THE BILDUNGSROMAN AND UTOPIA AS DISCURSIVE REGIMES OF PRODUCTION OF THE PEDAGOGICAL SOCIETY

O ROMANCE DE FORMAÇÃO E A UTOPIA COMO REGIMES DISCURSIVOS DA PRODUÇÃO DE UMA SOCIEDADE PEDAGOGIZADA

LA NOVELA DE FORMACIÓN Y UTOPÍA COMO REGIMENES DISCURSIVOS DE LA PRODUCCIÓN DE UNA SOCIEDAD PEDAGOGIZADA

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ABSTRACT: This paper starts from the Foucauldian principle that pedagogy emerges marked by the problem of the government of children. Still, in competition with a Deleuze-Guattarian concept called anti-production centered on the demands of caring for the self to conclude that pedagogy was not well enough to govern the children. It was necessary to engender a machine capable of handling everyone through extensive schooling practices and the intensive conditions of production control and circulation of subjectivity patterns. Through the readings of Foucault, Bakhtin, Deleuze, and Guattari, the text proposes an analysis-essay of discourse on a topic of broad interest in pedagogy and philosophy of education, which is the transition from the teaching of individuals to the education of society.

KEYWORDS: Bildungroman. Utopia. Total pedagogies society.

RESUMO: O texto em questão parte do princípio foucauldiano de que a pedagogia surge marcada pelo problema do governo dos filhos, mas em concorrência com sua antiprodução – conceito deleuziano-guattariano – centrada nas exigências do cuidado a si para chegar à conclusão de que não bastou à pedagogia bem governar os filhos. Foi necessário engendrar uma máquina capaz de governar a todos, não só pelas práticas extensivas da escolarização, mas, também, por meio das condições intensivas do controle da produção e circulação dos padrões de subjetividade. Por meio das leituras de Foucault, Bakhtin, Deleuze e Guattari, o texto propõe uma análise ensaio de discurso diante de um tema de amplo interesse na pedagogia e na filosofia da educação, que é a transição da educação dos indivíduos para a educação da sociedade.


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RESUMEN: Este texto parte del principio foucaltiano de que la pedagogía surge marcada por el problema del gobierno de los niños y al mismo tiempo, con la presencia del concepto de antiproducción deleuz-guattariano que exigía atención al cuidado de si, por lo que se concluye que no bastaba con la pedagogía para gobernar bien a los niños. Era necesario desarrollar una máquina capaz de gobernar a todos, no sólo a través de las prácticas extensivas de la escolarización, sino también a través de las condiciones intensivas de control de la producción y circulación de patrones de subjetividad. A través de las lecturas de Foucault, Bațtin, Deleuze y Guattari, el texto propone un análisis-ensayo del discurso sobre un tema de amplio interés en la pedagogía y la filosofía de la educación, cual es el tránsito de la educación de los individuos a la educación de la sociedad.


1 PEDAGOGISED SOCIETY: THE STARTING POINT AND ALSO THE ARRIVAL POINT

Described by Félix Pécaut (1828-1898), a French pedagogue and general inspector of public education in France, who enthusiastically participated in the movement in which European countries bet on the modernization of education, the pedagogised society is an ideal, a march, as ascertainment and a disillusionment. It is a movement that emerged in the Old World but became a worldwide phenomenon through mass schooling. The process that led to the concentration of the formation of the individual and individuality in the school institution as a principle of civility falls back on the concept of pedagogization of society.

2 FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE OFFSPRING TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ALL

The first production of the pedagogical field is marked by the emergence of pedagogy with the government problem of the offspring, associated with its anti-production, which is the government of self. However, this production will be belatedly taken as an expression of a new social modulation, as a vector par excellence for the production of subjectivities. Through a bookish culture, with the publication of works that functioned as general educational treatises or as particular manuals for the education of the children, this production can be delineated. Varied examples arise such as De pueris statim ac liberalliter instituendis (1529), by Erasmus, and The education of a Christian prince (1516), by Thomas More, as discursive investments on the educational problems of the sixteenth century in Europe, while the anti-production of this process is radicalized in another narrative form, the Bildungsroman, breaking with the positivity of the genesis of this social field and favoring the development of a pedagogical utopia.

In the sixteenth century, the development of an art of governing, even if it was blocked by the structural conditions of the time (Foucault 2008a), gleaned the emergence of a fusion between politics, still focused on the problem of sovereignty, on one hand, and the economy, as a principle for applying domestic governance to the general scale of government, on the other hand. As a result, political decisions gradually began to be replaced by indices of economic statistics or resolved according to them. Thus, politics becomes the place of decision representation, but it is no longer the place of the decision (Galimberti, 2015, p. 7).

