CONTRACTING, EXPANDING AND INTEGRATING TRANSLATION: WHO AND WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE?

CONTRATANDO, AMPLIANDO E INTEGRANDO A TRADUÇÃO: QUEM E ONDE DESENHAR A LINHA?

CONTRATACIÓN, AMPLIACIÓN E INTEGRACIÓN DE LA TRADUCCIÓN: ¿QUIÉN Y DÓNDE DIBUJAR LA LÍNEA?

Sinead Kwok*
The University of Hong Kong

ABSTRACT: This paper looks into the many-sided debate on the definition and thus delimitation of translation, extending over a generalized conception of translation as interlingual meaning transfer, a linguistically-centered expansion of translation, a modal orientation of translation, as well as a semiotic reform of translation. It is contended that the many ‘expansionist’ attempts at redefining translation, albeit bringing about a refreshing departure from the rigid, traditional concept at first blush, are either still predisposed to the translation myth (a manifestation of the language myth), or reliant on decontextualization and depersonalization. An integrationist critique on some major trends in the redefinition of translation will be offered in this paper, as well as an introduction to an integrationist view on translation.

KEYWORDS: Integrationism. Translation. Hermeneutics. Semiotics

RESUMO: Este artigo analisa o debate multifacetado sobre a definição e, portanto, a delimitação de tradução. Expandimos para uma concepção ampla de tradução como transferência de significado interlingual, uma expansão linguisticamente centrada da tradução, uma orientação modal da tradução, bem como uma reforma semiótica da tradução. Argumenta-se que as muitas tentativas ‘expansionistas’ de redefinir a tradução, embora trazendo um afastamento do conceito rígido e tradicional à primeira vista, estão centradas no mito da tradução (uma manifestação do mito da linguagem), ou dependem de descontextualização e

* Postgraduate student pursuing a PhD degree at the University of Hong Kong. Her research interests lie in integrationism/integrational semiotics, semiotics, philosophies of language and translation theories. Sinead is currently working on her thesis project in which she hopes to present an unprecedented, integrationist critique of Western translation theories. E-mail: mts0402@connect.hku.hk.
despersonalização. Uma crítica integracionista sobre algumas das principais tendências na redefinição da tradução será oferecida neste artigo, bem como uma introdução a uma visão integracionista da tradução.


RESUMEN: Este artículo analiza el debate multifacético sobre la definición y, por lo tanto, la delimitación de la traducción, extendiéndose sobre una concepción generalizada de la traducción como transferencia de significado interlingüístico, una expansión de la traducción centrada en la lingüística, una orientación modal de la traducción, así como una reforma semiótica de traducción. Se sostiene que los muchos intentos ‘expansionistas’ de redefinir la traducción, aunque a primera vista provocan un cambio refrescante del concepto tradicional y rígido, todavía están predispuestos al mito de la traducción (una manifestación del mito del lenguaje), o dependen de descontextualización y despersonalización. En este artículo se ofrecerá una crítica integracionista sobre algunas de las principales tendencias en la redefinición de la traducción, así como una introducción a una visión integracionista de la traducción.


1 INTRODUCTION: THE INSTITUTIONALIZED, LAY CONCEPTION OF TRANSLATION

It may seem that from time immemorial, a certain impression of translation has held sway: This impression, often referred to as the common or proper conception of translation or as Reynolds (2016, p.18) puts it, "translation in the true sense of the word", is characterized by a general picture of meaning transference between two texts, each written in a specific language. Translation is thus seen as a process which engenders or a product which emerges out of a relationship of equivalence between two languages. The preponderance of this impression does not dwindle even with the proliferation of academic theories on the malleable and protean nature of translation, or 'translationality', which has come to subsume linguistic (and/or non-linguistic) exchanges that do not fulfil the aforementioned translation criteria.

This unyielding impression, termed by Reynolds as Translation Rigidly Conceived (2016, p.18), is what the integrationist Roy Harris (2011) would call a manifestation of the translation myth, an assumption that "[…] we cannot translate until we have identified two languages, one to translate from and one to translate into. The languages come first, and translation is a secondary operation which presupposes them" (HARRIS, 2011, p.85). The myth also requires that "[…] some expressions belonging to different languages, although differing in form, need not differ in sense" (p.86), such that the meaning of a text can travel across languages. Proceeding with an integrationist view, the translation myth is part and parcel of the language myth (HARRIS, 1981, p.9), which perpetuates the conception of languages as first-order, sharply delineated codes within or between which communication takes place in the form of thought/content/meaning transfer. Harris summarizes it thus: translation projected as "[…] a process intrinsically dependent on the decontextualised matching of one fixed code with another, is itself the translator's version of the language myth" (HARRIS, 2011, p.149). There is indeed an inextricable tie between translation and the codification of language, especially in the Westernized world: translation reinforces linguistic boundaries and standardization, whereas languages are standardized in a way which promotes interlingual translationality, i.e., the compilation of grammatical categories and rules which are comparable across languages. This to a large degree resonates with Reynolds' remark on "Translation Rigidly Conceived", which "[…] needs standard languages so badly that, when it doesn't find them ready-made, it joins in the process of creating them" (REYNOLDS, 2016, p.21). Translation, itself a pliable and amorphous substance, as well as the language(s) involved in a translation process, almost always returns to a mold that forms the translation process into a readily describable one which transpires between two readily describable language codes. It seems as if translation is needed to be this way – but needed by whom?

One answer is the practitioners. As translation has come to be institutionalized, some would concur that translation now exists as a "social entity" (HERMANS, 1995, p.5) or a "social practice" (PYM, 1995, p.158) which has assumed a determinate nature transparent to the public, as required by an institution. Hermans speaks of this as the ‘public face’ of translation: "The meaning of ‘translation’ is codified in dictionaries, there are professional activities called translation, we have organizations representing
translators, institutes for translator training, etc. It is this ‘public face’ of translation that I have in mind when I speak of translation as ‘institution’ (HERMANS, 1995, p.5).

Alongside institutionalization is the professionalization of translation and hence the monopolization of its definition. Requirements for equivalence, fidelity, accuracy, etc. are set, proclaimed and maintained by relevant authorities “[...] In the interest of sharpening a given professional profile and safeguarding their members’ expert status” (POCHHACKER, 2019, p.60). A proper definition of translation, premised on equivalence meticulously obtained between two highly structuralized language codes, paints (proper) translation as a marked, intellectual form of engagement exclusive to specialists. To maintain this exclusivity is to keep an eye on the remit of (proper) translation. That being said, with institutionalization also comes commercialization. This means that whoever the translation is for also contributes to the reinforcement of the translation ideal. In this spirit, Pöchhacker (2019, p.60) claims that the clients or other stakeholders involved in the translation business also “[...] wield the power of definition and labelling themselves”. In a similar vein, Hill-Madsen and Zethsen (2016, p.694) equate “the perspective of translation as an institution” with that of “the translation consumer”, in which “[...] the scholarly debate about the (im)possibility of equivalence in translation is irrelevant, because equivalence is generally what external stakeholders expect”. This ties in with another answer to the question of whose interests the translation myth serves.

This other answer is the lay non-specialists. Van Doorslaer (2019, p.222), for instance, refers to the non-specialists’ view of translation as one predicated on “[...] the illusion that languages are equivalent, interchangeable tools and that it is possible to change only the language”. Apart from the translation consumers who approach translation as a means to an end (focus mainly on the guaranteed result of translation and its practical value, rather than on how the translation process actually pans out), the lay public also includes individuals who just do not feel the need to claim an expert status or to reflect on how much translation they partake in on a daily basis, who are happy to simply take translation ‘at face value’ and end up perpetuating the translation myth themselves. This complacency is further encouraged by the advent of machine translation, the proliferation of speedy translation tools online whose layout easily streamlines any translation process normally carried out by a translating individual by filtering out the translating persons and activities involved in translation, and finally “[...] reduces translation to a by-product of equivalent languages” (GAMBIER, 2016, p.889). Adding to all this is the lay, extensive use of the translation ideal as a metaphor, which has been applied to fields “as diverse as psychoanalysis, anthropology, sociology, media and communication theory, medicine, and genetics” where ‘translation’ assumes a central role (GULDIN, 2016). The inter-code, transferential nature of proper, ideal translation serves a wide range of theoretical purposes by facilitating easier comprehension of elusive processes studied by the quoted fields. The metaphorical conveniency amounts to all the more reason for the general public to retain a proper definition of translation from which metaphorical uses can be derived.

