Section 1 (trying to understand if the Brazilian diplomat followed or not Brazil traditional diplomatic discourse), the analysis of Amorim's speeches showed that he actually encompassed a universal conception, one of the traits of that tradition, as seen in the Section 2.



Graph 3: Universalist discourse

Source: author's elaboration

In fact, the Graphic 3 portrays that 73,33% of all Amorim's speeches presented a universalist foreign policy conception, 26,67% didn't show any trace of it, and no intervention defended the “occidental” perspective. The Amorim's intervention on April 25th, 2008, at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) for engineer researchers displays this universalism.

[...] *Brazil has a universalist vocation*, which is reflected in our ability to articulate in the *most varied forums* and with *countries of different characteristics*. By diversifying our partnerships, we open opportunities for joint political action, expansion of our exports, increased cooperation, and a fertile and unprepared exchange of ideas.

Developing countries were primarily responsible for the extraordinary *increase in our foreign trade*. Today, these countries buy around 55% of Brazilian exports, most of manufactured products. There was an inversion, of historical importance and proportions, because traditionally developed countries were always the ones who bought the most from Brazil.

An important step was the *resumption of our African policy*. President Lula, who has visited the continent eight times, has returned Africa to the central place it should always have in Brazilian foreign policy. We strengthen and, in some cases, create bilateral ties with a significant number of African

countries, including naturally the partners of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, created under the inspiration of José Aparecido de Oliveira. We currently have cooperation projects in almost all African sub-regions. Embrapa has opened an office in Accra and Fiocruz is expected to do the same in Maputo. [...] (Catalogue 46, Annex, our italics, our translation).

The Brazilian diplomat states clearly his universalist policy in the first paragraph, and then list some examples of the concrete actions related to it, such as: a) articulation in different forums in a large variety of countries; b) expansion of exportations, mainly to developing countries; c) recovery of the foreign policy with Africa.

Another example of a universalist foreign policy ideology is the Amorim's speech at the High-Level Seminary of the CEPAL⁹ 33rd Period of Sessions on 31st May 2010.


[...] More recently, we have dedicated ourselves deeply to a broader integration of all Latin America and the Caribbean, with intense participation, I believe, of almost everyone present here, and with this we founded, after the first meeting of Sauípe, but now already in Cancún, as Alicia reminded us, we founded CELAC, the entity that brings together all the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

It is worth saying, *this posture has no confrontational spirit*. In the same period, we have increased our relationship with the European Union, we have increased our relationship with the US. But, of course, without knowing that Latin America and the Caribbean is our largest home and South America, that closest home. By the way, I remember that once a Brazilian journalist, some time ago, maybe six years ago, asked me: "Minister, why do you pay so much attention to South America and Latin America?" And then I said, "Why do I live here. If I lived elsewhere, I would pay attention to another place, but I live here! So this is where I have to take care of, here I have to see if the plumbing is working, if the walls are good, if the doors are even better than the walls, unlike what would happen if I lived elsewhere. [...] (Catalogue 81, Annex, our italics, our translation).

In this extract Amorim reinterprets the notion of regionalism by affirming that the increase of relations in the region (Latin American and Caribe) is not a confrontation posture to other types of relations since Brazil has also increased its relations in the United States and in Europe.

Pragmatism, another constant of the Brazilian traditional diplomatic discourse, was also presented in Amorim's speeches. Although we observed 36,67% of its occurrence, there was no idealist discourse detected, that is, in international relations, speeches that emphasize ideological aspects of foreign policy.

⁹ The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, UNECLAC or CEPAL in Spanish and Portuguese), is a United Nations regional commission to encourage economic cooperation. It was established in 1948 and is part of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).



Graph 4: Pragmatic discourse

Source: author's elaboration


One case of pragmatic discourse was the Amorim's conference in the FIESP (Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo) Foreign Trade Council Meeting, on November 18th, 2005.

[...] *Every market is market and must be disputed.* A clear illustration of this is the attitude of the American agricultural sectors of food production towards Cuba. They always seek to loosen the embargo to sell. They don't miss an opportunity; they go to everyone. Here when we think: why will you bother with Angola if you have others?

But an interesting fact, which is not even part of our priorities, I would even say that it is not even a priority, but look, for example, Central America and the Caribbean. Today we export more than three billion dollars, from January to September. I mean, at the end of the year it should be 3,700, something out there. This was to illustrate a bit the pragmatic, *non-ideological sense*, say, of all these postures that drive Brazilian foreign policy and that have brought concrete results [...]. (Catalogue 12, Annex, our italics, our translation).