Foucault (2008b, p. 139-140) summarizes the problem with the following statement: “population will appear above all as the end of government”, to which he concludes with a crucial question: “What can the end of the government be?”. The French philosopher discusses extensively how the State can act directly and indirectly on the population, which, in short, can be understood as using the population itself as an instrument to reach it. From this, it is inferred that politics is present in the dispersed molecular set, which can be co-opted and managed by the State or result in a line of flight, a becoming-revolutionary, and mobilized according to the subject groups.

Machiavelli is an example of how politics and pedagogy were amalgamated. The Prince's politics intended to guarantee sovereignty while the pedagogy aimed at a (co)formation of the citizen to the instituted power. Despite a theory of desire, “to the Florentine, men, and things are unstable, desire leaves nothing at rest. [...] Man is determined, fundamentally, by the dynamism of the natural need of desire” (Ames, 2008, p. 140). In short, to Machiavelli, desire is individual and a source of conflict between men.
According to Foucault (2008b, p. 126-127), the "education of the Prince assures the upward continuity of forms of government", essentially through the control that will be exercised over reality through his objective and useful knowledge. The ascendancy is in the progressive formation of the individual who must first know how to govern himself, later, know how to manage his family and property well, and only later, qualify himself to govern the State.

Faced with such a scenario, the State and the State politics also prove to be inefficient models in understanding a productive process of the educational experience. There would remain some possibilities, but all of them, if confronted with the procedural and production principle that one aims to achieve, beforehand, would not be successful, as is the case of the Renaissance, humanism, or the military mobilizations present in the sixteenth century onwards.

Finally, what remains is to find elements, among the multiplicity of them, capable of identifying a productive movement in the field of education and not just an evolutionary or even dialectical movement. It is not a question of seeking the origin of the production of the educational experience, but of electing prominent characters who went with the flow that sustained the desire to educate, to govern, and even further, the desire to learn in a moment that was credited to pedagogy the potential representation of that desire.

The model in question, much more modest than what macropolitics could resort to (the State, the Church, the family) is represented by the small workshop of artisans, reaching the emerging manufacture, being recognized in the following characteristics: the family organization; independent production; the nebulous relationship between the means of production and the productive force. It is not a question of looking for evidence of a pedagogy of work, as there was no organization for that purpose in the workshops. Learning was an element of the production, but it was not the workshop's final goal. Therefore, it is appropriate here to apprehend the workshop mode of production in favor of the production of the formative experience along the same lines.

In summary, it can be said that pedagogy emerges as a part of the economic machine, which will later be coupled with the social machine. It is between the workshop and the sovereign palace, functioning not within the scope of great politics, still military, but in the space of domestic administration that will reproduce for the society as a whole the need for a government of all from the government of the offspring through the application of the economic principle, that the pedagogical field will carry out in its first movement with a view to its consolidation.

Foucault (2008b, 2014) shows how the family is raised to the condition of a model of government. In Classical Greece, the family, far from sustaining a mere reproductive condition of the species, represented the very genesis of the city administration, the formation of the original community. Marriage, more than a union or a contract, was an association for the government of the house and property that, if successful, would serve as expertise to the man who wanted to participate in the political decisions of the city. In the sixteenth century, the State, little by little, realized that it was necessary to appropriate this model in its ways of governing at the same time that it began to press, gradually, an opening of the family government to state intervention.

In general, the workshops of the sixteenth century operated according to family logic. By this logic, it is understood not only the conditions of affiliation but also of an alliance, in which not only associates direct descendants but also those who have common interests or submit to the artisan's interest, which seems to be the first production problem not only of economic order but also of desire and pedagogy.

In general terms, it can be said that, in the familist context, production works by transfer and not by creation; economic production involves mastering the craft of the father or the head of the workshop, which is all for him, but partial for male assistants and apprentices and unequal for women and daughters; the desiring-production is mediated by family or corporatist interest and the production of the pedagogical experience transits between the two formations, the subjective-parental and objective-professional.

The pedagogical machine of the sixteenth century began to take shape from the aggregation of other machines, some recently created, others being rediscovered and welded together and, all of them united to the socius.
The craftsman’s workshop offered the first elements – familist organization, circumstantially dependent production, willingness to distribute and alienate work, and desired production by capitalism; the palace also overlapped its elements: sovereignty, useful knowledge, discipline; finally, emerging technical machines were coupled, such as Gutenberg’s typographic pieces, the incorporation of literary genres such as satire and utopia “as a critique and the most radical projection of reality” (Manacorda, 2010, p. 249), the school institution as a place of training products and many other pieces of the social field.

