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F Ó R U M L I N G U Í S T I C O

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INTEGRATIONISM AND LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES

ADRIAN PABLÉ
CRISTINE SEVERO
SINFREE MAKONI
PETER JONES
(ORG.)

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F Ó R U M L I N G U Í S T ! C O

INTEGRATIONISM AND LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES

ADRIAN PABLÉ, CRISTINE SEVERO, SINFREE MAKONI E PETER JONES (ORG.)

VOLUME 19, *SPECIAL ISSUE*, FEB. 2022

The present special issue (*Fórum Linguístico*, v.19, Special Issue, 2022) goes back to the online conference entitled *Integrationism and Language Ideologies* (March 15-20, 2021), which was organized by the Language Policy Group of the Federal University of Santa Catarina in conjunction with the *International Association for the Integrational Study of Language and Communication* (IAISLC). The contributions in this issue are for the most part revised versions of the conference papers presented at the event. The special issue also features an interview with integrationist David Bade as well as a Portuguese translation by Cristine Severo and Ana Cláudia Eltermann of one of Harris' texts (*The integrationist critique of orthodox linguistics*). The present volume introduces key ideas on Roy Harris' integrational linguistics to a Lusophone readership by highlighting relevant issues in language ideology, linguistic methodology, decolonial linguistics and (socio)linguistic theory. The various contributions all underline the necessity to rethink (or 'demythologize') the semiological and philosophical foundations of orthodox linguistics and a need to develop a theory of communication in which language is treated as an integrated mode rather than a segregated object.

We open this special issue with a fascinating interview with the integrationist **David Bade** (*Prologue: Saying Something. An interview with DB*), who answers questions concerning his journey into integrationism; the core concepts or discussions of integrationism; the importance of Harris' books on Supercategories; the main priorities and challenges that integrationism faces in engaging with a wider audience; and the ways integrationism shaped his views and practices as a farmer.

Adrian Pablé (University of Hong Kong) in the paper *On language and its limits* considers three positions regarding the limits of language: two (mutually incompatible) 'segregational' approaches, which he contrasts with the 'integrational' approach advocated by Roy Harris. Pablé argues that an integrationist construal of the limits of language cannot be dissociated from the Harrisian concept of 'radical indeterminacy'. The latter notion is highly controversial within the linguistic orthodoxy, as it sponsors the idea that 'languages' qua describable objects are theoretically redundant. The author supports the thesis that the limits of language cannot be contemplated independently of the human communicational infrastructure and that these limits are co-extensive with personal linguistic experience.

The article *Integrationism in context: the integrationist tradition in the contemporary landscape of linguistic research – towards a 'critical communication studies'*, by **Peter Jones** (Sheffield Hallam University), presents a personal view on where integrationism sits in the current field of linguistics and applied linguistics research. In doing so, the author aims at clarifying the distinctive contribution that the integrationist tradition may make in responding to the challenge that Alastair Pennycook and Sifree Makoni (2020) have posed of a re-made linguistics which can learn from and do justice to the struggles for both social justice and equality across both the Global South and Global North as well as for harmonious and mutually beneficial relations with our world and the other beings that share it with us.

In the article *Methodology in Language Research: A Sailing Between Scylla and Charybdis*, **Dorthe Duncker** (University of Copenhagen) argues that unlike most linguistic theories, integrational linguistics does not include a methodology for linguistic inquiry. Integrationists are critical of the methodologies and assumptions of modern linguistics and find the notion of *linguistic data* highly problematic. For this, integrationists have taken a lot of heat from researchers from data-driven research traditions who ask for a methodological alternative and find the lack of empirical integrational research frustrating. In this essay, Duncker considers some of the background for the integrational critique of linguistic methodologies and discusses how to address the difficulties pertaining to linguistic data.

Vicky Khasandi-Telewa (Laikipia University), **Sifree Makoni** (Penn State University) and **David Bade** (University of Chicago/retired) are the authors of *Proverbial futures: proverbs and political discourse in Africa*. By examining references to proverbs in African political discourses in light of Integrational semiology and Southern Theory, the authors find the creative construction of desired futures that may grow out of the present situation in light of what has been learned from the past. They argue that proverbial discourse, always speaking to the present situation and commenting on available possibilities while being open to multiple interpretations, suggests an important argument about the provisional and contextual nature of all our knowledge. Beginning with the assumption that each of us is in a better position to understand our own situation than any foreign observer or abstract schemata could ever be, they propose that the indeterminacy of creative proverbial discourse can present a better epistemological foundation for dealing with the uncertainties of natural events.

The paper *Contracting, expanding and integrating translation: who and where to draw the line?*, by **Sinead Kwok** (University of Hong Kong), looks into the many-sided debate on the definition and thus delimitation of translation, extending over a generalized conception of translation as interlingual meaning transfer, a linguistically-centered expansion of translation, a modal orientation of translation, as well as a semiotic reform of translation. It is contended that the many 'expansionist' attempts at redefining translation, albeit bringing about a refreshing departure from the rigid, traditional concept at first blush, are either still predisposed to the translation myth (a manifestation of the language myth), or reliant on decontextualization and depersonalization. An integrationist critique on some major trends in the redefinition of translation is offered in this paper, as well as an introduction to an integrationist view of translation.

Ruyu Yan (University of Hong Kong) in *Translanguaging space: prolegomena to an integrational critique* argues that the notion of translanguaging space and its alleged functions/values cannot be taken for granted. Taking issue with the notion of translanguaging space, the author outlines an introductory critique from an integrational perspective to delineate the integrationist position. The critique also aims to contest the validity of the purported functions of translanguaging space and promised values of the translanguaging perspective. Her work sheds light on preliminary questions about the notion of translanguaging space, which will invoke further discussion. In terms of significance, this article highlights the deficiencies of translanguaging theory and contributes to an integrational critique on the hybrid linguistic theory, i.e., translanguaging.

The article *Text-immanent meaning: integrationist and terminological approaches to the indeterminacy of the sign*, by **Bassey E. Antia** (University of the Western Cape/South Africa), puts the fields of terminology and integrationism in conversation over the question of the indeterminacy of the sign. Antia employs the lenses offered by both paradigms to discuss data on the indeterminacy of terms in a text on legislative procedure. He argues that the data appear to confirm several related integrationist notions, including meaning-making as idiosyncratic contextualization and the reflexivity principle, thus making it apparent how the field of terminology can leverage on the integrationist philosophy of language to enhance its explanatory power. However, he also argues that theoretical insights from text-based terminology can serve as a corrective to perceptions of radical indeterminacy of the sign in integrationism.

The paper *Integrationism: Roy Harris's Artspeak, Artistic Creativity, and Human Diversity in the Age of Globalization*, by **David M. Balosa** (University of Maryland), provides a perspective on how Roy Harris's work can be used beyond linguistics and communication studies toward fields of studies such as social and public policies and related fields. This study proposes that integrationism should also address issues related to the fields of global studies, sustainable development, and other related fields. The author argues that the influence of integrationism on linguistics and communication analysis should be expanded to social and public policies to foster epistemic equity, diversity, and other intercultural values across academic disciplines and professional practices across the world.

The article *On 'racing' Linguistics*, by **Gabriel Nascimento**, is written in Portuguese and problematizes the wide use of the verb *to race* by scholars in language studies. A great range of these uses come from the global north, such as the use of the terms *linguaging race* or *racing language*. The author proposes that such discussions by Linguistics has contributed to mark its whiteness in discourse. By soing so, the paper problematizes the white supremacy in racial language studies.

The article *(Dis)lusophonies and (un)teachings: towards other language policies*, by **Alexandre Cohn da Silveira** (UNILAB), **Charlott Eloize Leviski** (UEPG), and Sabrina **Garcia Rodrigues Balsalobre** (UNILAB), is written in Portuguese and analyses how discourses concerning the idea of Lusophony works as a political project that integrates the cultural and linguistic diversity of Portuguese-speaking countries. From an integrationist perspective (HARRIS, 1998), the authors defend a radical contextualized concept of language, assuming language as a social practice. Concerning the Brazilian university context, the paper presents some institutional actions promoted by the University of International Integration of Afro-Brazilian Lusophony that contribute to the construction of what the authors call as an 'integrationist linguistic education'.

Finally, the paper *The integrationist critique of orthodox linguistics* is the first of Roy Harris' texts translated into Portuguese by **Ana Claudia Eltermann** and **Cristine Severo**. This article was first published in *The Sixteenth LACUS Forum 1989* (1990; p. 63-77), edited by M. P. Jordane and L.A.C.U.S. (Lake Bluff). The paper was republished in *Integrational Linguistics: a First Reader* (1998, p. 15-26), edited by Roy Harris and George Wolf.

We would like to thank the authors for their important and original contributions to this special issue, and the Editor of Fórum Linguístico for the opportunity to edit this Special Issue and for their guidance throughout the process. We invite you all to go through the interesting papers concerning *Integrationism and Language Ideologies*.

INTERVIEW | *ENTREVISTA* | ENTREVISTA



PROLOGUE:
SAYING
SOMETHING

AN INTERVIEW WITH DAVID BADE*

David Bade was born on a small farm in Illinois at the height of the Cold War. The rise of industrial agriculture meant that there was not enough income on the farm for it to support him and his brothers, so he went to the University of Illinois to study languages. Since a specific degree was required and he could not simply study languages, he decided to study Linguistics, thinking that it ought to have some relation to language. It sort of did, at least if you think that colourless green ideas sleep furiously. He studied the KiMeru tonal system in a field methods class and thus began a life long interest in language in Africa and language as song. Yet since he could not write a dissertation in verse, much less whistle like the Meru do, he took a job in a library where his linguistic oriented interests were amply satisfied and he continued to work in libraries until he was able to retire and return to the farm. While shearing sheep and mending fence, he continues to ponder the nature and meaning of birth, death, race, gender, a kind word, a smile, and the relationship between love and justice.

* The interviewee is now retired from the University of Chicago. Photo credit: Khaliun, who is David Bade's daughter. E-mail: dwbade1958@outlook.com.

The are interviewers: **Adrian Pablé**, associate professor at the University of Hong Kong and the Secretary of the International Association for the Integrational Study of Language and Communication; **Sinfree Makoni**, Professor of Applied Linguistics and African Studies at Pennsylvania State University in the United States and Interim Director of African Studies at Pennsylvania State University; **Peter Jones**, a reader in Language and Communication in the Department of Humanities, *Sheffield Hallam University*; and **Cristine Severo**, associate professor at the Federal University of Santa Catarina/Brazil and CNPq Research Productivity Fellow 2. E-mails: apable@hku.hk; sinfreemakoni@hotmail.com; P.E.Jones@shu.ac.uk; crisgorski@gmail.com.

INTERVIEWERS (I): *Could you describe your own journey into integrationism and the impact this has had on your intellectual and professional life?*

DAVID BADE (DB): With the circulation of Chomsky's Pisa lectures in not-yet-published typescript in early 1979 and all of generative grammar brought under the reign of "move alpha", I abandoned a PhD in linguistics with the feeling that all of linguistics had become a ludicrous intellectual game completely alienated from anything that one could call important. "Government and Binding" certainly sounded to me like "Fascism and Torture"; had I been aware at that time of Harris's 1983 remark about Chomsky's 'fascist concept of languages if ever there was one' (HARRIS, 1983), I might have remained a student of linguistics. Instead, I set out on my own to study poetry, philosophy, cybernetics, Buddhism and Mongolian history, and it was not until sometime in 1998 in a bookstore that I stumbled upon a trilogy of books by Roy Harris, picked up *The Language Machine* and read his "Epilogue: Saying Nothing". That was enough to turn my attention back to linguistics. Nevertheless, at that time I was in the middle of what would eventually be a 3 volume catalogue of books in African languages in the library at Northwestern University, and it was not until that was finished in early 2002 that I once again stumbled upon another book by Roy Harris—*The Language Connection*—and finally sat down and read it in earnest. Over the next two years I read everything that I could find of his, finally writing to Harris in late 2004 and thereby initiating a correspondence which led to my first publications in linguistics – 27 years after leaving graduate school. It was by putting the language maker at the origin of language that I was finally able to make sense of so much that had perplexed me over the decades – from my childhood experiences with pentecostal christianity and its 'speaking in tongues' to the problems of communication in technical systems that was to occupy so much of my time during the decade 1997-2007, all the way to my then just completed 2002 study of the sources for the study of the Mongolian naval campaign to Jawa in the 13th century. It was not just linguistics that Harris seemed to open up, but philosophy, literature, historiography, science, computers, technical communication and religion; in fact just about all of the myths upon which our civilization is founded.

I: *Which concepts or discussions would you highlight as the core of integrationism?*

DB: The central revelation in Harris's work is that language is a product of language makers. I deliberately refer to this as a revelation because this is not something that one can discover by analyzing sound or text, nor by counting speech events, etc. Writers on language have for centuries taken language to be an object that one finds 'out there' and that one may examine as one examines rocks, trees, etc. What Harris realized was that language is natural in exactly the same way as are marriages, laws, art, savings banks, trade unions, road kill and watches; language is NOT natural in the same way as sunshine, rain, tornadoes, volcanic eruptions, redwood trees and baby sharks. That is to say that language is a product of human activity and can only be understood from that perspective, while granting that human beings are but one among the many creatures that together make up what we call nature.

When William Paley famously argued that a watch found in nature will necessarily lead one to the assumption of a watchmaker because it is obviously the product of a design (and thus no accident), he failed to realize that no one could be led to the idea of design or a designer unless designers and their designs were already perfectly well known phenomena. No machine found alongside the road will ever be recognized as a machine unless the one examining it already knows what machines are. And in exactly the same manner marriages, laws, art and much else are products of human activity and can only be understood as such products; to eliminate the maker from consideration is to render such phenomena forever beyond comprehension. This is the point that Harris (1973) first grasped in *Synonymy and Linguistic Analysis*. There can be no analysis of linguistic artefacts unless one already understands them to be linguistic artefacts. An analysis must be based on what someone meant by those artefacts, but what someone meant can only be grasped from within the communication event itself. It follows from this realization that one cannot arrive at any notion of language based on sound in the environment or marks on a page; language can only be recognized as language by someone who already knows language as a language maker, and this includes the child who realizes that her gestures and sounds are taken as responses by those who are gesticulating and making sounds around her. No creature who does not make language can 'find' language 'out there'; only a language maker can do that because only a language maker can know *that there is language*.

I: *What is the importance of Harris' books on Supercategories and why wasn't the reception among the members of the integrationist community a unanimously positive one?*

DB: I honestly cannot comment on the reception of Harris's writings of his last 15 years by his students and those interested in his earlier works since I have not read many responses to them. I do know that *The Semantics of Science*, *The Linguistics of History*, and *Language, Lexicography and the Law* were not well received by reviewers outside of linguistics, and there are various reasons for that. For the most part all of his 'supercategory' books seem to have been dismissed or ignored by all but integrationists, and as you note, some even among Harris's admirers have not appreciated them. I found all of them of great interest, but I can see why others would be put off by them. *The Linguistics of History*, for example, suffers from not really being that familiar with debates in historical writing of the past few decades, and for some that is sufficient reason to dismiss the book entirely. To put it simply, Harris was an outsider and dismissed as such without any serious effort to grapple with his arguments; arguments, of course, that readers would really have had to pursue at greater length in his earlier works. Other readers had no clue as to what Harris thought was at stake (e.g. C. Behan McCullagh), and that is the same problem that many linguists have had with all of Harris's writings.

Yet I think Harris really had to write those volumes, for what those books, individually and collectively, force the reader to grapple with is the very basic notion of reification and its implications for everything about which we wish to speak or write. And this draws us directly into the age old philosophical problems of realism versus nominalism, the problem of the nature of universals and categories, and "how language relates to the world". That is not just a matter of linguistic theory; it is a matter of everything we say or write. If indeed how language relates to the world is necessarily *how the speaker/writer relates the world*, then no discourse—scientific, digital, religious, philosophical or poetic – can give us the one and only "God's Truth" perspective on the world: everything remains forever up for debate between you and me and all those who come after us, as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, words without end.

Nevertheless, while Harris (2009) suggests (in *After Epistemology*) that all language is reification, he does not mean that we cannot say what we mean nor that we cannot mean what we say, nor that we cannot speak about the real worlds of our experience. Harris steers a course between the scylla of the reifications of scientists and the charybdis of the relativists and postmodernists by insisting that we make language and that we make worlds with language, but that we do not make the world of the Other which stubbornly confronts us in all its reality and forces us to respond, as best we may, always needing to be ready to revise and restate and reposition ourselves depending upon what response we draw forth from the very real world within which we live.

The issue was actually put very clearly by the Russian philosopher N.O. Lossky in 1919. He made the integrationist argument *avant la lettre* in order to refute its "extreme nominalism":

Extreme nominalists maintain that classes of things are bundles of individual phenomena which have become associated with *one and the same* name. Yet if the point of view of extreme nominalism be consistently adhered to, and the changing aspects of life be *exclusively* attended to, the question arises whether we are justified in speaking even of the *same* name. The name 'tiger' spoken or written by me yesterday and today is not one and the same word, but two different words: the intonation, the clearness of pronunciation, the intensity of the sound, the timbre of the voice, are sure to have been quite different yesterday from what they are to-day. We have to do with phenomena almost as different from one another as two real tigers that live in different forests or as two acts of representing them in consciousness. (LOSSKY, 1919)

Yet in his presentation of nominalism, Lossky slights the language maker and writes as if it is language itself that groups things in the world, arguing (on page 287) "The contention is that the grouping of things into classes is not in any way determined by the properties of the things themselves but is due to names. ... If the grouping of things into classes is determined by names – understanding by a name not a universal element but something created afresh in every single act of utterance – how is it that a name is never associated with groups of heterogeneous things...?" Here the "grouping of things... is due to names", *not to our naming*. Whether it is categories or supercategories, for Lossky at least, the issue is "how language relates to the world" of heterogeneous things – *not* how we relate those things and choose to speak/write of them. For Harris this is not the issue at all, and this is what distinguishes integrationism from both realism and nominalism. While we would agree that our grouping of things into classes is indeed determined by the properties of the things themselves (at least if we are paying attention to them), from an

integrationist perspective the language we make in speaking of those intellectual acts of classification and grouping is, as Lossky noted in the previous passage, “not the same” from one utterance to another. The issue is not “how language relates to the world” but *how we relate the world*, the real world of our experience, when every utterance is indeed “created afresh in every single act.” Supercategories are created and sustained by us through our attending to the real world and the language made by others around us. How we speak and write about any matters (singularities, categories, supercategories, past, present, future) either affirms a previous discourse or changes it: the decision as to how to understand and to relate the world is an every moment decision for all of us.

I: *Recently the distinction has been introduced between moderate (or soft) integrationists and orthodox (or hard-core) integrationists, implying that the former are the way forward for linguistics. What is your stance when it comes to recognising different types of integrationism?*

DB: To think about the matter in terms other than *integrationisms* is much more appealing to me. And we can think about this issue in other terms, such as asking whether Harris’s writings may have a positive influence on linguistics and other disciplines without all those inspired by his ideas having to become linguists or accepting his writings as Holy Writ (God forbid!). I am certain that were Harris still living and should he read everything that I have written, he would subject me to the same withering criticism that he directed at virtually everyone else whose writings he read. Would that then make me a soft integrationist, sort of like a Lakoff or McCawley in the 1970s, banished from the Party by the Master? There is absolutely no need to establish an orthodox integrationism nor to worry about integrationisms. I think the only good way forward will not be following Harris like puppies, but learning everything from him that we can learn, and integrating that with whatever we are able to learn elsewhere. There can be no predicting where such trajectories may lead, no matter what the area that we choose to explore. I will mention Tim Ingold as an example of one who has acknowledged a great debt to Harris (in private communication) and who has a great deal to offer his readers apart from any reference to Harris or Integrationism(s). In my own case I have found reading Harris in conjunction with Erik Hollnagel, Georges Canguilhem, Gilbert Simondon, Peter Janich and Eugen Rosenstock-Huussy extremely rewarding, and not at all to the detriment of any one or the others.

If pressed, however, I think we can indeed find a shibboleth amongst those interested in Harris, but that will be a political rather than a linguistic matter. For those who want to remain within the world of science-since-Galileo, that world in which Laplace boasted that knowing the whole of it at any precise moment would provide a knowledge of the entire past and future of the universe (Big Data is Big Brother), Harris’s insistence upon the indeterminacy of meaning is unacceptable: there must be determinacy all the way down. If the moderate integrationism which you mention is one in which the world can be described as a law-abiding system, accommodating Harris as much as it is deemed desirable, then I would argue that orthodox integrationism takes as its premise a radical indeterminism, the freedom of nature and the responsibility of nature’s inhabitants for the world that they make together. That is to say that hard or soft integrationism depends on your politics: whether it is an indeterminate universe, with freedom and responsibility all the way up and all the way down; or a universe of scientific law and mathematical order, which we, by discovering those laws, may control as foolishly as Scientists or Führers, if not as wisely as Gods. On this issue, I am as hard as can be, in love with a world over which I would not rule even if I could. The world should not be remade in the image of my desires.

I: *Looking forward, what do you see as the main priorities and challenges that integrationism faces in engaging with a wider audience?*

DB: My answer to this question of course follows directly from the position that I set forth in answer to the preceding question. If integrational theory is to be worth anyone’s attention, it will have to keep its focus on the real world in which we live rather than on some theoretical fiction such as “the language organ,” Merge, Pro, syntax, morphemes, text processing, dialects, supervenulars, or whatever other entities linguists think that they find out there in the world. Linguistics as a discipline has obviously followed along the typical path of the harder sciences and the biosciences in seeking to understand language in order to create, imitate or control it in one fashion or another. The machine-generated language with which we are forced to deal in every online and many telephone encounters, the data-mining and marketing and spamming that we willingly or unwillingly inform with our emails and internet searching and online postings (Academia.edu, LinkedIn, Facebook, etc.) are all being produced deliberately to manipulate, control and enslave us. Shall our understanding of language and the science which pretends to study it be oriented by

such desires and directed by such goals? Should linguistics be a fascist enterprise in its theoretical foundations and orientations? It is precisely to this situation, our situation in the 21st century, dominated as it is by Big Science, Big Religion, Big Data, Big Money, Big Power and Big Lies, that our linguistics must respond. The indeterminacy of meaning and the responsibility of the language maker—speaker/writer and listener/reader—provide us with an assumption (we are free) and an orientation (we are responsible) that are essential for articulating an intellectual and political space for the exercise and the defence of our freedom as well as our obligations towards each other, both of these being of paramount importance to Harris. It is this philosophical basis that consistently underlies all of Harris's theoretical arguments and makes his work from beginning to end of urgent political importance. The challenge we face is how to keep that focus while building relations across disciplines rather than destroying all hope of open debate and communication by adopting an intellectual stance such as that which tragically alienated Harris from so many who could and perhaps would have learned as much from him as he might have learned from them. What might integrationism have become in Harris's own lifetime had Harris given his intellectual opponents as much consideration as he gave to the peasant in the Valle D'Aosta in 1967?

I: How has integrationism shaped your views and practices as a farmer ?

DB: Well, that is an unexpected question, but is indeed relevant. Over the years I have thought a lot about human-animal relationships and human-animal communication. I grew up with a milk cow, chickens, sheep, cats and dogs, with an occasional raccoon, possum, snake, turtle etc. and always lamented the fact that while I could talk to them, they never gave a hoot about talking to me. Since returning to the farm in 2008 I have once again had all these and more, but now with my thoughts oriented by questions arising from an integrational perspective. I cannot really think of any practices that I do differently, but certainly what I pay attention to and what I notice has changed. Livestock auctions, for example, and how farmers negotiate prices by bidding on their own animals: if anyone becomes aware that you doing this, they are liable to stop bidding immediately. Or the big dealers bidding animals up when out of towners are at the market in order to discourage them from coming back, and by their presence upping the competition for the best animals. The auctioneer offering the first buyer a choice among a group of animals then saying "Well Mr Bade has purchased the black lamb so you still have the best of the lot to choose from!" In fact just about every aspect of the livestock market should present an integrationist (at least one with a knowledge of economic theories) an incredibly rich field for study.

Yet for me, far more fascinating than the communication among farmers and livestock buyers is the way animals relate to their fellow pasture mates – of the same or other species – and with me in the pasture, in the barn, and on the road when they get out and run away. How incredibly quickly they learn the significance *for them* of the sight or sound of the rustling of a feed bag or the banging of a bucket. They are unquestionably responding to these sights and sounds as significant features in their world. They clearly respond to my movements and the sounds I make, including talking to them ("Good morning my lovelies!"), but my cows never respond with "Madainn mhath!" even though they are Scottish Highland cattle, nor do my Black Welsh Mountain sheep greet me with "Bore da Dafydd!". What I have become keenly interested in –especially after reading about the experiences of the horse trainer Monty Roberts – is how animals communicate with each other, and how they attempt to communicate and negotiate relationships with human beings – for they certainly do. While linguists have for decades attempted to teach English or sign language to apes – with very little success – Roberts simply observed how horses establish and maintain relationships among the members of a herd, and he was able to respond with his own movements – neither with English nor with Cherokee verbalizations – in such a way as to integrate his actions with theirs and achieve in 30 minutes and no violence what traditional trainers took weeks or months to accomplish with great violence. Instead of looking for language in the animal kingdom Roberts learned how horses communicate and he now moves among them as one of their own! This seems to me to be of enormous significance to linguistics. The language we know is human language and is inextricably formed in and through and together with our social relationships and institutions; to look for that – language as we know it –in other species is anthropocentrism in its most flagrant form. As though apes would argue about same sex marriage if they could only speak English or some other language, or birds would build penthouses and planetariums and cathedrals and write about them in their own edition of *Architectural Digest* if they but had hands with which to build and to write. Animals do not communicate using anything resembling human language because their biomechanical, macrosocial and circumstantial situation is wholly different from that of human beings. If instead of looking for language in the non-human world we pay attention to the forms of communication that animals have developed amongst *themselves*, the forms of communication that are appropriate for *their* biomechanical, macrosocial and circumstantial

situation, we will surely learn much that we never even thought that we should be thinking about. Integrationist theory argues that we cannot understand human language except by considering it within human communicational practices, and I would argue that it is equally true that we will never understand animal communication by looking for language among moos and meows. So these days, as an integrationist herder, I pay close and constant attention to how animals communicate, to how they establish, negotiate and maintain their relationships with all the various species with whom they must live and interact, but I no longer lament that we cannot all sit down together and talk about Sinfree Makoni's latest book.

I: What initial references would you recommend to those who want to initiate their readings on integrationism?

DB: As mentioned above, I was introduced to integrationism with the Epilogue in *The Language Machine*, and having read most of Harris's writings since that initial foray, I still think it is one of his most brilliantly written and argued pieces. But in order to grasp what all was at stake in the Epilogue, one really has to back up and read *The Language Makers*, *The Language Myth* and the rest of *The Language Machine*. I found *Synonymy and Linguistic Analysis* very hard reading – the 1950-1960s analytical philosophy style I have always found unbearable – but by the end I was astounded at what he had accomplished; Harris himself later wrote to me that most of his basic ideas were already present in that volume although it still took many years for him to work out the implications. *Rethinking Writing* is perhaps the most powerful of his late writings, and draws together all the strands of his thinking in what is an excellent example of a very directed integrationist critique. I would also recommend the festschrift *Linguistics Inside Out: Roy Harris and His Critics*, both for the essays critically responding to Harris's writings as well as for Harris's response to those criticisms.

Apart from the writings of Harris himself, there are a number of works by his students as well as writings by some who discovered Harris long after he had retired from teaching and they had finished their PhDs. Chris Hutton's *Abstraction and Instance*, Michael Toolan's *Total Speech* and Talbot J. Taylor's *Mutual Misunderstanding* are all outstanding books by Harris's Oxford students. Many papers by Harris and his students from the 1980-1990s were collected in *Integrational Linguistics: A First Reader* (Language and Communication Library, Pergamon, 1998). Of the later generation, Harris (personal communication) regarded Peter Jones's essay "Value for money? Putting Marx through the mill" (2011) as an outstanding example of taking integrational linguistics "out of bounds", and I agree; furthermore, it is as much fun to read as Harris's "Epilogue: Saying Nothing." For a recent essay that directly confronts Harris's understanding of indeterminacy, there is Adrian Pablé's "Radical indeterminacy, idealism, realism: Benedetto Croce vs. Roy Harris" (2018) this being an example of pushing forward the most important element of Harris's philosophical dissent. In Sinfree Makoni's works such as those collected in *Language in Africa*, the political dimensions of integrationism are stressed within a context that never got Harris's attention: Africa. The 2015 volume published by IAISLC *Roy Harris and Integrational Linguistics 1956-2015* contains a complete bibliography of the writings of Roy Harris, an extensive though incomplete list of reviews of his books, and a thematically arranged bibliography of writings on integrationism and publications by integrationist oriented scholars.

One last comment, without your questions to prompt me: We speak because we have been spoken to. Let us speak that others might speak in their time, as they need, to make the world in which they live one which they can love without reservation.

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ON LANGUAGE AND ITS LIMITS

SOBRE A LÍNGUA E SEUS LIMITES

SOBRE EL LENGUAJE Y SUS LÍMITES

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ABSTRACT: I consider three positions regarding the limits of language: two (mutually incompatible) ‘segregational’ approaches, which I will contrast with the ‘integrational’ approach advocated by Roy Harris. I shall argue that an integrationist construal of the limits of language cannot be dissociated from the Harrisian concept of ‘radical indeterminacy’. The latter notion is highly controversial within the linguistic orthodoxy, as it sponsors the idea that ‘languages’ qua describable objects are theoretically redundant. In other words, human communication does not involve ‘languages’ from an integrational point of view. However, it is the very notion of ‘a language’ which makes it possible for linguists and philosophers to discuss the limits of language in the first place. My position, in turn, is that the notion of English (German, etc.) as having limits originates in decontextualized analyses at both, the lay and professional levels of linguistic inquiry. I thus support the thesis that the limits of language cannot be contemplated independently of the human communicational infrastructure and that these limits are co-extensive with personal linguistic experience.

KEYWORDS: Segregational approach. Integrational approach. Language. Radical indeterminacy.

RESUMO: Considero três posições sobre os limites da linguagem: duas abordagens “segregacionistas” (mutuamente incompatíveis), que contrastarei com a abordagem “integracionista” defendida por Roy Harris. Defendo que uma interpretação integracionista dos limites da linguagem não pode ser dissociada do conceito harrisiano de “indeterminação radical”. Esta noção é altamente controversa dentro da ortodoxia linguística, uma vez que veicula a ideia de que “línguas” enquanto objetos descritíveis são teoricamente redundantes. Em outras palavras, a comunicação humana, para um ponto de vista integracionista, não envolve “línguas”. No entanto, é a própria noção de “uma língua” que torna possível para linguistas e filósofos discutir os limites da linguagem em primeiro lugar. Minha posição, por sua vez, é que a noção de inglês (alemão etc.) como tendo limites se origina em análises descontextualizadas, tanto no nível leigo quanto profissional, da investigação linguística. Assim, apoio a tese de que os limites da linguagem não podem ser contemplados independentemente da infraestrutura comunicativa humana e que esses limites são coextensivos à experiência linguística pessoal.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Abordagem segregacionista. Enfoque integrador. Linguagem. Indeterminação radical.

RESUMEN: Considero tres posiciones sobre los límites del lenguaje: dos enfoques “segregacionistas” (mutuamente incompatibles), que contrastaré con el enfoque “integracionista” defendido por Roy Harris. Sostengo que una interpretación integracionista de los límites del lenguaje no puede disociarse del concepto harrisiano de “indeterminación radical”. Esta noción es muy controvertida dentro de la ortodoxia lingüística, ya que transmite la idea de que las “lenguas” como objetos descriptibles son teóricamente redundantes. En otras palabras, la comunicación humana, desde un punto de vista integracionista, no implica “lenguas”. Sin embargo, es la misma noción de “una lengua” la que hace posible que los lingüistas y filósofos discutan los límites del

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lenguaje en primer lugar. Mi posición, a su vez, es que la noción de que el inglés (alemán, etc.) tiene límites se origina en análisis descontextualizados, tanto a nivel lego como profesional, de la investigación lingüística. Por tanto, apoyo la tesis de que los límites del lenguaje no se pueden contemplar independientemente de la infraestructura comunicativa humana y que estos límites son coextensivos con la experiencia lingüística personal.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Enfoque segregacional. Enfoque integrador. Lenguaje. Indeterminación radical.

1 PREFATORY REMARKS

If we accept that *self-knowledge* is the ultimate goal of the human intellectual quest, the task requires some understanding of human potentialities and limitations. One question we might wish to ask on that score would be: What are the limits of the human mind? If we further concede that ‘language’ plays a pivotal role in how we understand ourselves as a species, we may proceed to ask whether there are limits to human language, and what exactly this entails. Mainstream linguistics has set these limits around the notion of ‘a language’, ontologically conceived as a system of mutually dependent linguistic signs (as postulated by Saussure), or as generative rules of sentence formation (as envisaged by Chomsky), where the notion of ‘the sign’, while tacitly assumed, is no longer part of theoretical linguistics. In mainstream philosophy of language, the limits of language stretch as far as the ever-expanding boundaries of material reality: linguistic statements are thus assessed according to their truth-values. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Oxford linguist Roy Harris has proposed a radically different thesis on human language and its limits, including how language relates to what lies outside language. It is a view based on a semiological position that treats signs as *radically indeterminate in both form and meaning* (HARRIS; HUTTON, 2007). Harris’ critical exploration of the limits of language was set up under the aegis of ‘integrational linguistics’ (HARRIS, 1998). Integrationists regard communication as a time-bound activity, itself comprising many other time-bound activities (e.g. speaking, listening, gesturing, thinking). All of these activities, the integrationist argues, need to be integrated via signs by the human sign-makers at some level in order for communication to occur. Integration in the here-and-now presupposes the activation of personal past experience as well as the projection of personal future experience: no two individuals’ sign-making is ever the same because no two individuals share the same communicational history. Human memory and human imagination thus set limits to language, both individually and for the human species. Crucially, for Harris, there is no other basis for a communication theory than the *first-order*, which, translated into semiological terms, simply means that there are no abstract signs in the here-and-now – only personal signs. Such a position has consequences on how the limits of language are charted. However, as a result of linguistic reflexivity (HARRIS, 1998, p. 25), human beings are given to decontextualizing language, resulting in beliefs (among the members of the professional linguistic community) subsumed by Harris under the ‘Language Myth’ label (HARRIS, 1981). Hence the orthodox assumption that an inquiry into the limits of language requires a ‘scientific’ approach.