In this lecture, when Amorim states that every market should be conquered, he assumes a pragmatic view, according to which it does not matter the type or the ideology of a certain government of a country if it can provide a market for Brazilian products. Amorim illustrates his proposition with the attitude of agriculture sectors in North America that fight against Cuba embargo (Setor, 2015). He also enhances his argument citing the increase of Central American and Caribbean trade with Brazil, a partner that was not a priority for the latter, but that has brought concrete results anyway.

The next constant of the Brazilian traditional diplomatic discourse is autonomy in foreign policy, as detailed in the Section 2. Regarding Amorim's speeches, 81,11% of them were considered as mobilizing this tendency, while no presence of an automatic alignment was observed (Graphic 5).




Graph 5: Discourse of autonomy

Source: author's elaboration

Another part of the already cited Amorim's inaugurated ceremony on 2nd January 2003 is a pattern of the autonomous discourse perspective. Here he demonstrates autonomy when he affirms that it is the Brazilian choice what model of development to follow:

[...] We will know how to articulate, without prejudice, with the nations that share our interests and concerns. We will act at every moment guided by the need to ensure the *compatibility of what is being proposed with national policies*. We will strive to preserve the space of flexibility so that *we can decide, sovereignly, which development model suits us the most* (Catalogue 1, Annex, our italics, our translation).

The last variable of the Brazilian traditional diplomatic discourse to be analysed here is the desire for international insertion. We found that 93,33% of all Amorim's speeches had an emphasis on this willingness, and no intervention showed an isolationist discourse, as seen in the Graphic 6.



Graph 6: International insertion

Source: author's elaboration

A sample of this major tendency was observed in another part of the already cited G90 Ministerial Meeting, on 13th July 2004.

[...] In São Paulo and Georgetown, I had the opportunity to emphasize the possibilities of releasing great potential of South-South trade through free trade agreements and preferential agreements. Among others, he had in mind the ongoing process of association between MERCOSUR and the countries of the Andean Pact, which has allowed us to develop additional innovative modalities of special and differential treatment in favour of smaller and weaker economies. I have unequivocally indicated that we will examine the possibilities of further reproducing or improving these mechanisms in our business relations with other developing partners around the world. I understand that South Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have been developing an important network of trade agreements with other African countries in a similar spirit. We understand the hopes and concerns of each of us. We see trade as a vehicle for economic and social development. We had no past colonists. We never exercised colonial rule. Paternalism and condescension are not part of our worldview. In view of our common starting points, we dispense with the mediation of third parties to communicate [...] (Catalogue 4, Annex, our translation).

Amorim highlights here his disposition to manage global affairs, opening possibilities to South-South cooperation, without rich countries tutelage (a posture which is also conformed to an autonomous international political conception). This point of view could not be exclusively explained by the conditions of the auditorium, composed of the 90 poorest countries, since Amorim stressed this perspective in many other occasions, as displayed in the Graphic 6.

7 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we presented part of our research related to the analysis of the Rhetoric of Culture Wars in Brazilian diplomatic discourse. The entire investigation verified 20 years of all chancellor's official speeches, from the first Lula's government to the Bolsonaro's one. However, this article focuses on Amorim's interventions (from 2003 to 2010). Our goal is to understand which categories of the Rhetoric of Culture Wars explained in the Section 2 are observed or not in the minister's discourse, and in what manner; and how we can describe Amorim's conferences as conformed or not to the Brazilian traditional diplomatic discourse, also characterized in the Section 2.

Since the variables of analysis are based on specific theoretical framework, rendering difficult to use a software that, for example, scores the number of words or expressions, we had to read every single transcription and then catalogue the constants found, a procedure that is described in the Section 3.

The results of the analysis show that Amorim's speeches couldn't be classified as related to the variables of the Rhetoric of Culture Wars. In fact, there are no Rhetoric of Conspiracy, dichotomisation, and verbal violence, but he clearly encompasses a left political ideology. Regarding the Brazilian traditional diplomatic discourse, Amorim can be considered as one of its representatives, since he tended to adopt a universalist, pragmatic, autonomous, and participative perspective of foreign policy.

We hope to contribute, even with a very specific theme, to progress knowledge associated with the Brazilian diplomatic discourse, maybe still little explored in language sciences field, considering the literature we were able to document until here. We also aim to shed light on the contemporary history of Brazilian diplomacy, whose performance is essential to promote national development, and, consequently, improve Brazilians lives.

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