Humanism itself took advantage of this invention to spread through the offer of various publications. If more texts could be produced and more people could read them, pedagogy would need to absorb absolute values, the process, serialization, and circulation in the indices of its machine. It is marked by an idea of self-realization, without the traditional religious mediation. To make man “live in the love of things and beings”, as Rabelais sustained, but it is also the cult of “learned man, of the man of classical culture dominating languages, speech and writing in any circumstances” as Erasmus accribed (Simard, 2011, p. 99).

Renaissance produced a new model of man, but it is suspected that it made nothing more than an image or a symbolism to be installed in the full body of capitalism that was consolidating itself, despite the emphasis made by Simard (2011), because, “fascinated by nature, Renaissance men were less theoretical and contemplative (like the Greeks) and more observers, empiricists, and inventors. So their sciences are those of the engineer and the mechanic” (Simard, 2011, p. 99). Engineering and mechanics required a new connection of knowledge, which was only implemented in a new productive way, parallel to the Renaissance interpretive key, but not dependent on it.

3 SATIRE AND UTOPIA: THE DEFORMATION IS ENGENDERED IN THE FORMATION

Despite all possible variations in the production of thought during the sixteenth century, in general, all of it refers to the same “humanist antimachinism, which wants to rescue imaginary or symbolic desire, to turn it back against the machine” (Deleuze; Guattari, 2011, p. 534), in an attempt to subject it, once again, to a molar repressive investment. Utopia (1516), by T. More, The City of the Sun (1602), by T. Campanella, and New Atlantis (1624), by F. Bacon, are works that offer a “new land”, arising from the composition of old strata, well defined and known, ready to capture desire. Despite this, according to Deleuze and Guattari (2011, p.534), “Humanism affects a withdrawal of the investment of desiring machines which nonetheless continue to operate inside it”. It’s just that even this withdrawal of the investment is the production of desire and it is so because of the machines that are working in a given reality.

It can be said that humanist antimachinism is an element of opposition to the desiring-production that was being embedded in the socius sometimes replacing outdated re-territorializing models, sometimes as an original re-territorializing piece, but defective, to be installed in the social machinery, composing, therefore, the productive model in question. To the extent that it emanated from the molecular multiplicity itself, brought about by the different interests at stake, an attempt at regression, whether to the domain of the Church, to primitive Christianity, to other political regimes, to the Greeks, etc. It became evident that contingency is, in fact, the main characteristic of universal history and not progress. There was, with that, something to be released and not properly created.

Satire is a kind of release and regression. On the one hand, it releases criticism from the seriousness with which it is often related, through a literary technique that aims to ridicule something given as unreliable. Such a release occurs in two directions: the first in which the satirical target is released out of disdain for its seriousness; and, the second, in which the artistic production renews itself in a transgressive language. On the other hand, it represents a return, as the satirical image is the juxtaposition of other images capable of making the one considered really, and ridiculous. Deleuze (2011a, p. 257) calls “[…] ‘satiric’ the process by which regression regresses itself”.

In Rabelais’s book, when Gargantuas sent to Paris, for example, as a young man, he is received with mockery by the citizens of that city, which angers the giant and motivates him to flood the city with his urine, killing thousands of people by drowning them. Even so, the survivors are not intimidated and continue to laugh at the strange creature. The excrement is, until then, an unthinkable and objectionable expression, but, on the occasion, the act is at the height of the prejudiced behavior of the citizens toward the giant.
In the same style, Rabelais’s narrative exposes sex as a practice and not as a restrained conduct; gluttony as a value in a reality marked by food scarcity; drunkenness as a search for sense in confrontation with the pretentious lucidity of religion; among other themes linked to the people and institutions of his time. But Rabelais also defines a return, a point at which any ridicule ends, a critique of vices and regimes of censorship of man’s natural diversity: “Do what you will, because people who are free, well-born, well-bred, and easy in an honest company have a natural spur and instinct which drives them to virtuous deeds and deflects them from vice” (Rabelais, 2003, p. 203).