This contribution considers three positions regarding the limits of language: two (mutually incompatible) ‘segregational’ paradigms, namely the “reocentric surrogational” approach (HARRIS, 1980) and the Saussurean-mentalist approach, which it contrasts with the integrationist approach. I shall argue that an integrationist construal of the limits of language cannot be dissociated from the concept of “radical indeterminacy” (HARRIS, 2009, p. 81). The latter notion is highly controversial within the linguistic orthodoxy, as it sponsors the idea that ‘languages’ qua describable objects are theoretically redundant. In other words, human communication does not involve ‘languages’ from an integrational point of view. However, it is the very notion of ‘a language’, i.e. the limits posed by it, which make it possible for linguists and philosophers to discuss the limits of language in the first place. As the integrationist argues, the idea that English has limits (e.g. there are limits to what constitutes an English word: *qrwxzy* is not an English word) has its origins in – and is further reinforced by – decontextualized analyses at both the lay and professional levels of linguistic inquiry. The present paper will argue in favour of the thesis that the limits of language cannot be contemplated independently of the human “communicational infrastructure” (HARRIS, 1996, p. 12) and that these limits are co-extensive with personal linguistic experience.

2 LOWER AND UPPER LIMITS TO LANGUAGE

In the work of Roy Harris, there are several passages discussing the idea that language and communication have limits. The most thorough treatment features in the book *History, Science and the Limits of Language* (HARRIS, 2003). Moreover, Harris refers to this topic in a number of *Integrationist Notes and Papers*, e.g. such as when stating that “[...] integrationism places no a priori limit on what can be integrated in the process of communication” (2013, p. 101). Or when he asks: “What are the minimum beliefs for linguistic inquiry?” (HARRIS, 2014, p. 63), where the ‘minimum beliefs’ could be interpreted as referring to the ‘lower limits’. According to Harris (2014, p. 66), linguistic inquiry does not have to start with defining ‘a language’. Thus, belief in ‘languages’ does not count as a sensible lower limit for linguistic inquiry. Instead, Harris prefers a much more basic approach, namely that the minimum beliefs required for linguistic inquiry are (a) that it is possible to ask questions and (b) that to every question there is at least one possible answer (HARRIS, 2014, p. 64). Asking questions, according to Harris, is without limits, at least in the sense that there are no ‘ultimate’ questions (HARRIS, 2011). The day human beings stop asking questions is the day that humans cease to exist. Of course, we can refuse to ask questions, just as we can refuse to give answers. Harris (2012a, p. 83) proposes to call human beings “the questioning animal” (which he prefers to Aristotle’s ‘rational animal’). “The human being”, he claims, “is a creature that can ask questions”, to which he adds: “Unless we understand this latter capacity, we understand very little about human nature”. Harris (2012a, p. 84) goes on to state that the questions that have been asked in linguistics and in philosophy of language have received answers underwritten by simplistic assumptions. These assumptions are premised on what Harris (1981) has called the ‘Language Myth’.

In the *Introduction to Integrational Linguistics* (HARRIS, 1998), the reader encounters several passages referring to the limits of understanding and the limits of communication. Here are some examples:

So understanding itself [...] is limited by what, at any given time, participants are aware of and how they contextualize this in relation to past and (projected) future experience. (HARRIS, 1998, p.105)

Integrationism recognizes no limit to what might – or might not – be pertinent to linguistic communication in specific cases. (HARRIS, 1998, p 41)

For the integrationist, the possibilities and limits of human communication, both in general and in any given instance, are governed by three kinds of factor: biomechanical, macrosocial and circumstantial. (HARRIS, 1998, p. 29)

Why is it important for Harris to ponder the question of the limits of language and of linguistic communication? I think it matters to him because the question tells us something about human nature, in other words, it is a question that takes us a step further towards self-knowledge. Understanding human nature, for Harris, is bound to how we think about language. To Harris, it does matter how you think about language, or as he puts it: “[...] if you want to understand human nature, it is important to get your philosophy of language right” (HARRIS, 2003, p. 83). Different philosophies of language will thus lead to different understandings of human nature. So it *does* make a difference how we apply the term ‘language’, and Harris notes that “there are limits to how people are prepared to apply that term” (2003, p. 83). We may surmise that this is the case in any human cultural context. Harris’ insight was recently elevated to a central question within Southern linguistic theory (e.g. PENNYCOOK; MAKONI, 2019; HAUCK; HEURICH, 2018), which explores the idea of radical differences between the ‘Global South’ and the ‘Global North’ in terms of the upper and lower limits of language. Severo and Makoni (2021), for instance, argue that songs may need to be part of linguistic analysis in southern contexts. In fact, integrationists claim that there is no hard-and-fast line separating ‘linguistic’ activities from ‘non-linguistic’ activities. What would be the basis for such a distinction? Drawing such distinctions is indeed the hallmark of all ‘segregational’ theories of language, which Harris contrasts with his own ‘integrational’ approach (HARRIS, 1996). Nevertheless, Harris (2003, p.82) argues that “language has its limits”. The limit that Harris sets as the ‘lower limit’ of language is what he calls “proto-numeracy”. Grasping proto-numerical differences (such as the difference between ‘one’ and ‘many’) enables us to recognize words in the first place, and to make distinctions between what grammarians have traditionally called proper names and common nouns. Grasping the basic proto-numerical concepts is a precondition for linguistic abilities like

individuation, itemization, classification, setting up correspondences, and establishing equivalences (HARRIS, 2003, p. 77). The simplest forms of verbal communication, Harris tells us, require proto-numeracy.

3 THE LIMITS OF 'SEGREGATIONAL' PHILOSOPHIES OF LANGUAGE

In his book (HARRIS, 2003), Harris considers different ways in which language could be construed as having limits. One such way is the common notion, corresponding to a Whorfian stance, that "[...] my language has limits insofar as there is no way I can ask questions about anything I do not have words for" (HARRIS, 2003, p. 18), i.e. my language sets boundaries to my world (to what I can perceive and where the boundaries of my thought lie). From this, Harris (2003, p.19) concludes: "My intellectual inquiry is bounded by the questions my language allows me to ask. Intellectual resources and linguistic resources are co-extensive: one does not exceed the other".

A more radical interpretation of how your language has limits, Harris tells us, would be one in line with an integrational position: the limits of your language are thus not constraints imposed by the tense system or by the vocabulary of a particular language (in a Whorfian sense), but rather constraints imposed "[...] by what your linguistic community understands a language to be", i.e. how it sees "[...] its language as being related to the non-linguistic world in general" (HARRIS, 2003, p. 20). The example Harris provides is that of an imaginary terrestrial community, in which verbal activities are disconnected from non-verbal activities in a way that runs counter to our everyday linguistic experience. It is, Harris goes on to argue, "as if certain connections between language and the world had been severed". The relation between saying and doing, in that imaginary community, has not been implemented. The science community, with its 'reocentric' approach to words, might count as such a community. It is a community that has come to conceptualize 'a language' as a nomenclature, i.e. as an ever-changing list of words that get their meaning from outside language, namely by 'standing for' the things, states, and processes as they exist as part of external reality. Here we have an example of a conception of language in which words – and verbal statements made with these words – are treated as existing independently of the human activities they integrate in the here-and-now. For Harris, a reocentric conception of how words relate to the non-linguistic world is both limiting and limited (e.g. HARRIS, 2005). At the same time, science has as its task the continuous expansion of human understanding and of its limits. Ever since the publication of Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (KUHN, 1970), philosophers of science have debated whether scientists possess a common language, one that is constantly changing but at the same time remains the same. However, nobody in the science community – including the philosophers of science – seems to care to define what exactly 'a language' is. Scientists communicate, they agree and disagree with each other, and to do so they would seem to need 'a language' in which to carry out their agreements and disagreements. Some philosophers of science have argued against Kuhn, namely that a common language is not a prerequisite for science communication. For example, Proctor and Capaldi have argued that

[...] the absence of [a common] language in no way precludes scientists who work in different paradigms from communicating with each other. We suggest, for example, that Einstein, in expressing dissatisfaction with certain aspects of quantum mechanics, understood perfectly well the basis of his disagreement. After all, it is common knowledge that people who disagree with each other, even when those disagreements are fundamental, are perfectly capable of understanding what it is they disagree about. (PROCTOR; CAPALDI, 2006, p. 125)

However, in the absence of a common language, one might wonder, what is the basis for such an understanding? The idea seems to be that as long as you know how words correspond to things, i.e. as long as you are able to supply both the old and the new definitions of contested words, you are a speaker of the ever-evolving language of science. So, saying 'what is copper?' is not really 'doing' anything, and neither is replying 'it is a metal having the properties of malleability, fusibility, ductility, electric conductivity, density 8.92, atomic weight 63.54, and atomic number 29'. The 'realist' conception of the language of science likely is an extension of older, lay ways of thinking about language: Words are rooted in talking meaningfully about independently existing things, for which you need shared linguistic labels (SEALEY, 2014). Are there cultures and communities in which linguistic labels are not the names of things (material, immaterial, or whatever other ontology is believed to exist)? Could *reocentrism* be a universal linguistic

belief about how words signify, which sets limits to everyone's language? And is this linguistic belief not a direct consequence of our ability to create what Harris calls 'proto-numerate concepts'? This very ability, of course, is in turn linked to biomechanical, species-specific constraints, i.e. the fact that the world, from a human perspective, is made of both countable things and non-countable stuff, which we can compare and classify. We can see and touch those things, some of which we can hold in our hands, pick them up, and put them somewhere else (HARRIS, 2012b). More recently, things that would otherwise be too small to see, or too distant for the naked eye have been made accessible to our senses through artificial enhancement (HARRIS, 2005).

Could an integrationist approach, in turn, shift our understanding of the limits of language in a radically different direction? For instance, does it matter what semiological beliefs I hold when trying to figure out what the limits of language are? The integrationist posits the sign to be *radically indeterminate in both form and meaning* (HARRIS; HUTTON, 2007). This already marks a radical departure from any mainstream assumptions about the sign, usually conceived as a determinate signifier-signified pair: in other words, the Saussurean sign, which is the sign conception commonly (though mostly tacitly) assumed in orthodox linguistic theory. Saussure developed his semiological theory based on the insight that linguistic signs are psychological units in a system called 'the language' (*la langue*), which is shared by a collectivity of speakers. This manoeuvre allowed him to 'explain' how speaker A and hearer B communicate with each other, namely by sharing ideas/concepts by means of a common linguistic code. Saussure presented a general model of linguistic communication, which declared some parts of it to be non-observable. In fact, no empirical research can lead the linguist to 'see' signs as biplanar mental units. Saussure's psychological conception of the linguistic sign needs to be interpreted in the light of his rejection of 'languages' as nomenclatures. According to Saussure, successful linguistic communication is premised on speaker A and hearer B sharing the same abstract system of signs, which is in existence prior to any interaction between any real speaker and any real hearer. Without intending to, Saussure addressed John Locke's skeptical argument about communication, which treated it as a matter of speaker and hearer independently attaching their own private ideas to the words uttered or heard, which in turn failed to guarantee mutual understanding. Saussure's 'solution' was to deny that ideas are private or that they have a separate existence from words: Rather, ideas are concepts carved out from the potentiality of human thought, which are tied to sound patterns carved out from the potentiality of human sound, as historically institutionalized by a conscious collectivity.

The Saussurean view is arguably even more limiting than the reocentric view of languages. The former declares that, as far as our linguistic knowledge is concerned, we are 'prisoners' of our internalized language system. I may think I know what a word from another language means, or even a new word that I identify as being a word of my own language, but, from a Saussurean standpoint, I do not really 'know' those words (they are words, not linguistic signs, and thus at the mercy of the individual). Linguistic knowledge is collectively defined. The Saussurean argument thus runs as follows: lay speakers do not actually understand the nature of language. They think they do, but it is no more than an illusion. In fact, they believe that words are surrogates for things, which is what allows them to talk to others (who speak the same language) about that which lies outside of language. In turn, Saussure claims that what 'a language' actually is lies beyond the limits of lay understanding.

4 LANGUAGE AS UNFATHOMABLE

The psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird has championed his own version of the Saussurean thesis. He believes that one of the limits of human understanding is precisely "[...] a systematic inability to understand language" (JOHNSON-LAIRD, 2003, p. 4). For example, Johnson-Laird tells us that when we pause to reflect on what conditional *if* means, we will have to admit that we do not know. Not even philosophers and linguists do, he assures us. So we only "seem to communicate successfully" when using conditional clauses. Following that, Johnson-Laird (2003, p. 33) goes on to argue, we cannot really understand the verb *to cause* either, as, for instance, in the sentence '*to anger someone is to cause them to become angry*'. "Something mysterious is going on", Johnson-Laird (2003, p. 4) concludes. Human understanding, as Johnson-Laird's research endeavours to show, is an illusion, and one that leads us to make errors in reasoning. At the same time, Johnson-Laird assures us that we can "understand a potentially infinite number of distinct sentences" (JOHNSON-LAIRD, 2003, p. 7). Thus, on the one hand, we lack the ability to define perfectly familiar words like conditional *if*, on the other hand, there is no upper limit for us when it comes to understanding sentences never encountered before. However, our understanding of those sentences is itself an illusion; as soon as you stop to

analyze what the single words mean, you will realize that meaning is uncertain. Johnson-Laird (2003, p. 41) admits that stopping to analyze a word and not knowing what it means exactly is an “odd phenomenon”, which “may not matter in daily life”, but he adds that “there are occasions in which it is important to know what we mean”. On that score, we might conjecture that Saussure condemned the practice of decomposing words into semantically more transparent units (or folk-etymologizing them) *because* ultimately he also believed that a full understanding of words is not humanly possible. Hence, Saussure resolved that understanding is something that occurs in interpersonal communication automatically (between speaker A and hearer B – if they share the same system): understanding lies beyond the grasp of the individual’s conscious awareness. In a similar vein, Johnson-Laird (2003, p. 25) tells us that “communication succeeds” even though people speak “a language that they do not always understand” (2003, p. 24). If we apply Saussure’s theoretical model to Johnson-Laird’s model, it is at the level of *parole* that we do not understand (i.e. when we ‘stop to analyze’ the words that we and others use), while at the level of *langue* (the language system) identical mental concepts are triggered in the minds of speaker A and hearer B. Saussure decided that the non-finite nature of meaning at the level of *parole* was not to concern a linguistics of *langue*, which he saw as the proper domain of a general linguistics founded on semiological principles. In turn, Johnson-Laird’s argument that ‘there are occasions in which it is important to know what we mean’ is at odds with lay linguistic practices. Usually, we ask others to explain what they mean (e.g. to check if we understood what they mean by the words they used), or we may ask whether they understand what we mean (or we ask ourselves whether the others understand what we mean). However, do we ever pause and wonder whether we know what we ourselves mean?

Our semiology is certainly limited (HARRIS, 1996, p. 109-110): it is a *human* semiology. However, language is not something that has to be understood beyond itself. Johnson-Laird has no superior view about the essence of language than anyone else in the human community. His psycholinguistic research does not discover something new about human language: it just reaffirms the linguistic biases underlying the whole project. It is the result of thinking about language in a certain limited way. The limitation consists in treating words as already given (at some level of abstraction) and word-meaning (as well as sentence meaning) as something that our mind can never fully grasp. Language has been severed from the human individual who uses language. It is as if Johnson-Laird believed that human beings are not quite up to the linguistic task: We have been equipped with something that we do not fully understand. Nature has put a ‘language machine’ into our brain that would actually be better suited for *more intelligent* beings. However, is it not Johnson-Laird’s own notion of ‘understanding’ which creates the limits that allegedly characterize human understanding? In fact, what does understanding, as construed by Johnson-Laird, imply? For example, is it supposed to accommodate lay linguistic usage, e.g. when we say about our dogs that they ‘understand’ us? In what way would dogs ‘understand’ what we say? At the other extreme, there is the assumption that highly intelligent non-human (non-terrestrial) beings will be less limited in understanding the nature of human language. However, language cannot be grasped experientially outside the human body and mind. We simply do not know how a more intelligent non-human creature would grasp human language. Johnson-Laird (2003, p. 27) is right when he posits that our inability to “understand the mind of a super-intelligent being” is a consequence of human limits. But this is true in general: We are unable to understand the mind of *any* non-human being, whether more or less intelligent than us. The crux lies with the concept of ‘understanding’: we can only ‘understand’ qua human beings. There is no species-neutral understanding. Anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism may be limiting, however, these are the limits we have no choice but to embrace.

5 THE LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE BETWEEN PHILOSOPHIES OF LANGUAGE

From an integrationist point of view, the limits of language are not set by language itself or by the limits of the human mind. As mentioned earlier, they are related directly to what we as a community understand ‘a language’ (or language) to be. Scientists, for example, believe that the limits of language are set by the limits of nature. The word *phlogiston*, for instance, was taken off the list of scientific names once the theory that a fire-like element is released during combustion was shown to be wrong. Attempts to put phlogiston back on the name list are officially dismissed as ‘pseudo-science’. Reocentric science must by definition patrol the boundaries of its contemporary language, however without losing sight of its historical continuity. Thus, what copper ‘really’ is cannot be completely disengaged from “appeals to knowledge acquired in the past” (HARRIS, 2003, p. 66). For example, copper, as it is defined now, is related to copper as it was (wrongly) conceptualized in proto-scientific times. The reason for this is the word

copper itself, i.e. its linguistic survival throughout the centuries. In Latin, it was called *cuprum*, in Old English *copor*. In German, it is called *Kupfer*. It is the ‘same’ word attested in different time periods and across different geographical areas, as comparative philologists will assure us. As Harris (2003, p. 67) hastens to add, however, a reocentric semantics leads to conflating two sets of questions: One is to conflate the question ‘What does this word mean?’ with the question ‘What does this word stand for?’. The second is to conflate the question ‘What does this word mean?’ with the question ‘What is this word’s history?’. The respective views of language and how language relates to the world encapsulated in these four questions are limiting in the sense that (i) they assume words to be part of a fixed-code (‘a language’), which determines both their form and their lexical meaning; (ii) they assume that words can unproblematically be compared across languages; and (iii) they assume that words designate something outside of language independently of the context. Science, history, the law, and many other institutionalized fields of knowledge rely on a philosophy of language built on precisely these assumptions.

For the scientist, *copper* obviously is a word of a given language (‘English’ in this case), but the scientist would not want to concede that what *copper* means is therefore only ascertainable from within the English language. *Copper* is a word, yes, but it identifies a thing, and what that thing is does not depend on any linguistic or cultural reality. So the scientist is happy to operate with the notion that there are languages (such as ‘English’), whose words are used to identify things in the non-linguistic world – what Harris & Hutton (2007, p. 212) call a word’s “narrow referential focus”. However, the scientist is less happy to endorse the structuralist notion of ‘a language’ as a closed system – e.g. the Saussurean fixed-code, which enables speaker A and hearer B to verbally communicate with each other. But how, then, does the language of science accommodate lexical innovations or semantic changes? Tomorrow’s definition of *copper* might be different from yesterday’s definition of *copper* in scientific English: The same word, however with a different meaning. As the Saussurean linguist might wonder: Where is the guarantee that two scientists understand the same word in the same way (i.e. attach the same idea) *in the absence* of a closed system which fixes form and meaning? The reocentric conception of words fails to provide a coherent account of how communication within a community of speakers is possible through the words alone, i.e. without constantly having to make explicit to the others how the words you use are to be understood (‘I don’t mean *vaccine* in the traditional sense, I mean *vaccine* in the sense of ‘gene therapy’”). In turn, the Saussurean – or structuralist – conception of words (i.e. the linguistic sign) denies that words designate things (meaning is defined internally, not externally), even though nothing in our experience corroborates this distinction between the linguistic sign (the mental fact) and the actual word (the physical and physiological facts). So does science have its own language after all? And if it does not, how can a scientist distinguish, linguistically speaking, between fellow scientists and pseudo-scientists? There thus seem to exist *linguistic* limits to the language of science, which requires quite a bit of patrolling and policing. Reocentric surrogationalism and Saussurean structuralism cancel each other out, while at the same time requiring each other. Both philosophies of language, however, are somehow needed in order to make any sense, intellectually, of the claim that science has ‘its language’.

6 UNLIMITED LINGUISTIC EXPERIENCE

The integrationist holds that signs are ‘made’ by the sign-maker in relation to a present communicational purpose, namely to integrate various ongoing activities (one’s own and other people’s) in the here-and-now. Signs have no metaphysical existence, in fact, no existence above and beyond the communicational activities for which they are called into life. The signs required to integrate one activity with another are *personal* signs, i.e. they require a maker rather than a user. Such a personal sign can only be indeterminate in both form and meaning (HARRIS; HUTTON, 2007). Indeterminate signs in Harris’ sense are theoretically incompatible with the notion of ‘languages’ as scientifically describable objects identified by reocentric labels like *German*, *Portuguese*, *Falkland Islands English*, etc. This makes ‘languages’ second-order abstractions rather than first-order realities (LOVE, 2017). As a result of its rejection of the seminal orthodox distinction between ‘language’ as countable and ‘language’ as non-countable, the integrational understanding of language is not limited in the way that the surrogationalist and the structuralist conceptions are. The integrationist does not deny that human semiology is *limited* (in the sense that signs are by necessity limited, namely by virtue of the fact that they are species-specific signs), but will point out that an integrationist semiology is not *limiting*. For example, from an integrationist point of view, it makes no sense to embark on a search for the true or complete meaning of a word (HARRIS, 1998). The meaning of a word is limited to what I make that word mean in the present circumstances for the

present purposes. That includes situations in which I do not make it mean anything because, for example, I do not know an unfamiliar word or situations in which I make a wild guess. How can I come to know what a word means if I have never encountered it before? Well, I can consult a dictionary. I can google it online. I can ask a person who happens to be present, etc. So the limits of what a word means are the limits set by the contingencies of the time-bound situation, i.e. by the communicational possibilities presently available to the sign-maker/-makers. These limits are not determined by an impartial authoritative institution (e.g. a language academy) but depend on the sign-maker's communicational biography. Thus, *A* may know what the unfamiliar word means (he just came across the word yesterday and looked it up in a dictionary), while *B* doesn't (he can't remember encountering it ever before). In other words, the idea of 'a language' equally known by all the members of the speech community is a theoretical fiction. However, once we concede that, what is left of the notion that 'languages' exist as psychological realities shared by a group of speakers?

The Harrisian position on word meaning is often confused with a semantic thesis called 'Humpty-Dumptyism'. The integrationist does not endorse Humpty-Dumpty's linguistic belief in already given words (determinacy of form) to which speakers assign completely idiosyncratic meanings (semantic indeterminacy). In other words, the integrationist does not think that lexicographers indulge in lexical fantasies when establishing word-meaning correspondences. Rather, they are engaged in a cultural practice that aims to reduce semantic indeterminacy. The lexicographical formula operates on the correspondence '*a:b*' (e.g. *moshpit*: 'area nearest to the musician's stage'). The formula has *some* basis in the lexicographer's personal linguistic experience, which he/she assumes relates to the linguistic experience of others, too. This does not mean that the word *moshpit* cannot be used in a radically different way. Lewis Carroll's famous character Humpty-Dumpty did just that with the word *glory*. His perverse use of the word to mean a 'nice knock-down argument' shows that it is possible to create meaning on-the-spot, just as it is possible to create words on-the-spot. But until this particular use of the word *glory* can be related to by other people through their past linguistic experience (as far as we know, Alice is the only one to have been exposed to this use of *glory*), Humpty-Dumpty's innovation remains a macrosocially empty idiosyncrasy. At the same time, Humpty-Dumpty's linguistic nonsense is also a form of sign-making, and as such equally constrained by the three aforementioned parameters of communication. However, while it is true that integrationists believe that personal linguistic experience is our only "terra firma" (HARRIS, 1981, p. 204), this does not imply that my sign-making and other people's sign-making are insulated domains. For instance, linguistic experience is part of human (meta-)discourse, through which something personal becomes public. In fact, as Harris (2013, p. 36) has argued, integrationism is not a form of solipsism. The rejection of the metaphysical thesis that signs are 'shared' does not make one a solipsist.

If signs are indeterminate in the integrationist sense, rather than determinate in the abstract (Saussurean) sense, the limits of language must vary with every individual and with every situation. However, there are *general* limits of a biomechanical, circumstantial, and macrosocial kind (HARRIS, 1998, p. 29), which transcend individual variation: The human ear only perceives within a certain range of frequency. We cannot utter two words at the same time. Reading and understanding a long and complex sentence takes time. I cannot have a proper conversation in Portuguese if I have never learnt any Portuguese. But no linguist can predict what the signs mean for a particular individual, i.e. sign-making is private. We can observe what others do and we can hear what they say, but how these activities relate to the agents' communicational histories is not open to disinterested observation. Sign-making is unobservable. The limits of language are always the limits of *my* language. In fact, the integrationist holds that *the limits of my linguistic experience define the limits of my language*. If I have never encountered a word before, or do not know what it means, I do not know how to integrate it in the present circumstances. In other words: I do not know what to 'do' with it (HARRIS, 1998, p. 91). I may or may not need to know for the present task at hand. There is no complete (i.e. contextless) knowledge of a word that one could ever grasp (*pace* Johnson-Laird). 'Knowing what to do' with a word, in Harris' sense, is about me making it a sign in relation to how *I perceive* the present communicational circumstances (including my assessment of the person/persons communicating with me). Harris (2009, p. 71) calls this knowledge "integrational proficiency". Whether I make it the 'right' kind of sign is a question that may or may not enter the picture subsequently, but it does not concern my first-order sign-making here-and-now.

Language is not a 'thing' that can be defined reocentrically, e.g. as a 'complex computational system'. For integrationists, language is something we *do*, and as such, its only existence is through one's personal linguistic experience. 'Language' is also talked about, a topic of discourse, and as such, constrained by all sorts of macrosocial factors. What commonly counts as 'language' in the Global

North may thus be very different from what counts as ‘language’ in the Global South (PENNYCOOK; MAKONI, 2019). Is there anything more general to say about linguistic experience? I’d venture to suggest that linguistic experience is an exclusively *human* experience. We cannot know how non-human beings experience anything, let alone whether they have any ‘linguistic’ experience. My dog constantly hears human voices and human sounds. Does my dog have personal linguistic experience as a result? In turn, I know I experience language on a daily basis. I also know other human beings experience language on a daily basis. Do I know that about each and every human being? Not from personal experience. But I have to assume that human beings *all* possess linguistic experience, however varied that experience undoubtedly is. That is, every human being has his/her personal communicational history, of which linguistic experience is an integral part. In terms of the limits of language, these limits have to be set anthropocentrically: applying the term ‘language’ to non-human creatures compels us to treat it as a reocentric label denoting different (species-specific) ontologies. Advocating a non-anthropocentric understanding of language may seem to open up the limits of our understanding of the phenomenon: ‘Language’ as we thought it was, which turns out to be much more than we imagined it to be (PENNYCOOK, 2018). However, the resulting expansion of the ‘language’ account, somewhat paradoxically, leads to a reductionist (and thus impoverished) view of language in the human realm. The integrationist argues in favour of an anthropocentric, *non-segregational* approach to the limits of language. Consequently, we need no ‘scientific’ definition of human language – that is, we leave it macrosocially open. In fact, human communities differ in their views of what counts as ‘language’ (HAUCK; HEURICH, 2018; PENNYCOOK; MAKONI, 2019).

7 LANGUAGE AND RESPONSIBILITY

In the Western tradition, the ‘Language Myth’, i.e. the theses that (i) languages are fixed-codes and (ii) linguistic communication serves to make the speaker’s ideas known to the hearer, dictates that there are predefined limits to what words can mean. Here is what a famous neuroscientist, Sam Harris, said in his 2004 book *The End of Faith* about imaginary (Humpty-Dumpty) people he obviously regards as ‘irrational’ because they even contest the meanings of basic English words: “We are not free to mean whatever we want when using words like “poison” or “north” or “zero”. Anyone who would lay claim to such entitlements should not be surprised when the rest of us stop listening to him”. (S. HARRIS, 2004, p. 51).

From a Southern perspective, of course, the whole discourse on ‘rationality’ is based on a northern ideology. It goes hand in hand with the so-called ‘correspondence’ theory of truth, which in turn leans on a reocentric semantics (HARRIS, 2004, p. 70). For the integrationist, there is another – more fundamental – reason why debates on human reasoning should not be conducted based on alleged linguistic agreements between speakers of the ‘same language’. What words as used by individuals in concrete communicational situations mean is limited by circumstantial, biomechanical, and macrosocial factors. At the same time, they are *made possible* by these three factors. That is something that is lost completely on fixed-code theorists like Sam Harris. Language is always integrated with the rest of our ongoing activities. It is easy to condemn other people’s linguistic usage (as Sam Harris does) when it does not conform to the (decontextualized) propositional contents expressed by sentences like ‘poison is bad’. However, any utterance is a sponsored one, i.e. it is produced by someone, possibly in the presence of someone else, in some actual circumstance. What is more important than the question of whether ‘we are free to use words in whatever way we want’ is the integrationist semantic thesis that words mean what *we* make them mean in the here-and-now, for the present communicational purposes at hand. There is no word-meaning that is somehow ‘external’ to me, the meaning-maker. What *you* make my words mean is a totally different story: it is *your* interpretation of *my* words. How you interpret my words depends on you: Your signs are not my signs. What matters, in the end, is that we take *linguistic responsibility* for the signs we make, “at least to the extent”, as Roy Harris (1998, p. 71) argues, “of being able to explain what we mean if called upon to do so”. Asking the metalinguistic question ‘What do you mean?’ is one way for you to settle on a certain interpretation of my words (rather than another). If I want to know what someone meant by the words he/she used, the most straightforward course of action would be to ask him/her directly.

The notion of ‘linguistic responsibility’, it seems to me, opens up new avenues for linguistic inquiry. It is a notion tightly bound to the integrational conception of the sign as *radically indeterminate in both form and meaning*. The question of whether there are limits to language and what these limits are can only be pursued meaningfully by linguistic theorists after they have established (and declared) their semiological position. The question about the limits of language is not a theoretically neutral one. Neither are

the questions ‘What is language?’, ‘What is a language?’, ‘What is communication?’, and ‘What is a sign?’. Declaring one’s philosophy of language is also a linguistically responsible course of action. In fact, the answers provided to these pivotal questions will determine the limits within which linguistic inquiry proceeds.

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**INTEGRATIONISM
IN CONTEXT:
THE INTEGRATIONIST
TRADITION IN THE
CONTEMPORARY LANDSCAPE
OF LINGUISTIC RESEARCH –
TOWARDS A “CRITICAL
COMMUNICATION
STUDIES”**

**INTEGRACIONISMO NO CONTEXTO: A TRADIÇÃO INTEGRACIONISTA NA PAISAGEM
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COMUNICAÇÃO”**

**INTEGRACIONISMO EN CONTEXTO: LA TRADICIÓN INTEGRACIONISTA EN EL PAISAJE
CONTEMPORÁNEO DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN LINGÜÍSTICA – HACIA UN “ESTUDIO DE
COMUNICACIÓN CRÍTICA”**

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ABSTRACT: This paper presents a personal view on where integrationism sits in the current field of linguistics and applied linguistics research. In doing so, the paper aims at clarifying the distinctive contribution that the integrationist tradition may make in responding to the challenge that Alastair Pennycook and Sinfree Makoni (2020) have posed of a re-made linguistics that can learn from and do justice to the struggles for both social justice and equality across both the Global South and Global North as well as for harmonious and mutually beneficial relations with our world and the other beings that share it with us. The question, then, is whether in recoiling along this particular critical trajectory from within and against our own cultural heritage we will meet and

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join productively the decolonizing tide coming towards us in the form of the insurgent intellectual and activist movements of the global south.

KEYWORDS: Integrationism. Context. Global South. Social justice. Struggles.

RESUMO: Este artigo apresenta uma visão pessoal sobre a posição do integracionismo no campo atual da lingüística e da pesquisa em lingüística aplicada. Com isso, o artigo visa apresentar a contribuição que a tradição integracionista pode oferecer como resposta ao desafio que Alastair Pennycook e Sifree Makoni (2020) colocaram sobre a reconstrução de uma lingüística que possa aprender com as lutas e fazer justiça a elas, seja para promover igualdade social tanto no Sul Global quanto no Norte Global, como para fomentar relações harmoniosas e mutuamente benéficas com nosso mundo e com os outros seres que o compartilham. A questão, então, é se, recuando ao longo desta trajetória crítica e, a partir de dentro e contra nossa própria herança cultural, seremos capazes de nos encontrar e juntar produtivamente à maré descolonizadora que vem em nossa direção na forma dos movimentos intelectuais e ativismos insurgentes do sul global.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Integracionismo. Contexto. Sul Global. Justiça social. Lutas.

RESUMEN: Este artículo presenta una visión personal sobre la posición del integracionismo en el campo actual de la lingüística y la investigación en lingüística aplicada. Con ello, el artículo pretende presentar el aporte que la tradición integracionista puede ofrecer como respuesta al desafío que plantearon Alastair Pennycook y Sifree Makoni (2020) sobre la reconstrucción de una lingüística que pueda aprender de las luchas y hacerles justicia, o promover la igualdad social tanto en el Sur Global como en el Norte Global, y fomentar relaciones armoniosas y mutuamente beneficiosas con nuestro mundo y con los demás seres que lo comparten. La pregunta, entonces, es si, retrocediendo en esta trayectoria crítica y, desde dentro y en contra de nuestra propia herencia cultural, seremos capaces de encontrarnos y unirnos productivamente a la marea descolonizadora que se nos presenta en forma de movimientos intelectuales y activismo. insurgentes del sur global.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Integracionismo. Contexto. Sur Global. Justicia social. Luchas.