Thus an ostensible rift has formed between academia and the ‘actual world’ of translational practices: Translation scholars, on the one hand, show a predilection for broadening the term ‘translation’ and expanding the object of study in the discipline; on the other hand, the “outside world”, formed by the translation industry as well as people not even remotely involved in any translation business, continues to delimit translation to “an apparently simple practice” of interlingual transfer (VAN DOORSLAER, 2019, p.228). Within academia, translation scholars call for a revision of the classic translation typology imputed to Jakobson (2012 [1959]) which has long centralized interlingual translation (what Jakobson declares as translation proper) and pushed intralingual and intersemiotic translation to the periphery, thus creating a chasm between “translation in the proper sense” and “translation in the figurative sense” as pointed out by his critics such as Derrida (1992 [1985], p.226). The aim of translation researchers in the recent decades lies in unsettling the preset boundary between proper and metaphorical, between professional and unprofessional, between pure and applied translation, etc. Their research thus involves the expansion of the concept of translation, or more specifically, the reflection on the interconnections between different forms of translation (whether or not they are traditionally regarded as proper translations) and their respective ontological primacy.

What do these translation revolutionaries ultimately seek in their academic endeavors? Reynolds, for one, claims to render a fuller picture of translation that is somehow off limits to actual translation practitioners and the lay population who remains unaware of their own translational activities without this scholastic enlightenment. According to Reynolds (2016, p.3), those fixated on the narrow definition of translation as an interlingual activity rooted in faithfulness basically “shut out the complexities that make the
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subject interesting”, for they “stake a claim but don’t explore the territory”. If most translation revolutionaries concur with this statement, it means that the expansion project of theirs is not just some armchair reasoning but is instead an empirical exploration. The extended concept of translation is proclaimed to capture the essence of translation which has for long been veiled, even if it goes beyond the ambit of the non-intellectuals.

How does an integrationist weigh in on all this? This is what this chapter sets out to discuss. While certainly taking issue with the translation myth frequently ascribed to the ‘general public’ by translation scholars, it is argued here that the integrationist approach departs from a majority of ‘expansionist’ claims on translation, which either still subscribe to the very myth that they impugn or contribute to the depersonalization and decontextualization of translation. An integrationist would propose that the translation myth, the closely associated language myth, and the underlying assumptions about the interrelations between speech, writing and language(s) be laid bare and thoroughly perused. In fact, the integrationist prioritizes this investigation over the need to reach any decision between “semantic continuity” – the thesis that the academic definition of ‘translation’ can and should be extended to the lay population in order to rectify the rigid, traditional concept of translation – and “semantic discontinuity” - which holds that the gap between the academic and the industrial/lay definitions is simply unbridgeable (HARRIS, 2005, p.75). In terms of structure, this chapter will look into three types of expansionist claims on translation, each premised on some rumination about the relationship between translation and a certain subject which comes to shape what translation is/can be: (1) The linguistic expansion of translation; (2) the modal expansion of translation; (3) the semiotic expansion of translation. Each type will constitute a section of its own. Integrationist reflections will be included in each section, as well as in a concluding section that follows.

2 RETHINKING LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION

2.1 BILINGUALISM AND INTERLINGUAL TRANSLATION

A very first step on the revolutionary path is to question the technically confined, professionalized vision of interlingual translation and how realistic this vision is. Against proper interlingual translation, Brian Harris (1977, p.99) first coined the term “natural translation” to refer to “[…] translation done by bilinguals in everyday circumstances and without special training for it”. B. Harris’ original contention was that untrained bilinguals all engage in translation/interpretation to some degree, which entailed that translation studies should not only cover interlingual translation on paper, but also in reality, carried out ‘naturally’ between non-specialists. Later on, Harris was to further his claim and propose that translation studies should not only take natural translation into consideration but should instead treat natural translation as the basis. The argument is that a study of natural translation points towards the most basic form of translation, the innate third skill of bilinguals, on which more professionalized interlingual translations can be explained (HARRIS, 1992, p.101). The basis of the argument lies in the common nature of natural translation as well as its ontological precedence: B. Harris and Bianca Sherwood (1978, p.155) emphasize that while everyday communication is enabled by natural translation, professional translation merely constitutes a fraction of the totality of translational activities, a portion too meagre to be recognized as the essence of translation. This is echoed by Pérez-González and Susam-Saraeva, who state that due to its paucity in contrast to natural translation, “[…] professional translation becomes merely one sub-type of translation, rather than the norm-setting, prototypical form” (PÉREZ-GONZÁLEZ; SARAEVA, 2012, p.157). Grbic´ and Kujamäki (2019, p.114) provide another line of argument, reminding readers of how natural translation preceded (and still continues to influence) professionalized translation:

The binary distinction between ‘professional’ and ‘non-professional’ spheres of translation and interpreting has a further implication. It does not only camouflage or exclude a herd of ‘elephants in the room’, it also obscures the fact that translation and interpreting activities have always been carried out not only on an ad hoc basis, but also in a more or less organised manner, well before the onset of modern professionalisation tendencies.
Sustaining the rationale behind 'natural translation' studies is Koskinen's extension of Holz-Mänttäri's (1984) concept of tarnslatorisches Handeln (translatorial action) to cover a broad range of translational events across languages, without confining the concept to professional translation (KOSKINEN, 2014, p.187). While the naturalization movement may not be the newest trend in translation studies, it is nonetheless still pertinent up to these days.

A retort to the naturalization approach undermines it with the 'reflex vs reflexivity' distinction. Hans G. Hönig stands as a representative: Arguing against B. Harris and Sherwood, Hönig (1995) alludes to what he claims as one decisive difference between so-called 'natural translation' and 'professional' translation – that the former marks out only unconscious actions of human reflexes and the latter marks out actions with conscious reflexivity and thus controlled decision-making involved. Taking it from here, it seems plausible to then preserve the authority invested in professional translation and seek the essence of translation from it, by highlighting the importance of translational consciousness and reflexivity. This reflex-reflexivity opposition is also supposed to drive a theoretical wedge between bilingualism and translation – thus explains Hönig's (1995, p.26) reference to B. Harris and Sherwood as merely 'bilingualism researchers' separated from the proper field of translation.

An integrationist is not so much concerned to give an answer to whether there is any essential, substantial gap between bilingualism (or multilingualism) and interlingual ('proper') translation or to whether the former or the latter better encapsulates the essence of translation, as bemused by how a quest for the true foundations of translation ends up being a debate between these two constructs. The integrational analysis of this debate starts with a stance which holds that the study of 'natural translation' of bilinguals, in the way B. Harris and Sherwood propose, does not unveil the basics of translation. This is not to position the integrationist on Hönig's side either – rather, an integrationist account does not countenance the setting up of a 'reflex-vs-reflexivity' divide between bi-/multilingualism and interlingual translation. In other words, an integrationist question to ask Hönig would be why lay persons' engagement with multiple languages necessarily involves any less consciousness of the languages concerned, less reflexivity on any translationality between these languages, or any less controlled decision-making in their daily navigation within and between languages. The fact that professional translators more often than not have to lay claim to producing more informed and structured translations than lay people has nothing to do with the amount of reflexivity involved. It may even be a nebulous question to ask how much reflexivity pertains in professional and non-professional translational activities. In terms of linguistic reflexivity (language about language), no clear distinction between constructed concepts such as bilingualism and interlingual translation can actually obtain: both require one's conception of second-order languages to explain the relevant linguistic happenings, and these languages are "[...] products of reflection on languaging brought into being by and through languaging about languaging" (LOVE, 2017, p.117) i.e. through linguistic reflexivity. In the end bi-/multilingualism and interlingual translationality are inextricable concepts – you cannot have one without the other. This much is particularly evident in the European context, as Harris (1980, p.4) also remarks on how a European, having been raised in a multilingual environment (which makes the European at least aware of languages other than her/his own), readily accepts the translational property of languages, which is in no way "[...] something which could plausibly be said to be intuitively obvious". As a case in contrast, "[a]n isolated monoglot community having only the most tenuous contacts with its linguistically alien neighbours would have no reason for supposing that languages were in principle translatable" (p.4). In a nutshell, a bi-/multilingual "[...] concept of a language is one which thus intrinsically accommodates the principle of translatability" (p.5). A takeaway from this is that neither the concept of languages nor the concept of translation/translationality are intuitively available – instead, both concepts contribute to the construction of each other as well as co-construct the generalized notions of bi-/multilingualism and interlingual translation. Languages [count] and translationality are conceptually tangled, thus the same goes between bilingualism and interlingual translation. The integrationist's refusal to see natural bilingual translation as the key to access the rudiments of translation stems not from an attempt to segregate the two (e.g. Hönig's thesis) but from an awareness of the close associations between the two. Put in a more explicit manner, bi-/multilingualism and interlingual translation are both entrenched in the language myth and rely on a highly codified, streamlined vision of translation. As long as this vision is maintained, translation scholars are not going any deeper into the depths of translationality than before by investigating 'natural bilingual translation' rather than 'professionalized interlingual translation'. Both of these categories presuppose an unequivocal identity of a bilingual based on an unequivocal status of languages. A code-based understanding of translation i.e. one that starts with codes as the basis easily paints an abstract, misleading picture of translation which presents codes as first-order phenomena in the translation process. To probe into the basics of translation is to do away with this 'code filter'.