Deleuze (2011a, p. 254), through a set of series that make up his theory of sense, ranging from Lewis Carroll to the Stoics, highlights that the combination of two types of words, obscene and injurious, is present in satire. The first type, according to the philosopher, “refers to the excrémental schizoid position (hallucinated action-passion)”; the second type, in turn, corresponds to the state of frustration, in which the individual is prevented from achieving the satisfaction of a drive as he withdraws by contending himself with expelling the injured party, revealing a manic-depressive position. No matter how intimate their connection is “[…] the obscene word illustrates the direct action of one body on another that suffers passion, whereas the insult pursues all at once the one who withdraws, dispossesses this one of all voice, and is itself a voice which withdraws” (Deleuze, 2011a, p. 253-254).

There is, however, a certain reaction to satire, a reterritorializing force marked by the seriousness of the criticism that invests the comic delirium with molar repression in the name of truth, as described in Umberto Eco’s 1980 novel, The Name of the Rose. In this work, laughter is pursued as a forbidden pleasure, while its pursuers are also targets of an oppressive force, which tries to prevent access to the sourcebook of laughter. Deleuze (2011b) indicates that this return movement is attributed to Plato with the election of classical irony, and is considered by Socrates as the one that defines not only who speaks, but a true way of speaking in effective conditions of speech – reality, need, possibility. That is, irony wins over humor to the extent that it reaches the “perfect state when it manages to determine not only the reality as a whole but the set of the possible as original supreme individuality” (Deleuze, 2011b, p. 140).

The presence of satire in the Renaissance was not immune to this type of investment. Both the scholastics, the clergy, and the nobility, frequent targets of satirical expressions, tried to confront ridicule with the seriousness invested by their machines, to reverse burlesque. But satire itself is a kind of anti-mechanism, which tries to dismantle the oppressive machine through sabotage or ineffectiveness. Ultimately, satire would be for anti-machinism, just as utopia would be for anti-production.

4 THE UTOPIAN ANTI-PRODUCTION

Anti-production is the specific state of the body without organs, the vector of intensities, Deleuze and Guattari (2011, p. 22) affirm, with repulsion and attraction being the main poles of this process in which the encounter between “the process of production of the desiring-machines and the nonproductive stasis of the body without organs”, generating an apparent conflict of opposition or interaction. It is because the body without organs does not support the action of the desiring machines working, therefore, “as that which is going to neutralize – or on the contrary put into motion – the two activities, the two heads of desire” (Deleuze; Guattari, 2011, p. 431).

The place of anti-production is not the simple impediment of desiring-production or social production, in what is didactic to differentiate – education, economics, politics, religion, etc., but an interaction of the anti-productive force with the agents of production. It is just that anti-production is part of the production. It is up to it, for example, to insert the feeling of lack as well as the idea of fantasy into social production. Anti-production is born with production and accompanies it, always in an attempt to appropriate the surplus product, justify the entire process and subjugate it to its functioning.

Therefore, all products must be considered under the action of anti-production, which acts equally on the social body. Deleuze and Guattari (2011) show, for example, how anti-production is the only one capable of spreading capitalism, since, by producing the sense of lack, it can generalize it to large sets of surplus production, but on the other hand, it is also the anti-production responsible for ensuring “the integration of groups and individuals into the system” (Deleuze; Guattari, 2011, p. 313) when it doubles capital to
a degree of communal imbecility capable of making any exit unfeasible. It is, therefore, expected that in Humanism, together with the critical investment coming from the different thinkers of the time, another type of force is engendered in this production. Not by chance, it seems to be the literary utopia, one among other forms assumed by the anti-production agents, which draws attention.

Renaissance humanism gleaned the liberation of man to live his humanity from what he considered valid in the face of the intellectual and creative capacities that were declared inherent to him, a manual of philosophical civility first hand will point out. Nevertheless, the role attributed to education, in such a context, was to develop in these men a kind of unlimited intellectual capacity. The corresponding pedagogical humanism, therefore, aimed to produce the polymath, with the pansophy of Comenius, Wolfgang Rakte (1571-1635), and Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588-1638) an expression of this movement, even though the figure of the specialist demonstrated resourcefulness in the technical arts of manufacturing, commerce, and bureaucracy in the period in question.

In summary, it can be said that satire was on the sidelines of humanist production, mocking even the functioning of machines, while utopia acted from within the productive process of the educational experience. Thus, even Rabelais, who was so committed to defending humor as a master tool for dismantling the scenarios that took the place of reality, would be enchanted by utopia and its source of ghosts.

Since it is not the subject of this investigation to present a concept of utopia, old or new, but only to deal with some of the elements that sustain it and that, in some way, collaborate for the understanding that this genre/concept was fundamental in the production processes of the educational experience from the sixteenth century onwards, some considerations are highlighted below.