1 INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I wanted to give a personal view on where I believe integrationism (HARRIS, 1981, 1998) sits in the current field of linguistics and applied linguistics research. In doing so, I hoped to try to clarify what I see as the distinctive contribution that the integrationist tradition may make in responding to the challenge that Alastair Pennycook and Sifree Makoni (2020) have posed of a re-made linguistics that can learn from and do justice to the struggles for both social justice and equality across both the Global South and Global North as well as for harmonious and mutually beneficial relations with our world and the other beings that share it with us.

Integrationism itself is a “Northern” theory (CONNELL, 2007); it clearly does not spring directly from what Santos (2018, p. 1) calls “the epistemologies of the South”, anchored in “[...] the experiences of resistance of all those social groups that have systematically suffered injustice, oppression, and destruction caused by capitalism, colonialism, and patriarchy”. The critical perspective integrationists take is an antagonistic position within Northern Theory, motivated, couched (largely) in English and argued in ways that could only be possible, and have immediate relevance and meaning, to those steeped in the Northern “language myth” (HARRIS, 1981) and educated in its institutions. The question, then, is whether, in recoiling along this particular critical trajectory from within and against our own cultural heritage we will meet and join productively the decolonizing tide coming towards us in the form of the insurgent intellectual and activist movements of the global south (MAKONI; VERITY; KAIPER-MARQUEZ, 2021; PABLÉ, 2019). But that will not be for us to judge.

As I discovered around 2005, and as many readers have no doubt discovered for themselves, Roy Harris’s work has helped us to call into question many if not all of our long-held views and beliefs about language and communication, and perhaps to rethink our academic priorities or even change direction entirely. But it would be wrong to imagine that integrationism, even if we are in sympathy with its basic principles, offers or purports to offer the answers to all the challenges and intellectual issues raised by the

monumental and epochal tasks of anti-imperialism and decolonization, although it may have value in relation to such a mission. As Harris (1998, p. ix) put it himself:

Whether or not one accepts the integrationist critique, examining its claims provides a useful way of putting the orthodoxy in perspective. It is likely to sharpen an awareness of the problems that are involved in attempting to answer seemingly simple questions about how one person is able to communicate with another.

The integrationist movement is also, we should say, overwhelmingly white and male in its scholarly make up at the present time, though we earnestly hope that events such as IAISLC 2020 are helping to attract and include a more diverse body of researchers (MAKONI; VERITY; KAIPER-MARQUEZ, 2021).

2 THE INTEGRATIONIST PROJECT AND WHERE IT SITS TODAY

Nowadays, integrationism finds itself in a busy research field alongside post-humanist, post-colonial, new materialist, distributed, and existentialist approaches to the problems that applied linguistics faces in its decolonizing mission (PENNYCOOK; MAKONI, 2020; MAKONI; VERITY; KAIPER-MARQUEZ, 2021). In that context, I believe there are two key things that integrationism brings to the table: its critique of the Eurocentric “language myth” and its novel semiology of “integration”.

2.1 CRITIQUE OF THE EUROCENTRIC “LANGUAGE MYTH”

Integrationism is distinctive for the depth and power of its systematic critical analysis of the linguistic and communicational methods, assumptions, conceptions, theories, and programmes that the Eurocentric (CONNELL, 2007) “language myth” embodies and entails. This analysis embraces the core metalinguistic frameworks of linguistic theory and description but penetrates through to what Harris calls the “communication myth” (HARRIS, 2002) which both informs the more specific and explicit projects of linguistic theorization but also underpins fundamental perspectives on perception, knowledge, and learning. Both “language myth” and “communication myth” are themselves bound up with particular communicational processes in specific cultural contexts, including language teaching and literacy practices, but have also aided and abetted widespread practices of linguistic and cultural discrimination, denigration, and erasure – the “invention and disinvention of languages” in Makoni and Pennycook’s (2007) terms - in the service of the predatory and exploitative interests of the colonial elites and nationalisms of Europe and the global North more broadly.

In his 1981 book, *The Language Myth*, Roy Harris set out a project which he referred to as “demythologized linguistics” or “integrational linguistics”. The project was centered on the exposure and analysis of a specifically Eurocentric language ideology, the myth of the book’s title, which presents a picture of a segregated domain of linguistic facts, supposedly shared by whole societies or communities of linguistic communicators, rooted in discrete “languages” or “language systems”, identifiable and amenable to specialized technical procedures and/or natural scientific investigation. For Harris, such a view of language, along with the intellectual and social conditions for linguistic inquiry of this kind, constituted the primary target for critical investigation. As he put it:

Mainstream linguistics, in short, has a rather narrow, built-in cultural bias. Having its roots in Western traditional grammar, it assumes that the proper or natural basis for being a linguist is the kind of education afforded by membership of a European nation (or one of its colonies or former colonies). This means, in effect, membership of a literate society in which literacy has a common alphabetic basis. The irony of this situation is that no such basis has ever been available to the great majority of the world’s linguistic communities. (HARRIS, 1998, p. 19)

He went on (1998, p. 19):

If contemporary linguistics is to be rescued from this ethnocentric myopia (as an integrationist would hope) it must find a perspective from which “expertise” in linguistic matters is not equated with the self-serving professionalism that marked the rise of the subject to academic independence in Western universities during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Harris further argues that the “language myth” is but one manifestation of a more general “communication myth” in Western culture according to which all forms of communication are conceived in terms of transmission, a communicational model which is then applied more generally to other ways in which human beings connect to one another and the world, including perception (HARRIS, 2002).

Behind and within the myth, according to Harris, is a more fundamental sociological conception or assumption in Western culture which Harris (2002) calls “somatic particularity”, that is, a belief in the primary separateness, alone-ness, or a-social independence of individual human beings with their innate powers and propensities. From that perspective, sociality is an exteriority or imposition, something which we need to somehow derive from the initial state of naturalistic individual atomism, as was attempted by speculative 17th and 18th century accounts (TAYLOR, 1992). A key ingredient in such accounts was the postulation of a common, public language (established by natural iconicity or somehow through social conditioning, contract, or other convention) with a transmission model of communication acting as the bridging mechanism, a kind of social glue, between individual minds. Here language in effect becomes a socializing or, indeed, “civilizing” force.

Harris confronted this whole Western linguistic tradition in order to identify and problematize its core conceptions and assumptions, to demonstrate, in particular, its narrowness and elitism, and thereby to open up the field of communication both to critique from within as well to the perspectives of other linguistic traditions and philosophies in the world. Areas that Harris or other integrationist scholars have examined in this light include general linguistic theory, applied linguistic methodologies (e.g. corpus linguistics), historical linguistics, language teaching, sociolinguistics, discourse analysis (including Critical Discourse Analysis), and the linguistics of the law, with further, though less systematic, forays into cognitive and cultural-historical psychology (HARRIS, 2009; 2009; PABLÉ; HUTTON, 2015; PABLÉ, 2017). Harris stayed “true to his code”, as the Sinatra song says, for the rest of his life, pushing further and further at the ethnocentric and historically specific roots and assumptions of this communication myth and attempting to reveal its consequences for social life generally in Western societies, including the intellectual fragmentation represented by traditional academic disciplinary boundaries (art, history, science, philosophy, linguistics, psychology, sociology, and so on).

In all this, the integrationist inclination has been to emphasize the value of a humanist perspective on language and communication (PABLÉ, 2017) grounded in a shift from exclusively “third person” methods of handling the abstracted and reified products or traces of communicational activity to a focus on creative sign-makers, and their “first person” experiences, within their own situated communicational engagements (see JONES, 2017b, 2018, p. 119-123 on Conversation Analysis). The humanist tradition appealed to, however, is arguably not one that is vulnerable to the critique of humanistic rationality in the enlightenment tradition by those who advocate for a “post-humanism” (PENNYCOOK, 2018; PABLÉ, 2019; JONES; DUNCKER, 2021). The integrationist perspective, rather, emphasizes that no humanly experienced factors, whether in practices or beliefs or in the circumstances of life activity, can be ignored in advance or excluded (on theoretical or methodological grounds) from consideration of what language might be taken to be, if at all. The term “integration” itself, then, despite any mechanistic connotations that the English word may have, simply implies that attempts to find or create universally valid criteria for academic demarcation of “language” or “communication” are misguided since they precisely contravene what integrationism takes as its most basic and overriding principle – the integrated character of human activities and experience. It also follows of course that not all individuals, let alone communities, nations, or “cultures” will have commensurable metalinguistic terms for or accounts of anything that might correspond to particular readings or interpretations of the English words “language” and “communication”. Certainly, the “cosmovisions” of ubuntu (ubunto-nepantla) philosophy (PENNYCOOK; MAKONI, 2020) and Quilombo (MAKONI; SEVERO, 2015) could never have been a starting point for the methods and constructs of the Eurocentric language tradition and offer fruitful and provocative new lines for contemporary linguistic scholarship as well as for conceptions of

humanity and sociality. On that basis, all discussion of “language”, all linguistic and communicational research, necessarily involves “intercultural translation” (de Sousa Santos, 2018).

2.2 COMMUNICATION AS INTEGRATION

Some of the principles of Harris’s (1981) “demythologized linguistics” now may appear to be fairly mainstream forty years later and have, in that time, been converged on from a variety of different and independent perspectives. One particularly important area of convergence is the rejection of what one might call the classificatory (or compartmentalizing) tendency of segregationism, represented in its commitment to an ontology of distinct and identifiable “languages”. This convergence is apparent in the widespread recognition that linguistic or other communicational acts take place in and through collections, assemblages, or distributed networks of heterogenous “stuff”, from communicating actors (brains and bodies), including possibly other animate beings, through to inanimate objects, materials and processes of all kinds (PENNYCOOK; MAKONI, 2020). This widespread rejection of a key segregationist tenet, albeit couched in different terms (e.g. “multimodality”), runs parallel to some extent with Harris’s “non-compartmentalization” principle (HARRIS, 1981, p. 165) which builds on “Sapir’s observation that “communication is based on structural correspondences between certain forms of behaviour in a situational context” (SAPIR, 1998, p. 13), however, these forms of behaviour might be categorized.

Against this emerging consensus, though, integrationism stands out for its refusal of all reificatory inclinations to bestow semiological properties, functions, or potential on the material resources, circumstances, or physical processes which are implicated and impacted in particular communicational acts, insisting that signification generally can only arise through the *signifying* or *sign-making* powers of actors themselves in specific contexts. Accordingly, Harris describes what he calls the “philosophical basis” of integrationism the position that “the linguistic universe is populated not by mysteriously unobservable objects called “languages” but by observable human beings who somehow and sometimes manage to communicate with one another”. Communicational activities, consequently, “[...] are episodes in the lives of particular people at particular times and places” and “cannot be decontextualized” (HARRIS, 2009, p. 70).

What integrationism contributes here, in a way that flows logically from its critical rejection of *segregationism*, is its remaking of the whole concept of *communication* as a semiology of *integration* in which the meanings, senses, or values experienced and deployed by subjects are created by them as they integrate their movements, actions, feelings, and goals with others and with the lifeworld. The semiology of integration does not, therefore, depend on found “semiotic resources” or on the creation of special niche “units” which serve exclusively linguistic or communicational functions by supposedly containing and conveying meaningful “content”. On the contrary: a “sign” is “[...] any observable feature or complex of features which, by virtue of its integrational function, plays some role in our diverse but continuous practices of making sense” (HARRIS, 2009b, p. 72).

Thus, the integrationist view is that it is the specific relationship between acting subject and materials to hand or made in situ, i.e. the incorporation of materials into the purposeful activities of agents, that creates a semiological function or value *for the subject acting in that way*. Signs, consequently, do not exist anywhere except in the active relationship of individuals to the people and things dynamically integrated into a time-bound programme of activity. When we talk to one another we are not sending pre-fabricated units of meaning through space and time, but contextualizing each other’s behaviours as our integrational proficiencies allow in relation to the many different interactional goals, we are jointly pursuing or taking up through our activities in context. Such sign-making activity is therefore at once an effort to create the communicational links in the lines of engagement we are contributing to and at the same time, to mutually manage the problem of semiological indeterminacy – how things are to be understood or taken - which is constantly posed and needing to be resolved for mutual understanding and joint action to be possible (DUNCKER, 2017).

Such semiological activities can, of course, be approached with a particular focus on the specific media or materials drawn into, and playing an essential part in, the relevant communicational processes, such as written forms or texts. However, it is important to remember that, as in the case of recordings of speech, written forms give us directly only products and traces of the live exercise of communicational powers by the actors concerned. A text or corpus of written materials does not, therefore, present us with a

collection, still less a system, of signs as such but, as Duncker (2017) argues, constitutes a partial and selective legacy – some of the “debris” – of a collective sign-making effort, in particular the exercise of communicational powers to address and resolve (however transiently or unsuccessfully) the linguistic (and other) indeterminacies which beset collaborative or competitive endeavour.

Such a “semiology of activity” (JONES, 2011) is clearly also relevant to the vital behaviours of non-human animals with respect both to their social interactions and relations with the world as well as with their relations with human beings. Our traditions and daily life experiences teach us that we can communicate with animals and share a productive communicational space because we live with them and work with them. In such cooperative activities as sheep gathering, for example, we integrate our activities with those of sheepdogs towards particular ends. Of course, *their* semiological proficiencies and experiences cannot be *ours* - *the shepherds*” - because our activities and their activities, though complementary, are not and cannot be the same. Nevertheless, integrationism is not in the business of attempting to prescribe or stipulate a priori semantic or cognitive criteria that rationalise an unbridgeable gulf between the communicational capacities, and the communicational worlds, of humans and non-humans.

In some integrationist work, there is a clear emphasis or indeed exclusive focus on the sign as private experience or interpretation, and this is indeed one side of the semiological picture (PABLÉ; HUTTON, 2015). But integration is fundamentally *connection* - connection of the individual person with the lifeworld - since signs are made in the integration of our activities with those of others and the world we inhabit and create together. Integrationism, therefore, is a semiology of human community, interdependence, and interconnection. While my sign-making is an irreducibly subjective experience, the signs I make are not a barrier between me and others or between me and the world I move in, work on or perceive: such signs are the ways in which our vital connections are experienced; this is what our connections to others *mean* to us - what they feel like, sound like, or look like (see JONES, 2019 on “transparency”). Integrationism, thus, is a semiology rooted in the most basic condition of our humanity – our sociality, our acting together, our being together.

Hence, this basis offers us a linguistic and communicational perspective which is a breathtaking novelty in the history of language philosophy in the West: a view of communication without explicit or implicit theoretical grounding in a prior commitment to “languages”, a linguistics without structural systems, rules, code, transmission, the distinction between form and content (“bi-planarity”), and with a view of meaning and thinking grounded in meaningful social activity and, therefore, opposed to representationalism (“surrogation”) (HARRIS, 1981, 2009; JONES, 2019). Accordingly, instead of “sign systems” or communication as transmission, we have what Harris calls “communication processes”, a perspective which, from the beginning, situates our communicational powers in the very contexts of life in which those powers are developed and exercised and which they help create: “A communication process is defined by the activities it integrates, the particular constraints on integration involved, and the signs produced to implement the process” (HARRIS, 1996, p. 63).

Such processes do not themselves exist in isolation, in a communicational and biographical vacuum. In their interactional construction, they are communicationally bound through the many threads of our lives into the entire social dynamic. Therefore, as a result, and depending on concrete social conditions, actors engaged in one network of communication processes may not be aware of other communication processes (and their actors) that are presupposed by their own or of the consequences of their own communication processes for subsequent or simultaneous processes. While the conscious communicational purposes of subjects are a necessary dimension of any communicational act (“the sign cannot be decontextualized”) the progress and outcomes of particular communicational engagements cannot, therefore, be defined or understood either as a direct expression or result of communicational intention (HARRIS, 1996) or simply in terms of the (“first person”) conscious awareness or concerns of the actors directly involved (see Harris, 1996 for a distinction between “internal” and “external” integration; cf Jones, 2019). It is certainly generally true that, while we knowingly contribute to a particular activity, we cannot on the basis of that experience alone know the shape and dynamic of social activity en masse. The relevant macrosocial patterns of integration (including “macrosocial conformities”, HARRIS, 1996) will, consequently, require special attention and focus. As we know only too well, in specific historical and cultural circumstances, such communicational organization may create, and depend on, depersonalization, alienation, and, generally, dehumanizing circumstances and consequences of all kinds. However, as Connell (2007) and Smith (2012) argue, Northern scholars have, in positivist style, decontextualized and naturalized such coercive patterns of conformity

and have regularly misread such impersonal and alienating social systems as the template or model for universal theories of social organization.

Integrationism offers a different perspective: the dehumanizing premisses and consequences of particular social systems, indeed *all* processes and activities of social exploitation and injustice, are necessarily the continuously produced outcomes of sign-making activity, i.e., communication processes and their internal and external integration (JONES, 2019). On that basis, we may decide to focus our communicational interest precisely on a critical study of the communicational conditions and processes which produce injustice and inequality, as well as on the creative communicational acts, forms, and methods of organization that afford critical awareness of and resistance to these injustices.

3 DEMYTHOLOGISATION AND DECOLONISATION OF LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION RESEARCH: DEGREES OF ALIGNMENT?

In this section I wanted to briefly discuss two topic areas over which demythologizing and decolonizing projects appear to be aligned: a) Critical Discourse Analysis and b) the conception of verbal thinking and its historical development in Vygotskys cultural-historical psychology.

a) *Critical Discourse Analysis: how to make the world safe for the Western grammatical tradition*

I began a critical exploration of Critical Discourse Analysis in the early 2000s. At that time I had no knowledge of integrationism, but as a Marxist and a linguist I was disturbed by what I considered the pretentious and self-serving claims of CDA to be a method of social-ideological critique based on linguistic analysis. An early paper in *Historical Materialism* (JONES, 2004) centered directly on the key arguments that both Norman Fairclough (1989) and Fairclough and Wodak (1997) advanced for such a “discourse turn” in the social sciences.

The CDA case rested on the claim that there had been “important shifts in the function of language in social life” whereby discourse had become “perhaps the primary medium of social control and power” (FAIRCLOUGH, 1989, p. 3). It was this newly won primacy of “discourse” in social life that was held to license a specifically *linguistic* approach to the analysis of social processes. This argument in turn rested on a number of claims about fundamental changes in global economic production.

It is well known for instance that the balance of economic life has shifted increasingly from production to consumption and from manufacturing industries to service, culture and leisure industries. In many service contexts, a key factor in the quality of the “goods” produced and therefore in profitability is the nature of the language that is used in “delivering” services. (FAIRCLOUGH; WODAK, 1997, p. 259)

On these grounds, the authors claimed that “[...] language has become more salient and more important in a range of social processes” and that “[...] the increased economic importance of language is striking” (FAIRCLOUGH; WODAK, 1997, p. 259). These economic arguments were intended to justify a view of global capitalism today as a social form whose driving forces are less and less “material”, or “economic” and where “[...] the exercise of power, in modern society, is increasingly achieved through ideology, and more particularly through the ideological workings of language” (FAIRCLOUGH, 1989, p. 3).

What is striking, therefore, is that these arguments for a privileging of *linguistic* methods from a distinctly Eurocentric tradition appeal quite explicitly to what are clearly Northern-centered perspectives (and blindspots) on globalization. My critical commentary at the time put it this way:

The first problem here is the failure, and this despite CDA's professed interest in "globalisation", to examine the relationship between advanced capitalist countries and the world economic system as a whole. If the authors have in mind shifts in economic activity in Britain, Western Europe, and the USA (for example) ... the fact is that these economies are globally locked in to other economies where the 'balance of economic life' remains with or is shifted towards manufacturing. (JONES, 2004, p. 102)

The second point concerned "the naivety of the view of capitalist society and the capitalist state" (JONES, 2004, p. 104):

This is evident in the equation of "modern society" with bourgeois-democratic states and in the failure to see the interconnection between apparently consensual or hegemonic forms of political domination in, say, Britain and directly coercive, violent forms of domination in others, as well as the violence meted out abroad by the British state itself (I write after the invasion and occupation of Iraq by US and UK military forces).

If I would make these arguments differently and more pointedly today, the main point is that CDA's use of *segregationist methods of linguistic analysis* needed a biased, *Northern myth of contemporary social and economic life* to support it. Who would have thought, for instance, that the traditional doctrine of "parts of speech" could be an instrument of critical social science and political analysis? And yet this is Fairclough's claim in carrying out "grammatical and semantic analysis" which "can, I believe, be very productive in social research", though "it is often difficult for researchers without a background in Linguistics to access it" (2003, p. 6). He explains:

Doing social scientific analysis of social events and texts entails shifting away from our ordinary experience of them. Human beings are reflexive about what they do in their practical social life – they have ways of talking about it, describing it, evaluating it, theorizing it. For example, we might describe what someone says as 'long-winded', or 'wordy', or say that someone is "too fond of his (or her) own voice". These are some of the categories we have for talking about texts. *We also have categories when we do social scientific analysis of texts* ('noun', 'sentence', 'genre', and so forth), but they are specialist categories which are different from the ones we use in our ordinary social interaction. *These social scientific categories*, unlike practical categories, allow particular texts to be seen in relation to elaborated general theories. (FAIRCLOUGH, 2003, p. 15, my emphasis)

Here, then, is a methodology that requires a view of the world – of global economic and political relations and processes – fashioned in the image of the methods and concepts of the Western grammatical tradition and, naturally, therefore, requiring the specialist skills of the professional linguist to handle such esoteric tools. In subsequent papers (JONES; COLLINS, 2006; COLLINS; JONES, 2006; JONES, 2007) the critique of CDA's linguistic arguments were deepened through the incorporation of integrationist insights, not least the integrationists' lay-oriented perspective, quoted above, in which "expertise" in linguistic matters is not equated with the self-serving professionalism that marked the rise of the subject to academic independence in Western universities during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" (HARRIS, 1998, p. 19). Two of these critical encounters (COLLINS; JONES, 2006; JONES, 2007) went on to show how "expertise in linguistic matters" is developed and exercised by lay people in their battles to understand, expose, research, and resist, by intellectual and practical means, the impositions of governments and state forces. Jones (2007) therefore concluded:

[...] there is no such thing as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in the sense of a method of political or ideological critique based on the application of conventional linguistic constructs. All of us, as language users and makers, are continuously engaged in the critical examination of and response to communication in our everyday lives. The article argues that this constant critical engagement with communication cannot be captured or accounted for by conventional linguistic methods and concepts. Such critical engagements involve the interrogation and evaluation, in moral, political, and practical terms, of novel communicative acts in their unique, contextualized links with other aspects and dimensions of conduct. The abstract entities of conventional linguistics and pragmatics allow no critical purchase on this integration of communicative behaviour into the fabric of our social lives. The article argues that the attempts by Critical Discourse Analysts to build a method of political and ideological critique out of such entities is misguided and inevitably leads to a distorted view of the role of communication in society and of the workings of social processes more generally.

b) *Vygotsky's cultural-historical psychology and the evolution of "cultural man"*

My second example comes from research on the tradition of "cultural-historical psychology", primarily developed by Lev Vygotsky and often referred to as "Marxist psychology" (JONES, 2019). The interpretation of Vygotsky's oeuvre and its relevance today is undoubtedly a highly complex and controversial area, partly because of Vygotsky's own dissatisfaction with his successive formulations of psychological principle and his consequent rapid and sometimes drastic shifts in approach and method up to and including his very final days. All the same, it is instructive to examine key stages in the shaping of his unfinished project for their problematic assumptions and conceptions of human cognitive development.

One such case concerns *Studies in the History of Behavior: Ape, Primitive, Child* (VYGOTSKY; LURIA, 1993), a book originally published in 1930 and which gives perhaps the most substantial account of the philosophical rationale and scientific orientation of cultural-historical psychology up to that point. In this work, Vygotsky and Luria are concerned to trace the psychological history of what they call "a psychological type of modern cultural man, *the European or American*" (VYGOTSKY; LURIA, 1993, p. 81, my emphasis). At another point, the description of "cultural man" is even more specific – "an average modern Parisian" (VYGOTSKY; LURIA, 1993, p.169), in contrast with "an Australian who is at a very primitive stage of development" (VYGOTSKY; LURIA, 1993, p. 169). Though "[...] the cultural man is inferior to the latter with respect to almost all the simplest psychological functions", they argue, nevertheless, that "we still know that the mental life of the latter is much richer, that he is much more powerful, and that often he is much better oriented in his environment and controls the environmental phenomena".

Vygotsky and Luria argue that such cultural "primitivism" is most clearly exhibited *linguistically*: the language of "[...] primitive man is more meagre in means, cruder, and less developed than the language of a cultural man" (VYGOTSKY; LURIA, 1993, p. 108). In particular:

The wealth of vocabulary is directly dependent on the concrete and precise nature of primitive man's language. In the same way that he photographs and reproduces all his experience, he also recalls it, just as precisely. He does not know how to express himself abstractly and conditionally, as the cultural man does. (VYGOTSKY; LURIA 1993, p. 110)

In this context, it is unnecessary to dwell on the familiar racist and colonialist tropes that these arguments and descriptions embody and expound (SMITH, 2012). However, it is worth noting that these tropes themselves – particularly the distinction between the "concrete" language of the "primitive" and the "abstract" language of the "cultural" person – rely completely on long-standing philosophical prejudices within Western thinking to do with the way in which language expresses, or mediates between, the mind and "reality". Harris critically examined such traditions and their continuing grip on views of cognition, including within Vygotsky's research, in his book on literacy and rationality (HARRIS, 2009; see also JONES, 2017b, 2020). Harris (2009) identified two problematic linguistic themes in the philosophical standpoint informing the cultural-historical account.

Firstly, Harris demonstrated how a whole methodology of comparative psychological research can take its inspiration from a segregationist view of language. Here the "abstract" use of words – words disconnected from any context of directly useful action – is valorized over use of words as part of a practical endeavour. Secondly, and allied with this first, we note the representationalist or "surrogational" assumptions about language: word meanings are arranged on a hierarchical and value-laden scale of representational scope in terms of the degree of *generality* with which aspects of the world are mirrored conceptually. Thus, the words of primitive peoples represent individual, concrete objects (like a photograph) while the words of cultural people are abstract generalizations over many (or infinite) concrete instances. In this way, a ladder or scale of semantic/cognitive content from the low (concrete) to the high (abstract) is constructed and given an evolutionary significance for human historical development (JONES, 2017b).

Integrationism rejects both these inter-dependent positions. As Harris (2008, p. 111) puts it: "Words are in the first instance tools for living. The idea that they are tools for thinking is a prejudice derived from the way we have been educated" More particularly:

[...] languages are not systems for the expression of thoughts: the essential function of words is the contextualized integration of activities. From that integration come what are called the "meanings" not only of words but of the many varieties of non-verbal signs that human beings have developed. (HARRIS, 2008, p. 112)

We should also acknowledge that this Northern, colonizers' perspective on the cognitive capacities of so-called "primitive peoples", with its "concrete"- "abstract" dichotomy, is the same perspective which became entrenched in the Northern educational systems in respect of its own populations (cf PENNYCOOK, 1998), for instance in the theory of language deficit developed by Basil Bernstein with the help and support of linguists Michael Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan (JONES, 2013).

4 CRITICAL COMMUNICATION STUDIES?

With the help of the examples above, I hope to have demonstrated a degree of alignment and confluence between demythologizing and decolonizing projects. Specifically, the range and depth of Harris's critical engagement with the Western language tradition from an integrationist perspective reveals fundamental problems and biases in the mythological foundations of that tradition that the decolonizing movement is also addressing from its own perspective and on the basis of its own pressing concerns and aims.

In this final section, I thought it might be useful to consider some possible implications of this confluence for a demythologized/decolonized field of language and communication research or curriculum of study which I refer to, tentatively, as "Critical Communication Studies".

First of all, such a field of study would be lay-oriented in the sense that we have already discussed, i.e., "expertise" in linguistic matters' is not regarded as the preserve of a Western educated elite. Here instead the emphasis would be on probing and challenging the Western (Northern) Eurocentric language myth through a combined focus on a) our communicational powers, their development, and exercise in our everyday lives, activities, and struggles and b) on the understandings of language and communication that different communities and cultures have developed across the world in articulating their own identities and aspirations including their abilities and potential as language-users.

Secondly, instead of teaching established linguistic frameworks, we would hear and engage with direct testimony about the communicational approaches and innovations of participants in contemporary popular movements with particular attention to their methods of challenge and resistance to the communicational agendas, means, and ideologies of dominant powers. In such discussion, we could certainly learn about CDA, for example, and try to use it, but this would be a critical endeavour, aimed at finding the limitations of CDA, its problematic assumptions, and biases, as well as any potential value.

And thirdly, a Critical Communication Studies would be not merely a study of the "language" of injustice – for example, the vocabulary and semantics of class and race hate and of misogyny - but an examination of the networks of communication processes in and through which structural injustice and inequality are produced and reproduced and actual and possible ways and means by which such networks can be subverted, transformed, destroyed or replaced.

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METHODOLOGY IN LANGUAGE RESEARCH: A SAILING BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS

METODOLOGIA NA PESQUISA DE LÍNGUAS: UMA VELA ENTRE SCYLLA E CHARYBDIS

METODOLOGÍA EN INVESTIGACIÓN LINGÜÍSTICA: UNA VELA ENTRE ESCILLA Y CARIBDIS

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ABSTRACT: Unlike most linguistic theories, integrational linguistics does not include a methodology for linguistic inquiry. Integrationists are critical of the methodologies and assumptions of modern linguistics and find the notion of *linguistic data* highly problematic. For this, integrationists have taken a lot of heat from researchers from data-driven research traditions who ask for a methodological alternative and find the lack of empirical integrational research frustrating. In this essay, I consider some of the background for the integrational critique of linguistic methodologies and discuss how to address the difficulties pertaining to linguistic data. I conclude with an empirical example to illustrate the problems as well as their possible solution.

KEYWORDS: Linguistic inquiry. Linguistic data. Integrationism.

RESUMO: Ao contrário da maioria das teorias linguísticas, a linguística integracionista não inclui uma metodologia de investigação linguística. Os integracionistas são críticos das metodologias e das suposições da lingüística moderna, considerando a noção de dados linguísticos altamente problemática. Por isso, os integracionistas têm recebido muita pressão de pesquisadores de tradições de pesquisa baseadas em dados que pedem uma alternativa metodológica e consideram a falta de pesquisa integracionista empírica frustrante. Neste ensaio, considero alguns dos antecedentes da crítica integracionista das metodologias linguísticas e discuto como abordar as dificuldades relativas aos dados linguísticos. Concluo com um exemplo empírico para ilustrar os problemas, bem como sua possível solução.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Investigação linguística. Dados linguísticos. Integracionismo.

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RESUMEN: A diferencia de la mayoría de las teorías lingüísticas, la lingüística integradora no incluye una metodología para la investigación lingüística. Los integracionistas son críticos con las metodologías y supuestos de la lingüística moderna y encuentran muy problemática la noción de datos lingüísticos. Por esto, los integracionistas han recibido mucha atención de los investigadores de tradiciones de investigación impulsadas por datos que piden una alternativa metodológica y encuentran frustrante la falta de investigación empírica integradora. En este ensayo, considero algunos de los antecedentes de la crítica integracionista de las metodologías lingüísticas y discuto cómo abordar las dificultades relacionadas con los datos lingüísticos. Concluyo con un ejemplo empírico para ilustrar los problemas y su posible solución.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Indagación lingüística. Datos lingüísticos. Integracionismo.

1 INTRODUCTION

Universities from every corner of the world cannot be wrong when they define research for their students on their website. Or can they? It is recurrently acknowledged that research requires data and that it implies the application of a certain discipline-specific methodology. No special provisions seem to be made when it comes to researching language. It is assumed that “all ‘scientific’ disciplines need facts to go on, and these facts must be of an order appropriate to the concerns of the discipline” (HARRIS 2009a, p. 41). Without facts the researcher is unable to tell “what can truly be said about something” (HARRIS 2009a, p. 41). Integrational linguists, however, take a critical view on these assumptions. They question the benefits of methodologies, and they refute the notion of linguistic data (e.g., HARRIS, 1997; PABLÉ; HUTTON, 2015; ORMAN; PABLÉ, 2016). The integrational sign as a historical and semiological fact is uniquely contextualized. It cannot be abstracted and turned into an object of inquiry. Therefore, it follows that linguistic research for the integrationist differs radically from the application of positivist methodologies within mainstream linguistics as well as the epistemological naturalism that supports them. It also means, however, that integrational inquiry hardly can be empirically informed, “[...] apart from the provision of anecdotal accounts of the specifics of particular communicative episodes” (LOVE, 2007, p.705).

Although this empirical predicament seems to apply to integrational linguistics in particular, the implicit assertion is that it applies more widely, but that researchers tend to ignore it, because it is customary within their research tradition to ignore it and/or because it makes them uneasy about the scientific status of their discipline.

Integrational linguistics never was a “theory + methodology + data’ model of linguistics” (HUTTON, 2016, p. 81). It was introduced by Roy Harris in 1981 as a “heretic” approach to linguistic inquiry “[...] which would examine language from a different theoretical perspective from that adopted in the Western grammatical tradition and its modern linguistic continuations” (HARRIS, 1998, p. 9). In *The Language Myth* (1981), Harris explains the myth of “orthodox” linguistics (HARRIS, 1981, p.10-11). According to the myth, language users require a shared language, a “fixed code”, in order to communicate, because communication is essentially a process of thought transfer, or “telementation”. The language has to be a fixed code “[...] in the sense that the same forms are paired with the same meanings for all speakers of the language” (WOLF; LOVE, 1997, p. 2), otherwise it would not enable speakers to exchange their thoughts by swapping messages in it. The myth is a product of these two fallacies, the telementation fallacy that posits the function of language and the fixed-code fallacy that posits the mechanism of language.