2.2 INTRALINGUAL AND INTERLINGUAL TRANSLATION

Translation revolutionaries gradually realize that something more has to be done than instigating a ‘naturalist’ turn – more specifically, to subvert the age-long notion of translation as a meaning transfer between languages is to query whether the existence of two distinct languages is indeed a *sine qua non* condition for translation and more importantly, to delve into what qualifies as a ‘language’ even if academics are to accommodate the common vision of translation. This inquiry sparks off a series of comparisons between intralingual and interlingual translation in the search for a common denominator in both kinds of translation which points toward the ultimate basis of translation. In this sense, translation thus becomes a root concept more general than interlingual translation, which is but one form of translation germinated by an underlying basis of translationality.

The common denominator in both intra- and interlingual translations is often claimed to be the concept of a barrier. Steiner (1992, p.29) hints at the potential linkage between the translational operations across languages and within one language:

> The schematic model of translation is one in which a message from a source-language passes into a receptor-language via a transformational process. The barrier is the obvious fact that one language differs from the other, that an interpretive transfer, sometimes, albeit misleadingly, described as encoding and decoding, must occur so that the message ‘gets through’. Exactly the same model – and this is what is rarely stressed – is operative within a single language.

Inferred from this is the thesis that intralingual translation also transpires in the form of an interpretive transfer of a message across a barrier, a “language-internal barrier” with respect to Hill-Madsen and Zethsen (2016, p.693). Some would take it to the next level with the assertion that it is necessary to go beyond language to acquire a fuller understanding of the concept of a barrier, the prerequisite of any translation process: This is often explained by the ambiguity inherent in the demarcation of linguistic boundaries, demonstrated by the fine lines between concepts like a dialect and a language (as exemplified by cases of mutual intelligibility between languages and unintelligibility between dialects, etc.). This is why Screnock (2018, p.483) declares that “[…] the distinction between intralingual translation and interlingual translation is, at least linguistically speaking, nonexistent” – for the definition of a language, and in turn, the definitions of inter- and intralingual, are all flimsy manifestations. One possible interpretation would be to equate translational barriers with cultural or conceptual barriers, which are borderlines “[…] not restricted to those running between cultures encoded in the semantics of a `national’ language” (SCHMID, 2008, p.48). As Schmid explains, smaller cultures sharing the same ‘language’ conceptualize the world in different ways which therefore necessitates translations to enable smooth communication across these smaller cultures. The incorporation of intralingual translation into translation studies thus reveals a broader concept of translation no longer simply centered around a linguistic barrier but a barrier formed on a cultural, conceptual, cognitive, communicative level:

> It appears that attempts to reconcile intralingual processing with the notion of interpreting are founded not so much on an analysis at the linguistic level, where the task(s) would be described as monolingual paraphrasing and/or summarising, as on an overall view of the communicative interaction, together with an account of the cognitive processing involved. (POCHHACKER, 2019, p.54)

Still, opposing voices abound within the discipline against the integration of intralingual exchanges into proper translation studies. Among these voices is Newmark (1991, p.69), who unyieldingly denies intralingual practices a seat in translation studies on the grounds that “[…] the qualitative difference between `interlingual’ and `intralingual’ translation is so great that it makes a nonsense of the concept of translation”. This is reverberated in other works like Mossop (1998), Eco (2003), Schubert (2005) and Trivedi (2007). Eco (2003, p.2), for example, insists on a stark difference between forms of semiotic exchanges (‘translation’ in his sense, put in inverted commas) and translation in an ordinary sense.

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1 Following from this is the thesis that translation “[…] comprises the reconfiguration of concepts from the perspective of another concept system” (SCHMID, 2008, p.54) – this actually ties in with the semiotic turn of translation which pictures translation as broadly as a process that takes place between semiotic systems, to be further discussed in section 4.
Do integrationists subscribe to a continuity or discontinuity view as regards the relationship between intralingual and interlingual translation? An integrationist should not regard this as a matter of utmost concern, for it is not the final destination of an expedition to the fundamentals of translation. Can one see any conspicuous differences between activities commonly referred to as intralingual and interlingual translations? Yes, but these are not so much typological differences as perspectival, contextualized, spatio-temporal differences. Can one notice any striking similarities between the two forms of translation? Yes, but to capture all these in the form of a barrier to be transcended also risks depersonalization and decontextualization: the barrier metaphor easily fabricates the illusion of an externalized border existing between concretized languages, cultures, communities, or conceptual realms, a border external of the translator her/himself. Rather, an integrationist suggestion is to divert the focus away from a typological investigation (i.e. struggling with the question of whether intra- and interlingual translations are similar enough to come under the general ‘translation’ category or not and the criteria for the unification/demarcation), which, despite serving some practical purposes, is not the fundamental concern – one can translate just as well with or without a clear categorization of this kind. A more pertinent task, integrationally speaking, would be to reflect on one’s experience with what in retrospect feels like intralingual and interlingual translation, in order to discuss the essential nature of translation:

Ultimately, there is no gap separating the translator’s problem from the kind of problem which may face the participants in any monoglot conversation. If someone asks ‘But what did you mean by tolerance?’ it is no use telling him to go away and learn English. This is not his difficulty. Analogously, it is not necessarily helpful to recommend the translator to go away and learn Hopi. His problem may well remain, however fluent in Hopi he becomes. What he has to decide, in his capacity as translator, is the relevance to a particular communication situation of the words used, and how best to clarify that relevance in a reformulation. That the reformulation has to be couched in another language may make the task more complicated, but it does not affect its essential nature. (HARRIS, 1981, p.148)

A takeaway from this quote is that the first thing to note about the interrelations between intra- and interlingual translation is how they, as any other kind of translation fathomable, all emerge in particular communication situations, involving actual translating individuals who try their best to achieve communicational relevance. In this sense, the integrationist sympathizes with Pöchhacker (2019) who stresses the importance of reflecting on the communicational episode in the study of translation. To the integrationist, this means that the contemplation of the essentials of translation is more than pondering the similitude and dissimilitude between ‘intralinguality’ and ‘interlinguality’ i.e. yet another two abstract notions which are hard to pin down without reexamining one’s own communicational (and translational) history.

2.3 LANGUAGE ITSELF AS TRANSLATION

Perhaps there is a more perceptive takeaway from the interconnectedness between intralingual and interlingual translation – this is what a hermeneutician would say. This takeaway is a broadened conception of language, which in turn gives rise to a redefinition of translation and communication.