Some see utopia strictly, or at least originally, associated with ideology since it presents itself as "a set of ideas and beliefs that form a cohesive and guiding sense of behavior" (Bastazin, 2012, p. 2), which are not found at present, except sparsely, but which make up the main objective in the author's creative activity – of generalization. Utopia projects this set, however, such a movement can be credited not to an ideal constitution, purely metaphysical, but virtual, with a transcendent characteristic. It is that utopia creates for itself an organization plan that it propagates as possible, therefore, virtually real, which has not yet been (re)territorialized or cannot be carried out due to some contingency that makes it impossible to make it current.

Therefore, another recurring idea is that utopia is related to a non-place. Even if this statement is etymologically valid, the idea of a non-place does not find support except in a strictly idealistic or fantastic perspective. Utopia, as it seems, carries a much larger reterritorializing portion than what it publicly assumes, that is, it still contains molecular elements recognizable in the social field, but subordinated to a more intense and oppressive molar organization. In that regard,

Plato's Republic (1993) is, what we could say, a production surplus of the world of ideas that, needing to take shape, takes place as a fantasy construction of a model society. Perfect and powerful. The Republic represents, for its creator, the place where the perfect advancement of humanity is possible. The example of a social space where a man would have the possibility of feeling fulfilled or even being happy (Bastazin 2012, p. 3)

Not by chance, some maintain that utopia is linked to the realization of a state of pure satisfaction. Well-being, equality, justice, wealth, and happiness appear as values that would be guaranteed in the new land. Contrary to appearances, utopia would be the virtualization of all repressive investments in the name of a new organizational plan.

Despite all the efforts of utopia to assert itself as a political, cultural, educational, economic expression, etc., its field of analysis is still inscribed in the field of idealizations. Its machines, unlike desiring, social or technical machines, do not work without the activation of a prime mover, which is neither God nor Nature, but the primum utopian, the one that carries with it the map of the territory, and the instruction manual for the machines it created.

In turn, the pedagogical utopia, as a product of the literary utopia, was nourished by the same elements that conditioned the second to the status of a fantastic source, animating the educational space in the same conditions of a utopian society: the supremacy of lack.
which drives the individual to the new territory (through formation); pleasure as the conclusive objective of desire, which launches the individual into a perpetual search (and the promise of a future through education); the non-place that puts him in despair with the reality in which he lives (and bets on training as a way out); and the feeling that it is possible to ban the becoming in the name of a set of comforting hallucinations – full justice, endless food, pleasurable work, productive leisure, in short, happiness (of educated men).

In the case of pedagogical utopia, there is the advantage, of course, of being directed to a field that is, by vocation, accompanied by a certain utopian discourse, which seems to be intrinsic to this type of activity that, “in the light of reforming ideals, comes to combine the model of a perfect and harmonious man, typical of humanistic pedagogy, with the projection of an ideal just society” (CAMBI, 1999, p. 273), that is, to form the man of tomorrow’s society.

As Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) recalls, in an interview given to Luiz Fernando Teixeira:

The role played by education in all political utopias since ancient times shows how natural it seems to start a new world with those who are new by birth and nature. [...] But even the children who want to educate so that they are citizens of a utopian tomorrow are denied their future role in the political organism, because, from the point of view of the youngest, whatever the adult world can propose as new is necessarily older than themselves (Teixeira, 2018, p.n.)

The pedagogical utopia, following the clues presented by Arendt, is not originally addressed to children, but to them as potential adults. Utopia remains new, just for a moment, the moment it is created by its author, and soon becomes old when presented to others, as it is a residual product and not a production process. So,

[...] the forms of social production, like those of desiring production, involve an unengendered nonproductive attitude, an element of anti-production coupled with the process, a full body that functions as asccius. This socius may be the body of the earth, that of the tyrant, or capital. (Deleuze; Guattari, 2011, p. 22)

That is why the instance of anti-production inherent to the production process of the educational experience will be marked, specifically, not by the utopia that was coupled to the social machines of the sixteenth century, functioning as an extension of the bookish pedagogy of the time, composing, therefore, the ideal projection of society, but through the novel of formation – Bildungsroman, at the end of the eighteenth century, as an “unengendered unproductive attitude” of the flows that crossed the socius since Renaissance (Deleuze; Guattari, 2011, p. 22).