Integrational linguistics is concerned with human communication. Rather than being concerned with “the language” as in orthodox linguistics, it is “[...] a linguistics which takes as its point of departure the individual linguistic act in its communicational setting” (HARRIS, 1981, p.166). A linguistics which sees language as “a process of making sense of verbal behaviour” (HARRIS, 1981, p.165), as “continuously created by the interaction of individuals in specific communication situations” (HARRIS, 1981, p.167), and sees communication as including “[...] all processes in which human activities are contextually integrated by means of signs” (HARRIS, 1996, p.11). Signs are made when people communicate. Communicating participants are situated, “time-bound agents” (HARRIS, 1996, p.154), and therefore each sign is uniquely contextualized. Signs

are the contextualized products of communication (HARRIS, 1996, p.7). They do not pre-exist particular episodes of communication, for the simple reason that the integration of activities does not pre-exist the situation in which it is achieved.

This order of priority means that for integrational linguistics “languages presuppose communication” (HARRIS, 1998, p. 5), not the other way around as implied by the language myth. Rather, it is the interaction in particular communicational episodes “[...] which confers relevance upon the participants’ past experience with words; and not, as orthodox linguistics would have us believe, past experience (that is to say, mastery of ‘the language’) which determines the communicational possibilities of their present interaction” (HARRIS, 1981, p. 167). The “complex, cultural objects” (HARRIS, 1998, p. 4) we call “languages” are second-order abstractions, and although a language can be institutionalized, codified, and taught by a society to its members, “[...] at no point does it become a first-order reality for individuals” (LOVE, 1990, p. 101).

The aim of integrational linguistics is to “demythologize” the study of language, and instead of erecting abstract fixed codes to “explain and delimit in advance what it is possible for a sign to signify” (HARRIS, 1996, p.245), Harris takes the perspective of the individual communicating participants when he invites linguists to consider:

[H]ow do people actually use words to communicate, and how can this be described in ways which yield statements which both correspond to the language-user’s experience and are open to the kinds of verification and disproof characteristic of the *empirical sciences*? (HARRIS, 1981, p. 164, my italics)

This empirical invitation was issued 40 years ago, but unlike other linguistic theorists, Harris never supplied a programme of research activity to go with the theory. In fact, he explicitly refused to do so (HARRIS, 1997, p. 309). For this reason, he was met with accusations of offering “[...] no alternative to the methodologies and assumptions of modern linguistics which he dismissed in such withering terms” (HUTTON, 2016, p. 82). Later this criticism has been extended to other integrationists who are said to “[...] heavily criticise work carried out by various sociolinguists and in return offer philosophical discussions instead of research alternatives” (RITZAU, 2014, p. 4). Between the lines, integrationists are reproached for being intellectual free riders “[...] who would prefer to discuss the limits of knowledge rather than to add to it” (LABOV, 1975, p. 56).

But what, according to integrational linguistics, is so problematic about the “theory + methodology + data” model of linguistics? And do these issues apply to all language researchers who want to take part in debunking the language myth, or should only integrational linguists be concerned? It appears that not just questions about methodology, and data are included, but that also conceptions of knowledge and the research process are involved.

In the following, Section 2, I relate the integrational position on methodology and linguistic data to Internet and textbook assumptions concerning scientific inquiry. Next, Section 3, I consider traditional approaches versus an integrational approach to the study of language and communication, and after that, Section 4, I discuss the question of linguistic data. By way of illustration, I present an example taken from a sociolinguistic interview, and I conclude, Section 5, that the empirical consequence of an integrational approach applies not only to integrational linguistic inquiry.

2 THE RESEARCH PROCESS

Methodology is the normative version of epistemology (BUNGE, 1983, p. 4) while epistemology is concerned with human knowledge in general. Methodological deliberations concern “the principles of successful inquiry” (BUNGE, 1983, p. xiv). When researchers engage with methodological matters they attend to best practices for their discipline, i.e., the best ways of conducting the inquiry, how they can be justified, and which methods or techniques to apply. In itself, a set of methods does not constitute a methodology, but the decision to include or exclude a particular method is a methodological concern.

A quick web search turns out a great many definitions of “research” from as many textbooks and university websites. Despite differences in wording, the similarities are striking. Research is a kind of inquiry characterized by being

careful/systematic/organized, and by the discovery/production/creation of new knowledge through the gathering/collecting/mining for and subsequent analysis of data/information on a particular topic/observed phenomenon with the use of a suitable method, generally called “the scientific method”. This method, apparently applicable to all objects of study, is a procedure that consists of 4-6 steps, including observation of a phenomenon, formulating research questions and theoretical hypotheses, gathering data to test the hypotheses, analysing results, and drawing conclusions. (Enter “scientific method” in Google Image Search and see for yourself.) Hepburn and Andersen (2021, §6.1) also find that “[s]uch references to a universal scientific method can be found in educational material at all levels of science education”, and they note that “[...] numerous studies have shown that the idea of a general and universal scientific method often form part of both students’ and teachers’ conception of science”. Integrational linguistics questions the soundness of this method as well as the scientism that supports its acceptance, i.e., “[...] the belief that the methods of the natural sciences are applicable in all inquiry, especially in the human and social sciences” (MAUTNER, 1997, p. 511 *apud* HARRIS, 2009b, p. 125).

The pursued outcome of the research process is allegedly knowledge, preferably new knowledge. Data go in at one end, and an artefact called “knowledge” comes out at the other, but it is not as if research is a black-box process: Data are turned into knowledge when they are processed according to the scientific method. However, although the method provides a clear and easy-to-follow set of instructions for the production of knowledge, it conveys an incomplete picture of what research involves. First of all, it does not situate the research activity in a wider institutional setting, and hence fails to mention explicitly that the produced knowledge is not something researchers are supposed to keep to themselves, but that they should *disseminate* it.

In a sense, the cliché “publish or perish” puts the matter in a nutshell. The livelihood of professional researchers is based on the extent of their publications. The academic circuit materializes in writing, in books and articles, with the original research article as its flagship. The publication system is what makes the wheel of scientific knowledge production turn. It is no coincidence that the structure of the prototypical research article is isomorphous to the steps of the scientific method. Although the scientific method does not tell you in so many words what research *looks* like, the entire design incorporates visual dissemination as its primary objective. Even when researchers present their research orally at conferences and seminars, they either “read a paper” or subsequently commit their talk to paper to be published in the congress proceedings. Thus, it would be futile for any research method to include steps that could not be documented and reported within the limits imposed by two-dimensional graphic space. The advent of digital publication media has not fundamentally altered this limitation. Irrespective of the device on which the published text is displayed, the digital text bearer is still two-dimensional and requires readers to access information spatially. Every attempt to symbolize a phenomenon in a non-visual modality “[...] must pay the integrational price that visual communication demands” (HARRIS, 1996, p. 20).

Since the outcome of the research process is knowledge and this knowledge is created in anticipation of (visual) communication, it means that the forms of communication permitted by the material properties of the publication system effectively define the parameters for the forms of knowledge the academic community has the capacity to recognize. Thus, “[f]orms of communication make a crucial difference not only to what is known, but what is knowable” (HARRIS, 2009b, p. 2).

Researchers ask questions, and their methodology determines what is askable. Methods recognized among the practitioners of a discipline are the means by which (proposed) answers to such questions are developed. The methods constitute a (practical) tie between the (abstract) theory and its (concrete) object of study. They operationalize the concepts of the theory, verbalize the associated terminology, and instruct researchers in what to look for and how to process their observations in order to achieve their research goal.

A theory can be compared to an assertion about something, and in order to determine whether it, in practice, works as an assertion it must be possible to confront it, somehow, with the “something” it concerns. When a theoretical assertion is investigated, it is typically put forward as a question, a hypothesis, and the process of implementing it first and foremost involves a practical application procedure capable of detecting and identifying the phenomenon under consideration, i.e., a method. If the phenomenon is indeed “out there”, in the section of the world that falls within the scope of the theory, it can, in principle, be observed, whether wholly or partly, directly or indirectly with the aid of sense-extending instruments. Once the phenomenon has

been identified, various things can be done with the observed object depending on its materiality, it can be described, measured, weighed, cut open to reveal its inside, etc., and from these activities pieces of information about it can be collected, i.e., data. The point is that the phenomenon exists whether it is observed or not, and that observation is indifferent to the individuality of the observer, provided that the exact same methods are used for collecting the data on each instance. The “things of the world” are seen from a third-person perspective, “the view from nowhere” (NAGEL, 1986), and, in some cases, the observing and gathering of data can be left entirely to a machine. The observation is *objective*, and objectivity is the cornerstone of the scientific edifice.

Equipped with the data, the researcher can process and analyze them, with the use of additional methods, in order to discover what the data reveal about the phenomenon and determine whether the explanatory power of the theory suffices to account for it. Also, these methods are supposed to be objective and reliable in the sense that when applied by different researchers on the same set of “raw” (i.e., unprocessed) data, or by the same researcher on different instances, they will lead to identical results. If this outcome is an issue, there are methods to validate the results by ascertaining the degree of inter- or intra-observer reliability. Such methods may be formal, or informal as when conversation analysts meet in data-sessions to reach a “shared understanding” about the transcription of a recording (TEN HAVE, 2007, p.140).

By instructing researchers in *what to look for*, the methodology at the same time determines *what can be seen* “but, in virtue of its framing of the ‘object of study’, it also represents a form of systematic ‘not-seeing’” (PABLÉ; HUTTON, 2015, p. 40). The theoretical concepts invested in the technical terminology and implemented in practical methods become a lens through which “the world” is viewed and facts about the phenomenon are recognized. Not all observations count as facts, though, and therefore different researchers need to agree on their observations, how they are made, and whether or not they are indeed facts. This requires them to have access to a “common language” in which to talk about the object of study and their observations of it, i.e., a superordinate level of abstraction on which they can jointly fix their identifications. In short, a fixed code is required that will allow them to make and talk about identical reifications in contextual practice. The technical terminology of a discipline may be seen as an attempt to fulfill this role. The terminology makes the relevant cuts through the amorphous plane of thought for the members and shapes their thinking of the object of study. A carefully curated technical terminology is the thing that comes closest to a Saussurean *langue*, and through education students are initiated into its discriminations. University students are introduced to the terminology and receive training in its application through the practical implementation of the methods relevant to their field of study. The development in the grades they make is a reflection of how well they, according to their assessors, deploy the terminology and the degree to which they succeed in implementing the methods. Once they master both, they are ready to undertake original research projects of their own within the research tradition in which they are raised. Although desirable, it is not imperative that they have or are able to demonstrate any deeper understanding of the historical or theoretical underpinning of the concepts they are applying if only they are practically proficient in their methodological implementation. For example, unless they specialize in it, linguists are generally not expected to be erudite in the historical background and theoretical reasoning behind the part-of-speech system, so long as they can point out instances of nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc. with professional certainty. In this way, the mastery of the technical terminology and the methods of the discipline serves as an admission ticket to the research community, but in addition it carries a certain risk of being a pretext for intellectual negligence. In a highly popular guide to researching language, students who venture into theory-only projects are encouraged to engage critically with the theory, but at the same time they are warned against embarking on such projects because “they are difficult to do well” (WRAY; BLOOMER, 2013, p. 10), whereas neither the same encouragement nor the same warning is issued against data-based research. Apparently, a data-based approach is a safer way to follow en route to knowledge.

However, and as also implied by “publish or perish”, merely committing your research to paper is no guarantee for its publication. Once a work has been submitted for publication, it will be subjected to scrutiny by colleagues (editors and reviewers) who will assess whether or not it actually “contains” knowledge, and if so, whether this knowledge is new, i.e., significant enough to justify its addition to the “fund of knowledge” recognized by the discipline. The background against which this assessment is made is essentially the same as the one that guided the author through the research process, i.e., the scientific method. Authors who fail to meet the methodological expectations of their audience are not likely to pass through the eye of their disciplinary needle. (For this reason, especially junior researchers cannot afford to play havoc with such expectations as it may jeopardize their career prospects.) In academia, every member is in a sense their “brother’s keeper”, a function which is institutionalized through the peer

review system. Peer reviewers are gatekeepers whose task is to prevent deviant or low-quality research and “fake news” from being published (which is why predator journals and “unscreened” self-publication constitute a threat to the system). However, not all reviewers agree in their assessments. In actual practice, most journals require recommendations from more than one reviewer, and settle the matter in this way, but on a deeper level, such differences suggest that what counts as scientific knowledge is debatable. Ultimately, knowledge may become unrecognizable across research traditions due to the application of incompatible methodologies. For example, a practitioner of the quantitative research methodology may find it difficult to appreciate the outcome of a piece of qualitative research, and vice versa, even within the same discipline.

The integrational objections against the scientific method could be seen as a disagreement of this kind. However, this should not be taken to imply that integrationists would automatically endorse a methodology based on qualitative data. Irrespective of the kind of data, methodological rigour in itself is considered problematic, and “[...] we should not mistake the analysis of data for the uncovering of a hidden key or underlying essence which explains the practice from which the data is drawn” (PABLÉ; HUTTON, 2015, p. 39). The danger is that “when theorists take it upon themselves to supply a methodology ... the resultant analyses proceed, solemnly and inevitably, to ‘reveal’ a structure in the ‘data’ that reflects, point by point, the ‘system’ that is already tacitly incorporated in the methodological procedure” (HARRIS, 1997, p. 304).

Another objection concerns the assumption that knowledge can be passed around. The idea that the knowledge created by individual researchers can be shared by being added to a public fund of knowledge conflates knowledge with information. Knowledge presupposes a “knower”, and “the self is necessarily implicated as a knowing agent” (HARRIS, 2009b, p. 3). Information can be published and passed around and the published work can be read, but every time a person engages in reading or writing new signs are created, and “something is known that was not known before” (HARRIS, 2009b, p. 78).

Information, unlike knowledge, is always second-hand or third-hand or umpteenth-hand. It is always available in principle to as many people as are linked in any particular chain of communication. Knowledge on the other hand, belongs to the individual or individuals personally engaged in its creation. (HARRIS, 2009b, p. 143)

When knowledge is conflated with information, the individual knowing agent who created it is eliminated and “knowledge” becomes objective public property.

3 RESEARCHING LANGUAGE

Although the above is a gross simplification of the research process in academia across disciplines, it points out some of the integrational concerns. Methodologically, no special measures are taken with respect to language research. Quantitative, qualitative as well as mixed-methods methodologies seem equally applicable. It is taken for granted that the language researcher can collect linguistic data in the same way and on the same conditions as those that apply to all other researchers when they collect their data, i.e., through objective observation. Not all observational and analytical methods, however, are equally scientifically admissible, and this puts methodological discussion points on the agenda. Agreement in such matters is vital, partly in order to motivate researchers to pull together within their paradigm, and partly in order to avoid being suspected of substandard scientific practice.

While the Kuhnian paradigm model may adequately describe the organization of disciplines where one scientific paradigm successively replaces another, it does not make a good fit with the field of language studies. Although Saussurean structuralism may be said to have instituted a new paradigm in replacement of historical-comparative linguistics, the replacement was not effective. To this day, the comparative method thrives in Indo-European studies. Neither the advent of Chomskyan generative grammar thoroughly revolutionized linguistics. The Chomskyan or formalist paradigm is practiced side by side with its functionalist counterpart, just as post-structuralist theories co-exist happily with developments on a structuralist substrate. What can be reasonably said, though, is that both structuralism and generativism have had an impact on linguistic theorizing to the effect that later “hyphen linguistics” often contrast or relate their own position to either or both approaches. The bottom line,

however, is that each research tradition represents a different understanding of the subject matter “language”, as noted by (the structuralist) André Martinet (1984, p. 31): “If asked point-blank what the object of their science is, I assume that few professional linguists would hesitate to answer that it is ‘language’. But if asked what they mean by ‘language’ serious divergences would soon appear”.

In light of this theoretical diversity, it seems even more pertinent for language researchers to demonstrate methodological consistency through their collective practice. Almost half a century ago, Labov pointed out the importance of methodological agreement when he concluded that even if “all linguists are data-oriented”, “equally concerned with the empirical foundations of [their] field” there will be no progress in the field until they “can jointly recognize a valid and reliable linguistic fact” (LABOV, 1975, p. 5). Unless such an agreement can be reached, “[...] if one linguist cannot persuade another that his facts are facts”, then “he can hardly persuade him that his theory is right, or even show him that he is dealing with the same subject matter” (LABOV, 1975, p. 7). More recently, and from the perspective of discourse analysis, Antaki, Billig, Edwards, and Potter, based on their “experience of refereeing journal submissions”, discuss measures they feel that discourse analysts need to take in order to gain academic acceptance from “those who have been schooled in quantitative analysis” (ANTAKI *et al.*, 2003, p. §2). Although Labov here represents a quantitative approach and Antaki *et al.* a qualitative, both discussions rest on the “assumption that all ‘scientific’ disciplines need facts to go on” (HARRIS, 2009a, p. 41), and both are concerned with the scientific quality of their respective discipline.

Methodologically, both Labov and Antaki *et al.* lay out “principles of successful inquiry” (BUNGE, 1983, p. xiv) in terms of do’s and don’ts. Labov identifies the problem as a question between observation through introspective judgement and observation of linguistic behaviour. He cautions researchers against “uncontrolled intuitions” that may result in analyses that rest “on a very uncertain foundation” and therefore should “be looked on with grave suspicion” (LABOV, 1975, p. 30). Antaki *et al.* aim to point out how to avoid activities such as summarizing text and transcripts, isolated quotation, feature spotting, unwarranted generalization etc., that do not qualify as analysis proper, and how to “[...] scotch the sort of errors” that “might lend credence to the quantitative researcher’s dismissal that, in discourse analysis, ‘anything goes’” (ANTAKI *et al.*, 2003, p. §10, §2).

While Labov’s strategy seems to be aimed at borrowing “the institutional clout of the so-called hard sciences” (BENNE, 2017, p. 43), Antaki *et al.* lean “towards those aspects of rigour that mirror the positivist approach” (MEYRICK, 2006, p. 802) and argue for an equal scientific standing of quantitative and qualitative approaches. They find that a qualitative (“soft”) approach is not inferior to a quantitative (“hard”) since the practitioners of both approaches “want to do something with the data” (ANTAKI *et al.*, 2003, p. §4). Through analysis the qualitative researcher is enabled to produce an outcome of the same standing as the “sort of statistical testing” performed by the quantitative researcher on “raw data” (ANTAKI *et al.*, 2003, p. §4).

It appears that both Labov and Antaki *et al.* distinguish between unprocessed or “raw” data and processed data, and presumably the facts are the outcome of the processing. This explains why a joint recognition of facts is required among the practitioners of a paradigm, and why it is vital that principles and procedures of best practice are laid down for their identification.

It is worth noticing that in both cases the question of the ontological status of the “something” the facts are supposed to be evidence for, is a theoretical concern and not on the methodological agenda. It is posited by the theory, but not accessible to direct observation. Thus, the methodological considerations concern how its existence can be evidenced by the data. Given that there is agreement about what constitutes, for example, a repertoire, an ideology or a discourse, a passage of text or a transcript can be evidence for the existence of such phenomena for the discourse analyst (ANTAKI *et al.*, 2003, p. §7). Likewise, a syntactic form can be evidence for the speaker’s grammar for the sociolinguist, provided that there is agreement about what constitutes a syntactic form and a grammar, and the item is observed in “ordinary conversation” (LABOV, 1975, p. 34). This latter constraint sparks another methodological difficulty, known as “Observer’s Paradox”: For the field worker the “[...] goal is to observe the way people use language when they are not being observed” (LABOV, 1991 [1972], p. 61), and therefore efforts to solve this paradox “have been a central focus of sociolinguistic methodology” (LABOV, 2006, p. 86).

The theoretical assertion is, in both cases, that underneath communicating participants' (observable) contextualized behaviour certain abstract structures exist, and these structures (grammar, (Foucauldian) discourse, etc.) become evident through, i.e. as they are manifested in, the behaviour, although the participants are or may be entirely unaware of their existence.¹ The research output of such an empirical inquiry would then include documentation for the existence of the structures posited by the theory. In this way, the researcher is enabled to establish the existence of underlying structures that determine people's communicative behaviour and explain to them what they are doing. Hence, the implication is that the researcher becomes an expert on, i.e., more knowledgeable about the (first-order) language of the participants than they are themselves. Incidentally, both approaches by mistaking an underlying postulated abstraction for a first-order reality exemplifies "the essence of the language myth" (LOVE, 2002, p. 34).

In neither case, it is addressed that the object of study is language, and hence coincides with the medium of the inquiry. Language is treated like any other object amenable to observation from a third-person perspective. This means that the requirement of objectivity is applicable to the observation.² It is presumed that if sufficient care is exercised in the collection of data, linguistic data and their collection do not pose any qualitatively different challenge to data collection in general. The collecting of the data requires a method, and when the collecting researchers adhere strictly to its instructions, the collected data will provide a sound basis for further linguistic analysis.

In this connection, it is worth noticing that both sociolinguists and discourse analysts collect their data from speech communication,³ but that in practice the collected speech data, fixed and stored as audio or video recordings, are subsequently transcribed. Transcription is inevitable for two reasons: because it "enables analysis of spoken language" (D'ARCY, 2013, p. 187), and because it is vital that the data can be presented in writing for publication. Although it is widely recognized that transcription is not entirely theory-neutral (e.g., OCHS, 1979), and hence may affect objectivity, detailed conventions for transcription have been codified in an attempt to mitigate these effects. The conventions, in particular the ones devised by Gail Jefferson, have "become a kind of 'common language'" (TEN HAVE, 2007, p. 95) for transcribers and analysts. Apart from these methodological concerns, the transmodal translation of the raw data from speech to writing is not seen as potentially disruptive to their integrity.⁴ Transcription "prepares the data for analysis", but "it is not analysis in itself" (ANTAKI *et al.*, 2003, p. §4).

The idea that data can be *collected* from communicative episodes clashes with basic principles of integrational semiology. The integrational sign does not outlast the episode in which someone made it, and therefore whatever is caught on a recording cannot be the sign made by a historical participant; it follows that neither can the transcription of it.

[T]o envisage treating linguistic phenomena as 'objects' is, in and of itself, to propose a distorted account of them. There are no (first-order) linguistic objects. Language is a temporally situated, ongoing process – the process of making and re-making signs in contextualized episodes of communicative behaviour. (LOVE, 2007, p. 705)

When a recording is listened to (and viewed) by a field worker, time has passed, and the original communicative event no longer exists. Instead, a new communication process is initiated with the participation of the researcher, i.e., the field worker/transcriber. The researcher engages with the recorded traces of the original event and makes their *own* signs from the materials. These new signs are the products of the new communication process in which they among other things are put in writing. It would be

¹ For Labov, it disqualifies informants if they "are familiar with the theoretical issues", in which case their judgements "may not be counted as evidence" (LABOV, 1975, p. 31).

² The Observer's Paradox is concerned with difficulties involved in eliciting manifestations of a particular kind of abstraction, the "vernacular", for observation and does not affect the objectivity of the observing.

³ Although discourse analyst may collect written texts as well, and more recently sociolinguists have included digital text communication data (from social media and mobile texting).

⁴ Not all researchers agree is this conclusion, e.g., Bucholzt (2000, 2007), Ashmore et al. (2004); see Duncker (2019) for discussion.

impossible for the transcriber to make any transcription unless they were able to grasp what was being said on the recording. That is to say, the transcriber is required to engage with the traces *as traces* of language.

If the researcher listens to the same recording and/or reads the same transcript a second, third, etc. time, these communication processes will yield new signs as well, only each next time they will be experientially based on the signs the same person made on the previous occasions. A person can only make signs based on their own past linguistic experience, from their own unique first-person perspective here-and-now. No transcriber can ever reconstruct the same signs as the ones made by the participants of the original encounter. On the other hand, given the recording and the transcript, the transcriber and the analyst of the transcription (who need not be the same person) both have other options available for their sign making than the original participants. They can, for example, replay the recording any number of times, they can re-read the transcript, they can *see* what will be said in a minute from now, etc., whereas the historical participants had to make do with whatever they were able to perceive and remember in real time.

Because all linguistic inquiry and all dealings with collected traces of past communication require the participation of an inquirer, nothing linguistic is ever objectively “given” by nature.

Language does not present itself for study as a neatly disengaged range of homogeneous phenomena, patiently awaiting description by the impartial observer, as is suggested by the misleading expression linguistic data. ... On the contrary, language occurs nowhere as ‘data’. Language offers a paradigm case of interference by investigation. The interference arises from the fact that in linguistics language becomes both the object and the instrument of investigation, as well as the medium in which the linguist’s conclusions are ultimately formulated. (HARRIS, 1997, p. 272-73)

4 LINGUISTICS IS A LINGUISTIC EXERCISE

The failure to acknowledge and to act upon the fact that language is fundamentally different from other objects of study, leads to the misconception that linguists are free to observe language and collect objective data from it. The failure amounts to ignoring the reflexivity of language altogether.

[L]inguistic description of the verbal activity of A and B requires the linguist also to engage in verbal activity. Linguistics itself is a linguistic exercise; ... In order to describe or discuss the linguistic activities of others, we must ourselves engage in linguistic activity of our own. (HARRIS, 1998, p. 25)

Every step of the way, linguistic inquiry is itself linguistic. Language research is possible because and *only* because of linguistic reflexivity. “Language is our great general medium of concerted and systematic inquiry. It can be used to investigate and talk about anything under the sun, not to mention the sun itself” (JOSEPH *et al.*, 2001, p. 212).

When the reflexivity of language is ignored or taken for granted, it may *seem as if* language can be turned into an object of inquiry, rather than being “turned back on itself” (FIRTH, 1948[1964], p. 147), without further ado and without any theoretical, methodological, or empirical consequences. Nothing could be further from the truth. Although this omission may seem to some to be no more than a minor philosophical detail, it effectively pulls the empirical rug from under data-based linguistic inquiry in the traditional sense.

The reflexivity of language applies to all researchers who study language, one way or the other and irrespective of their “paradigm”. It applies to all communicating participants: “For all human beings engage in analytic reflection about their own linguistic experience and use words to describe it. This is a *sine qua non* of engagement in language as a mature member of society.” (HARRIS; HUTTON, 2007, p. 223).

The consequences of linguistic reflexivity to the *study* of language, however, are only fully recognized by integrational linguistics. It may be recognized that certain technical terms are metalinguistic, e.g., that “‘dialects’ and ‘varieties’ are artifacts of the ways sociolinguists talk about talk” (JOHNSTONE, 2006, p. 463), but otherwise the linguist appears to be exempted from the scope of linguistic reflexivity. Typically, lay metalanguage is recognized, e.g., in sociolinguistics with respect to people’s linguistic attitudes to and comments about language, or in applied linguistics with respect to learners’ metalinguistic awareness, and “folk linguistics” as a field of study investigates how non-linguists talk about language (e.g., AGHA, 2007; NIEDZIELSKI; PRESTON, 1999; PRESTON, 2004; SILVERSTEIN, 1993). Where linguistic reflexivity *is* recognized, it is recognized exclusively with respect to the persons whose linguistic activity is providing the researcher with data, not as something that applies to the researcher personally. The researcher is supposedly situated outside or above linguistic activity from which the linguistic activity *of others* can be observed, from a third-person perspective, but without requiring the researcher to engage in linguistic activity of their own. This situation, however, is not possible. To use a Wittgensteinian phrase, language is “unhintergebar”.

[L]anguage itself has to provide the means by which linguistic phenomena may be analysed and linguistic information given. We cannot get ‘outside’ language in order to do this: on the contrary, we have no option but to remain ‘within’ the confines of language if our attempts at linguistic analysis are to be successful. We must be able to ask questions about language and propose answers to those questions. But questions and answers *are themselves linguistic operations*. (HARRIS, 1998, p. 25)

In the social sciences, reflexivity with respect to the researcher is recognized in qualitative research as a matter of distance vis-à-vis the data. If researchers are too close to or personally involved in the phenomenon being studied, it may affect their impartiality as observers and make it impossible to maintain full objectivity. Accordingly, they should openly state “the exact nature of their proximity through reflexivity. For example, a white, male researcher may focus on aspects of a topic that resonate with his own experience (SHERRARD, 1997) thereby shaping his findings and this should be acknowledged” (MEYRICK, 2006, p. 804). This recommendation, however, concerns research ethics and the integrity of the researcher. It does not concern observation per se. While being a “white male” may arguably “shape” what is observed, observation from a third-person perspective is still possible if the object of study exists “out there”, independent of his own experience. It will only be the way he looks at it that is affected, and when this is declared “through reflexivity”, readers are free to decide whether or not his proximity to the data disqualifies him as an observer – and ultimately whether the outcome of his research qualifies as scientific knowledge.

Dealt with in this way, the appeal to reflexivity becomes a personal disclaimer, a pre-emptive defence against accusations of behaving unscientifically, and a request for methodological absolution in advance. It puts reflexivity in an unfavourable light by presenting it as an empirical deficit. Although the whole point of the reflexive declaration was to break away from judgements of research quality “biased towards those aspects of rigour that mirror the positivist approach” (MEYRICK, 2006, p. 802), its apologetic character makes it effectively counterproductive. Moreover, this view of reflexivity does not translate to linguistic reflexivity. For the linguist, reflexivity is not a choice. Language cannot be conceived “from the outside” by any communicating participant. No one can leave language in order to adopt an impersonal perspective. There is no alternative to the perspective of the first person, and it is absurd to require of linguists that they should disregard their personal linguistic experience. It is because of this experience and not a lack of personal linguistic experience that enables a linguist to (perhaps) succeed in the attempt to reach a worthwhile insight about a linguistic phenomenon. Any serious account of a communicational event presupposes the analyst’s “ability to integrate present experience with past experience” (HARRIS, 1998, p. 25).

Nevertheless, linguists should explicitly declare their interpretational efforts invested in the presented *material*. Not in order to make excuses or ask for forgiveness for creating the material on which they base their analysis. On the contrary, the linguist must claim responsibility for the data. Linguistic data are inevitably *sponsored data*, they are not objectively “given” by nature but hermeneutically (first-person) given as presented by the analyst (DUNCKER, 2019, p. 142-147).

The following – empirical – example is intended as an illustration of this point. The extract below is taken from a corpus of Danish sociolinguistic interviews, Corpus BySoc (available online at <https://bysoc.ku.dk/>). The recordings were collected and analysed in and around 1987, in connection with Project Urban Sociolinguistic (GREGERSEN; PEDERSEN, 1991). The corpus consists of 76

transcribed conversations with participants who were born and raised in Nyboder in central Copenhagen. The conversations were mostly recorded in the participants' own home and had no preset subject. In all conversations, a field worker participated. The recordings were transcribed in score format, and this is also how they appear on the website. Below, I have copy-pasted an extract from interview number 60010700 and added line numbers and an English version of the transcript in italics. (See transcription key below, before list of references.) Four persons participated in the interview, three informants and a field worker. In the extract, the transcribed talk of two participants is shown: Participant 1 (male, 61 years) and Participant 2 (male, 36 years).

-
- L. 1 1> da vi havde fået C%%% ik' £ # så lovede jeg mig selv
when we had <name> right £ # I promised myself
2>
-
- L. 2 1>"nu skulle der fandeme ikke flere" £ for alene det der
"now there should be no more" £ only for all that nappy
2>
-
- L. 3 1>blevaskeri og skylle det og [vil du] "hold
washing and rinsing it and [would you]
2>
-
- L. 4 1>kæft" det er jo £ man kunne våg- vågne op badet i sved
"good god" it is £ you could wak- wake up in a sweat
L. 5 2> jamen der
but surely
-
- L. 6 1> bare ved tanken
just to think of it
- L. 7 2>må da have været (uf) sådan nogle~ vasc- £
there must have been (uf) some of those~ vasc- £
-
- L. 8 1>
2>nej der var heller ikke vasco- £ vaskerier vel'
no there were no vasco- £ laundries were there
-

The reason why I noticed this episode was because of the spellings “vasc-” (l. 7) and “vasco-” (l. 8). In Danish orthography “c” is not a frequently occurring letter. It is used in names and loan words, e.g., “escort” (borrowed from English) and “lambrusco” (borrowed from Italian) and is pronounced as the letter “k” when it occurs before a consonant or back vowel letter. The anonymized name “C%%%” (l. 1), for example, could perhaps be the boy’s name “Claus” which could also be spelled “Klaus”. The two spellings “vasc-” and “vasco-” are transcribed as truncated words, and later in l. 8, Participant 2, according to the transcript, said “vaskerier” (‘laundries’). What made me wonder was why the transcriber would use the letter “c” rather than “k” in the two truncations. If they are read aloud in Danish “vasc-”/“vask-” and “vasco-”/“vasko-”, respectively, sound the same.

A second later in the interview (not shown in the extract), the transcription of Participant 2 shows another truncated form, “vascoma-”. Because of my personal experience of the textualized city space, I recognize this spelling with a “c” as the name of a chain of coin-operated laundries called “Vascomat”.⁵ Today (2021), this laundry chain has been discontinued, and young Copenhageners may no longer be familiar with its name. That is to say, readers of the transcript with a linguistic experience different from mine (and my generation of Copenhageners), would probably not make this connection. They may, however, still notice the spelling with a “c”, but they will each interpret it in their way, i.e. integrate into their own personal experience, because “[...] each of us contextualizes in our own way, taking into account whatever factors seem to us to be relevant. The individual participants in any communication situation will each contextualize what happens differently, as a function of the integrational proficiency each exercises in that situation.” (HARRIS, 2009c, p. 71).

⁵ A photograph of a Copenhagen Vascomat laundry façade, contemporary with the interview, can be viewed at <https://kbhbilleder.dk/kbh-museum/32285>.

As I interpret it, the transcriber was familiar with the name, and the transcription of Participant 2's contribution to the conversation with a "c" rather than a "k", suggests that Participant 2 also knew it, but that it had slipped his mind at the moment. Strictly speaking, I have no way of knowing how the transcriber contextualized the auditory traces on the recording at the time of transcribing it, but the exact same objection could be made against the transcriber's knowing about Participant 2's contextualization at the time of the conversation. The way the transcript came out is the responsibility of the transcriber, and the way I contextualize the information to which it gives me access is my responsibility. It would, however, be misleading to claim that the transcript constituted objective linguistic data, collected from a concrete historical communicational episode.