Reflections on intralingual and interlingual translation coalesce into an all-embracing and dynamic concept of language in the hermeneutical lens. Language is not restricted to discrete, stable language codes and the interactions among them – a given existence highlighted by interlingual translationality, but more importantly it consists in the communicational exchanges within language codes – phenomena classified as intralingual translation, which eventually induce changes and reconfigurations in the established codes themselves. Language is thus the human reality itself which begets, unites as well as differentiates different language codes in the process of translation. Trying to visualize it in a Saussurean way, it is langage, a totality which almost defies delineation but certainly involves linguistic systematization (langues) and changes (parole), both engendered in translation. Hence in this interpretation, translation has always been an indispensable part of language. Language (as langage) is the human, communicational universal that is translative in nature. This thinking is exemplified by Steiner, an exponent of a hermeneutical approach to translation, who points to the two senses of language: the first sense he describes as the most “technical semiotic level” of language consisting of “sequential rule-governed sign systems obeying certain constraints”, while the second sense is roughly conceptualized as a sense ‘almost too large for proper definition’, a sense of language which “can communicate human emotions and articulate states of mind” (STEINER, 1992, p.445). The first sense clearly has its footing in langues as rule-governed codes,
whereas the second sense harks back to the Saussurean notion of langage i.e. everything, the totality of language which cannot actually be outlined. The hermeneutical project can be seen as redirecting the age-long focus on the first sense (langue) to the second sense (langage), and to do this an element has to be added and intermeshed with the first sense – the creative force in the domain of parole most evidently manifested in intralingual translation, which serves as a more fundamental layer on which different langues proliferate and get constantly modified. In hermeneutics, a central role is conferred upon translationality, which becomes a first-order reality necessary for perpetual linguistic change, an indispensable element in language, communication and reality. This renewed concept of translationality is a much-expanded version compared to the hackneyed view of translation as a one-time interlingual exchange.

Giving translationality a central part within language is to put forward even loftier or more pioneering claims, such as drawing a parallel between translation and understanding, or even between translation and being. This claim is developed from the hermeneutical contention that the process of understanding reality is always in language, while understanding is the basic mode of operation of being/existence/dasein: "Being that can be understood is language" (GADAMER, 2004 [1960], p.469-470). To the prominent hermeneutician Gadamer, the "primordial world experience" is achieved "through the conceptual and intuitive power of the language in which we live" (GADAMER, 2007, p.12). Put differently, phenomenological hermeneutics starts with dasein, 'something being here', which involves the understanding, the coming to know of the ontological world. This process is necessarily one of meaning generation, which is essentially linguistic. The next step is to ponder how big of a part translationality takes up in the understanding of the world, in the basic mode of being, given translationality is indeed an essential feature of language. Are all our acts of understanding, of communicating in language, just acts of translating through and through? Does our being or existence as humans consist essentially in translationality?

Reynolds (2016, p.25) is certainly not sympathetic to this idea:

I could explain to myself that a 'father' is a male parent, or that 'I' is a pronoun one uses when speaking of oneself, but why would I? 'I' and 'know' and 'where' and 'not' and 'when' and 'was' and 'call' and 'father' are all familiar to me already. I don't need to read them in translation. The only way it would make sense to say that understanding these sorts of words is a form of 'translation' would be if there were some secret language in the mind that absolutely all words had to be translated into. On this view, what we call 'meaning' would itself be a kind of language, so that when you understand a word you translate it into 'meaning'. But, if understanding is really a process of translating how would you then understand the 'meaning'? You would have to translate it in its turn. And so on. And on. The structure is endlessly recursive. The reason why communication does not 'equal translation' is simple. You can understand by just knowing the words.

There is a lot packed into Reynolds' commentary, but also a lot to clarify, debunk and question further. First it needs to be said that Reynolds' argument would not be one accepted by hermeneuticians, on the grounds that it is sustained by a much narrower concept of translation than what has been offered in hermeneutics. Translation, in Reynolds' words, goes back to being a process that is only obtainable when there exists a language different from the one the original text is coded in (this is bizarre coming from an author who tries to reexamine and explore the notion of translationality). Secondly, hermeneuticians might simply welcome the notion of understanding as endlessly recursive, that we constantly try to understand (in language) something anew in our interactions with the world, and invalidate Reynolds' argument for it presupposes a straitened concept of understanding (as a discrete, completable process).

The integrationist would rather say that Reynolds is at least pointing out a very relatable, personal experience – that of understanding something without the need to translate, albeit providing a largely cursory and even misleading explanation. To start with, the integrationist would not draw on (and thus presuppose) the 'standard' sense of translation as an interlingual transfer of content in order to prove how understanding is not to be identified as translating. Moreover, the idea that any understanding in translation must reveal meaning itself as a kind of language makes no sense and does not pertain to our personal translation experience (when translating across languages, it is hard to believe that one would think whatever meaning rendered in translation is itself the language of the target text). More doubts are cast upon Reynolds' assertion that one can understand by 'knowing the
words’. Coupled with his denial of an incessant nature of understanding (which he believes to be a ramification of equating understanding with translating), Reynolds seems to base his argument on a concept of (linguistic) understanding as the acquisition of or access to informational content i.e. the meanings of the words – which paints understanding as a goal-oriented act that is not at all ‘endlessly recursive’. Thus to Reynolds, to ‘know the words’ is to attain their (at least provisionally stable) meanings, which therefore cannot be in the process of translation (changes) when being known and understood. This is, for the integrationist, a distortion of the experience of knowing and understanding. “Knowledge, in integrationist epistemology, is always a form of activity” (HARRIS, 2011, p.63, italics original) and this activity is not to be reduced to an act of ‘information collection’.

To know a word is to know what to do with it – it is to integrate one’s past, present and future activities as well as others’ activities via sign-making in a manner relevant to the communicative situation. If, say, a scientist takes it that salt has to be translated into NaCl to have a proper understanding of the substance for a particular study, it can be said that translation is among the activities integrated with the act of developing an understanding. But when a shopper picks up a bag of salt and puts it in the shopping cart, understanding takes place without such an integration between translating and understanding in the scientist’s case. And this is why the integrationist does not find the need to equate understanding with translation, the reason being that such a claim can only proceed upon a high level of filtering and decontextualization. Tying in with the integrationist’s refusal to stake the hermeneutician’s claim is also the former’s rejection of the premises underlying it, i.e., that language is the human communicational universal which consists or even subsists in translation.

Integrationally speaking, the hermeneutician’s portrayal of language as a cosmic existence and the axis about which communicationality, translationality, understanding, etc. rotate actually renders language, communication and translation conceptually remote, i.e., detached from personal experience. Contrary to hermeneutical thinking, the integrationist would assert that language does not exhaust translation – and this stems from the integrational belief that language does not exhaust communication. Integrationism, after all, is a view of human communication, a “product and resource of the constantly renewed process of integration”, wherein lies language (HARRIS, 1996, p.X). What Harris implies is that the starting point of an integrational study is always human communication i.e. a person’s integration of activities via sign-making. Language definitely takes a central role in human communication, and the integrationist does not deny this – this much is made clear in Harris’s statement that “[…] to conceive of a languageless human society is not strictly possible, even for the most fertile imaginations” (HARRIS, 2011, p.83). A human world in which language does not occupy a central role would be a drastically different world (if not unfathomable). But one of the integrationist’s central contentions remains that language presupposes communication. While communication is basic human existence (HARRIS, 1996, p.13), language is not what singly defines human existence. Instead, an arguably better, more inclusive way of defining what makes us human is “[…] to say that we are persons (not in a legal sense), each with his/her unique personal history. It follows that each of us has his/her own communicational biography, which comprises so much more than merely ‘linguistic’ communication” (PABLÉ, 2020, p.142).

This, however, does not presuppose a clear and absolute distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic. While it pertains to personal experience that linguistic communication usually involves a different set of integrational abilities and activities to be integrated compared to non-linguistic communication, no one can make a general statement on what exactly is linguistic in linguistic communication or what exactly non-linguistic communication lacks (HARRIS, 1998, p.3) – it is all subject to contextualization and recontextualization by the individual. But the absence of a pre-drawn division between linguistic and non-linguistic does not, for an integrationist, lead to the conclusion that everything is linguistic in nature. The saying that ‘everything is language’ is not pertinent to a lay perspective which includes prelinguistic experience, as Harris puts forward (Harris describes “observational knowledge” as a kind of prelinguistic experience he has had and illustrates it with the example of seeing a cat in his garden; see HARRIS, 2009a, p.164-165 for more).