5 FORMATION NOVEL: GIVING SHAPE TO THE CHARACTER AND THE FORMATION OF MAN

The Bildungsroman is more of a comeback, but not just that. It provokes a reterritorialization in the training field with the insertion of an element that seems not to be concerned with composing the pedagogical plan in vogue in the social field: the return to the individual and its direct connection with the universal. Furthermore, the appreciation of local culture and self-cultivation as a formative process, typical of German Romanticism, appears out of step with the dominant scenario of the French Enlightenment or about a retrograde humanistic pedagogy in the Renaissance style. The Bildungsroman was still contrary to technical-liberal expectations, insofar as it was also opposed to strictly professional training, even though work is an important element of the formative narratives.

If in utopia with its ideal cities, “the formation of the man-citizen is, in fact, a central moment in the social balance and is carried out, above all, through a collective education administered by the State and disciplined accepted by all its members” (CAMBI, 1999, p. 273), in the Bildungsroman there is centralization in the main character, punctuating the individual character of the formation even though the world is real and the source of the problems to be faced by the character. The individual is put on a formative journey that may coincide with his/her biological development – from childhood to maturity, in which the hero/heroine seeks to reach a certain degree of perfection in his/her spiritual, psychological, social life, physical and moral integrity state. In the broader context, Bildung the term from which the novel of formation – Bildungsroman – derives
imposed itself from the second half of the eighteenth century, expressing, at the same time, the defining element, the process, and the result of culture. [...] the meaning of the term remained reasonably fixed throughout the nineteenth century, a period in which the word progressively empties and its content enters a crisis, which Friedrich Nietzsche’s *Extemporaneous Considerations* would already attest (Suárez, 2005, p. 193).

In general, it can be said that the emergence of the *Bildungsroman* operated an attempt to shift the concern with the government of the offspring to the government of self, as an introspection, at the same time, of the individual towards him/herself, but also of the culture with itself, as a defense against the harbinger of new times – the modernity. Therefore, more than understanding how this process took place, it is pertinent to identify in this variation of the novel genre the movement that inspired formation in general.

Bakhtin (2015), when analyzing the construction of the novel genre in literature, presents a typology that comprises three stylistic forms – the travel novel, the novel of the ordeal, and the biographical novel, which, in one way or another, will be present in the development of the novel of formation/education, which appeared in the second half of the eighteenth century, “as a characteristic of the German Enlightenment” (Bakhtin, 2015, p. 223).

No concrete historical modality [of a novel] maintains the principle in pure form, but it is characterized by the prevalence of this or that principle of character shaping. Since all elements mutually determine one another, a certain principle of character shaping is linked to a certain type of plot, to a conception of the world, and a certain composition of the novel (Bakhtin, 2015, p. 205).

In all three cases, the emphasis is on the shaping of the character, which remains unchanged, whether during or after the narrative. In the adventure novel, for example, Bakhtin (2015) says that the adventure is greater than the hero who goes through it. Adventure Time has nothing to do with historical time, marked by the linearity of facts. This novel is not related to the social context and makes it an exotic element and backdrop for the adventure, and also “unaware of the formation, the development of man” (Bakhtin, 2015, p. 207), making him a static hero.

The novel of the ordeal is, according to Bakhtin (2015), the style that strongly subsidizes the appearance of the Germanic *Bildungsroman*. The time of the narrative, as in the adventure novel, is not historical, but neither is it adventurous, “consisting of a contiguity of approximate moments” (Bakhtin, 2015, p. 206). An alternative is a psychological time and its parallel, legendary time, which are mixed with geographical exoticism.

In turn, the biographical novel, perhaps the one that offers the least elements to the *Bildungsroman*, supports a hero stripped of his heroism in the name of objectivity and the search for real results. Constructed from the notion of biographical time, the closest to historical time, in this type of novel, “the events shape not the man, but his destiny” (Bakhtin, 2015, p. 215).

Thus, the novel of education as a modality of the novel genre marks the transition from character shaping to the composition of a character in formation. The issue, according to Bakhtin (2015), seems to be the insertion of the character’s movement in counterpoint to the inertia that previously characterized it. According to the author, “the vast majority of cases [...] know only the image of the finished character. [...]. Parallel to this dominant and massive type, there is another type of novel incomparably rarer, which produces the image of a man in formation” (Bakhtin, 2015, pp. 218-219).

Bakhtin (2015), in *The Aesthetics of Verbal Creation*, does not hesitate to produce series after series to classify the novel. However, the objective here is limited and circumscribed to borrowing some of his considerations about the novel of formation and, therefore, stands out among the categories extracted from the didactic-pedagogical novel.