No matter how you look at it, the transcript is the result of the transcriber's personal interpretation of the recording. In order to make the transcript in the first place, the transcriber would have been required to decide "what was said" on the tape. Otherwise, it would not have been possible to render the recorded speech in glottic writing. In this case, according to my interpretation of the traces of the transcribing, i.e., the material artefact of the transcript, the transcriber made a decision about the sign making of a historical participant, an event the transcriber had no chance of knowing anything about from the situated perspective of Participant 2.

Transcription systems usually allow for transcribers to document their uncertainty about "what was said". This also applies to the transcription notation in Corpus BySoc (e.g., the square brackets in l. 3 and "(uf)" for "uforståeligt" ('unintelligible') in l. 7). The trouble is, that in this case the transcriber fails to provide the reader of the transcript with this crucial piece of information, and the reader is left to believe that this was what Participant 2 actually "said". However, it may not be entirely fair to reproach the transcriber for this omission since the notation does not provide transcribers with the means to explain why and how they reached their decision with respect to a particular "hearing".

This example may hit you in the eye because of its marked spelling, provided that you are familiar with the principles of Modern Danish orthography. All the same, it makes you wonder whether the same problem could potentially apply to the rest of the transcript – or to any transcript for that matter. At all times, when listening to a recording, or when participating in a conversation, you need to decide for yourself "What was said?" and "What was meant?", irrespective of whether or not you are going to transcribe it. These questions "are variables constantly subject to monitoring by the participants themselves" (HARRIS, 1998, p. 145). For transcribers (and analysts) do not "merely reproduce the spoken word in written form, but produce new texts that bear the mark of our authorship" (BUCHOLTZ, 2000, p. 1453). It is crucial that this authorship is accepted and declared, but when this is done there is no reason for integrationists to exclude empirical materials from their linguistic inquiries.

5 AN INTEGRATIONAL METHODOLOGY?

The problems posed by linguistic data to linguistic inquiry are not something just integrational linguists should be concerned with. They apply to everyone who engages in linguistic analysis. The empirical working conditions for linguists of all hues are the same, but depending on their theoretical orientation, and the degree to which they are willing to acknowledge the consequences, linguists are likely to draw different conclusions. In order to avoid introducing analytical inconsistencies, it will, however, require them to rethink the way they conceptualize linguistic facts.

The reflexive blindness is the Achilles' heel of mainstream linguistic methodology leading to the false belief that objective linguistic data are obtainable. "We cannot think our way out of our personal experience to find a neutral vantage point on language, nor should we trust any analytical methodology which purports to achieve this" (PABLÉ; HUTTON, 2015, p. 8). There is no impersonal objective standpoint for the linguist to adopt, and there is no "getting out" of language in order to adopt it. The reflexivity of language is not an additional extra, although "[t]he typical assumption appears to be that reflexive discourse is a superficial *supplement* to language itself, one which could be removed without seriously affecting language" (TAYLOR, 2000, p. 486). Any linguistic business we may have with language, whether as laypersons or professional linguists, will have to be done within the confines of language – and that includes selecting traces of past communication for analysis.

Empirically informed linguistic inquiry along the principles of integrational semiology *is* practicable. It merely requires the analyst to take full hermeneutic responsibility for the presented (written) materials as well as their analysis. Language occurs nowhere as “data”, and therefore linguistic analysts must acknowledge that the data on which they base their analyses are the outcome of their own interpretational efforts. This requires analysts – and their readers – at least to integrate present linguistic experience with past linguistic experience. All texts, including transcripts, have to be written and read “by *someone, somewhere, at some time*” (HARRIS, 2009b, p. 101). Both reading and writing “involves an engagement with a text by an individual” (ibid.), and each individual person is unique. For this reason alone, “laying down a methodology – i.e., mechanical application procedures” (HARRIS, 1997, p. 304) would be futile. In this sense, it is true that “[...] integrationism does not provide an alternative methodology for studying language, languages or signs” (PABLÉ; HUTTON, 2015, p. xvii), but it is not entirely accurate to conclude that integrationists do not engage in methodological deliberations. Quite the contrary in fact. The trouble is that the “principles for successful inquiry” (BUNGE, 1983) laid out by integrationists are strange and difficult to deal with in comparison with similar “orthodox” principles. Integrational linguistics “[...] simply accepts that the observer is also a participant, and sees no virtue in a futile attempt to transcend the particularities of our own experience”, it “seeks an engagement with experience, and is willing to use all kinds of methods and approaches in order to achieve this” (PABLÉ; HUTTON, 2015, p. 39). Harris does not mince his words when he openly states that integrational linguistics is linguistics without a methodological safety net, and that “to take an integrational approach in the first place requires some fundamental rethinking about what you are doing” (HARRIS, 1997, p. 309). However, if you are willing to put yourself on the line, take interpretational responsibility, and exercise the necessary “intellectual muscle” (HARRIS, 1997, p. 310), you will weather the mythical storm and safely reach the port of empirical linguistic inquiry.

Transcription key

(cf. https://bysoc.ku.dk/engine_main.cgi? > Transskription)

£ for pause

X%%% for anonymized name

for pause filled out with breathing

~ for hesitation (‘eh’)

XY- “(with possible replications)XYZ for stuttering” or “for self-interruption at Y in the sequence XYZ”

(uf) for unintelligible passage

? for question intonation

"" “for citation/direct speech (only used where the speaker imitates another person, subs. him- or herself)”

(XYZ) for transcriber’s comments, relating to “udtale, nonverbal ytring etc.” (‘pronunciation, nonverbal utterance etc.’)

[XYZ] “for a passage that we are uncertain about”

Overlapping speech in score format

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PROVERBIAL FUTURES: PROVERBS AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN AFRICA

FUTUROS PROVERBIAIS: PROVÉRBIOS E O DISCURSO POLÍTICO NA ÁFRICA

FUTUROS PROVERBIALES: PROVERBIOS Y DISCURSO POLÍTICO EN ÁFRICA

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Our motto: Lume ling'ompela alikombi chiwulu – Kalanga proverb

ABSTRACT: Examining references to proverbs in African political discourses in light of Integrational semiology and Southern Theory, we find not fossils of ancient wisdom but the creative construction of desired futures that may grow out of the present situation in light of what has been learned from the past. Proverbial discourse, always speaking to the present situation and commenting on available possibilities while being open to multiple interpretations, suggests an important argument about the provisional and contextual nature of all our knowledge. Beginning with the assumption that each of us is in a better position to

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understand our own situation than any foreign observer or abstract schemata could ever be, we argue that the indeterminacy of creative proverbial discourse can present a better epistemological foundation for dealing with the uncertainties of natural events. We suggest that proverbial discourse as it is practiced in various African societies can be utilized as a way of framing and approaching Southern Theories.

KEYWORDS: Proverbs. Africa. Indeterminacy. Global South.

RESUMO: Analisando o uso de provérbios em discursos políticos africanos à luz da semiologia integracionista e da Teoria do Sul, não encontramos fósseis de sabedoria antiga, mas a construção criativa de futuros desejados que podem surgir da situação presente à luz do que foi aprendido com o passado. O discurso proverbial, sempre falando sobre a situação presente e comentando as possibilidades disponíveis e ao, mesmo tempo, aberto a múltiplas interpretações, sugere um importante argumento sobre a natureza provisória e contextual de todo o nosso conhecimento. Partindo do pressuposto de que cada um de nós está em uma posição melhor para compreender nossa própria situação do que qualquer observador estrangeiro ou esquema abstrato jamais poderia estar, argumentamos que a indeterminação do discurso proverbial criativo pode apresentar uma base epistemológica melhor para lidar com as incertezas dos eventos. Sugerimos que o discurso proverbial, tal como é praticado em várias sociedades africanas, pode ser utilizado como uma forma de enquadrar e abordar as teorias do sul.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Provérbios. África. Sul Global. Indeterminação.

RESUMEN: Al examinar las referencias a los proverbios en los discursos políticos africanos a la luz de la semiología integracional y la teoría del sur, no encontramos fósiles de sabiduría antigua, sino la construcción creativa de futuros deseado que pueden surgir de la situación actual a la luz de lo que se ha aprendido del pasado. El discurso proverbial, siempre hablando de la situación actual y comentando las posibilidades disponibles mientras está abierto a múltiples interpretaciones, sugiere un argumento importante sobre la naturaleza provisional y contextual de todo nuestro conocimiento. Partiendo de la suposición de que cada uno de nosotros está en una mejor posición para comprender nuestra propia situación de lo que podría estarlo cualquier observador extranjero o esquema abstracto, argumentamos que la indeterminación del discurso proverbial creativo puede presentar una mejor base epistemológica para lidiar con las incertidumbres de eventos naturales. Sugerimos que el discurso proverbial, tal como se practica en varias sociedades africanas, puede utilizarse como una forma de enmarcar y abordar las teorías del sur.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Proverbios. África. Indeterminación. Sur global.

1 INTRODUCTION, PROVERBIALY SPEAKING

Speaking (or writing) in proverbs and speaking (or writing) about proverbs are not the same activities; the first is a linguistic activity, while the second is both a linguistic and a metalinguistic activity. The great difficulty when engaged in a metalinguistic discourse (such as this paper) is to avoid reification, to keep ourselves from assuming that the things/practices/concepts which we have named have a reality that precedes (and presumably persists beyond) the life or our empirical examinations and theoretical explorations.

Proverbs, Ruth Finnegan (1994 [1970], p. 1) noted, “[...] are not always distinguished by a special term from other categories of verbal art.” This indicates a critical problem for the lexicographer and the paremiologist: are the “categories of verbal art”, such as “proverb”, scholars’ fictions, artifacts of a particular analysis, or the lexicon of a culturally biased perspective? Are proverbs widespread linguistic-cultural phenomena, or is the identification of some speech act/image as “proverbial” a widespread form of metalinguistic or semiological analysis, either of folk origin or in an academic discipline known amongst professional students as *paremiology*? Later in the same chapter as that quoted above, Finnegan elaborated upon the matter:

The close connection of proverbs with other literary forms raises a difficulty. How, particularly in an oral culture, can we distinguish proverbs from other forms of oral art? or, indeed, from ordinary clichés and idioms, and from such related but different forms as maxims and apothegms?

Most of the published collections ignore this point of definition and by merely entitling their works “Proverbs” often give the misleading impression that these sayings are clearly differentiated from other expressions or that they are in all ways equivalent to our idea of proverbs. (FINNEGAN, 1994 [1970], p. 14)

Dundes (1994 [1975], p. 45) went straight to the heart of the matter in his remark about “[...] the inevitable controversy as to whether the units of analysis are really in the data (God’s truth) or are only a heuristic device found exclusively in the mind of the analyst (Hocus-Pocus),” but he immediately set the controversy aside in order to offer his structural analysis and a corresponding definition, concluding his paper with the caveat “[...] insofar as proverbs are traditional propositions, they should properly be studied by scholars with expertise in symbolic logic and related disciplines” (DUNDES, 1994 [1975], p. 61). Apparently he did not count himself among such scholars.

Some paremiologists and others writing of proverbs attempt a definition of “proverb”¹ but many more either offer someone else’s definition or offer (as Finnegan did) “some general agreement as to what constitutes a proverb” (FINNEGAN, 1994 [1970], p. 14). Dundes (1994 [1975], p. 45) believed that a “proverb may best be defined in structural terms” and gave as his definition “[...] the proverb appears to be a traditional propositional statement consisting of at least one descriptive element, a descriptive element consisting of a topic and a comment”. Villers (2019) wrote “As for the term *proverb*, it will be used to refer to self-sufficient utterances with a generic meaning involving Mankind that are not associated with a specific author and that are current among the folk (and consequently have a stable form)” while Omenya (2019, p. 2) stated only that proverbs are “tested wisdom with considerable authority” and Ademowo and Balogun (2014, p. 38) wrote “Proverbs are the simple truths of life that contain the moral values of a society,” referring the reader to Taylor. Vellasco (2000, p. 127) came to the conclusion that “[...] os provérbios são itens tradicionais do folclore de uma comunidade, frutos da experiência do povo; são afirmações concisas e impessoais de verdades gerais — a sua formulação é genérica e o seu valor de verdade é universal, atemporal e alocativo” while Widbäck refrained from coming to conclusions, offering instead a list of “[...] criteria that can be used to distinguish proverbs from most other phraseological units” (WIDBÄCK, 2015, p. 162) and a working definition: “Min arbetsdefinition av ordspråk är alltså att ordspråk är relativt korta, självständiga enheter som uttrycker sanning och livsvisdom. De är dessutom generaliserbara, anonyma och har hävd” (WIDBÄCK, 2015, p. 55).

Mieder and Dundes (1994), commenting on Ruth Finnegan’s discussion of proverbs in her book *Oral Literature in Africa* (1970), noted that we find in her remarks “[...] many of the critical issues found in proverb studies generally: definition, structure, style, context, function, and meaning” (from the editor’s introduction to her chapter in the 1994 reprint, p. 10). From that comment alone we can see what is, from an Integrationist perspective, the chief failure of what Rose Marie Beck has called ‘the classical notion of ‘proverb’ ’ (BECK, 2005, p. 132): the one glaring omission is the one speaking in proverbs.

Just as Beck sought to reinterpret several of the issues given prominence in paremiological studies – “out-of-context”, citation, fixedness, style – so we seek to reconsider proverbial communication in light of Integrational theory, with particular reference to speaking proverbially in political contexts. By considering proverbs to be the products (oral, written, drawn, painted, pantomimed...) of someone in an always unique communication situation, our research proceeds with a reorientation towards the proverb maker and can thus dispense with the need to define the term “proverb”. Insofar as what paremiologists call “proverbs” can be closely related to riddles, stories, maxims, parables, allegories, poems, fables, moral tales and in some cultures identified locally with the same term, we have no wish to force a foreign analytical framework onto a variety of differing local cultural-linguistic practices. Finnegan reminded her readers that the decision as to “[...] whether or not some attractive saying is really a ‘proverb’ depends on the local evaluation of it” (FINNEGAN, 1994 [1970], p. 15) and that attitude towards lay understandings is exactly in line with the Integrational approach to the layman’s understanding. Later in that same paragraph, Finnegan herself suggested the approach that we have adopted: “Therefore to differentiate those sayings which are merely idiomatic from those which the people concerned consider to have that special flavour which makes it correct to call them proverbs, we need more precise information about context and attitude than we are usually given” (FINNEGAN, 1994 [1970], p. 15). With plenty of context and at least as much attitude, we are going for broke.

¹ See Bhuvaneshwar (2015a) for 50 of these definitions, from Aristotle to Mieder, and discussions of them in terms of Karimic Linguistics, an un-Integrational but exuberantly Hindu and defiantly post-colonial theory of language.

2 THEORETICAL ORIENTATIONS AND AXIOMS OF INTEGRATIONAL SEMIOLOGY

Roy Harris used the term “Integrational semiology” partly in response to a complaint by the Berlin linguist Hans-Heinrich Lieb who claimed the phrase “Integrational linguistics” for his own theory several years before Harris began using it, and partly because Harris’s theoretical perspective rather quickly moved towards a more encompassing theory of sign making and the diverse forms of human communicative activity. Although he coined a few neologisms and phrases, his theoretical discussions rely very little on technical terminology for he offers no theoretical entities in need of names. Instead of PRO and MERGE and a growing number of hypothesized cognitive structures and operations, in his writings we encounter people speaking, hearing, writing, reading, drawing, singing, questioning, answering, debating, performing music, misunderstanding, repeating, restating, contradicting, imploring, interpreting road signs, responding to body language, applying the law, making peace and pronouncing some couple husband and wife. Harris used lay language for an approach to communication that takes communication as we experience it as its object of study.

With its focus on the language maker, Integrational semiology rejects the notion that our object of study is or should be “a language” that exists independently of us and which we use for communicational purposes, as well as the more extreme claim that such a language is an “organical structure” (Chomsky) for generating syntactic structures that has evolved within the human brain and which the human species at some point accidentally discovered could be used for communicational purposes. Instead of the language (words, proverbs) meaning something, “the language” is understood to be the product of our making something (sounds, marks, gestures) mean what we hope our interlocutor will understand in a particular situation. In Hutton and Pablé’s words,

Linguistics and many other disciplines rely on the idea of languages as fixed codes that are held to make meanings available for us to use in particular contexts (the “language myth”). Integrationism denies that our communicational activity has any underlying guarantee or set of fixed reference points – we are always in the middle of a temporal and communicational stream, and the reference points we use are shifting along with us. (HUTTON; PABLÉ, 2011)

One consequence of making language a product of communicational activity instead of an autonomous system used for communicating is that communication and language-making are both understood to be necessarily creative processes, and creativity in this view is not the Chomskyian generation of an infinite number of well-formed strings. The sort of creativity that Integrationists have in mind is one which brings us and our worlds together, in fact a making of worlds and all the relationships that they require in order to bring times and spaces, people and things, memories and dreams into an active, conscious life. As Hutton and Pablé put it,

Communication is a creative process which involves an unbounded and unknowable number of factors and viewpoints, and through which individuals constantly adjust, assess and contextualize and recontextualize their experiences and practices in the light of the unfolding situation. In communicating, we integrate aspects of the situation we are in, including the on-going behavior of people present, with our past, present and anticipated experience in ways that are not knowable in advance, even by ourselves. Nothing is given in advance in communication; signs are created in the here-and-now; the relationship between words and ideas, and words and things, is not fixed... (HUTTON; PABLÉ, 2011)

Harris argued that all communication takes shape within a world constrained by three kinds of factors: biomechanical, macrosocial and circumstantial. The tongue, the ear and the hand are the main biomechanical factors providing the possibilities and limits for certain forms of language, though one can also communicate by nods and winks and shimmers and shakes. That this essay is written in what some would call Standard English is due to the fact that none of the three authors is comfortable writing in Portuguese or Estonian as well as the unlikelihood of tenure committees in the United States giving much weight to a paper written in Swahili (shame on them!) – all matters relating to the larger social worlds in which the authors live and write, i.e., macrosocial factors. The fact that we can and are writing one paper though living on separate continents is due to the circumstance that we are all able to communicate using email—a circumstantial factor.

Alongside these three factors in the shaping of communication, Harris proposed what he termed the “principle of cotemporality”. Hutton and Pablé describe this principle thus:

This principle is based on a simple lesson of linguistic experience: that what is said is immediately applicable to the current situation, unless there is reason to suppose otherwise. But this holds not only for what we say but for everything we do. In other words, in this respect there is a complete parity of status between linguistic acts and other acts. Linguistic acts do not have some special temporal status of their own, which somehow puts them outside the sequentiality of the rest of our existence. This might be thought to be an extremely banal observation, and in one sense it is. But it is perhaps worth calling a “principle” when we realize how far-reaching its implications are for linguistic inquiry. (HUTTON; PABLÉ, 2011)

To our orientation towards the language maker, the related recognition that language is the product of a person communicating, the three constraints on communication and the principle of cotemporality, we need only add two theoretical axioms to have the fundamental orientations and assumptions that underwrite an Integrationist approach to language and communication.

Integrationist semiology is based on two theoretical axioms: “(1) What constitutes a sign is not given independently of the situation in which it occurs or of its material manifestations in that situation. (2) The value of a sign (i.e. its signification) is a function of the integrational proficiency which its identification and interpretation presuppose” (*After Epistemology*, p. 73). In this sense, “[e]very act of communication, no matter how banal, is seen as an act of semiological creation” (*After Epistemology*, p. 80). (HUTTON; PABLÉ, 2011)

In these axioms especially the relevance of Integrational theory to paremiological issues, theories and debates should be readily apparent. In particular, we point out that the problems associated with discussions of decontextualized proverbs, the indeterminacy of proverb meaning and the numerous calls for more context in paremiological research closely parallel these same issues in Integrational discussions of language and semiology. In Integrational semiology, however, “context” ceases to have any theoretical basis since “text” and “context” cannot exist independently, and meaning is always and everywhere necessarily indeterminate. And with that *Bon voyage*, we leap into the political arena.

3 INTEGRATIONAL LINGUISTICS, SOUTHERN THEORY AND PROVERBIAL DISCOURSES

How might languages start to look if an alternative conception were mapped back to the center from the periphery? (MAKONI; PENNYCOOK, 2005, p. 152-153)

One of the unpredictable properties of the modern world is its seeming unpredictability and unrelenting uncertainty. We argue that the uncertainty of contemporary times creates a need to articulate innovative interpretations and use proverbial discourses, particularly in political contexts. This paper seeks to explore the nature of Southern Theory and Integrational Linguistics in the new millennium, particularly in political contexts, as seen in the case of RO analyzed in this paper.

Complexity and creativity in the use and interpretation of proverbs is typical of Southern Epistemologies, which emerged in reaction to colonialism, rationalism, and monocausality. The defining features of Southern Epistemology are the multiple connections among the many components that constitute reality of formerly colonized persons. Southern Epistemology is, by definition, a form of “solidarity epistemology”, as it seeks to establish interconnections between many dimensions, including history, culture, society, and communicative biography, among others. In terms of a “solidarity epistemology”, proverbial discourses, like other forms of language practices, must be analyzed in a relationship to power, history, culture, and identities. The critique of language that we draw upon in Southern Epistemologies is, to a large extent, founded on the notion of the disinvention and reconstitution of language (MAKONI; PENNYCOOK, 2005; PENNYCOOK; that is compatible with Integrational Linguistics in the ontological perspectives it adopts toward language.

In this framework, language should not be construed as something natural that simply exists as an autonomous system disconnected from private and public lives. Rather, language is a form of invention legitimized by metadiscursive regimes. For Makoni and Pennycook (2005, 2020), colonialism and Christianity influenced the ways that language is taught and understood. In Southern Epistemology, we start from the assumption that both the languages and the metadiscursive regimes used to describe them as fixed codes were originally embedded in colonial discourses and practices. Further, it was through these discourses that these languages were regulated through description. In Southern Epistemologies, we explore the role of “resistance”, “disruption”, and “disciplinary disobedience” (MIGNOLO, 2008). The decolonization of sociolinguistics is part of the broader effort to develop Southern Epistemologies through cultivation of a decolonial imagination (SAVRANSKY, 2017).

This article should be understood as part of a tradition of anti-imperial scholarship from the perspective of voices frequently excluded in Global North scholarship. In the paper, we seek to challenge what Cornel (2018) refers to as “extraverted sociolinguistics”. “Extraverted sociolinguistics is the tendency to understand colonial and postcolonial societies through concepts proposed in the metropole for understanding the metropole, using methods developed in the metropole” (CORNELL, 2018, p. 402). The emphasis on interconnectedness is part of our general interest in developing a “solidarity-based epistemology”, or what is referred to as “connected sociolinguistics”. The ultimate objective of this sociolinguistics is to fight “epistemic injustice” (SHILLIAM, 2016) by causing us to recognize that colonialism led to an erasure of cultural memory as part of epistemicide, which is one of the consequences of colonialism. A decolonization of communication is feasible if communication and the use of proverbs are construed as an integration of human activities that are contextually integrated by employing signs.

4 REVISITING “JAMAA WA VITENDAWILI”

The attentive reader of Khasandi-Telewa and Barasa’s 2018 paper “Jamaa wa vitendawili” will note that the cognitive analysis provided therein implies that the proverbial discourses investigated are better understood through positing a hypothetical abstract mental form that is not available to the speakers themselves, and furthermore that this abstract level is provided in the English language. Yet the explanatory value of that paper is found not in the analysis based on Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) but in Khasandi-Telewa and Barasa’s discussion of situations and attitudes. The reader must also admit that it is either an astounding coincidence that the purportedly universal cognitive structures found in African minds exactly match the English language of two professors from the United States; or else identifying universal cognitive structures as English language structures is an artifact of a peculiarly North American science fiction. The authors of this paper are inclined to think that the latter rather than the former is the case. The “universal trope” masks the fact that we are dealing with an interpretation of the world from a very specific locus articulated through Standard English. In fact, any cognitive analysis of African linguistic practices eliminates the African from the picture entirely, and this should be of great concern to anyone interested in the utter specificity of each and every linguistic interaction in Africa (or anywhere else). The elimination of the African from the analysis runs contrary to the ontological convictions of Southern Epistemology in which the aim is to reintroduce (in this case) Africans into the analysis.

In this section we revisit the riddles and proverbs discussed in Khasandi-Telewa and Barasa (2018) but unlike that paper we use Integrational Linguistics to develop a decolonial/Southern Epistemology with which to understand proverbial discourse. Decolonial/Southern Epistemology is founded on an analysis of a unique context rather than on some supposedly universal cognitive structures from which metaphors take their form. Here we are critical of the universalism implied in cognitive linguistics and Conceptual Metaphor Theory because we regard its universalism as being a barely concealed imperial imposition and interpretation produced by a group of Euro-American scholars which by its very abstractness and claim to universalism erases the experiences of ALL speakers.² It is from “this grand erasure” of other people’s experiences (as Mignolo, a leading decolonial scholar, puts it) that this paper seeks to depart.³ The present rereading of that earlier paper aims to demonstrate that a deeper

² “Metaphorical thought and the metaphorical understanding of situations arises independent of language. [...] There is a language-independent system in which abstract thought is understood metaphorically” (LAKOFF, 2014).

³ It is perhaps not without political and historical interest that Lakoff named his list of Cognitive Metaphors “The Master Metaphor List”.

understanding of the political discourses investigated therein can be arrived at by dispensing with abstract theoretical fictions and by looking more closely at the social and political origins of speaking in African societies, in this case specifically, Kenyan society in the early 21st century.

“Jamaa wa vitendawili” (fellow of riddles) is a phrase with which the Kenyan politician Raila Amollo Odinga (hereafter RAO) is often derided, since riddling is usually associated with children, not serious matters of state. Yet Khasandi-Telewa and Barasa note that RAO’s positioning of riddles is anything but childish:

It would appear RAO’s riddles are actually preludes to stories he wants to tell. In all the three instances found in the sampled speeches in this paper, for instance, though RAO tells some riddles, he follows them with extensive stories of serious political discourse highlighting issues of immense political concern affecting citizens. Thus, though the riddles per se may appear childish, they are mostly preludes to stories that are adult and serious in nature. Indeed, the riddles serve to capture and sustain the audience attention in preparation for the main stories. Their interactive nature that requires audience participation captures people’s attention and allows him to raise his serious concerns with some humour as in political satire. (KHASANDI-TELEWA; BARASA, 2018, p.193)

As is often the case in African communities, riddles and proverbs are closely related and often discussed together, the distinction between the two genres being a matter of a mode of analysis rather than a necessity forced upon the hearer/reader. Riddling and proverb saying in RAO’s speeches are integrated into story-telling and interpretations of political conditions in Kenya in 2017 in a manner that shows no significant differences between proverbs and riddles. The present authors have therefore chosen the examples in Khasandi-Telewa and Barasa as providing both an excellent introduction to our topic, as well as a revealing juxtaposition of western/universalistic approaches to language scholarship as opposed to more specific approaches to analysis. Those are in fact two vastly different ways of looking at the language of political speeches in Kenya.

The first riddle discussed is the following, which RAO introduces by asking if his listeners would like a riddle (and they do): *Alibisha akafunguliwe mlango alipoingia akanyakua nyumba kuwa yake - nani?* Khasandi-Telewa and Barasa translate the riddle into English as “He knocked to be allowed in but when he entered he took over the house. Who is it?” and they then put the riddle and its associated story into the context of Kenyan politics. They remark “According to CMT, the source domain here is an animal and the target domain is human relationships as well as politics [...]” (KHASANDI-TELEWA; BARASA, 2018, p.194-195). This analysis assumes that in our minds “[...] something that is concrete is taken as a source domain to help us understand something more abstract” (p. 191) and it is this cognitive or thought process that is then given a linguistic formulation. Thus RAO appears to move from his and Kenya’s political circumstances to the thought of the universal conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A CONTAINER to a riddle then a story about camels and tents and finally to remarks on his activities in Kenyan politics.

From an integrational point of view, it would appear that positing an abstract universal concept underlying RAO’s riddle cannot survive Ockham’s Razor, but more significantly the abstraction removes RAO’s thought process away from his and his audience’s participation in Kenyan politics toward a mental construct in which neither RAO nor Kenya has any existence. Khasandi-Telewa and Barasa’s paragraphs explaining the political events that serve as the background known to everyone in the audience give us what we need to know in order to understand the riddle and its relevance; CMT theory may supply LIFE IS A CONTAINER, but we doubt that RAO or anyone in his audience would have summed up the riddle that way.⁴ In short, we can say that Khasandi-Telewa and Barasa could dispense with CMT and their discussion would lose nothing needed for understanding RAO’s riddle, his story and his entire speech.

When later in the same speech RAO offers a proverb in reference to alleged corrupt practices, Khasandi-Telewa and Barasa offer no CMT analysis, nor do they need to:

⁴ The Americentric and English language bias in this particular Conceptual Metaphor can readily be seen by comparing this view of a house (LIFE IS A CONTAINER) with the Saami view noted by Tim Ingold (2019, p.116): “In the North”s history *from*, however, houses and vehicles take on a significance different from that which the history *of* the West has accorded to them. The house in history *from* is not so much a container for life as a place of convergence – a knot in a mesh of comings and goings.”

The proverb “*Waswahili husema mkuki kwa nguruwe kwa mwanadamu mchungu*” [Literally, “an arrow is used to shoot pigs but is painful for a human being”] is also used. This is equivalent to “what is good for the goose is good for the gander”. In this text, he complains about alleged looting of taxpayers’ funds in the National Youth Service saga and insists the allegedly protected looters must be brought to justice as happens to other thieves. (KHASANDI-TELEWA; BARASA, 2018, 195)

A third example of a proverb from that speech is quoted, again without a CMT analysis:

Tumekuja kupiga mbiu ya mgambo; mbiu ya mgambo ikilia kuna jambo.

We have come to blow the warning horn. When the warning horn is sounded, there is an issue. He uses the Swahili proverb that is equivalent to “Where there is smoke there is fire”. RAO then goes on to explain the various failings of Jubilee including unfulfilled promises. (i KHASANDI-TELEWA; BARASA, 2018, p.196)

One could, of course, seek (or propose) some abstract universal cognitive metaphor that would bring together arrows, pigs, pain and people, or smoke and fire, but is there a need to do that? Must we assume that intelligence and understanding must proceed through or end in abstraction?⁵ What RAO is doing seems to be something much more direct than going from something concrete to an abstraction and asking his hearers to do the same: he is asking them to understand a concrete situation, the very situation they are all in, and he wishes them to understand it in a certain manner. The riddle about camels in tents, the proverb about pigs and people getting shot with arrows and the proverb about warning horns are all integrated into his speech because he could count on his audience knowing the proverbs and eagerly trying to solve the riddle, and in each case easily able to grasp how these related to the political events of the day, a relationship that he would in any case set out in more detail in the manner in which he wanted those events to be understood.

The second riddle discussed by Khasandi-Telewa and Barasa is based on a proverb. The form in which it appears in RAO’s speech is “*Alitaka yote mwisho akaanguka majini*” which the authors translate as “He wanted it all; in the end he fell in the water.” The answer is a dog who looking in a river saw a dog (his own reflection), and wanting that dog’s seemingly bigger bone, jumped into the crocodile infested river to get it. The authors explain the political context in Kisii to which the riddle was directed, and the explanation seems sufficient. Yet in the next paragraph they offer a CMT analysis in which “we are called upon to map the dog’s greed and folly” (the source domain) to a defecting Kisii politician (the target domain).

The last riddle examined, “*Alikimbia uchi, akalala akamuka asubuhi akapata aibu kubwa*”. “He ran naked, he fell asleep; he woke up and was greatly shamed”, is also followed by a story which the authors summarize in English rather than presenting in RAO’s words. A CMT analysis follows: “[...] the source domain is the human body—here it is the state of human nakedness, while the Target domain is, once again, politics and morality” (KHASANDI-TELEWA; BARASA, 2018, p. 198).

In the final section (before the Conclusion) the authors ask the question “How do the riddles help RAO to attain his aims?” and it is to just such a question that our integrational approach should focus its attention. The concluding sentence of this section is “The hidden meanings to be unravelled by the recipients also sustain audience participation.” Those “hidden meanings,” as Khasandi-Telewa and Barasa explain, are the publicly known facts of Kenyan political life in 2017, and audience participation is what electoral campaigns are all about. But why proverbs and riddles? The authors quote RAO from a television interview: “I used to listen to the elders—one way of bringing a point home – you look at a real life situation then you liken it to what you want to explain.” It is not clear what he meant by “a real life situation” as distinct from “what you want to explain”, but what is clear is that his “way of bringing a point home” was learned from listening to the elders in his community. While Khasandi-Telewa and Barasa demonstrate in detail that what RAO is dealing with are real life situations, matters in need of explanation, and a political constituency to whom he wishes to make himself understood, by divorcing RAO’s cognitive activity from all of these matters, CMT leaves Kenya’s political life as nothing more than LIFE IS A CONTAINER and a few other sources and target domains somehow activated within RAO’s brain. Does an integrational approach offer anything more revealing?

⁵ See Jones (2017, p.189) for a critical discussion of the common discourse in which “[...] language is said to enable an intellectual ascent from the lowly *concrete* of existing particulars to the lofty *abstract* of general or universal principle, law or essence”.

The starting point for an integrational understanding of language is that people speak (write, sign, sing, listen, read...) for a reason⁶. And we learn to speak from those who speak to us; in RAO's case, we have his own testimony that this involved listening to the elders in his community. Thus we have the origin of our language always in a social relationship within which we are named and placed as *mwana* or *binti*, *mjukuu*, *kaka* or *dada*, *mpwa*, *binamu*, *jirani*, *mwanafunzi*, *mrithi wa kiti cha enzi*, etc. (using Swahili terms for the authors' and readers' convenience only, with no intention of ethnocentrism), and therefore the analysis must always try and capture the social context in which the language originated. The reasons for our speaking will be conditionally related to the time and place of our speaking as well as the time(s) and place(s) of our intended audience or readership. In the case of RAO's political speeches, they are prompted by an upcoming election in which RAO is running for office, they are in English and Swahili (or broken Swahili as *Khasandi-Telewa* and *Barasa* indicate) due both to RAO's linguistic abilities and the presumed linguistic capabilities of the audiences in Bomet, Kisii and Runyenjes, and the riddling and proverbial remarks are directly related to his own initiation into public speaking in the presence of the elders as well as to his expectation that his listeners will respond knowledgeably and appreciatively to those well known ways of speaking. RAO's practice of following his riddles with a story and relating both to the current political situation is rooted in his need to ensure that he is understood (and not misunderstood and perhaps subsequently misrepresented in the press) and that he can convince the audience members to cast their votes for him. He is attempting to bring about, through his speaking, a change in the political direction of his country. His choice of where to speak, when to speak, how to speak and what to say are all dependent upon what he finds when he arrives at each particular destination, and most importantly, how the audience responds to his promptings, questions, riddles and stories. There is therefore a high degree of sociolinguistic dexterity in his use of language. It is this high degree of creativity which underpins his use of proverbs.