To sum it up, the hermeneutical approach to language, communication and translation does not square with the integrational view on language and communication.
3 RETHINKING MODALITY AND TRANSLATION

Deliberation on intralingual translation gives rise to deliberation on translation as writing, or more specifically, creative rewriting. Moving from interlingual translation to intralingual translation, concerns about the (an)isomorphisms between languages become inapposite, and the emphasis shifts from language(s) to the activities carried out in language(s), or the manifestations of language(s), e.g. writing(s). This much is expressed by Screnock (2018, p.484), who affirms that “[t]he features of intralingual translation illuminate the affinity of rewriting to translation”. Put differently, the reflection on the mode or medium in which a translation process pans out ensues from studies on intralingual translation, and translation scholars swiftly turn their attention to the relationships, not only between (re)writing and translating, but also between speech and translation. A modal investigation of translation goes in tandem with the study of interpretation which is considered to be a more immediate form of translation, since the process of interpreting can transpire within or traverse across different modes/media (e.g. speech-to-speech i.e. the most commonly-known form of instant interpretation, speech-to-writing, writing-to-speech, writing-to-writing, speech-to-signing, signing-to-signing, etc.) (POCHHACKER, 2019, p.47). The question to start off with in a (multi-)modal exploration of translation is whether translationality resides within the mode(s) themselves or transcends them. The question can be couched in another way: What exactly is the relationship between translation and the modes in which it is carried out and how does this inform us about the essence of translation?

3.1 TRANSLATION AND WRITING

A few words can first be said about writing and translation. The relationship between writing and translation has long been a topic for discussion in the translation field. St. Pierre (1996, p.233), for instance, asserts that “translation cannot be divorced from writing”, for it “[…] is a form of writing, or more exactly of rewriting, and the two practices cannot be distinguished in any systematic way” (p.253). This has not exactly deterred researchers following St. Pierre from pursuing a more organized way of studying the interconnections. In the recent two decades, a blueprint for a typology of text production gradually emerged: In Dam-Jensen & Heine’s (2013) version, text production is taken as a superordinate category subsuming all acts of producing a coherent written text for a specific audience with a specific goal in mind, including writing, translation and adaptation, and this entails that writing and translation share the aforementioned characteristics in essence, despite differing in specific writing phases and strategies. Risku et al. (2016, p.48) further explore dam-jensen & heine’s (2013) claim, yet yield a rather inconclusive result: “The positioning of translation and writing on different levels of the scholarly concept system has led to an – admittedly, theoretically inspiring – situation in which the borders of translation have become increasingly blurred, and the translation concept itself seems to elude definition”.

Risku et al., however, claim that translation bears a higher degree of interlinguuality and imitation, but attribute creativity to both writing and translation. This echoes with Perteghella’s (2013, p.204) statement that “[a]ll writers are translators. Creative writing is above all a translational process”. The three studies mentioned thus far converge on the fact that they all constitute comparisons between the process of writing and the process of translation, which sets them apart from Screnock’s (2018) attempt to reconcile rewriting with translation, both as a set of techniques per se instead of the full, actual processes of producing a written/translated text. In contrast to said approaches, Hill-Madsen (201, p.556) offers a solution to the question ‘is translation (re)writing?’ by defending a conceptual barrier, emphasizing the lack in rewriting of two criteria that make up the translation concept – the criteria being “the neutralization of a comprehension obstacle and the presence of a semiotic border between ST and TT, or a border between two different meaning-making systems” – and thus arguing against the dilution of translation to “[…] such a degree that any kind of rewriting or metatextuality must be recognized as translation”.

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1 Interpretation theories and practices, apart from informing modal studies of translation, can actually be fitted into an investigation of intralingual translation as well as intersemiotic translation, which cannot be covered in this paper due to limited space. An example to demonstrate this is the debate over speech-to-writing (or writing-to-speech) interpretation, over whether this type of interpretation belongs in the intralingual dimension (which requires one to presuppose that speech and writing are alternative representations of a given language) – as Gottlieb (2008) does, who termed this type of interpretation diamesic INTRA (p.56) – or in the intersemiotic dimension (which entails that speech signs and written signs constitute two separate semiotic systems on their own), as proposed by Chuang (2006).
The integrationist would warn against one inherent issue with the identification (or association) of translation with writing as a mode or concept in itself, which is the risks of abstraction and distortion. This is because writing and translation are not standalone concepts which can be singled out from trillions of episodes of writing and translating, so there is no, pauce Screnock (2018, p.498-499), any such question of “[w]hether translation is a part of rewriting or rewriting is a part of translation” or any such answer which consists of a general truth about translationality or writing as a mode of its own. Comparatively speaking, the method of process comparison employed in research like Dam-Jensen & Heine (2013) and Risku et al. (2016) perhaps pertains more within our integrative boundaries – we can certainly entertain the envisioning of previous writing experience and previous translating experience and compare them in our acts of recontextualization, without having to abstract any general comparison between the ultimate notions of writing and translating or delineate a clear start and end of a general writing/translation process. In the end, it is important to remember that whenever the term ‘translation’ or ‘writing’ is conjured up by an individual, it is always a sign that integrates (and gets integrated into) a series of activities, within the individual’s perspective, activities which otherwise remain unintegrated. No single activity in the integration serves as the essence of the integrated whole or the final referent of the sign created (‘translation’ or ‘writing’). An integrationist thus finds the following remark by Screnock (2018, p.499) futile:

But does the fact that something occurs in a translation make it an aspect of translation? Are these elements basic to translation or merely things that happen to occur in translations? If they are basic to translation, rewriting is translation insofar as it uses these elements. If they merely occur in translations, one would say instead that translations utilize rewriting.

To set foot on such metaphysical quests for the ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’ properties of translation, in terms of modes or other characteristics identifiable either at the very moment of translation or post facto, is to deny that what constitutes translation (or writing) can only be so at a particular instance where an individual integrates different activities together (more about this act of integration will be discussed in section 5), instead of some essence emanating from a certain activity/series of activities on its own.

3.2 TRANSLATION AND SPEECH

Other than writing, some translation scholars zero in on the relationship between speech and translation, and how the former may be the origin of the latter. One argument in favor of this is that we usually learn to speak earlier than we learn to write, which may or may not work in tandem with the argument that language is primarily spoken, i.e. audible and ephemeral. Derived from these premises, translation begins as soon as we learn to speak: “When we learn to speak, we are learning to translate; the child who asks his mother the meaning of a word is really asking her to translate the unfamiliar term into the simple words he already knows” (PAZ, 1992 [1971], p.152).

According to Steiner, central to speech is the counter-factuality of language, which is what makes language both a “mirror and counterstatement to the world” (STEINER, 1992, p.19). For Steiner, it is crucial that “Language is the main instrumental of man’s refusal to accept the world as it is” (STEINER, 1992, p.228). Hermeneuticians like Gadamer and Steiner believe that the counter-factuality in speech is a universal linguistic fact which points to a rift between ‘what is meant’ (our experience which is always experienced anew) and ‘what is said’ (schematized linguistic forms which can never catch up with our experience). Such a rift is embodied in both our daily exchanges with others (which would be much shorter and more efficient if the rift did not exist) and even our internal monologues (we often rethink our experience in different terms to form a different conclusion or make a better judgment as time passes). To hermeneuticians, human’s reliance on speech, as essentialized by counter-factuality, entails that translation is inevitable: “Speech would be an immensely profitable but also reductive, partially narrowing evolutionary selection from a wider spectrum of semiotic possibilities. Once it was ‘chosen’ translation became inevitable” (STEINER, 1992, p.50).

And this is it: we never fully express what we mean in speech, so what is meant is always regenerable and re-expressible, marking the beginning (but no end) of translation. The non-transparent nature of speech, as manifested in counter-factuality, warrants continuous translation. It is translationality, the possibility to translate what is said to generate a deeper understanding of what is meant, which sustains speech by complementing its counter-factuality. If there were no translation, there might as well be no speech at all – “no es una objeción contra el posible esplendor de la faena traductora” (STEINER, 1992, p.264).
Two integrationist comments should be made here on the proposed interdependence between speech and translation. First, the hermeneuticians have not sufficiently elaborated on how the counter-factuality of language is primarily attributable to speech. It is in fact dubious how the counter-factuality, premised on a notion of relatively fixed, stable linguistic forms, is not influenced by the availability of writing which supplies this very notion (the introduction of the idea of a ‘word’ in itself by writing as well as printing technologies). It is thus unclear whether it is speech itself which calls for translationality. Like writing, abstracting speech as a totalizing, abstract concept from an infinite number of instances of speaking in order to locate the ‘origin’ of translation does not get us any further in approaching the fundamentals of translation.