However, the Bakhtinian analysis will choose another category as the main expression of the *Bildungsroman* – the realistic novel of formation. Despite all the reservations made by the author that support interconnection between the five types (cyclical novel; a novel of experience; biographical/autobiographical novel of formation; didactic-pedagogical novel; a realistic novel of formation), it is evident the author’s choice to privilege the latter type of novel as one that would gather the qualities of a formative narrative. Nonetheless, it is noted that in the same work, the approach of the biographical/autobiographical novel of formation has greater
emphasis than any other. One sees, for example, the extensive analysis devoted to Goethe in this case. Therefore, even though the Russian theorist has a predilection for the realistic model of the novel of formation, listing Rabelais as an exponent of this modality, he ends up focusing his investigation on the model that consecrated the narrative style for the variation of the genre: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.

Therefore, it seems that the didactic-pedagogical novel is capable of responding to the specific reasons for the problem of producing the educational experience, which can be exposed in the form of an unproductive attitude – anti-production, of bookish pedagogy that was exhausted in the face of the challenges of the present as has already been presented. This variation of the novel of formation is relevant, as it not only presents the character’s formative trajectory but uses blocks of knowledge applied to this trajectory: there are, for example, indications of emerging developmental psychology, composing, finally, a novel with nuances or even obvious educational recommendations that go beyond the limits of the narrative and come to life in reality. Therefore, it can be said that this type of novel favored a preview of the development of a new educational environment.

Thus, the Bildungsroman as a novel genre, regardless of its different variations, is understood as an expression of anti-production to the first productive mode of the educational experience, insofar as it provokes a return to the idealizing principle of formation. The end of the modus operandi of bookish pedagogy pointed to a technification of this knowledge, a highly educated society for the full functioning of humanity devoted to technology. Work, a differentiating element of the modern school about similar spaces of other times, becomes the beacon of affective and cognitive relationships between individuals disposed of in these environments.

It was up to the novel of formation to interrupt this movement, giving rise to other values that, in general, contradicted any formative intention that did not pass through the idealized form of human education. It is, in summary, an attempt to return to the formation, as presented by Bakhtin (2015) in the question of the formation of a static character for a non-historical time and a reality that found no place anywhere except in the novel.

This anti-productive interruption was responsible for resurrecting the feeling that anticipated and animated the emergence of pedagogy in the sixteenth century, which was the search for the art of governing, achieved in politics in the eighteenth century. In the case of pedagogy, this art of government obtained results comparable to the political and economic fields only in the twentieth century, with the consolidation of scientific education, and analysis of the second mode of production of the educational experience.

Still in this regard, it is important to highlight that anti-production is responsible, according to Deleuze and Guattari (2011), for the counter-production of the lack of machinism, as well as its accommodation within the production process. As in the economy in general, the economy of cognitions makes use, in the capitalist society, of the propagation of the feeling of lack by

> [...] deliberately organizing wants and needs (manque) amid an abundance of production; making all of the desire teeter and fall victim to the great fear of not having one's needs satisfied; and making the object dependent upon a real production that is supposedly exterior to desire (the demands of rationality), while at the same time, the production of desire is categorized as fantasy and nothing but fantasy. (Deleuze; Guattari, 2011, p. 45)

It is not by chance that novels of formation are often based not only on lack, but also on two other contradictions in the theory of the right to desire – a natural reality in which the character finds him/herself, and the conclusion of his/her career as something festive. Thus, in literature, there is also a record of the attempt to always place desire as related "to lack or law; a natural or spontaneous reality; a pleasure or, above all, the festival" (Deleuze; Parnet, 1998, p. 122).

The lack of law is the starting point of the didactic-pedagogical novel, as it is from it that the character can be provoked or directed towards the formation. Emile carries with him, even before his birth, the mission of a new pact, of a new society based on the insertion of the young person according to a list of absences and a universal law. The first absence is positive: man lacks perversion or evil by nature. The other absences present themselves negatively along the trajectory of the young person: he lacks basic care provided by a mother... He lacks a tutor... He lacks contact with nature... He lacks maturity for contact with the classics etc.
In the novel formation, the feeling of lack is falsely filled along the formative trajectory, thanks, of course, to the stability of the scenarios through which the character travels. It could not be otherwise, because desire as a lack is never effective. *Emile* just does not resent the absence of the hectic life of urban centers, for example, because, for him, this is not even a lack of something. The city will appear only in adult life. *Emile* finds himself constantly inserted in a favorable and stable landscape, which offers him problems and adversities, but at the same time, solutions and overcoming obstacles. Nothing is more present in this novel than the natural and spontaneous expression of desire. Not by chance, “[…] for Rousseau, for example, the passage from the state of nature to the social state is like a leap in […]” (Deleuze; Guattari, 1987, p. 102).