What the integrational approach insists upon is an understanding that proceeds from the speaker's history and current circumstances as much as from his listeners and respondents: the communicational biography is an essential element to consider. The event that is a RAO speech is therefore in origin and in essence a matter of a Kenyan man in a world of Kenyan politics. The political and historical contexts that *Khasandi-Telewa* and *Barasa* provide for each of the riddles and proverbs examined are exactly the matters that illuminate RAO's language, and they involve Kenyan men and women and politics from start to finish. If we ignore the CMT analysis, we conclude that *Khasandi-Telewa* and *Barasa* have provided a fairly concise description of how RAO integrates his world and his plans with those of his listeners. In contrast to their description, the CMT analysis which they also provide adds only a series of cognitive metaphors originally conjured up in an office in Berkeley that has nothing to do with Kenya, politics or gender, a theoretical position that will always raise the eyebrows of integrationist oriented linguists as well as Southern Theorists, for, as they say in Kenya, *Tumekuja kupiga mbiu ya mgambo*. We will have more to say about integrational and Southern Theory approaches to proverbial speech after we have looked at some more examples taken from other sources.

5 POLITICAL THEMES IN LUHYA PROVERBS

The Luhya are the second largest ethnic community in Kenya, a country in East Africa. In Kenya, as in many African countries, demographics play a large part in the politics. Many people count on ethnic affiliations and loyalty to garner votes during presidential and other elections. The large ethnic groups are usually wooed into political associations to produce even larger numbers of voters.

In spite of this ethnic advantage, the Luhya have never produced a president for Kenya. They have been given three vice presidency positions which is with the aim of collecting votes for presidential candidates from other communities and propelling them to power. This has led to their votes being split since they might have running mates for vice president for different parties.

⁶ In CMT, "language expresses thought" and "The neuroscience of concepts leads to a general principle: **You can only understand what the neural circuitry in your brain allows you to understand.** (LAKOFF, 2014) emphasis in original). What Lakoff claims to be studying is "embodied metaphor circuitry" and "embodied metaphorical thought" and his "general principle is that regular correlations in real-world embodied experience leads to primitive conceptual metaphors—*embodied primary metaphors using embodied primitive concepts*" (LAKOFF, 2014, emphasis in original). In spite of the author's emphasis on embodiment and experience, here language and thought are independent of communication; in this view, what we think and say and how we say it can be studied and understood without reference to why we speak, to whom, when or where.

Where there can be a presidential candidate, they end up splitting the votes and ultimately not winning the presidential race. They are often urged that:

Eshienyu neshienyu

Yours is yours.

meaning that they should vote for their fellow Luhya even if he is not the best, as other communities are known to do, but in vain. In fact, divide and-rule tactics are used to divide the community along dialects whereby, for example the Maragoli sub-tribe would support their own candidate Mudavadi while the Bukusu would support Wetangula or Wamalwa. When the same proverb is used for dialectal differences then the vote is split even further as their loyalties split the vote additionally since “Even if it is rotten it is yours”. This proverb was heard a lot during the campaigns for the 2017 presidential election especially among the Kikuyu, the largest ethnic community in Kenya. Unlike the Luhya, the Kikuyu prefer to present a presidential candidate in each election and vote for him or her no matter what odds there are against him/her. In the 2013 campaigns their favorite presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta, was facing a serious case in the ICC court at the Hague yet they still preferred to vote him in. As the Swahili say “**Zimwi likujualo halikuli likakwisha**” (The ogre that knows you will not eat you up completely” meaning “We prefer our own even if s/he is terrible”). This was much to the exasperation of the rest of the ethnic communities who thought this time the path was clear for them to present a president for the country.

Emotions run high during elections and many of the candidates do not win elections due to development agenda or strategic plans for the country but on the strength of ethnic affiliations. This is a pity as strong potential presidents are left aside and tribal giants take the seat, much to the detriment of the country’s development. In order to foment their strength, it is necessary for candidates to enter into alliances with other large groups under some arrangement of power- sharing once elections are won. Unlike in the USA where people are either Republican, Democratic or Independent, in Kenya alliances are so fluid that on one day people can be hurling insults at each other and on the next day they are bed fellows. What matters is which side the bread is buttered on for the particular season.

These political associations involving forming alliances and shifting here and there are accompanied by a lot of debates, many of them laced with apt proverbs summarizing one’s displeasure, mocking or justification for their choices including the consequences. A common theme in these proverbs is one to do with consumption: eating or drinking. In these sections we examine some of the proverbs used among the Luhya to express the various political tides, especially during election campaigns. It is a worthwhile to note that most of these proverbs center on metaphors of eating, drinking and marriage or sexual liaisons and make use of animal metaphors as well. The proverbs we discuss here are based on the theme of shifting political alliances: from the view of those that defect or shift alliances and from the perspective of those left behind.

Defecting to other parties

Every five years after elections are over, victories have been celebrated by winners and tears shed by losers, it is time for new alliances in preparation for the next elections. Even though politicians are always urged to “leave politics and focus on working together for the development of the nation” there can never be said to be a time when presidential elections are not a factor in Kenyan discourse. Especially in the case of losers, people start realigning themselves in preparation for the next five years. Thus, the agenda of wooing voters is permanent in Kenya. It is an adage that in Kenya there are no permanent political friends or foes. There are only political interests. Therefore, it is common for people to quarrel and call each other names in one political era and the next day they are shaking hands.

These political scenarios are well captured by diverse proverbs.

When the signs of shifting alliances begin to show

Having fought together during elections and won or lost, it is expected that the alliances that went into the election during an election year will continue throughout the five years and live to fight together in another election five years later. However, this does not easily happen in Kenya. The winning team hopes to hold onto their victories and gain more strength by bringing

onboard those that gave them a hard time and that are perceived to be future threats. Therefore, surprises occur when such virulent opponents start showing signs of softening their hard stance towards the opponents. When these scenarios emerge, the Luhya are heard to quip:

“Enjendekhwo ebulebe”, abetsanga nende eshimuyilayo”

When you hear someone talk of going somewhere, there must be a reason for this.

So, for example when an opposition leader goes to State House it is not for nothing. It is the harbinger of something sinister.

This is what happened in the run-up to the 1992 elections when the erstwhile hot-headed passionate opposition critic of president Moi was surprisingly spotted leaving the president’s residence. At first it was denied as rumors but later confirmed as true when the late Luhya leader, Martin Shikuku was confronted with evidence of his visit to State house. He said he was invited there and only took some *ugali*. Unfortunately, for him, eating “*ugali*” in Kenya is synonymous with receiving corrupt gifts and it was assumed that apart from the actual *ugali*, he must have also taken some metaphorical *ugali*. The result of these “*ugali*” eating sessions was a split in the opposition Ford party which now had Ford Asili and Ford Kenya, easily handing over the election victory to Moi. The Luhya say:

Otembelesia wateshia

If you want to marry you have to woo the girl.

Even if a girl appears to hate you if you want to marry her you must devise some strategy that will win her over. This must be done by use of sweet, persuasive words:

Omunwa omulayi kuchira walia eshikhongo

A good mouth will make you eat great things.

Carrot goodies must be dangled to the desired individuals, to win them over. In the aftermath of elections many will be hurting from the loss of elections and will decry the millions of shillings they have lost in campaigns. They are, therefore, more amenable to “eating something” and will easily rationalize their defections and argue that:

Owomufukoamanya okukwe

Everyone must first take care of his own pockets.

Martin Shikuku did not turn politically to the president’s KANU party but it became evident that the sharp edge from his criticism was smoothed out and he succeeded in denying the opposition victory by splitting up FORD.

Former colleagues of defectors, either out of principle or jealousy will not let them go without enough invectives. They will accuse them of minding their own stomachs and betraying the cause. You often hear:

Amakumba kabili kakanakania imbwa

The two bones confounded the dog.

This proverb is an extract from the tale of how a dog thought his reflection in a river was another dog carrying a bigger bone. In the process of trying to reach out and grab the bone from the shadow dog, his own bone fell into the water and he lost all. They are also reminded about how the legendary hyena split into two while trying to eat from two diverse feasts. He smelt some delicious food but when he reached at a crossroads, the alluring smell of a roast meat appeared to be coming from both sides of the road. He decided to use two legs to go to one feast and the other two to the other feast. Since the delicious smells kept beckoning him and he could not decide which one to give up he stretched himself until he split into two.

Defectors will be reminded of how previously they abused the opponents and called them vile names – how can they now sit with them at the same table? Truly:

Tsifwa tsioleka nitsio tsiawikurira

The vegetables you despise are the same that will satisfy you.

When someone is given a huge serving of *ugali* and a small amount of vegetables to eat with, they may complain that those vegetables will not suffice to make them satisfied. However, it is believed that this may only be an illusion but once he/she starts eating s/he will find the vegetables quite sufficient. Thus, this proverb means that one should never underrate anything just by looking – never judge a book by its cover.

Similarly, **“Owekana omurwe niye owakuchinga”**

He who declined to carry the head did carry it in the end.

The story is told about how at a feast, a cow was slaughtered and the meat equally shared out among the celebrants. There was someone who swore that they had had enough meat and could never carry the head, but ironically, they were the ones given the head and had to carry it to their homes. Thus, it is good never to say never as you might be forced to eat humble pie. However, these insults are often not directed at the strong leader in the open, for fear of the consequences but whispered behind their backs. Care must be taken as these leaders are still very powerful and have many supporters:

Inzofu ifutara khoyanyekwa

An elephant is insulted only when it has turned its back.

When Martin Shikuku went to State House it was a shock for all including the Luhya. Why? He was a renowned straightforward opposition leader who apparently had nothing in common with the corrupt president. After the *ugali*-eating session his criticism of the ruling party KANU and its leader, the president, was much subdued. So, it was alleged that Shikuku must have received some thick brown envelope for his silence and softening. To these accusations his supporters would reply:

Eshiolilekhwo nishioeshishio

Only what you have eaten can be counted as yours: you cannot be sure of owning anything else.

After such visits where opposition leaders go to Statehouse, and are always accused of taking some tea or eating “*ugali*” they may begin to show some disloyalty to their hard stance colleagues and might even say a good word about the erstwhile archenemy. Indeed, with time they may be appointed to an office and become friends with the administration. This is a case of wooing in courtship. Those left behind are heard to complain that:

Amache kabeyeresia tsiswa

The crawling termites deceived the flying white ants that all was well outside.

The Luhya consider a dish of flying white ants to be a treasured delicacy and source of protein. When it is raining, sometimes white ants fly out of their holes. They may be caught for dinner as they fly about. But often even when it is not raining some Luhya children prepare traps for white ants and beat some sticks to woo them outside. Before the white ants come flying out some crawling termites from the same anthill come out, ostensibly, to spy if all is well. Since these are not considered a delicacy, they are not picked; so the white ants get the false message that all is well and it is okay to fly out. As soon as they come out of their holes, they are caught for drying or frying. Thus, this proverb is used to warn people not to follow others blindly.

Indeed, some people who follow defectors find that the political cake has all been shared out and there is no slice left for them. For example, all ministerial positions may already be filled up including the ambassadorships. They may regret that they got nothing in

return for their defection unlike those who went before and persuaded them to follow suit. Nevertheless, they are reassured that they will not miss out on the goodies altogether since:

Eyulilemwo shiifwa obuloo

The animal that gets to the river cannot die of thirst.

They may not be satisfied with what is left on offer though and feel bitter. Defections lead to bitterness since after taking tea or eating *ugali* one is expected to dance to the tune of the provider. They put themselves in embarrassing situations, for example defending corrupt officers in the system when previously they would have lashed out at them. They are thus often ridiculed and compared to frogs:

Ometa lishere; kumala okhulia khokwaruma

[Look at how] Ometa the fat frog jumps about when he has eaten!

This defection proclaims doom for their former parties; and when they decamp, they do not just leave in peace. Like Shikuku's departure from FORD to form FORD Asili with Matiba left the political party in disorder and much weakened. They would be told:

Imbongo ikhasi ahayirula yisakula obukono

The female deer destroys her lair before departing

And also:

Owenyaomuseasambulaahamenyele

He who wants to start a new home must dismantle the old one.

This taunting is meant to elicit an exchange of insults. But sometimes they have lost so much face that they do not want to answer anything back. Yet, if even under provocation they say nothing they are further goaded than if they had kept the insults they received. They are reminded of the fox who tried to provoke the rock but the rock would not respond:

Ing'u yaboolera olwanda kata noholela ekhunielekhwo

The fox said to the stone that even if the stone chose to remain silent, the fox had excreted on it.

To this they may retort that they had to decamp even if they had been formerly allied to their former parties since those parties no longer served their interests:

Eshibi shifutswa, Ingokho yafutsa lisa

A bad thing must be spat out: even the hen spat out the caterpillar.

Their opponents will still insist that they are former beneficiaries of these parties and compare them to a woman seeking divorce who will invent all manner of excuses to justify her desire for departure.

Omukhasinakhulobireakhuambaliloko

When your wife refuses you and wants to leave, she will accuse you of witchcraft.

It is similar to the case of giving a dog a bad name before killing it.

More recently, Kenya has also experienced a great political shaking. It was the clincher for the shifting of alliances, when president Uhuru Kenyatta and his arch rival, the opposition leader Raila Amollo Odinga (RAO), after years of political tussles with much bitterness and even deaths of followers shocked the country by entering into a secret "Handshake". After the bloody and very violent elections of 2017 that were so flawed that the Supreme Court nullified them and ordered a re-run, there was a lot of adversity in Kenya. It was largely believed that RAO won those elections with his coalition called the National Super Alliance

(NASA) which comprised Amani National party, led by Musalia Mudavadi, Ford Kenya of Moses Wetangula, and the Orange Democratic Party (ODM) led by RAO. The run-off was boycotted by the opposition who insisted that they had won the elections and were not going back to the ballot box for “computer-generated” election results unless certain conditions were changed for a level playing field. When Uhuru Kenyatta was sworn in as president RAO also swore himself in as the “people’s president”. His followers made the country virtually ungovernable. It scared the ruling coalition and they seemed at a loss on what to do to end the violence since even if RAO’s supporters were shot at they still persisted with their riots.

Thus, on 9 March 2018, the whole country was woken up to the sensational news that president Uhuru and RAO had buried the hatchet and resolved to work together, ostensibly for the good of the country. They were pictured engaged in the now famous “Handshake” outside State House. Even their ardent supporters seem to have been taken aback as they were in the dark concerning the negotiations or what the terms of the handshake were. However, the government side was much relieved as they would now be able to have some peace and move their agenda forward. Some within the diverse camps however, felt betrayed, especially those that had made enemies across the board. Also, the Deputy president and his allies were at a loss since, having RAO in the government posed a risk to their 2022 presidential bid. No one knows for sure what agreement the two arch rivals made behind closed doors but when they came out and shook hands the political arena changed completely. They pledged to work together and Kenya was virtually left without an opposition as RAO had previously led the strongest opposition. Their terms of the handshake have never been disclosed to the public but it certainly achieved some calm and peace, though temporarily. The riots ceased from the streets and there was a calm-albeit an uneasy one with both sides not knowing how to interpret the situation.

The USA leaders seem to have been glad at the move and invited the two leaders to address the 68th National Prayer Breakfast meeting in Washington and share their handshake story which could hopefully be applied to other nations for peace. RAO’s speech at the breakfast begun in his characteristic way with a saying:

“Here in America you say that **“any jackass can kick down a barn but it takes a good carpenter to build one”**”.

He then went on to explain that for the sake of the peace they had agreed to lay aside their differences and work for the prosperity of the country. Uhuru also explained the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) which is an attempt to expand top leadership positions for a more inclusive government.

The 2018 handshake is the most illustrious example of the scenario where one’s mouth is silenced because of being invited to *ugali*-eating sessions. Situations that would have called for the harshest of criticisms from RAO and team have caused awkwardness since they are supposed to be the custodians of non-corruption. However, now, in 2020 there is a big scandal whereby government officials are alleged to have looted millions of shillings meant to fight COVID-19. All we hear from the erstwhile loud opposition politicians is stone silence, therefore, they are compared to hens which are given some grains and easily captured for slaughter:

Botsa okaale

Feed and be complacent

Protests and demonstrations for the corrupt to be brought to book seem to have fallen on deaf ears and even the futile attempts have been lukewarm, nothing compared to the erstwhile passionate demonstrations led by RAO and his team. This calls to mind two proverbs:

Oukhulisia akhupa mao nolola

He who feeds you can beat your mother in your presence.

This points out the awkwardness the former self-appointed fighters of corruption are faced with. They are required to look aside as suspected corruption cases thrive and even to justify their newfound cooperation with suspected thieves. The term “mao” means “your mother” but is used in an insulting way unlike the neutral or endearing “mama”; (mummy). It is enough to cause a fight,

when one says “Mao!” But when one is under the control of others that are feeding them, they are useless and cannot even defend their beloved mothers from attack. And they have already been insulted just by the use of the term “mao” instead of “mama wuwo” (your mother). The second, similar proverb is:

Oukhumechera akhwayakhumoni.

He who slices a piece of ugali for you can graze his cattle at your door step.

Meaning that whoever has control of feeding you makes you powerless before him. It is a form of emasculation since you depend on him for food. Any murmuring or signs of discontent on the part of defectors will be met with the rejoinder that:

Okhulia khwera isuna

Eating caused the mosquito to die. (The mosquito was so keen on sucking blood from someone that he got slapped to death)

They will also be reminded that they will ultimately receive the shorter end of the stick so they should not be overexcited. All they will get is a big bone but no real meat:

Olasangalira okhukabwa likumba

Do not be excited by the big bone that you have been given.

This simply means that defectors will be given a few political crumbs such as some appointment to minor offices here and there but the not big things they were made to believe they would receive. This was a common situation whereby the former president, the late Daniel Arap Moi was known to promise many different communities that he would give them the vice president slot if they rallied their communities to vote for him and his party, KANU. During the era of his presidency the old constitution gave the president powers to select a vice president, unlike in the new constitution in that one selects a running mate right from the beginning and so cannot change them anyhow. So, Moi promised around seven large ethnic communities that their man would be vice president and, in the hope, that the national cake would trickle down to them they would be persuaded to vote for him. When the elections were over and he appointed one vice president there would be around six communities weeping and feeling very deceived and betrayed. Moi was heard to cite the equivalent of the proverb:

Olulimi luserera shilulilwo oluteshia ta

[Literally, the tongue that woos is not the one that marries] meaning, the language of courtship is not the same as the language in marriage. Once you have been won over and married, you do not have to be promised goodies anymore; you have no choice but to take what you are offered.

He shamelessly defended his lies and explained that when one is courting a girl they are expected or allowed to woo them with sweet promises including lies. When the girl finally agrees to get married, they might be shocked to discover that the prince charming is actually nothing but an ugly frog. He, therefore had no apologies to make. After all, this is a hunting strategy and one has to be blinded with false promises to be won over:

Oureka elilola lipulukha

If you trap a bird while it is seeing you it will surely fly away.

He needed votes from all those communities and he was not expected to lay the trap when they were looking. So, justifiably he had to lay his traps secretly. Those who felt betrayed were reminded that:

Oulonda omwalo ashira oulonda omwami

He who follows the course of a river is better than he who follows a king

It is better to follow one's course of life and mind one's own business than waste time following these political leaders since many of them are liars and will disappoint unashamedly.

What Moi usually did was dishing out some appointments such as sending them off to be ambassadors in diplomatic embassies or perhaps some ministerial appointment but these were considered mere crumbs compared to the vice presidency that was used to hook them up with. The Luhya say:

Owabeya ebunyakhufiala imukhupanga nabira

The person who lied to his in-laws is rained on rather than shelter at the in-law's place.

This means principally that one should be straightforward especially to those who are important to them. This proverb is used when one's lies cause them inconvenience. If someone lied to their in-laws, they lose face and miss out on opportunities. If such a person is known to have lied to his in-laws and the rain started falling, he would be unable to seek shelter in their homes. So, he has to continue walking in the rain for the shame of his lies. Thus, for a short while those in office are expected to feel ashamed to visit the communities they lied to since lies are not easily forgotten:

Wikumula emwalo olekumula emukulu

Better stumble in your steps than stumble in your mouth.

Indeed, some communities were very bitter and lamented that they were lied to and complained that:

Owolia ninaye niye oukhwira

The one you eat with is the one who kills you.

One would expect that when the five-year cycle was over and Moi would need votes from the communities he had deceived, he would be ashamed to go back and lie to them again. But, Moi, the self-proclaimed "professor of politics", would unashamedly still make inroads. He reckoned it is better to be bold and come out and not be like the rabbit that died in its den because of shame:

Tsisoni tsierera akhatuyu mubukono

Shame made the little rabbit to die in its den.

He would strategically appoint someone from those communities into some office towards the end of the electoral cycle and task them with convincing his community with more promises that "development" was coming and that the appointment would trickle down to them by close association since:

Omechera oukhumechera

{Literally "you slice some ugali for him who also slices for you} You give to him who gives you.

Since many of these communities are very poor the promise of good roads, electricity, schools etc. being dangled before their eyes would make them easily forgive the president and await another deception come the next election. With these tactics Moi was able to rule Kenya for 24 long years until the opposition discovered that they had to unite if they were to defeat him at all, which they did in 2002 with a resounding victory over Moi and KANU.

6 DISCUSSION

Examining proverbial speech in political discourses in Kenya, we are led to see the disconnect between a theoretical understanding of proverbs which sees them as fossils, and a practice that judges the present in terms of the future towards which it points. Instead of abstracting proverbs from contexts, the Integrational perspective asks us to see communicative action, a social engagement that is NOT the sum of pre-given proverbs and situations, but a world in development, a world made up of “[...] the voluntary acts of individual linguistic agents within the coercive moral context of everyday life” (TAYLOR, 1997, p. 156). Theorizing proverbs, as all of communication, cannot be

[...] about boiling particular utterances, texts and documents down to some mythical residue of stable and constantly reproducible forms and meanings but about finding and understanding the distinctive contribution that the relevant parties make by their situated communicative conduct to a developing sphere of activity or engagement – local, regional, global. (JONES, 2007, p. 72)

Consequently, the refusal to make of proverbs an abstract linguistic entity entails rejecting an abstract sociality as well. Recognizing social abstractions and linguistic abstractions to be what they are – artefacts of a particular form of analysis – engages the Integrationist directly with the central preoccupations of Southern Theory. Again we can quote Peter Jones (2007, p. 71):

[...] to make sense of the communicational initiatives of another person requires nothing less than trying to make sense of what they are up to, of their motives and purposes in relation to whatever is at stake in the business at hand or in their engagement with us. And this is why we are able to pass judgement on what they say.

The examples discussed in section 5 above clearly demonstrate Kenyans “trying to make sense of what they are up to” and passing judgement on what has been said—and done.]

7 CONCLUSIONS

The love of, and value of proverbs in African conversations cannot be gainsaid. Proverbs are an artistic genre that is used creatively for entertainment as opposed to long held beliefs that they are some fossils of wisdom stuck in the past. They are learned and drawn upon with great pleasure for both speaker and listener in a creative activity of bringing the past forward into some desired new future that will (hopefully) unite the generations (rather than bury the “nightmare” of Marx’s dead generations) by means of a proverbial language that they have made their own. They are also used to teach people the mores and values of a society as situations are analyzed and proverbs creatively adapted to ingeniously comment. In this paper we have examined political proverbs in several African communities using Integrationist Semiology and Southern theory. As the Swahili say “*mwacha mila ni mtumwa*” [whosoever leaves their tradition is a slave]. Thus theories from the Global South can more relevantly be used to examine uncertainties of natural events from their own perspective instead of relying on northern and western totalitarian discourses of knowledge as power and Theories of Everything such as the ostensibly universal Conceptual Metaphor theory .

We have tried to illustrate the extent to which an Integrational approach to proverbs is able to more accurately capture the dynamics, and creative language use of proverbs in contemporary African politics than cognitive orientations which tend to be asocial, ahistorical and aspire towards fictitious abstract universalisms. The Integrationist approach adopted in this paper is compatible with a Southern/ decolonial approach to linguistic analysis. Southern Theory and decolonial approaches to proverbs constitute a radical challenge to the metalanguage of linguistic analysis, an area which has rarely been systematically studied (see Hutton forthcoming). On the one hand, a detached, disembodied approach to linguistic analysis may be construed as creating opportunities for an objective analysis consistent with the aspirations of linguistics as a science, on the other hand, from a Southern/decolonial perspective such a detached approach may be construed as lacking in social legitimacy and is alienating. Consequently, a linguistic analysis of proverbs grounded on metalanguage as used in ordinary discourses is a more legitimate as a

source of social critique than a detached metalanguage in spite of the postmodern fluidity and unpredictability of ordinary discourse from which such a metalanguage is drawn.

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CONTRACTING, EXPANDING AND INTEGRATING TRANSLATION: WHO AND WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE?

CONTRATANDO, AMPLIANDO E INTEGRANDO A TRADUÇÃO: QUEM E ONDE
DESENHAR A LINHA?

CONTRATACIÓN, AMPLIACIÓN E INTEGRACIÓN DE LA TRADUCCIÓN: ¿QUIÉN Y DÓNDE
DIBUJAR LA LÍNEA?

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ABSTRACT: This paper looks into the many-sided debate on the definition and thus delimitation of translation, extending over a generalized conception of translation as interlingual meaning transfer, a linguistically-centered expansion of translation, a modal orientation of translation, as well as a semiotic reform of translation. It is contended that the many 'expansionist' attempts at redefining translation, albeit bringing about a refreshing departure from the rigid, traditional concept at first blush, are either still predisposed to the translation myth (a manifestation of the language myth), or reliant on decontextualization and depersonalization. An integrationist critique on some major trends in the redefinition of translation will be offered in this paper, as well as an introduction to an integrationist view on translation.

KEYWORDS: Integrationism. Translation. Hermeneutics. Semiotics

RESUMO: Este artigo analisa o debate multifacetado sobre a definição e, portanto, a delimitação de tradução. Expandimos para uma concepção ampla de tradução como transferência de significado interlingual, uma expansão linguisticamente centrada da tradução, uma orientação modal da tradução, bem como uma reforma semiótica de tradução. Argumenta-se que as muitas tentativas 'expansionistas' de redefinir a tradução, embora trazendo um afastamento do conceito rígido e tradicional à primeira vista, estão centradas no mito da tradução (uma manifestação do mito da linguagem), ou dependem de descontextualização e

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despersonalização. Uma crítica integracionista sobre algumas das principais tendências na redefinição da tradução será oferecida neste artigo, bem como uma introdução a uma visão integracionista da tradução.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Integracionismo. Tradução. Hermenêutica. Semiótica.

RESUMEN: Este artículo analiza el debate multifacético sobre la definición y, por lo tanto, la delimitación de la traducción, extendiéndose sobre una concepción generalizada de la traducción como transferencia de significado interlingüístico, una expansión de la traducción centrada en la lingüística, una orientación modal de la traducción, así como una reforma semiótica de traducción. Se sostiene que los muchos intentos ‘expansionistas’ de redefinir la traducción, aunque a primera vista provocan un cambio refrescante del concepto tradicional y rígido, todavía están predispuestos al mito de la traducción (una manifestación del mito del lenguaje), o dependen de descontextualización y despersonalización. En este artículo se ofrecerá una crítica integracionista sobre algunas de las principales tendencias en la redefinición de la traducción, así como una introducción a una visión integracionista de la traducción.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Integracionismo. Traducción. Hermenéutica. Semiótica.

1 INTRODUCTION: THE INSTITUTIONALIZED, LAY CONCEPTION OF TRANSLATION

It may seem that from time immemorial, a certain impression of translation has held sway: This impression, often referred to as the common or proper conception of translation or as Reynolds (2016, p.18) puts it, “translation in the true sense of the word”, is characterized by a general picture of meaning transference between two texts, each written in a specific language. Translation is thus seen as a process which engenders or a product which emerges out of a relationship of equivalence between two languages. The preponderance of this impression does not dwindle even with the proliferation of academic theories on the malleable and protean nature of translation, or ‘translationality’, which has come to subsume linguistic (and/or non-linguistic) exchanges that do not fulfil the aforementioned translation criteria.

This unyielding impression, termed by Reynolds as Translation Rigidly Conceived (2016, p.18), is what the integrationist Roy Harris (2011) would call a manifestation of the *translation myth*, an assumption that “[...] we cannot translate until we have identified two languages, one to translate from and one to translate into. The languages come first, and translation is a secondary operation which presupposes them” (HARRIS, 2011, p.85). The myth also requires that “[...] some expressions belonging to different languages, although differing in form, need not differ in sense” (p.86), such that the meaning of a text can travel across languages. Proceeding with an integrationist view, the translation myth is part and parcel of the *language myth* (HARRIS, 1981, p.9), which perpetuates the conception of languages as first-order, sharply delineated codes within or between which communication takes place in the form of thought/content/meaning transfer. Harris summarizes it thus: translation projected as “[...] a process intrinsically dependent on the decontextualised matching of one fixed code with another, is itself the translator’s version of the language myth” (HARRIS, 2011, p.149). There is indeed an inextricable tie between translation and the codification of language, especially in the Westernized world: translation reinforces linguistic boundaries and standardization, whereas languages are standardized in a way which promotes interlingual translationality, i.e., the compilation of grammatical categories and rules which are comparable across languages. This to a large degree resonates with Reynolds’ remark on “Translation Rigidly Conceived”, which “[...] needs standard languages so badly that, when it doesn’t find them ready-made, it joins in the process of creating them” (REYNOLDS, 2016, p.21). Translation, itself a pliable and amorphous substance, as well as the language(s) involved in a translation process, almost always returns to a mold that forms the translation process into a readily describable one which transpires between two readily describable language codes. It seems as if translation is needed to be this way – but needed by whom?

One answer is the practitioners. As translation has come to be institutionalized, some would concur that translation now exists as a “social entity” (HERMANS, 1995, p.5) or a “social practice” (PYM, 1995, p.158) which has assumed a determinate nature transparent to the public, as required by an institution. Hermans speaks of this as the ‘public face’ of translation: “The meaning of ‘translation’ is codified in dictionaries, there are professional activities called translation, we have organizations representing

translators, institutes for translator training, etc. It is this 'public face' of translation that I have in mind when I speak of translation as 'institution' (HERMANS, 1995, p.5).

Alongside institutionalization is the professionalization of translation and hence the monopolization of its definition. Requirements for equivalence, fidelity, accuracy, etc. are set, proclaimed and maintained by relevant authorities "[...] In the interest of sharpening a given professional profile and safeguarding their members' expert status" (PÖCHHACKER, 2019, p.60). A proper definition of translation, premised on equivalence meticulously obtained between two highly structuralized language codes, paints (proper) translation as a marked, intellectual form of engagement exclusive to specialists. To maintain this exclusivity is to keep an eye on the remit of (proper) translation. That being said, with institutionalization also comes commercialization. This means that whoever the translation is for also contributes to the reinforcement of the translation ideal. In this spirit, Pöchhacker (2019, p.60) claims that the clients or other stakeholders involved in the translation business also "[...] wield the power of definition and labelling themselves". In a similar vein, Hill-Madsen and Zethsen (2016, p.694) equate "the perspective of translation as an institution" with that of "the translation consumer", in which "[...] the scholarly debate about the (im)possibility of equivalence in translation is irrelevant, because equivalence is generally what external stakeholders expect". This ties in with another answer to the question of whose interests the translation myth serves.

This other answer is the lay non-specialists. Van Doorslaer (2019, p.222), for instance, refers to the non-specialists' view of translation as one predicated on "[...] the illusion that languages are equivalent, interchangeable tools and that it is possible to change only the language". Apart from the translation consumers who approach translation as a means to an end (focus mainly on the guaranteed result of translation and its practical value, rather than on how the translation process actually pans out), the lay public also includes individuals who just do not feel the need to claim an expert status or to reflect on how much translation they partake in on a daily basis, who are happy to simply take translation 'at face value' and end up perpetuating the translation myth themselves. This complacency is further encouraged by the advent of machine translation, the proliferation of speedy translation tools online whose layout easily streamlines any translation process normally carried out by a translating individual by filtering out the translating persons and activities involved in translation, and finally "[...] reduces translation to a by-product of equivalent languages" (GAMBIER, 2016, p.889). Adding to all this is the lay, extensive use of the translation ideal as a metaphor, which has been applied to fields "as diverse as psychoanalysis, anthropology, sociology, media and communication theory, medicine, and genetics" where 'translation' assumes a central role (GULDIN, 2016). The inter-code, transferential nature of proper, ideal translation serves a wide range of theoretical purposes by facilitating easier comprehension of elusive processes studied by the quoted fields. The metaphorical conveniency amounts to all the more reason for the general public to retain a proper definition of translation from which metaphorical uses can be derived.

Thus an ostensible rift has formed between academia and the 'actual world' of translational practices: Translation scholars, on the one hand, show a predilection for broadening the term 'translation' and expanding the object of study in the discipline; on the other hand, the "outside world", formed by the translation industry as well as people not even remotely involved in any translation business, continues to delimit translation to "an apparently simple practice" of interlingual transfer (VAN DOORSLAER, 2019, p.228). Within academia, translation scholars call for a revision of the classic translation typology imputed to Jakobson (2012 [1959]) which has long centralized interlingual translation (what Jakobson declares as *translation proper*) and pushed intralingual and intersemiotic translation to the periphery, thus creating a chasm between "translation in the proper sense" and "translation in the figurative sense" as pointed out by his critics such as Derrida (1992 [1985], p.226). The aim of translation researchers in the recent decades lies in unsettling the preset boundary between proper and metaphorical, between professional and unprofessional, between pure and applied translation, etc. Their research thus involves the expansion of the concept of translation, or more specifically, the reflection on the interconnections between different forms of translation (whether or not they are traditionally regarded as proper translations) and their respective ontological primacy.