Another comment is that the integrationist also holds reservations about the ‘counter-factuality of language’ – this narrative shows the propensity (whether self-aware or not) to pin all acts of translation down to the same, ultimate source, to propose once and for all the final answer. The integrationist believes that the inexhaustible and untraceable instances of translation which have all panned out (and will pan out) in different persons’ lives cannot and do not have to be reduced to a crude, universal linguistic fact of counter-factuality, to a formula of ‘what is said never exhausts what is meant’. By contrast, there are many instances in our lives as lay, communicating and perhaps translating persons, where we find our words to be adequate for expression, for achieving whatever communication purposes at hand.

In short, the integrationist is suspicious of the headlong dash toward an equation between translation and any mode – be it writing or speech – in which it transpires.

3.3 TRANSLATION BEYOND WRITING AND SPEECH?

Does this then imply that translation/translationality transcends whatever mode (speech, writing, etc.) it is realized in, or whatever substance (scripts, sounds, etc.) it involves? Pöchhacker (2019, p.51) may in fact incline toward this deduction, having claimed that the notion of interpreting cuts across different modalities, i.e. that its definition transcends any changes in modality. This transcendental view may also be reinforced by the expediency afforded by machine translation: In the technical age, “Translation no longer necessarily involves a translator writing anything. A short, successful translation can now be produced by somebody who does not know how to write and does not know a word of the target language, but possesses a smart phone with a relevant app” (JAKOBSEN, 2019, p.76).

It appears that in the myriad of translational acts constantly taking place nowadays, neither writing nor speech is required any more. The detachment from traditional modalities seems to call for a redefinition of translation in order to catch up with the actual translation practices which are interminably being redesigned. Yet to the integrationist, the paradox of constant redefinition only arises when the definition is taken to be context-independent. But the integrationist, instead, acknowledges in the first place the contextual, fleeting nature of the definition of ‘translation’ which only serves an integrational function in a certain here and now, inseparable from what it is created to integrate. This is why the process of translation – along with the definition provisionally provided for ‘translation’, itself a contextually created sign – is not perpetually defined by any activity or ‘mode’ that has ever been integrated into the process, but is not independent of any of these activities either. This is simply a manifestation of one of the axioms of integrational semiology: “[w]hat constitutes a sign is not given independently of the situation in which it occurs or of its material manifestation in that situation” (HARRIS, 2009b, p.70). This axiom, if accepted, renders any such transcendental claim to ”medium-transferability” (HARRIS, 2000, p.193) in the conceptualization of translation/interpretation across modes (e.g. speech-writing) a precipitate one which simply presupposes the existence of some fixed semiological relations across material manifestations (p.193) – this in turn means ignoring the contextualized, integrated, situated and embedded nature of any semiological relation involved in the acts of translation.
4 RETHINKING SIGN AND TRANSLATION – A (BIO)SEMIOTIC TURN

After the many unsuccessful attempts at essentializing translation by pinning it down to some basic activity or mode (e.g. natural bilingual and intralingual exchanges, writing and speech), an approach that essentializes translation by linking it to a universal phenomenon may be a promising answer we need. This approach is the semiotic approach, which ties translation with the universal phenomenon known as semiosis, the generation and perpetuation of sign relationships. In semiotics, translation and semiosis form a dialectical relationship: one cannot be explained except by the other. Stecconi (2004, p. 482) puts it this way: "[…] there is no translation if the target sign does not speak on behalf of the source sign", thus translation necessarily consists in traversing a 'fold between semiotic systems' (p.480).

The semiotician appeals to the universal capacity of translation, or what is more frequently referred to as translationality by semioticians, by declaring it to be a semiotic capacity. In describing the most discernable form of translation i.e. interlingual translation, Petrilli (2014, p.240) states that "[…] each single language presents its own interpretation/s of reality, but does this thanks to the semiotic capacity for translation across different orders and systems of signs" (p.240). Hence the essentialness of translation is, for a semiotician, derived from its interconnection with the sign, with semiosis, itself an essential process in the interaction with and interpretation of reality:

Translative thinking converges with semiotic processes where something stands for something else, where different sign systems are related and defer to each other in meaning-making processes, where one sign is more fully developed, enriched, criticized, put at a distance, placed between inverted commas, parodied or simply imitated and, in any case, interpreted in terms of another sign. (PETRILLI, 2014, p.189)

The notion of 'translative thinking' – with thinking being a human signifying capacity in semiotic parlance (WELBY, 1903, p.34) – demonstrates how intertwined translation and semiosis are, and how because of this, translation is exalted to be a first-order, essential process.

To put it more specifically, semiosis – the generation of the interrelationships between a representamen, its object as well as its interpretant(s) – cannot subsist without translation, a pivotal process in which an interpretant is produced to relate a representamen to an object, a relation which would not come into our thinking without the translation process. Hence translation is the main semiotic element – it is the production of an interpretant, a form of metasemiosis wherein a relation between a representamen and its object is considered and thus the semiosis process is envisaged. This is why Petrilli (2014, p.189) claims that "[…] the role of translation is fundamental in the very constitution of the sign". Following from this, translation is tantamount to the meaning of a sign, as the meaning of a sign is always a further sign which interprets it and this process of interpretation is translation. This harks back to the Peircean dictum that a meaning "[…] is, in its primary acceptation, the translation of a sign into another system of signs" (CP4.127). Translation and semiosis are two sides of the same semiotic coin.

4.1 TRANSLATION BEYOND LANGUAGE

Having 'semiotized' translation as the first-order reality, a semiotician contends that this reality is not just language. Nota bene, the semiotician does not wish to downplay the significance of language in human translation. Their point of departure, however, is that intralingual and interlingual translations do not exhaust the whole of translation. Semiotically speaking, to merely focus on language means to ignore what Jakobson classifies as intersemiotic translation. Putting it in terms of semiotic signs, it means to only focus on one type of sign – the symbolic sign – and to overlook the significance of iconicity and indexicality in translation. Semiotic translation research often argues that the two nonverbal types of signs i.e. iconic and indexical signs in the trichotomy have long been neglected or brushed off as a topic to be explicaded after theorists settle on a universal theory for linguistic translation. To semioticians this is, however, putting the cart before the horse. The prioritization of symbolic signs over iconic and indexical signs pays no heed to the semiotic precedence of iconicity and indexicality: Merrell (2003) asserts that translation does not only take place on a conscious, rational level (thus mainly verbal) but also on an unconscious, irrational and nonverbal level; Petrilli (2014) puts the most stress on iconicity, which she sees as the main fuel for any translational process between interpretants
and interpreted signs. In light of translation as a highly creative process that occurs in dialecticality and alterity, Petrilli (2014, p.193) believes that iconicity – which is “[…] neither conventional, nor necessary and contiguous, but rather hypothetical” – is the main determinant in how a translation process develops (p.193). Translation is a process undergirded by “hypothetical similarity” (p.193), an inferential process of abduction (Peirce’s firstness) rather than induction (Peirce’s secondness) or deduction (Peirce’s thirdness), the latter of which is favored by what Petrilli calls the “short-sighted and mystifying nature of glottocentrism” (p.vi).

4.2 TRANSLATION BEYOND HUMANS: TRANSLATION AS A POSTHUMAN REALITY?

Translation as a universal operation as proposed in semiotics lends itself to aiding biological studies, thereby also reinforcing the post-linguistic truth of translation as well as extending translation to the post-human realm:

In order to study meaning in living organisms, biologists had to borrow from semiotics. One of the concepts borrowed is ‘translation’. Biosemiotics thus uses the term ‘translation’ to refer to the process of semiosic exchange taking place in and between all organisms, even at the cellular level. Furthermore, its use is much wider than the use in translation studies in that it does not only consider translation between linguistic systems but translation between many kinds of sign systems in and between organisms. In this sense, its use is derived from semiotics (or intersemiotic translation theory) rather than from translation studies. (MARAI; KULL, 2016, p.172)

Biosemiotics encourages a shift of focus from linguistic phenomena – which Marais (2019) sees as a fundamentally human condition – to the total set of semiotic and semiotic phenomena, spanning processes that all living organisms (or even parts of organisms) engage in. This entails that a theory of translation (a semiotic process) has to also acknowledge this posthuman shift.

Marais deems it crucial that “[…] a theory of translation is able to explain, not only human semiosis, but also non-human semiosis” (2019, p.49). He also asserts that “translation studies could become part of the response against anthropocentric ideas and practices, by taking a broader, biosemiotic approach” (MARAI, 2019, p.54). Accordingly, a theory of translation has to answer for “the whole of the biological world” (MARAI, 2019, p.115).