The natural reality, which the novels of formation seem to support, is sometimes seen as an original principle, sometimes as a mystifying element of desire. The desiring machines are replaced by foundational forms that were lost in the present time in the first case, and by miraculous forms that are never realized in the second case.

In these same novels of formation, the festivity as the equivalent of desire, or its materialization in the festive form of closing the event – which can be self-knowledge or the success of the instruction received – often causes the formative trajectory to be mistakenly attributed to the idea of completion of all education. By the end of the novel, the character is ready for life beyond the plot. With that, the transcendence of the formative trajectory to the idea of formation that was refined throughout the narrative and that, now, will serve as a model for everyday life.

In turn, even if this first mode of production of the educational experience is not the preferred plan for the intended analysis, it would be impossible not to point out the problem that concerns its entire constitution. What is the position of the desire (to learn) in the social field that was constituted in the period between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries?

In general, this first mode of production of the educational experience established important relationships for the limitation of what would come to be determined not only by pedagogy but the forthcoming capitalist education. The first point of this limitation is the friction between a statutory and a contractual pole of pedagogy. Unlike a dispute between common sense and a scientific one that will be revealed later on in the educational scene, this dispute will provoke the competition of specialized knowledge about the formation and a confrontation against alternative ways of approaching the educational problem.

Another point to be highlighted is the fact that duty will increasingly occupy the place of desire in educational matters with the institutionalization of pedagogical knowledge. Since interest in formation is the engine of educational achievement in a civilized society and, above all, invested by the molar flow, the fusion between interest and duty makes it easier to carry out projects and the structuring of mass education systems.

6 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The first mode of production of the educational experience is defined here as the constitution of a pre-pedagogical society, responsible for promoting the certainty that through formation it was possible to establish new relationships between individuals and between them and culture and society, operating, for this purpose, discursive flows around satire, utopia and the novel of formation.

Under the influence of Deleuze and Guattari, it is concluded that this mode of production of the educational experience resulted in the setting up of a pedagogy machine, ready not only to fulfill a function but to continuously operate flows that could pass through it. In summary, what we have is the composition of this pedagogy machine not as a technical machine, delimited by an objective or a field of action, but as a social machine, ready to invest socially in the production of subjectivities.

Faced with this, the medieval work preparation workshop is the starting point and not the formation of the hero or the citizen. The workshop, in general terms, brings with it a new social hierarchy of useful knowledge, as well as a practical discipline of bodies prepared for economic production and social life.
The pedagogy machine cannot be restricted to the technical machine either, as its advent required the coupling of other technical machines, as happened, for example, with Gutenberg’s invention of the press and movable type, which favored the dissemination of texts that, in turn, contributed to the popularization of the practice of reading and, consequently, to the need for instruction.

Regarding Ponocrates’s purgative, it is not a metaphor but a machine. When the new master of Gargantua administered the solution to him, it is to provoke in the young giant the evacuation of all the useless knowledge that he previously received. Rabelais disdains the seriousness of a strictly erudite formation that does not find meaning in those who receive it. More than that, despite the limitation of the method that Ponocrates employed in his preceptorship, not so much revolutionary, the purgative represents, in potency, the possibility of producing lines of flight outside the instituted from the machination of the desire to learn due to the interest and duty to learn. The possibility of making the young man excrete everything he had known then encouraged not only the feeling that it is possible to know what matters, but also that there is a sterile and weak imposition on what is necessary to know.

In the opposite way of Rabelais’s pedagogy, the novel of formation, as just presented, worked as an ultimatum to pedagogical knowledge, saying that it was necessary to return to the ideal principle of formation. Nevertheless, the origin of pedagogy projected an ideal that the government as a whole depended, in equal measure, on an effective method of controlling and disciplining children, for the good of the house, the prosperity of wealth, and the image of the ruler as the one consequently able to govern all. This ideal, however, loses its ability to impose itself as there is a current need for a constant movement that imposes itself and confronts the always static ideality.

Finally, there is a decisive conclusion from this first mode of production that can be summarized in the argument that it is not enough to govern the offspring, but it is necessary to govern everyone, not only through the extensive practices of power, such as right or government but also, through the formation and control of the production and circulation of patterns of subjectivity.

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