What do these translation revolutionaries ultimately seek in their academic endeavors? Reynolds, for one, claims to render a fuller picture of translation that is somehow off limits to actual translation practitioners and the lay population who remains unaware of their own translational activities without this scholastic enlightenment. According to Reynolds (2016, p.3), those fixated on the narrow definition of translation as an interlingual activity rooted in faithfulness basically "shut out the complexities that make the

6003 Kwok | Contracting, expanding and integrating translation: who and where to draw the line subject interesting”, for they “stake a claim but don’t explore the territory”. If most translation revolutionaries concur with this statement, it means that the expansion project of theirs is not just some armchair reasoning but is instead an empirical exploration. The extended concept of translation is proclaimed to capture the essence of translation which has for long been veiled, even if it goes beyond the ambit of the non-intellectuals.

How does an integrationist weigh in on all this? This is what this chapter sets out to discuss. While certainly taking issue with the translation myth frequently ascribed to the ‘general public’ by translation scholars, it is argued here that the integrationist approach departs from a majority of ‘expansionist’ claims on translation, which either still subscribe to the very myth that they impugn or contribute to the depersonalization and decontextualization of translation. An integrationist would propose that the translation myth, the closely associated language myth, and the underlying assumptions about the interrelations between speech, writing and language(s) be laid bare and thoroughly perused. In fact, the integrationist prioritizes this investigation over the need to reach any decision between “semantic continuity” – the thesis that the academic definition of ‘translation’ can and should be extended to the lay population in order to rectify the rigid, traditional concept of translation – and “semantic discontinuity” – which holds that the gap between the academic and the industrial/lay definitions is simply unbridgeable (HARRIS, 2005, p.75). In terms of structure, this chapter will look into three types of expansionist claims on translation, each premised on some rumination about the relationship between translation and a certain subject which comes to shape what translation is/can be: (1) The linguistic expansion of translation; (2) the modal expansion of translation; (3) the semiotic expansion of translation. Each type will constitute a section of its own. Integrationist reflections will be included in each section, as well as in a concluding section that follows.

2 RETHINKING LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION

2.1 BILINGUALISM AND INTERLINGUAL TRANSLATION

A very first step on the revolutionary path is to question the technically confined, professionalized vision of interlingual translation and how realistic this vision is. Against proper interlingual translation, Brian Harris (1977, p.99) first coined the term “natural translation” to refer to “[...] translation done by bilinguals in everyday circumstances and without special training for it”. B. Harris’ original contention was that untrained bilinguals all engage in translation/interpretation to some degree, which entailed that translation studies should not only cover interlingual translation on paper, but also in reality, carried out ‘naturally’ between non-specialists. Later on, Harris was to further his claim and propose that translation studies should not only take natural translation into consideration but should instead treat natural translation as the basis. The argument is that a study of natural translation points towards the most basic form of translation, the innate third skill of bilinguals, on which more professionalized interlingual translations can be explained (HARRIS, 1992, p.101). The basis of the argument lies in the common nature of natural translation as well as its ontological precedency: B. Harris and Bianca Sherwood (1978, p.155) emphasize that while everyday communication is enabled by natural translation, professional translation merely constitutes a fraction of the totality of translational activities, a portion too meagre to be recognized as the essence of translation. This is echoed by Pérez-González and Susam-Saraeva, who state that due to its paucity in contrast to natural translation, “[...] professional translation becomes merely one sub-type of translation, rather than the norm-setting, prototypical form” (PÉREZ-GONZÁLEZ; SARAIEVA, 2012, p.157). Grbic´ and Kujamäki (2019, p.114) provide another line of argument, reminding readers of how natural translation preceded (and still continues to influence) professionalized translation:

The binary distinction between ‘professional’ and ‘non-professional’ spheres of translation and interpreting has a further implication. It does not only camouflage or exclude a herd of ‘elephants in the room’, it also obscures the fact that translation and interpreting activities have always been carried out not only on an ad hoc basis, but also in a more or less organised manner, well before the onset of modern professionalisation tendencies.

Sustaining the rationale behind ‘natural translation’ studies is Koskinen’s extension of Holz-Mänttari’s (1984) concept of *translatorisches Handeln* (translational action) to cover a broad range of translational events across languages, without confining the concept to professional translation (KOSKINEN, 2014, p.187). While the naturalization movement may not be the newest trend in translation studies, it is nonetheless still pertinent up to these days.

A retort to the naturalization approach undermines it with the ‘reflex vs reflexivity’ distinction. Hans G. Hönl stands as a representative: Arguing against B. Harris and Sherwood, Hönl (1995) alludes to what he claims as one decisive difference between so-called ‘natural translation’ and ‘professional’ translation – that the former marks out only unconscious actions of human reflexes and the latter marks out actions with conscious reflexivity and thus controlled decision-making involved. Taking it from here, it seems plausible to then preserve the authority invested in professional translation and seek the essence of translation from it, by highlighting the importance of translational consciousness and reflexivity. This reflex-reflexivity opposition is also supposed to drive a theoretical wedge between bilingualism and translation – thus explains Hönl’s (1995, p.26) reference to B. Harris and Sherwood as merely ‘bilingualism researchers’ separated from the proper field of translation.

An integrationist is not so much concerned to give an answer to whether there is any essential, substantial gap between bilingualism (or multilingualism) and interlingual (‘proper’) translation or to whether the former or the latter better encapsulates the essence of translation, as bemused by how a quest for the true foundations of translation ends up being a debate between these two constructs. The integrational analysis of this debate starts with a stance which holds that the study of ‘natural translation’ of bilinguals, in the way B. Harris and Sherwood propose, does not unveil the basics of translation. This is not to position the integrationist on Hönl’s side either – rather, an integrationist account does not countenance the setting up of a ‘reflex-vs-reflexivity’ divide between bi-/multilingualism and interlingual translation. In other words, an integrationist question to ask Hönl would be why lay persons’ engagement with multiple languages necessarily involves any less consciousness of the languages concerned, less reflexivity on any translationality between these languages, or any less controlled decision-making in their daily navigation within and between languages. The fact that professional translators more often than not have to lay claim to producing more informed and structured translations than lay people has nothing to do with the amount of reflexivity involved. It may even be a nebulous question to ask how much reflexivity pertains in professional and non-professional translational activities. In terms of linguistic reflexivity (language about language), no clear distinction between constructed concepts such as bilingualism and interlingual translation can actually obtain: both require one’s conception of second-order languages to explain the relevant linguistic happenings, and these languages are “[...] products of reflection on languaging brought into being by and through languaging about languaging” (LOVE, 2017, p.117) i.e. through linguistic reflexivity. In the end bi-/multilingualism and interlingual translationality are inextricable concepts – you cannot have one without the other. This much is particularly evident in the European context, as Harris (1980, p.4) also remarks on how a European, having been raised in a multilingual environment (which makes the European at least aware of languages other than her/his own), readily accepts the translational property of languages, which is in no way “[...] something which could plausibly be said to be intuitively obvious”. As a case in contrast, “[a]n isolated monoglot community having only the most tenuous contacts with its linguistically alien neighbours would have no reason for supposing that languages were in principle translatable” (p.4). In a nutshell, a bi-/multilingual “[...] concept of a language is one which thus intrinsically accommodates the principle of translatability” (p.5). A takeaway from this is that neither the concept of languages nor the concept of translation/translationality are intuitively available – instead, both concepts contribute to the construction of each other as well as co-construct the generalized notions of bi-/multilingualism and interlingual translation. Languages [count] and translationality are conceptually tangled, thus the same goes between bilingualism and interlingual translation. The integrationist’s refusal to see natural bilingual translation as the key to access the rudiments of translation stems not from an attempt to segregate the two (e.g. Hönl’s thesis) but from an awareness of the close associations between the two. Put in a more explicit manner, bi-/multilingualism and interlingual translation are both entrenched in the language myth and rely on a highly codified, streamlined vision of translation. As long as this vision is maintained, translation scholars are not going any deeper into the depths of translationality than before by investigating ‘natural bilingual translation’ rather than ‘professionalized interlingual translation’. Both of these categories presuppose an unequivocal identity of a bilingual based on an unequivocal status of languages. A code-based understanding of translation i.e. one that starts with codes as the basis easily paints an abstract, misleading picture of translation which presents codes as first-order phenomena in the translation process. To probe into the basics of translation is to do away with this ‘code filter’.

2.2 INTRALINGUAL AND INTERLINGUAL TRANSLATION

Translation revolutionaries gradually realize that something more has to be done than instigating a ‘naturalist’ turn – more specifically, to subvert the age-long notion of translation as a meaning transfer between languages is to query whether the existence of two distinct languages is indeed a *sine qua non* condition for translation and more importantly, to delve into what qualifies as a ‘language’ even if academics are to accommodate the common vision of translation. This inquiry sparks off a series of comparisons between intralingual and interlingual translation in the search for a common denominator in both kinds of translation which points toward the ultimate basis of translation. In this sense, translation thus becomes a root concept more general than interlingual translation, which is but one form of translation germinated by an underlying basis of translationality.

The common denominator in both intra- and interlingual translations is often claimed to be the concept of a barrier. Steiner (1992, p.29) hints at the potential linkage between the translational operations across languages and within one language:

The schematic model of translation is one in which a message from a source-language passes into a receptor-language via a transformational process. The barrier is the obvious fact that one language differs from the other, that an interpretive transfer, sometimes, albeit misleadingly, described as encoding and decoding, must occur so that the message ‘gets through’. Exactly the same model – and this is what is rarely stressed – is operative within a single language.

Inferred from this is the thesis that intralingual translation also transpires in the form of an interpretive transfer of a message across a barrier, a “language-internal barrier” with respect to Hill-Madsen and Zethsen (2016, p.693). Some would take it to the next level with the assertion that it is necessary to go beyond language to acquire a fuller understanding of the concept of a barrier, the prerequisite of any translation process: This is often explained by the ambiguity inherent in the demarcation of linguistic boundaries, demonstrated by the fine lines between concepts like a dialect and a language (as exemplified by cases of mutual intelligibility between languages and unintelligibility between dialects, etc.). This is why Screnock (2018, p.483) declares that “[...] the distinction between intralingual translation and interlingual translation is, at least linguistically speaking, nonexistent” – for the definition of a language, and in turn, the definitions of inter- and intralingual, are all flimsy manifestations. One possible interpretation would be to equate translational barriers with cultural or conceptual barriers, which are borderlines “[...] not restricted to those running between cultures encoded in the semantics of a ‘national’ language” (SCHMID, 2008, p.48). As Schmid explains, smaller cultures sharing the same ‘language’ conceptualize the world in different ways which therefore necessitates translations to enable smooth communication across these smaller cultures¹. The incorporation of intralingual translation into translation studies thus reveals a broader concept of translation no longer simply centered around a linguistic barrier but a barrier formed on a cultural, conceptual, cognitive, communicative level:

It appears that attempts to reconcile intralingual processing with the notion of interpreting are founded not so much on an analysis at the linguistic level, where the task(s) would be described as monolingual paraphrasing and/or summarising, as on an overall view of the communicative interaction, together with an account of the cognitive processing involved. (PÖCHHACKER, 2019, p.54)

Still, opposing voices abound within the discipline against the integration of intralingual exchanges into proper translation studies. Among these voices is Newmark (1991, p.69), who unyieldingly denies intralingual practices a seat in translation studies on the grounds that “[...] the qualitative difference between ‘interlingual’ and ‘intralingual’ translation is so great that it makes a nonsense of the concept of translation”. This is reverberated in other works like Mossop (1998), Eco (2003), Schubert (2005) and Trivedi (2007). Eco (2003, p.2), for example, insists on a stark difference between forms of semiotic exchanges (‘translation’ in his sense, put in inverted commas) and translation in an ordinary sense.

¹ Following from this is the thesis that translation “[...] comprises the reconfiguration of concepts from the perspective of another concept system” (SCHMID, 2008, p.54) – this actually ties in with the semiotic turn of translation which pictures translation as broadly as a process that takes place between semiotic systems, to be further discussed in section 4.

Do integrationists subscribe to a continuity or discontinuity view as regards the relationship between intralingual and interlingual translation? An integrationist should not regard this as a matter of utmost concern, for it is not the final destination of an expedition to the fundamentals of translation. Can one see any conspicuous differences between activities commonly referred to as intralingual and interlingual translations? Yes, but these are not so much typological differences as perspectival, contextualized, spatio-temporal differences. Can one notice any striking similarities between the two forms of translation? Yes, but to capture all these in the form of a barrier to be transcended also risks depersonalization and decontextualization: the barrier metaphor easily fabricates the illusion of an externalized border existing between concretized languages, cultures, communities, or conceptual realms, a border external of the translator her/himself. Rather, an integrationist suggestion is to divert the focus away from a typological investigation (i.e. struggling with the question of whether intra- and interlingual translations are similar enough to come under the general ‘translation’ category or not and the criteria for the unification/demarcation), which, despite serving some practical purposes, is not the fundamental concern – one can translate just as well with or without a clear categorization of this kind. A more pertinent task, integrationally speaking, would be to reflect on one’s experience with what in retrospect feels like intralingual and interlingual translation, in order to discuss the essential nature of translation:

Ultimately, there is no gap separating the translator’s problem from the kind of problem which may face the participants in any monoglot conversation. If someone asks ‘But what did you mean by tolerance?’ it is no use telling him to go away and learn English. This is not his difficulty. Analogously, it is not necessarily helpful to recommend the translator to go away and learn Hopi. His problem may well remain, however fluent in Hopi he becomes. What he has to decide, in his capacity as translator, is the relevance to a particular communication situation of the words used, and how best to clarify that relevance in a reformulation. That the reformulation has to be couched in another language may make the task more complicated, but it does not affect its essential nature. (HARRIS, 1981, p.148)

A takeaway from this quote is that the first thing to note about the interrelations between intra- and interlingual translation is how they, as any other kind of translation fathomable, all emerge in particular communication situations, involving actual translating individuals who try their best to achieve communicational relevance. In this sense, the integrationist sympathizes with Pöchhacker (2019) who stresses the importance of reflecting on the communicational episode in the study of translation. To the integrationist, this means that the contemplation of the essentials of translation is more than pondering the similitude and dissimilitude between ‘intralinguality’ and ‘interlinguality’ i.e. yet another two abstract notions which are hard to pin down without reexamining one’s own communicational (and translational) history.

2.3 LANGUAGE ITSELF AS TRANSLATION

Perhaps there is a more percipient takeaway from the interconnectedness between intralingual and interlingual translation – this is what a hermeneutician would say. This takeaway is a broadened conception of language, which in turn gives rise to a redefinition of translation and communication.

Reflections on intralingual and interlingual translation coalesce into an all-embracing and dynamic concept of language in the hermeneutical lens. Language is not restricted to discrete, stable language codes and the interactions among them – a given existence highlighted by interlingual translationality, but more importantly it consists in the communicational exchanges within language codes – phenomena classified as intralingual translation, which eventually induce changes and reconfigurations in the established codes themselves. Language is thus the human reality itself which begets, unites as well as differentiates different language codes in the process of translation. Trying to visualize it in a Saussurean way, it is *langage*, a totality which almost defies delineation but certainly involves linguistic systematization (*langues*) and changes (*parole*), both engendered in translation. Hence in this interpretation, translation has always been an indispensable part of language. Language (as *langage*) is the human, communicational universal that is translative in nature. This thinking is exemplified by Steiner, an exponent of a hermeneutical approach to translation, who points to the two senses of language: The first sense he describes as the most “technical semiotic level” of language consisting of “sequential rule-governed sign systems obeying certain constraints”, while the second sense is roughly conceptualized as a sense ‘almost too large for proper definition’, a sense of language which “can ‘communicate human emotions and articulate states of mind’” (STEINER, 1992, p.445). The first sense clearly has its footing in *langues* as rule-governed codes,

whereas the second sense harks back to the Saussurean notion of *langage* i.e. everything, the totality of language which cannot actually be outlined. The hermeneutical project can be seen as redirecting the age-long focus on the first sense (*langue*) to the second sense (*langage*), and to do this an element has to be added and intermeshed with the first sense – the creative force in the domain of *parole* most evidently manifested in intralingual translation, which serves as a more fundamental layer on which different *langues* proliferate and get constantly modified. In hermeneutics, a central role is conferred upon translationality, which becomes a first-order reality necessary for perpetual linguistic change, an indispensable element in language, communication and reality. This renewed concept of translationality is a much-expanded version compared to the hackneyed view of translation as a one-time interlingual exchange.

Giving translationality a central part within language is to put forward even loftier or more pioneering claims, such as drawing a parallel between translation and understanding, or even between translation and being. This claim is developed from the hermeneutical contention that the process of understanding reality is always in language, while understanding is the basic mode of operation of being/existence/*dasein*: “*Being that can be understood is language*” (GADAMER, 2004 [1960], p.469-470). To the prominent hermeneutician Gadamer, the “primordial world experience” is achieved “through the conceptual and intuitive power of the language in which we live” (GADAMER, 2007, p.12). Put differently, phenomenological hermeneutics starts with *dasein*, ‘something being here’, which involves the understanding, the coming to know of the ontological world. This process is necessarily one of meaning generation, which is essentially linguistic. The next step is to ponder how big of a part translationality takes up in the understanding of the world, in the basic mode of being, given translationality is indeed an essential feature of language. Are all our acts of understanding, of communicating in language, just acts of translating through and through? Does our being or existence as humans consist essentially in translationality?

Reynolds (2016, p.25) is certainly not sympathetic to this idea:

I could explain to myself that a ‘father’ is a male parent, or that ‘I’ is a pronoun one uses when speaking of oneself, but why would I? ‘I’ and ‘know’ and ‘where’ and ‘not’ and ‘when’ and ‘was’ and ‘call’ and ‘father’ are all familiar to me already. I don’t need to read them in translation.

The only way it would make sense to say that understanding these sorts of words is a form of ‘translation’ would be if there were some secret language in the mind that absolutely all words had to be translated into. On this view, what we call ‘meaning’ would itself be a kind of language, so that when you understand a word you translate it into ‘meaning’. But, if understanding is really a process of translating how would you then understand the ‘meaning’? You would have to translate it in its turn. And so on. And on. The structure is endlessly recursive. The reason why communication does not ‘equal translation’ is simple. You can understand by just knowing the words.

There is a lot packed into Reynolds’ commentary, but also a lot to clarify, debunk and question further. First it needs to be said that Reynolds’ argument would not be one accepted by hermeneuticians, on the grounds that it is sustained by a much narrower concept of translation than what has been offered in hermeneutics. Translation, in Reynolds’ words, goes back to being a process that is only obtainable when there exists a language different from the one the original text is coded in (this is bizarre coming from an author who tries to reexamine and explore the notion of translationality). Secondly, hermeneuticians might simply welcome the notion of understanding as endlessly recursive, that we constantly try to understand (in language) something anew in our interactions with the world, and invalidate Reynolds’ argument for it presupposes a straitened concept of understanding (as a discrete, completable process).

The integrationist would rather say that Reynolds is at least pointing out a very relatable, personal experience – that of understanding something without the need to translate, albeit providing a largely cursory and even misleading explanation. To start with, the integrationist would not draw on (and thus presuppose) the ‘standard’ sense of translation as an interlingual transfer of content in order to prove how understanding is not to be identified as translating. Moreover, the idea that any understanding in translation must reveal meaning itself as a kind of language makes no sense and does not pertain to our personal translation experience (when translating across languages, it is hard to believe that one would think whatever meaning rendered in translation is itself the language of the target text). More doubts are cast upon Reynolds’ assertion that one can understand by ‘knowing the

words'. Coupled with his denial of an incessant nature of understanding (which he believes to be a ramification of equating understanding with translating), Reynolds seems to base his argument on a concept of (linguistic) understanding as the acquisition of or access to informational content i.e. the meanings of the words – which paints understanding as a goal-oriented act that is not at all 'endlessly recursive'. Thus to Reynolds, to 'know the words' is to attain their (at least provisionally stable) meanings, which therefore cannot be in the process of translation (changes) when being known and understood. This is, for the integrationist, a distortion of the experience of knowing and understanding. "Knowledge, in integrationist epistemology, is always a form of *activity*" (HARRIS, 2011, p.63, italics original) and this activity is not to be reduced to an act of 'information collection'. To know a word is to know what to do with it – it is to integrate one's past, present and future activities as well as others' activities via sign-making in a manner relevant to the communication situation. If, say, a scientist takes it that salt has to be translated into NaCl to have a proper understanding of the substance for a particular study, it can be said that translation is among the activities integrated with the act of developing an understanding. But when a shopper picks up a bag of salt and puts it in the shopping cart, understanding takes place without such an integration between translating and understanding in the scientist's case. And this is why the integrationist does not find the need to equate understanding with translation, the reason being that such a claim can only proceed upon a high level of filtering and decontextualization. Tying in with the integrationist's refusal to stake the hermeneutician's claim is also the former's rejection of the premises underlying it, i.e., that language is the human communicational universal which consists or even subsists in translation.

Integrationally speaking, the hermeneutician's portrayal of language as a cosmic existence and the axis about which communicability, translationality, understanding, etc. rotate actually renders language, communication and translation conceptually remote, i.e., detached from personal experience. Contrary to hermeneutical thinking, the integrationist would assert that language does not exhaust translation – and this stems from the integrational belief that language does not exhaust communication. Integrationism, after all, is a view of human communication, a "product and resource of the constantly renewed process of integration", wherein lies language (HARRIS, 1996, p.X). What Harris implies is that the starting point of an integrational study is always human communication i.e. a person's integration of activities via sign-making. Language definitely takes a central role in human communication, and the integrationist does not deny this – this much is made clear in Harris's statement that "[...] to conceive of a languageless human society is not strictly possible, even for the most fertile imaginations" (HARRIS, 2011, p.83). A human world in which language does not occupy a central role would be a drastically different world (if not unfathomable). But one of the integrationist's central contentions remains that language presupposes communication. While communication is basic human existence (HARRIS, 1996, p.13), language is not what singly defines human existence. Instead, an arguably better, more inclusive way of defining what makes us human is "[...] to say that we are persons (not in a legal sense), each with his/her unique personal history. It follows that each of us has his/her own communicational biography, which comprises so much more than merely 'linguistic' communication" (PABLÉ, 2020, p.142).

This, however, does not presuppose a clear and absolute distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic. While it pertains to personal experience that linguistic communication usually involves a different set of integrational abilities and activities to be integrated compared to non-linguistic communication, no one can make a general statement on what exactly is linguistic in linguistic communication or what exactly non-linguistic communication lacks (HARRIS, 1998, p.3) – it is all subject to contextualization and recontextualization by the individual. But the absence of a pre-drawn division between linguistic and non-linguistic does not, for an integrationist, lead to the conclusion that everything is linguistic in nature. The saying that 'everything is language' is not pertinent to a lay perspective which includes prelinguistic experience, as Harris puts forward (Harris describes "observational knowledge" as a kind of prelinguistic experience he has had and illustrates it with the example of seeing a cat in his garden; see HARRIS, 2009a, p.164-165 for more).

To sum it up, the hermeneutical approach to language, communication and translation does not square with the integrational view on language and communication.

3 RETHINKING MODALITY AND TRANSLATION

Deliberation on intralingual translation gives rise to deliberation on translation as writing, or more specifically, creative rewriting. Moving from interlingual translation to intralingual translation, concerns about the (an)isomorphisms between languages become inapposite, and the emphasis shifts from language(s) to the activities carried out in language(s), or the manifestations of language(s), e.g. writing(s). This much is expressed by Screnock (2018, p.484), who affirms that “[t]he features of intralingual translation illuminate the affinity of rewriting to translation”. Put differently, the reflection on the mode or medium in which a translation process pans out ensues from studies on intralingual translation, and translation scholars swiftly turn their attention to the relationships, not only between (re)writing and translating, but also between speech and translation. A modal investigation of translation goes in tandem with the study of interpretation which is considered to be a more immediate form of translation, since the process of interpreting can transpire within or traverse across different modes/media (e.g. speech-to-speech i.e. the most commonly-known form of instant interpretation, speech-to-writing, writing-to-speech, writing-to-writing, speech-to-signing, signing-to-signing, etc.) (PÖCHHACKER, 2019, p.47)². The question to start off with in a (multi-)modal exploration of translation is whether translationality resides within the mode(s) themselves or transcends them. The question can be couched in another way: What exactly is the relationship between translation and the modes in which it is carried out and how does this inform us about the essence of translation?

3.1 TRANSLATION AND WRITING

A few words can first be said about writing and translation. The relationship between writing and translation has long been a topic for discussion in the translation field. St. Pierre (1996, p.233), for instance, asserts that “translation cannot be divorced from writing”, for it “[...] is a form of writing, or more exactly of rewriting, and the two practices cannot be distinguished in any systematic way” (p.253). This has not exactly deterred researchers following St. Pierre from pursuing a more organized way of studying the interconnections. In the recent two decades, a blueprint for a typology of text production gradually emerged: In Dam-Jensen & Heine’s (2013) version, text production is taken as a superordinate category subsuming all acts of producing a coherent written text for a specific audience with a specific goal in mind, including writing, translation and adaptation, and this entails that writing and translation share the aforementioned characteristics in essence, despite differing in specific writing phases and strategies. Risku *et al.* (2016, p.48) further explore Dam-Jensen & Heine’s (2013) claim, yet yield a rather inconclusive result: “The positioning of translation and writing on different levels of the scholarly concept system has led to an – admittedly, theoretically inspiring – situation in which the borders of translation have become increasingly blurred, and the translation concept itself seems to elude definition”.

Risku *et al.*, however, claim that translation bears a higher degree of interlinguality and imitation, but attribute creativity to both writing and translation. This echoes with Perteghella’s (2013, p.204) statement that “[a]ll writers are translators. Creative writing is above all a translational process”. The three studies mentioned thus far converge on the fact that they all constitute comparisons between the process of writing and the process of translation, which sets them apart from Screnock’s (2018) attempt to reconcile rewriting with translation, both as a set of techniques *per se* instead of the full, actual processes of producing a written/translated text. In contrast to said approaches, Hill-Madsen (201, p.556) offers a solution to the question ‘is translation (re)writing?’ by defending a conceptual barrier, emphasizing the lack in rewriting of two criteria that make up the translation concept – the criteria being “the neutralization of a comprehension obstacle and the presence of a semiotic border between ST and TT, or a border between two different meaning-making systems” – and thus arguing against the dilution of translation to “[...] such a degree that any kind of rewriting or metatextuality must be recognized as translation”.

² Interpretation theories and practices, apart from informing modal studies of translation, can actually be fitted into an investigation of intralingual translation as well as intersemiotic translation, which cannot be covered in this paper due to limited space. An example to demonstrate this is the debate over speech-to-writing (or writing-to-speech) interpretation, over whether this type of interpretation belongs in the intralingual dimension (which requires one to presuppose that speech and writing are alternative representations of a given language) – as Gottlieb (2008) does, who termed this type of interpretation diamesic INTRA (p.56) – or in the intersemiotic dimension (which entails that speech signs and written signs constitute two separate semiotic systems on their own), as proposed by Chuang (2006).

The integrationist would warn against one inherent issue with the identification (or association) of translation with writing as a mode or concept in itself, which is the risks of abstraction and distortion. This is because writing and translation are not standalone concepts which can be singled out from trillions of episodes of writing and translating, so there is no, *pace* Screnock (2018, p.498-499), any such question of “[w]hether translation is a part of rewriting or rewriting is a part of translation” or any such answer which consists of a general truth about translationality or writing as a mode of its own. Comparatively speaking, the method of process comparison employed in research like Dam-Jensen & Heine (2013) and Risku *et al.* (2016) perhaps pertains more within our integrative boundaries – we can certainly entertain the envisioning of previous writing experience and previous translating experience and compare them in our acts of recontextualization, without having to abstract any general comparison between the ultimate notions of writing and translating or delineate a clear start and end of a general writing/translation process. In the end, it is important to remember that whenever the term ‘translation’ or ‘writing’ is conjured up by an individual, it is always a sign that integrates (and gets integrated into) a series of activities, within the individual’s perspective, activities which otherwise remain unintegrated. No single activity in the integration serves as the essence of the integrated whole or the final referent of the sign created (‘translation’ or ‘writing’). An integrationist thus finds the following remark by Screnock (2018, p.499) futile:

But does the fact that something occurs in a translation make it an aspect of translation? Are these elements basic to translation or merely things that happen to occur in translations? If they are basic to translation, rewriting is translation insofar as it uses these elements. If they merely occur in translations, one would say instead that translations utilize rewriting.

To set foot on such metaphysical quests for the ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’ properties of translation, in terms of modes or other characteristics identifiable either at the very moment of translation or *post facto*, is to deny that what constitutes translation (or writing) can only be so at a particular instance where an individual integrates different activities together (more about this act of integration will be discussed in section 5), instead of some essence emanating from a certain activity/series of activities on its own.

3.2 TRANSLATION AND SPEECH

Other than writing, some translation scholars zero in on the relationship between speech and translation, and how the former may be the origin of the latter. One argument in favor of this is that we usually learn to speak earlier than we learn to write, which may or may not work in tandem with the argument that language is primarily spoken, i.e. audible and ephemeral. Derived from these premises, translation begins as soon as we learn to speak: “When we learn to speak, we are learning to translate; the child who asks his mother the meaning of a word is really asking her to translate the unfamiliar term into the simple words he already knows” (PAZ, 1992 [1971], p.152).

According to Steiner, central to speech is the counter-factuality of language, which is what makes language both a “mirror and counterstatement to the world” (STEINER, 1992, p.19). For Steiner, it is crucial that “*Language is the main instrumental of man’s refusal to accept the world as it is*” (STEINER, 1992, p.228). Hermeneuticians like Gadamer and Steiner believe that the counter-factuality in speech is a universal linguistic fact which points to a rift between ‘what is meant’ (our experience which is always experienced anew) and ‘what is said’ (schematized linguistic forms which can never catch up with our experience). Such a rift is embodied in both our daily exchanges with others (which would be much shorter and more efficient if the rift did not exist) and even our internal monologues (we often rethink our experience in different terms to form a different conclusion or make a better judgment as time passes). To hermeneuticians, human’s reliance on speech, as essentialized by counter-factuality, entails that translation is inevitable: “Speech would be an immensely profitable but also reductive, partially narrowing evolutionary selection from a wider spectrum of semiotic possibilities. Once it was ‘chosen’ translation became inevitable” (STEINER, 1992, p.50).

And this is it: we never fully express what we mean in speech, so what is meant is always regenerable and re-expressible, marking the beginning (but no end) of translation. The non-transparent nature of speech, as manifested in counter-factuality, warrants continuous translation. It is translationality, the possibility to translate what is said to generate a deeper understanding of what is meant, which sustains speech by complementing its counter-factuality. If there were no translation, there might as well be no speech at all – “no es una objeción contra el posible esplendor de la faena traductora” (STEINER, 1992, p.264).

Two integrationist comments should be made here on the proposed interdependence between speech and translation. First, the hermeneuticians have not sufficiently elaborated on how the counter-factuality of language is primarily attributable to speech. It is in fact dubious how the counter-factuality, premised on a notion of relatively fixed, stable linguistic forms, is not influenced by the availability of writing which supplies this very notion (the introduction of the idea of a ‘word’ in itself by writing as well as printing technologies). It is thus unclear whether it is speech itself which calls for translationality. Like writing, abstracting speech as a totalizing, abstract concept from an infinite number of instances of speaking in order to locate the ‘origin’ of translation does not get us any further in approaching the fundamentals of translation.

Another comment is that the integrationist also holds reservations about the ‘counter-factuality of language’ – this narrative shows the propensity (whether self-aware or not) to pin all acts of translation down to the same, ultimate source, to propose once and for all the final answer. The integrationist believes that the inexhaustible and untraceable instances of translation which have all panned out (and will pan out) in different persons’ lives cannot and do not have to be reduced to a crude, universal linguistic fact of counter-factuality, to a formula of ‘what is said never exhausts what is meant’. By contrast, there are many instances in our lives as lay, communicating and perhaps translating persons, where we find our words to be adequate for expression, for achieving whatever communication purposes at hand.

In short, the integrationist is suspicious of the headlong dash toward an equation between translation and any mode – be it writing or speech – in which it transpires.

3.3 TRANSLATION BEYOND WRITING AND SPEECH?

Does this then imply that translation/translationality transcends whatever mode (speech, writing, etc.) it is realized in, or whatever substance (scripts, sounds, etc.) it involves? Pöchhacker (2019, p.51) may in fact incline toward this deduction, having claimed that the notion of interpreting cuts across different modalities, i.e. that its definition transcends any changes in modality. This transcendental view may also be reinforced by the expediency afforded by machine translation: In the technical age, “Translation no longer necessarily involves a translator writing anything. A short, successful translation can now be produced by somebody who does not know how to write and does not know a word of the target language, but possesses a smart phone with a relevant app” (JAKOBSEN, 2019, p.76).

It appears that in the myriad of translational acts constantly taking place nowadays, neither writing nor speech is required any more. The detachment from traditional modalities seems to call for a redefinition of translation in order to catch up with the actual translation practices which are interminably being redesigned. Yet to the integrationist, the paradox of constant redefinition only arises when the definition is taken to be context-independent. But the integrationist, instead, acknowledges in the first place the contextual, fleeting nature of the definition of ‘translation’ which only serves an integrational function in a certain here and now, inseparable from what it is created to integrate. This is why the process of translation – along with the definition provisionally provided for ‘translation’, itself a contextually created sign – is not perpetually defined by any activity or ‘mode’ that has ever been integrated into the process, but is not independent of any of these activities either. This is simply a manifestation of one of the axioms of integrational semiology: “[w]hat constitutes a sign is not given independently of the situation in which it occurs or of its material manifestation in that situation” (HARRIS, 2009b, p.70). This axiom, if accepted, renders any such transcendental claim to “medium-transferability” (HARRIS, 2000, p.193) in the conceptualization of translation/interpretation across modes (e.g. speech-writing) a precipitate one which simply presupposes the existence of some fixed semiological relations across material manifestations (p.193) – this in turn means ignoring the contextualized, integrated, situated and embedded nature of any semiological relation involved in the acts of translation.