Biosemiotic translation, or biotranslation, opens up the remit of translation to by far the broadest extent: Typical examples of biosemiotic translations (or biotranslations) are proved by semioticians like Barbieri (2007), Hofmeyer (2008) and Markoš et al. (2007) to exist even between DNA, RNA, cells and viruses. These assertions presuppose the existence of different non-linguistic codes with which different species, or molecular or cellular groups of an organism, operate. For instance, in the interactions between DNA and cells within an organism, the information stored in DNA – which is digitally coded – needs to be translated into the information used by the metabolism of the cell – which is coded in an analogue form instead of digital. This therefore suggests that the processes of non-linguistic decoding and recoding constitute translation (MARAI, 2019, p.117). Research such as this shows that translation exists not on a human-to-human level but on a cellular or even a molecular level, reinforcing translation as a posthuman universal.

4.3 THE INTEGRATIONAL SIGN VS THE SEMIOTIC SIGN

The integrationist repudiates the semiotic attempt at expanding translation, and this is attributable to the fundamental differences between the integrational sign and the semiotic sign. One of such aspects is the semiotic conception of a linguistic sign. As said, the semiotic denunciation of the language bias in translation is formulated as a complaint against the prioritization of intra- and interlingual over intersemiotic translation in precedent translation theories. This implies a segregation between the linguistic and the non-linguistic. Seen as a symbolic sign (sign of thirdness), the linguistic sign is automatically associated with conventionality i.e. construed as a member belonging to an autonomous linguistic system. This is confirmed by the Peircean attribution of creativeness and abductivity to icons and situatedness to indices, both of which are technically non-linguistic signs, leaving the linguistic sign (symbol) on a higher level of generalization, abstraction and organization. The linguistic sign, unlike an index, has an unactualized existence and does not have to be material and immediate to a particular context; also, unlike an icon, a linguistic sign is a collective concept rather than an individual one. The integrationist contends that categorical separation between linguistic and non-linguistic signs does not account for the complexity of the integrational activities and abilities involved in daily
Another discrepancy between the integrational and the semiotic sign is that the former is a contextualized, personal sign grounded semiologically whereas the latter is an autonomous sign whose inherent translationality does not rely on a specific individual’s interpretation of the sign. As Harris proclaims, integrationism is a semiotics (HARRIS, 1996, p.12). Following from this, the integrationist theorizes the human sign and opts out of going beyond the human ambit to investigate the non-human sign or even the transcendental sign which unites both realms. This human sign is not some universal sign shared by every human individual but only ever exists in relation to a particular individual who contextualizes this sign i.e. endows it with an integrational function for oneself in a certain situation. On this basis, integrational semiology shuns the semiotic sign and fights shy of theorizing signs as “[…] tripartite (sign-object-interpreter), as the sign only exists to fulfill an integrational function for someone in the here-and-now” (PABLE, 2020, p.134). Withstanding the biosemiotic contention, the integrationist does not accept the decontextualization and hence depersonalization of the sign “for the sake of disciplinary demands, such as extending the study of signs to all living organisms” (p.138). In opposition to the posthuman disposition of biosemiotics, Harris declares integrationism as an anthropocentric enterprise, a humanism in a Sartrian manner i.e. in the sense that human individuals are free to make their own signs, for which they are fully responsible (HARRIS, 2013, p.56). All in all, the semiological, human, contextualized and personal nature of an integrational sign forestalls integrationists from providing an all-purpose concept of the sign that fits “[…] all intellectual enterprises”, be they enterprises aiming at explaining the signing behavior of the totality of humankind or of all living beings (HARRIS, 2009b, p.61). This separates integrationists from biosemioticians, for the former admit to and are perfectly comfortable with the unavoidability of anthropomorphic conceptualizations in the study of animal communication (including ‘animal translation’) (see HARRIS, 1990 [1984]; HUTTON, 2019; KWOK, 2020 for more). Underlying the superficial convergence between the integrational and semiotic arguments that a sign is not limited to a linguistic sign (and that a sign is more suited as the comprehensive, base unit of a translation theory – more to be discussed in section 5) is, in fact, an irreconcilable gap between two different theorizations of the sign. As opposed to a semiotic attempt at translation, integrationist’s stress on the radically indeterminate, contextualized, lay experience of translation does not admit of nor necessitate a positivist or a metaphysical attempt to define what language/non-language/sign/translation is and delineate its scope. There is no need to render a theoretical explanation of language (the same goes for sign) as if without it the lay person/translator would be clueless as to what s/he is constantly doing: “The embarrassment arises from having to explain to one’s readers something with which they are already perfectly familiar, and have to be in order to understand the explanation” (HARRIS, 2014, p.67).
5 CONCLUSION: SO WHAT IS TRANSLATION? AN INTEGRATIONAL REFLECTION

To recapitulate the main thesis of this paper, the integrationist dissents from both the so-called orthodox view of translation as well as all the expansionist attempts to redefine translation discussed thus far, for they either still embody the language myth/translation myth or present a conceptually vacuous, remote, decontextualized and depersonalized view of translation. This distorted presentation of translation is ascribed to the misassumption born by most translation scholars that a lexical definition of translation i.e. the verbally constructed definition of translation, while being conceptually separable from a real definition of translation i.e. the essence of translation unsponsored by any linguistic construction (HARRIS, 2005), should eventually point toward the real definition. This constitutes what Harris refers to as reocentric surrogationalism, a thesis which holds that "[…] verbal discourse is essentially a convenient substitute for laborious and complicated physical action" (HARRIS, 1996, p.127), and that the verbal is distinguishable from the reality while bearing a referential relationship with the latter. On top of the reocentric misassumption, most translation scholars mentioned in this paper surmise that the urgent problem that they feel responsible for tackling is the apparent divergence between the lexical and the real definition. This is manifested by, most conspicuously, semioticians who aspire to a transpecies definition of translation corroborated by the reality of translationality instead of one restricted or misled by the limits of human verbal descriptors (how this is achievable is another question). Other ‘expansionists’ demonstrate a similar attitude – they proceed from the belief that the term ‘translation proper’ and its verbal definition can easily be reduced to a hollow, verbal construct that does not accurately or comprehensively reflect the reality of translation (which, according to them, should encompass the natural, everyday practices of translation, more forms of translation which take place in different modes, etc.), resulting in a word-reality mismatch which they have to rectify. An ostensibly enlightening alternative to this reocentric thinking is offered by the hermeneutic approach, which turns the tide by revealing how the real definition obtains within the lexical definition, for language and reality do not form a referential relationship between each other but instead make up a raveled whole – our language is the reality. Yet the integrationist cannot commend either of these options. To explain this, one may start from the integrationist “principle of cotemporality” which proposes that "[…] what is said is immediately applicable to the current situation, unless there is reason to suppose otherwise" (HARRIS, 1998, p.81-82). In other words, this principle stresses the ineluctably simultaneous integration between linguistic and non-linguistic activities in a person’s perspective which is what actually provides an awareness of the activities themselves and their linguistic/non-linguistic ‘nature’, which are otherwise absent (because unintegrated) in that person’s point of view. An entailment from this is that there cannot be a neat divide between a lexical definition and a real definition. The sign ‘translation’ does not form any reocentric relationship with a definite referent in reality, but serves to integrate a series of activities at the moment and in the situation it is created. A lexical definition of translation is not any less real for the definer than a ‘real definition’ – a definition is always prompted by some real happenings and interests involved in the happenings, and is always something afforded by human language. This, however, does not drive the integrationist to the hermeneutical side, for the principle of cotemporality between linguistic and non-linguistic cannot be reduced to a principle of pure ‘linguisticality’ which eventually renders every activity integrated with a verbal activity linguistic (see section 2.3). Neither does a detached, absolute division between the linguistic and non-linguistic, an incontestable referential relation between a linguistic label and an object/event in reality, nor a consciousness of everything in the world being linguistic (and translatable) in nature, squares well with personal experience. Getting rid of the reocentric undertones of the expansionist claims to remedy translation, an integrationist approach suggests that one starts from contemplating the person involved in the act of translating and defining translating, instead of zooming in on the very sign (‘translation’) created by the person and filtering out everything surrounding it. This calls for a view of translation as a personal perspective.

What does this personal view entail? At the very least (which is most likely the extent to which an integrationist can make positive claims about the personal view without unnecessary decontextualization), translation has to be something more than simply the integration of activities via sign creation in a contextualized/situated, personal perspective (consisting of a time, a place, a situation which the integrating person finds her/himself in). This is because, according to our personal experience, we do – perhaps very often – communicate without translating. Without developing a full-fledged integrationist thesis on translation here, it is proposed in this paper that translation must at the bare minimum involve some level of consciousness or reflexivity on the integration between two or more activities which form a chronological sequence and are distinguished by the integrating person in terms of some contextualized set of similarities as well as differences (the latter of which at least include a temporal difference). Hence when discussing a scenario in a wedding ceremony, where the couple is exchanging vows while holding each other’s hands,
Harris (1996, P.85) maintains that there is no translation involved in the integration between ‘what is said’ in the vows and the act of joining hands – for the two activities are simultaneously linked and integrated as a whole, without a particular awareness of how one can be ‘processed’ into another i.e. without any specific effort on the part of the integrating person in delineating two or more chronologically successive activities and in reflecting on their similarities and differences. But as long as an integrating person is aware of her/his own act of integration and of a successive chain of activities connecting with as well as disconnecting from each other in certain ways, the possibility of translation arises.

Integrationism as a personal attempt at explaining translation proceeds with a non-essentialist account of translation: Reflecting on one’s personal experience with translating (and not translating), there is just no fixed set of activities or integrational procedures which always unfolds in translation. Every time we translate we translate anew, meaning that we integrate a different set of activities in a whole new way each time, via a newly created sign ‘translation’ (or ‘translate’, ‘translating’, etc.) endowed with a provisional integrational function which will be gone the next moment when we stop contemplating or engaging in this translational process. This, however, does not align an integrationist position with the following statement of Reynolds (2016, p.15): ‘Because the activities we can call ‘translation’ are so varied, the word ‘translation’ keeps having to stretch or shrink to fit them. It keeps on being ‘translated’ […]’.

The difference lies in the lack of such a word ‘translation’ in the integrationist’s book, a word whose form remains constant (‘it is the same word spelt t-r-a-n-s-l-a-t-i-o-n and pronounced as /transˈleɪʃən/ which we have been dealing with all along, across different paradigms of translation theories, extending over centuries of translation practices’) and whose meaning constantly changes, as suggested by Reynolds. The ‘radical indeterminacy’ of the integrational sign goes further than “applicational indeterminacy” i.e. the lack of consistency in sign behavior between different communities (translation scholars, practitioners, lay translators) and “intrinsic indeterminacy” i.e. the fuzziness over the inherent properties of translation itself (HARRIS, 2009b, p.81) – for the latter two both rely on formal determinacy (that it is the same orthographic form of the word ‘translation’ which is being applied differently by different communities or having its content determined by specialists), while the former does not. This is to say that the integrational sign is radically indeterminate in both form and meaning, and that there is not a lingering word/sign ‘translation’ which keeps being redefined/recontextualized over and over. Every act of redefinition (as discussed in this paper) brings in new signs. One has thus to be careful not to be misled by such remarks as “[e]ven if ‘translation’ is not the most exciting or fitting term to some, it actually seems to work quite well. People largely know what it means, and perceptions are similar enough for the term to serve its purpose” (DAM et al., 2019a, p.10), to conceive of a term ‘translation’ with a stable form shared by different researchers and translators. Hence the integrationist does not sympathize with Dam et al. when they see the continuity of the term ‘translation’ in translation studies as “[…] quite a feat considering that we do not even have a generally accepted definition of translation” (p.11) – putting it integrationally, this could only be a feat if such a formally determinate term ‘translation’ did exist, and if settling on the meaning of this term were a prerequisite for any translational process or discussion on such a process, which would necessitate a general definition for the term. However, to acknowledge the radical indeterminacy of a sign is to realize that an illusory word or term ‘translation’ with an allegedly fixed form which calls for a definition to finalize its meaning also arises in the decontextualization of an infinite number of instances of translating, each of which involves vastly different signs with vastly different (and incomparable) integrational functions. In fact, the integrationist argues that much of the debate over what translation is (or should be) presupposes formal determinacy of an abstract sign ‘translation’, a sign which ultimately should acquire a stable, validated meaning. This misconception is what fuels certain translation scholars’ aversion to the proliferation of replacements for the term ‘translation’ (see SCHAFFNER, 2012, p.880-881 for instance), which may in turn undermine the stability and authority supplied by an illusory term, whose imaginary, formal determinacy serves as the motivation for reaching an agreement on the meaning of such a term.

A final question to address is this: How then, does an integrational i.e. personal and non-essentialist view of translation, which neither conforms to the popularized, simplified notion of translation attributed to the lay individuals and the translation practitioners, nor to the multitudes of academic attempts to open up translation, shed light on the dynamics and tensions between academia and the public on the topic of translation? By embracing a personal view of translation, does one automatically sign up to solipsism and withdraw from mediating the conflicts between academia and the ‘collective outside world of actual, everyday translations’ – on the basis that one can never have full access to others’ personal definitions of translation? The integrationist does
not accept this as a coda to this paper. Indeed, adopting a personal view means not only seeing oneself as a communicating and translating person but also seeing others as persons. And every person, with her/his own personal communicational history, can offer as well as renew a definition of translation via countless times of contextualized integration. While Dam and Zethsen (2019, p.215) assert that "[…] there are probably as many conceptualisations of the translation field as there are scholars. But then this may also be true of practitioners", the integrationist would add that the number of conceptualizations correspond to the number of attempts at (re)contextualizing translational activities that have ever taken place. The integrationist also admits that interactions and reconciliations are bound to happen between different persons – with translation firmly established as an institution, as a business, the decision-making on whether something suffices as translation (or as quality translation) cannot be a one-person game. A person often has to integrate others' activities with one's own in constructing a workable definition of translation for different purposes at hand – "[i]t is the participants' interaction in that situation which makes what the interpreter said a translation" (HARRIS, 1981, p.149). It, however, does not follow that different individuals' views of translation get completely blended into one single shared view of translation everyone consents to. Yet more often than not, the integration of others' activities with one's own is what largely shapes an individual's view on translation. It is thus crucial to acknowledge that discrepancies between different communities (lay, non-lay) – or more precisely, between different persons – do exist and constitute a force which propels constant acts of redefining and renewing translation.

Adopting an integrational view on translation is not so much taking an absolute, uncompromising stance on the definitional debate between academics and practitioners as providing a simple yet illuminating explanation for the debate. While Koskinen (2010) calls for a dialogue between academia and industry on the definition of translation, and Dam et al. (2019b, p.231) affirm that translation "[…] will continue to be part of human life regardless of the existence or not of a scholarly field", the integrationist also does not wish to downplay the importance of lay translation experience (which is not confined to the stale concept of translation reinforced by many translation scholars discussed here) – for it would be paradoxical to downplay the only terra firma on which everyone (including the self-proclaimed professionals who are lay translators themselves) understands and engages in translation, the only point of departure from which one starts to explore translation – it is in this sense that integrationism is lay-oriented (PABLÉ; HUTTON, 2015). The integrationist does not side with whatever is considered to be the lay conception of translation – it is no folk linguistics, or a folk translation theory. Yet to be lay-oriented is to propose that any specialized study on translation has to start from lay translating experience, which is why the integrationist does not shun the abstract conception of translation as interlingual meaning transfer ascribed to the lay public; neither does integrationism call it a narrow-sighted observation or even a circular argument as Hill-Madsen (2019, p.555) would claim (in making that claim he is referring to how the recognition of interlingual translation as the prototype of translation is backed up by the claim that interlingual translation has to take place between two lexicogrammatical systems, which constitutes circularity according to him). The conception of translation as an interlingual transfer can be a sufficient one ascribed to the communicative situation. To think of interlingual translation as the yardstick, in a certain here and now, does not require one to provide a non-circular justification for it – the relevance to the communicational happenings already provides the ‘justification’. Instead of feeling a need to rectify the generalized notion of translation, the integrationist concedes that the activities integrated in a layman's translational practices (or reflections on translation) are vastly different from the activities integrated in an academic’s theorization of translation, and it is from these differences between integrational patterns that the definitional debate (as well as any subsequent need to take a side in the debate) emerges. The dynamics of different activities integrated by the translating persons is what keep and will continue to invigorate the debate as well as the translation discipline, institution, business and everyday lay practices.

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