4 RETHINKING SIGN AND TRANSLATION – A (BIO)SEMIOTIC TURN

After the many unsuccessful attempts at essentializing translation by pinning it down to some basic activity or mode (e.g. natural bilingual and intralingual exchanges, writing and speech), an approach that essentializes translation by linking it to a universal phenomenon may be a promising answer we need. This approach is the semiotic approach, which ties translation with the universal phenomenon known as semiosis, the generation and perpetuation of sign relationships. In semiotics, translation and semiosis form a dialectical relationship: one cannot be explained except by the other. Stecconi (2004, p. 482) puts it this way: “[...] there is no translation if the target sign does not speak on behalf of the source sign”, thus translation necessarily consists in traversing a “fold between semiotic systems” (p.480).

The semiotician appeals to the universal capacity of translation, or what is more frequently referred to as translationality by semioticians, by declaring it to be a semiotic capacity. In describing the most discernable form of translation i.e. interlingual translation, Petrilli (2014, p.240) states that “[...] each single language presents its own interpretation/s of reality, but does this thanks to the semiotic capacity for translation across different orders and systems of signs” (p.240). Hence the essentialness of translation is, for a semiotician, derived from its interconnection with the sign, with semiosis, itself an essential process in the interaction with and interpretation of reality:

Translative thinking converges with semiotic processes where something stands for something else, where different sign systems are related and defer to each other in meaning-making processes, where one sign is more fully developed, enriched, criticized, put at a distance, placed between inverted commas, parodied or simply imitated and, in any case, interpreted in terms of another sign. (PETRILLI, 2014, p.189)

The notion of ‘translative thinking’ – with thinking being a human signifying capacity in semiotic parlance (WELBY, 1903, p.34) – demonstrates how intertwined translation and semiosis are, and how because of this, translation is exalted to be a first-order, essential process.

To put it more specifically, semiosis – the generation of the interrelationships between a representamen, its object as well as its interpretant(s) – cannot subsist without translation, a pivotal process in which an interpretant is produced to relate a representamen to an object, a relation which would not come into our thinking without the translation process. Hence translation is the main semiotic element – it is the production of an interpretant, a form of metasemiosis wherein a relation between a representamen and its object is considered and thus the semiosis process is envisaged. This is why Petrilli (2014, p.189) claims that “[...] the role of translation is fundamental in the very constitution of the sign”. Following from this, translation is tantamount to the meaning of a sign, as the meaning of a sign is always a further sign which interprets it and this process of interpretation is translation. This harks back to the Peircean dictum that a meaning “[...] is, in its primary acceptation, the translation of a sign into another system of signs” (CP4.127). Translation and semiosis are two sides of the same semiotic coin.

4.1 TRANSLATION BEYOND LANGUAGE

Having ‘semiotized’ translation as the first-order reality, a semiotician contends that this reality is not just language. *Nota bene*, the semiotician does not wish to downplay the significance of language in human translation. Their point of departure, however, is that intralingual and interlingual translations do not exhaust the whole of translation. Semiotically speaking, to merely focus on language means to ignore what Jakobson classifies as intersemiotic translation. Putting it in terms of semiotic signs, it means to only focus on one type of sign – the symbolic sign – and to overlook the significance of iconicity and indexicality in translation. Semiotic translation research often argues that the two nonverbal types of signs i.e. iconic and indexical signs in the trichotomy have long been neglected or brushed off as a topic to be explicated after theorists settle on a universal theory for linguistic translation. To semioticians this is, however, putting the cart before the horse. The prioritization of symbolic signs over iconic and indexical signs pays no heed to the semiotic precedence of iconicity and indexicality: Merrell (2003) asserts that translation does not only take place on a conscious, rational level (thus mainly verbal) but also on an unconscious, irrational and nonverbal level; Petrilli (2014) puts the most stress on iconicity, which she sees as the main fuel for any translational process between interpretants

and interpreted signs. In light of translation as a highly creative process that occurs in dialecticality and alterity, Petrilli (2014, p.193) believes that iconicity – which is “[...] neither conventional, nor necessary and contiguous, but rather hypothetical” – is the main determinant in how a translation process develops (p.193). Translation is a process undergirded by “hypothetical similarity” (p.193), an inferential process of abduction (Peirce’s firstness) rather than induction (Peirce’s secondness) or deduction (Peirce’s thirdness), the latter of which is favored by what Petrilli calls the “short-sighted and mystifying nature of glottocentrism” (p.vi).

4.2 TRANSLATION BEYOND HUMANS: TRANSLATION AS A POSTHUMAN REALITY?

Translation as a universal operation as proposed in semiotics lends itself to aiding biological studies, thereby also reinforcing the post-linguistic truth of translation as well as extending translation to the post-human realm:

In order to study meaning in living organisms, biologists had to borrow from semiotics. One of the concepts borrowed is ‘translation’. Biosemiotics thus uses the term ‘translation’ to refer to the process of semiotic exchange taking place in and between all organisms, even at the cellular level. Furthermore, its use is much wider than the use in translation studies in that it does not only consider translation between linguistic systems but translation between many kinds of sign systems in and between organisms. In this sense, its use is derived from semiotics (or intersemiotic translation theory) rather than from translation studies. (MARAIS; KULL, 2016, p.172)

Biosemiotics encourages a shift of focus from linguistic phenomena – which Marais (2019) sees as a fundamentally human condition – to the total set of semiotic and semiotic phenomena, spanning processes that all living organisms (or even parts of organisms) engage in. This entails that a theory of translation (a semiotic process) has to also acknowledge this posthuman shift. Marais deems it crucial that “[...] a theory of translation is able to explain, not only human semiosis, but also non-human semiosis” (2019, p.49). He also asserts that “translation studies could become part of the response against anthropocentric ideas and practices, by taking a broader, biosemiotic approach” (MARAIS, 2019, p.54). Accordingly, a theory of translation has to answer for “the whole of the biological world” (MARAIS, 2019, p.115).

Biosemiotic translation, or biotranslation, opens up the remit of translation to by far the broadest extent: Typical examples of biosemiotic translations (or biotranslations) are proved by semioticians like Barbieri (2007), Hoffmeyer (2008) and Markoš *et al.* (2007) to exist even between DNA, RNA, cells and viruses. These assertions presuppose the existence of different non-linguistic codes with which different species, or molecular or cellular groups of an organism, operate. For instance, in the interactions between DNA and cells within an organism, the information stored in DNA – which is digitally coded – needs to be translated into the information used by the metabolism of the cell – which is coded in an analogue form instead of digital. This therefore suggests that the processes of non-linguistic decoding and recoding constitute translation (MARAIS, 2019, p.117). Research such as this shows that translation exists not on a human-to-human level but on a cellular or even a molecular level, reinforcing translation as a posthuman universal.

4.3 THE INTEGRATIONAL SIGN VS THE SEMIOTIC SIGN

The integrationist repudiates the semiotic attempt at expanding translation, and this is attributable to the fundamental differences between the integrational sign and the semiotic sign. One of such aspects is the semiotic conception of a linguistic sign. As said, the semiotic demurrer of the language bias in translation is formulated as a complaint against the prioritization of intra- and interlingual over intersemiotic translation in precedent translation theories. This implies a segregation between the linguistic and the non-linguistic: Seen as a symbolic sign (sign of thirdness), the linguistic sign is automatically associated with conventionality i.e. construed as a member belonging to an autonomous linguistic system. This is confirmed by the Peircean attribution of creativeness and abductivity to icons and situatedness to indices, both of which are technically non-linguistic signs, leaving the linguistic sign (symbol) on a higher level of generalization, abstraction and organization. The linguistic sign, unlike an index, has an unactualized existence and does not have to be material and immediate to a particular context; also, unlike an icon, a linguistic sign is a collective concept rather than an individual one. The integrationist contends that categorical separation between linguistic and non-linguistic signs does not account for the complexity of the integrational activities and abilities involved in daily

communicational tasks (translation included) wherein it becomes “[...] problematic to identify or single out what exactly is ‘linguistic’ in it” (HARRIS, 1998, p.3). A presumption that a sign basically (however roughly) falls under either an icon (non-linguistic), an index (non-linguistic) or a symbol (linguistic) foists unwarranted (and at times unsuitable) confines upon how an individual perceives a sign. Ripostes along the lines of a more flexible view on the interconnectedness between three sign categories (e.g., that some iconicity is inherent in a majority of symbols, that indexicality underlies both iconic and symbolic signs) all stop short of actually questioning the establishment of predetermined distinctions between sign types in the first place. All in all, this semiotic sign typology gives rise to some undesirable, interrelated ramifications – all of which justify the integrationist rejection of the semiotic sign: First is the semiotician’s cursory dismissal of language as explained above. By drawing a preemptive distinction between language and non-language, semioticians have not paid due attention to human language or been mindful enough of their own linguistic suppositions, casting aside something which plays a significant role in human communication and *ipso facto* in their personal experience; second is the fact that such a prescriptive divide between the linguistic and non-linguistic and the essentialization of the non-linguistic (as a posthuman reality) actually necessitate a demonstrably clear understanding of what language is – which the semiotician cannot provide; third is that by denying any central role to language and to humans, the (bio)semioticians have dug a hole for themselves. Hence when it comes to the explanation of non-human translation (see section 4.2), the semiotician gets caught up in a dilemma where the only way s/he can account for non-human translation (which should not operate on the basis of language) is to assign human linguistic labels to their observation – thereby gainsaying their initial pursuit of a concept of ‘translationality’ which covers both human and non-human *umwelten* and is thus not premised on language.

Another discrepancy between the integrational and the semiotic sign is that the former is a contextualized, personal sign grounded semiologically whereas the latter is an autonomous sign whose inherent translationality does not rely on a specific individual’s interpretation of the sign. As Harris proclaims, integrationism is a semiology (HARRIS, 1996, p.12). Following from this, the integrationist theorizes the human sign and opts out of going beyond the human ambit to investigate the non-human sign or even the transcendental sign which unites both realms. This human sign is not some universal sign shared by every human individual but only ever exists in relation to a particular individual who contextualizes this sign i.e. endows it with an integrational function for oneself in a certain situation. On this basis, integrational semiology shuns the semiotic sign and fights shy of theorizing signs as “[...] tripartite (sign-object-interpreter), as the sign only exists to fulfill an integrational function for someone in the here-and-now” (PABLÉ, 2020, p.134). Withstanding the biosemiotic contention, the integrationist does not accept the decontextualization and hence depersonalization of the sign “for the sake of disciplinary demands, such as extending the study of signs to all living organisms” (p.138). In opposition to the posthuman disposition of biosemiotics, Harris declares integrationism as an anthropocentric enterprise, a humanism in a Sartrean manner i.e. in the sense that human individuals are free to make their own signs, for which they are fully responsible (HARRIS, 2013, p.56). All in all, the semiological, human, contextualized and personal nature of an integrational sign forestalls integrationists from providing an all-purpose concept of the sign that fits “[...] all intellectual enterprises”, be they enterprises aiming at explaining the signing behavior of the totality of humankind or of all living beings (HARRIS, 2009b, p.61). This separates integrationists from biosemioticians, for the former admit to and are perfectly comfortable with the unavoidability of anthropomorphic conceptualizations in the study of animal communication (including ‘animal translation’) (see HARRIS, 1990 [1984]; HUTTON, 2019; KWOK, 2020 for more). Underlying the superficial convergence between the integrational and semiotic arguments that a sign is not limited to a linguistic sign (and that a sign is more suited as the comprehensive, base unit of a translation theory – more to be discussed in section 5) is, in fact, an irreconcilable gap between two different theorizations of the sign. As opposed to a semiotic attempt at translation, integrationist’s stress on the radically indeterminate, contextualized, lay experience of translation does not admit of nor necessitate a positivist or a metaphysical attempt to define what language/non-language/sign/translation is and delineate its scope. There is no need to render a theoretical explanation of language (the same goes for sign) as if without it the lay person/translator would be clueless as to what s/he is constantly doing: “The embarrassment arises from having to explain to one’s readers something with which they are already perfectly familiar, and have to be in order to understand the explanation” (HARRIS, 2014, p.67).

5 CONCLUSION: SO WHAT IS TRANSLATION? AN INTEGRATIONAL REFLECTION

To recapitulate the main thesis of this paper, the integrationist dissents from both the so-called orthodox view of translation as well as all the expansionist attempts to redefine translation discussed thus far, for they either still embody the language myth/translation myth or present a conceptually vacuous, remote, decontextualized and depersonalized view of translation. This distorted presentation of translation is ascribed to the misassumption born by most translation scholars that a *lexical definition* of translation i.e. the verbally constructed definition of translation, while being conceptually separable from a *real definition* of translation i.e. the essence of translation unsponsored by any linguistic construction (HARRIS, 2005), should eventually point toward the real definition. This constitutes what Harris refers to as reocentric surrogationalism, a thesis which holds that “[...] verbal discourse is essentially a convenient substitute for laborious and complicated physical action” (HARRIS, 1996, p.127), and that the verbal is distinguishable from the reality while bearing a referential relationship with the latter. On top of the reocentric misassumption, most translation scholars mentioned in this paper surmise that the urgent problem that they feel responsible for tackling is the apparent divergence between the lexical and the real definition. This is manifested by, most conspicuously, semioticians who aspire to a transspecies definition of translation corroborated by the reality of translationality instead of one restricted or misled by the limits of human verbal descriptors (how this is achievable is another question). Other ‘expansionists’ demonstrate a similar attitude – they proceed from the belief that the term ‘translation proper’ and its verbal definition can easily be reduced to a hollow, verbal construct that does not accurately or comprehensively reflect the reality of translation (which, according to them, should encompass the natural, everyday practices of translation, more forms of translation which take place in different modes, etc.), resulting in a word-reality mismatch which they have to rectify. An ostensibly enlightening alternative to this reocentric thinking is offered by the hermeneutic approach, which turns the tide by revealing how the real definition obtains within the lexical definition, for language and reality do not form a referential relationship between each other but instead make up a raveled whole – our language is the reality. Yet the integrationist cannot commend either of these options. To explain this, one may start from the integrationist “principle of cotemporality” which proposes that “[...] what is said is immediately applicable to the current situation, unless there is reason to suppose otherwise” (HARRIS, 1998, p.81-82). In other words, this principle stresses the ineluctably simultaneous integration between linguistic and non-linguistic activities in a person’s perspective which is what actually provides an awareness of the activities themselves and their linguistic/non-linguistic ‘nature’, which are otherwise absent (because unintegrated) in that person’s point of view. An entailment from this is that there cannot be a neat divide between a lexical definition and a real definition. The sign ‘translation’ does not form any reocentric relationship with a definite referent in reality, but serves to integrate a series of activities at the moment and in the situation it is created. A lexical definition of translation is not any less real for the definer than a ‘real definition’ – a definition is always prompted by some real happenings and interests involved in the happenings, and is always something afforded by human language. This, however, does not drive the integrationist to the hermeneutical side, for the principle of cotemporality between linguistic and non-linguistic cannot be reduced to a principle of pure ‘linguisticity’ which eventually renders every activity integrated with a verbal activity linguistic (see section 2.3). Neither does a detached, absolute division between the linguistic and non-linguistic, an incontestable referential relation between a linguistic label and an object/event in reality, nor a consciousness of everything in the world being linguistic (and translative) in nature, squares well with personal experience. Getting rid of the reocentric undertones of the expansionist claims to remedy translation, an integrationist approach suggests that one starts from contemplating the person involved in the act of translating and defining translating, instead of zooming in on the very sign (‘translation’) created by the person and filtering out everything surrounding it. This calls for a view of translation as a personal perspective.

What does this personal view entail? At the very least (which is most likely the extent to which an integrationist can make positive claims about the personal view without unnecessary decontextualization), translation has to be something more than simply the integration of activities via sign creation in a contextualized/situated, personal perspective (consisting of a time, a place, a situation which the integrating person finds her/himself in). This is because, according to our personal experience, we do – perhaps very often – communicate without translating. Without developing a full-fledged integrationist thesis on translation here, it is proposed in this paper that translation must at the bare minimum involve some level of consciousness or reflexivity on the integration between two or more activities which form a chronological sequence and are distinguished by the integrating person in terms of some contextualized set of similarities as well as differences (the latter of which at least include a temporal difference). Hence when discussing a scenario in a wedding ceremony, where the couple is exchanging vows while holding each other’s hands,

Harris (1996, P.85) maintains that there is no translation involved in the integration between ‘what is said’ in the vows and the act of joining hands – for the two activities are simultaneously linked and integrated as a whole, without a particular awareness of how one can be ‘processed’ into another i.e. without any specific effort on the part of the integrating person in delineating two or more chronologically successive activities and in reflecting on their similarities and differences. But as long as an integrating person is aware of her/his own act of integration and of a successive chain of activities connecting with as well as disconnecting from each other in certain ways, the possibility of translation arises.

Integrationism as a personal attempt at explaining translation proceeds with a non-essentialist account of translation: Reflecting on one’s personal experience with translating (and not translating), there is just no fixed set of activities or integrational procedures which always unfolds in translation. Every time we translate we translate anew, meaning that we integrate a different set of activities in a whole new way each time, via a newly created sign ‘translation’ (or ‘translate’, ‘translating’, etc.) endowed with a provisional integrational function which will be gone the next moment when we stop contemplating or engaging in this translational process. This, however, does not align an integrationist position with the following statement of Reynolds (2016, p.15): “Because the activities we can call ‘translation’ are so varied, the word ‘translation’ keeps having to stretch or shrink to fit them. It keeps on being ‘translated’ [...]”.

The difference lies in the lack of such a word ‘translation’ in the integrationist’s book, a word whose form remains constant (‘it is the same word spelt *t-r-a-n-s-l-a-t-i-o-n* and pronounced as /transˈleɪʃ(ə)n/ which we have been dealing with all along, across different paradigms of translation theories, extending over centuries of translation practices’) and whose meaning constantly changes, as suggested by Reynolds. The “radical indeterminacy” of the integrational sign goes further than “applicational indeterminacy” i.e. the lack of consistency in sign behavior between different communities (translation scholars, practitioners, lay translators) and “intrinsic indeterminacy” i.e. the fuzziness over the inherent properties of translation itself (HARRIS, 2009b, p.81) – for the latter two both rely on formal determinacy (that it is the same orthographic form of the word ‘translation’ which is being applied differently by different communities or having its content determined by specialists), while the former does not. This is to say that the integrational sign is radically indeterminate in both form and meaning, and that there is not a lingering word/sign ‘translation’ which keeps being redefined/recontextualized over and over. Every act of redefinition (as discussed in this paper) brings in new signs. One has thus to be careful not to be misled by such remarks as “[e]ven if ‘translation’ is not the most exciting or fitting term to some, it actually seems to work quite well. People largely know what it means, and perceptions are similar enough for the term to serve its purpose” (DAM *et al.*, 2019a, p.10), to conceive of a term ‘translation’ with a stable form shared by different researchers and translators. Hence the integrationist does not sympathize with Dam *et al.* when they see the continuity of the term ‘translation’ in translation studies as “[...] quite a feat considering that we do not even have a generally accepted definition of translation” (p.11) – putting it integrationally, this could only be a feat if such a formally determinate term ‘translation’ did exist, and if settling on the meaning of this term were a prerequisite for any translational process or discussion on such a process, which would necessitate a general definition for the term. However, to acknowledge the radical indeterminacy of a sign is to realize that an illusory word or term ‘translation’ with an allegedly fixed form which calls for a definition to finalize its meaning also arises in the decontextualization of an infinite number of instances of translating, each of which involves vastly different signs with vastly different (and incomparable) integrational functions. In fact, the integrationist argues that much of the debate over what translation is (or should be) presupposes formal determinacy of an abstract sign ‘translation’, a sign which ultimately should acquire a stable, validated meaning. This misbelief is what fuels certain translation scholars’ aversion to the proliferation of replacements for the term ‘translation’ (see SCHÄFFNER, 2012, p.880-881 for instance), which may in turn undermine the stability and authority supplied by an illusory term, whose imaginary, formal determinacy serves as the motivation for reaching an agreement on the meaning of such a term.

A final question to address is this: How then, does an integrational i.e. personal and non-essentialist view of translation, which neither conforms to the popularized, simplified notion of translation attributed to the lay individuals and the translation practitioners, nor to the multitudes of academic attempts to open up translation, shed light on the dynamics and tensions between academia and the public on the topic of translation? By embracing a personal view of translation, does one automatically sign up to solipsism and withdraw from mediating the conflicts between academia and the ‘collective outside world of actual, everyday translations’ – on the basis that one can never have full access to others’ personal definitions of translation? The integrationist does

not accept this as a coda to this paper. Indeed, adopting a personal view means not only seeing oneself as a communicating and translating person but also seeing others as persons. And every person, with her/his own personal communicational history, can offer as well as renew a definition of translation via countless times of contextualized integration. While Dam and Zethsen (2019, p.215) assert that “[...] there are probably as many conceptualisations of the translation field as there are scholars. But then this may also be true of practitioners”, the integrationist would add that the number of conceptualizations correspond to the number of attempts at (re)contextualizing translational activities that have ever taken place. The integrationist also admits that interactions and reconciliations are bound to happen between different persons – with translation firmly established as an institution, as a business, the decision-making on whether something suffices as translation (or as quality translation) cannot be a one-person game. A person often has to integrate others’ activities with one’s own in constructing a workable definition of translation for different purposes at hand – “[i]t is the participants’ interaction in that situation which makes what the interpreter said a translation” (HARRIS, 1981, p.149). It, however, does not follow that different individuals’ views of translation get completely blended into one single shared view of translation everyone consents to. Yet more often than not, the integration of others’ activities with one’s own is what largely shapes an individual’s view on translation. It is thus crucial to acknowledge that discrepancies between different communities (lay, non-lay) – or more precisely, between different persons – do exist and constitute a force which propels constant acts of redefining and renewing translation.

Adopting an integrational view on translation is not so much taking an absolute, uncompromising stance on the definitional debate between academics and practitioners as providing a simple yet illuminating explanation for the debate. While Koskinen (2010) calls for a dialogue between academia and industry on the definition of translation, and Dam *et al.* (2019b, p.231) affirm that translation “[...] will continue to be part of human life regardless of the existence or not of a scholarly field”, the integrationist also does not wish to downplay the importance of lay translation experience (which is not confined to the stale concept of translation reinforced by many translation scholars discussed here) – for it would be paradoxical to downplay the only *terra firma* on which everyone (including the self-proclaimed professionals who are lay translators themselves) understands and engages in translation, the only point of departure from which one starts to explore translation – it is in this sense that integrationism is lay-oriented (PABLÉ; HUTTON, 2015). The integrationist does not side with whatever is considered to be the lay conception of translation – it is no folk linguistics, or a folk translation theory. Yet to be lay-oriented is to propose that any specialized study on translation has to start from lay translating experience, which is why the integrationist does not shun the abstract conception of translation as interlingual meaning transfer often ascribed to the lay public; neither does integrationism call it a narrow-sighted observation or even a circular argument as Hill-Madsen (2019, p.555) would claim (in making that claim he is referring to how the recognition of interlingual translation as the prototype of translation is backed up by the claim that interlingual translation has to take place between two lexicogrammatical systems, which constitutes circularity according to him). The conception of translation as an interlingual transfer can be a sufficient one apposite to the communication situation. To think of interlingual translation as the yardstick, in a certain here and now, does not require one to provide a non-circular justification for it – the relevance to the communicational happenings already provides the ‘justification’. Instead of feeling a need to rectify the generalized notion of translation, the integrationist concedes that the activities integrated in a layman’s translational practices (or reflections on translation) are vastly different from the activities integrated in an academic’s theorization of translation, and it is from these differences between integrational patterns that the definitional debate (as well as any subsequent need to take a side in the debate) emerges. The dynamics of different activities integrated by the translating persons is what keep and will continue to invigorate the debate as well as the translation discipline, institution, business and everyday lay practices.

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TRANSLANGUAGING SPACE: PROLEGOMENA TO AN INTEGRATIONAL CRITIQUE

ESPAÇO DE TRANSLINGUAGEM: PROLEGÔMENOS PARA UMA CRÍTICA INTEGRACIONISTA

EL ESPACIO DEL TRANSLINGUAJE: PROLEGOMENA A UNA CRÍTICA INTEGRACIONISTA

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ABSTRACT: In an article entitled *Moment Analysis and Translanguaging Space: Discursive Construction of Identities by Multilingual Chinese Youth in Britain*, Li Wei (2011) unfolds his primary account of translanguaging. Providing a set of influential theoretical explanations, the piece enjoys a fundamental status in translanguaging theorisation. However, this theoretical effort is not unproblematic. This article contends that the notion of translanguaging space and its alleged functions/values cannot be taken for granted. Taking issue with the notion of translanguaging space, the present work will outline an introductory critique from an integrational perspective (see HARRIS, 1996), to delineate the integrationist position. The critique also aims to contest the validity of the purported functions of translanguaging space and promised values of the translanguaging perspective. The work will shed light on preliminary questions about the notion of translanguaging space, which will hopefully invoke further discussion. In terms of significance, this article will highlight the limitations of translanguaging theory and contribute to an integrational critique on a hybrid linguistic theory, that is, translanguaging.

KEYWORDS: Translanguaging space. Translanguaging. Integrational linguistics.

RESUMO: Em um artigo intitulado *Moment Analysis and Translanguaging Space: Discursive Construction of Identities by Multilingual Chinese Youth in Britain*, Li Wei (2011) expõe sua concepção de translanguagem. Fornecendo um conjunto de definições muito citadas e mantras teóricos influentes, o texto goza de um status fundamental na teorização da translanguagem. No entanto, esse esforço teórico primário e influente não é isento de problemas. Este artigo defende que a noção de espaço de translanguagem (*translanguaging space*) e suas alegadas funções/valores não podem ser tomados como garantidos. Discordando da noção de espaço de translanguagem, o presente trabalho delineará uma crítica introdutória a partir de uma perspectiva integracionista. A crítica também visa contestar a validade das funções supostamente do espaço translanguagem e dos valores

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prometidos da perspectiva da translanguagem. O trabalho lançará luz sobre questões preliminares sobre a noção de espaço de translanguagem. Este artigo irá destacar as deficiências da teoria da translanguagem e contribuir para uma crítica integracionista sobre a teoria linguística híbrida, ou seja, a translanguagem.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Espaço translanguagem. Translanguagem. Linguística integracional.

RESUMEN: En un artículo titulado *Moment Analysis and Translanguaging Space: Discursive Construction of Identities by Multilingual Chinese Youth in Britain*, Li Wei (2011) desarrolla su explicación principal del translenguaje. Proporcionando un conjunto de definiciones muy citadas y mantras teóricos influyentes, la pieza disfruta de un estatus fundamental en la teorización del translenguaje. Sin embargo, este esfuerzo teórico primario e influyente no está exento de problemas. Este artículo sostiene que la noción de espacio translenguaje (*translanguaging space*) y sus supuestas funciones / valores no pueden darse por sentados. En desacuerdo con la noción de espacio translenguaje, el presente trabajo esbozará una crítica introductoria desde una perspectiva integracionista. La crítica también apunta a cuestionar la validez de las supuestas funciones del espacio translenguaje y los valores prometidos de la perspectiva translenguaje. El trabajo arrojará luz sobre cuestiones preliminares sobre la noción de espacio translenguaje. Este artículo destacará las deficiencias de la teoría del translenguaje y contribuirá a una crítica integracionista de la teoría lingüística híbrida, es decir, el translenguaje.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Espacio translenguaje. Translenguaje, Lingüística integradora.

1 TRANSLANGUAGING AND PREVIOUS CRITIQUES

Translanguaging, put simply, refers to an intellectual appeal in linguistics to think between and beyond language boundaries (GARCÍA; LI, 2014; LI, 2011). Within the discipline of linguistics, a simple sketch of its emergence and development can be offered as follows: The term translanguaging has its origin, as specialists claim, in Cen Williams' works in 1994 and 1996, in which translanguaging is primarily known as a descriptor for the pedagogy of using two languages in class (GARCÍA; LI, 2014; LI, 2011). By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the term had been extended to different definitions in a series of scholarly works (e.g., BLACKLEDGE; CREESE, 2010; CANAGARAJAH, 2013; GARCÍA, 2009; LI, 2011). Based on these previous efforts, the past ten years has witnessed a significant increase in research output on translanguaging. Enjoying high prestige in this network, Li Wei is recognised as one of the founders of the trans-framework in linguistics. The works of Li and his co-authors are prized, circulated, much-cited, influential and highly acclaimed (e.g., GARCÍA; LI, 2014; LI, 2011).

However, what follows the increasing popularity of translanguaging in recent years is a growing critical awareness regarding its theoretical value. As a theoretical framework, translanguaging is held to offer a new understanding of language and communication (GARCÍA; LI, 2014). Yet, critics have pointed out that translanguaging as well as other related terminologies are “new lingualisms” but “old codes” (ORMAN, 2013; ORMAN; PABLÉ, 2015). These critiques have exposed that the emerging terminological innovations fail to completely depart from traditional code-based views of language and communication, casting scepticism on the theoretical coherence of translanguaging constructs. Whilst the critiques suggest that translanguaging shares a kinship with previous linguistic theories, translanguaging scholars eagerly defend the status of translanguaging as a valuable theory of language and communication which offers new insights (e.g., LI, 2018a). Yet what is new and innovative in the theorisation and how to justify it? The continuous debate over the validity of translanguaging theory implies that the question of its value has not been solved yet. Thus, this paper is to take the discussion of translanguaging theory further, with a particular focus on the notion of translanguaging space (the reasons for this focus will be discussed in the following parts).

Despite a nascent corpus of critical responses, there remains a gulf in output between translanguaging advocates and its critics. Furthermore, compounding this purely numerical imbalance, the critiquing efforts related to translanguaging are mostly visible within a constellation of other recent constructs with prefixes such as super-, poly-, etc. (e.g., JASPERS; MADSEN, 2016; ORMAN,

2012, 2013; ORMAN; PABLÉ, 2015; PAVLENKO, 2018). This means that there are few critiques that directly take issue with translanguaging or specific trans- constructs (For the specific critiques, see Jaspers, 2018; Kramersch, 2018). Additionally, one major group of critics do find their analysis of translanguaging (or other constructs alike) within a broader discussion of academic trends, such as the influence of the digital era on academic discourses (KRAMSCH, 2018), the tendency of academic sloganisation (PAVLENKO, 2018), or the influence of critical pedagogy and an ideological dilemma in theory making (JASPERS, 2018). This group therefore critiques translanguaging within the context of broader discussions surrounding intellectual theorisation. Whilst this positioning helps inform the problems faced by translanguaging, it is important to put more emphasis on that translanguaging is primarily a theory of language and communication, and therefore, a deep reflection on the nature of language and communication is required for a more comprehensive analysis. This is where an integrationist perspective is useful, with its focus on understanding the nature of communicational experience and the fundamental difficulties in studying language and communication (see HARRIS, 1996).

Against this background, the present article aims to carry on exposing the problems of translanguaging research. This study will be conducted in an integrationist lens, starting with an assessment of the notion of translanguaging space, introduced by Li Wei in his 2011 study entitled *Moment Analysis and Translanguaging Space: Discursive Construction of Identities by Multilingual Chinese Youth in Britain* (from this point, *Translanguaging Space*).

2 INTEGRATIONISM AND SEGREGATIONISM

Integration is believed to be the foundation of communication, on which integrationism has developed as a theoretical stance since the 1980s (see e.g., HARRIS, 1981). In this theoretical vein, the communication process is recognised as a complicated integration of different forms of human activities and abilities, which is structured by time, contextualised in specific situations, and experienced by the situated individual (HARRIS, 1996). Moreover, this complex integration has effect on the study of language. In *Signs, Language and Communication*, Harris (1996) proposes that the study of language should start with an understanding of the fundamental difficulty in the study of communication. This difficulty resides in the complexity of communicative experience, which results from its integrational character. For Harris, this integrational character is so fundamental that the failure to acknowledge it will lead to misrepresentation of language and communication. The theoretical consequence means there is a divide between segregational and integrational approaches to ideas about language and communication.

Segregationism is regarded as a representative position held by mainstream modern linguists. Segregational beliefs underlie the postulations that lead to the segregation between linguistic and non-linguistic domains of inquiry, which ignores the fact that linguistic and extra-linguistic knowledge are integrated into daily communication (HARRIS, 1998). According to Harris (1998), there are specific segregational assumptions: (1) Languages as systems; (2) Communication as a consequence of the use of language; (3) Languages as user-independent systems. The integrational counterpropositions include: (1) Language is not a knowing in advance system; (2) Language is the product of communication and should be studied within communicational situations; (3) Communication always involves specific individuals (HARRIS, 1998).

However, the opposition between these two approaches is not always taken seriously. There is thus a hybrid form of theorisation, which compromises the two approaches. As Harris observed (1998, p.13) “[...] one common reaction to the segregational/integrational opposition [...] is to seek some compromise between the two approaches”. Yet, as the two approaches give “ontological priority to a quite different order of ‘facts’” (HARRIS, 1998, p.14), a compromising stance not only leads to a paradoxical theoretical account, but also finally entails settling on either a refined segregationism, or a disoriented integrationism. As Harris (1998, p.14) states, “the beginning of wisdom in linguistics is to recognise the fundamental dichotomy”. Because the

discourse about communication is already problem-fraught, more confusion would not help the situation but leave us with a theoretical mess (HARRIS, 1996). This is why a hybrid theorisation is of critical interest to an integrationist and why a hybrid theory should be subject to critical scrutiny.

Thus, the underlying assumption of this paper is that an indecisive and compromising attitude on the dichotomy would have consequences on theoretical claims and their further application. This paper thus takes an integrationist perspective to examine the hybrid theorisation of translanguaging and to clarify the dichotomy. The reasons for this paper's focus on the translanguaging scholarship and particularly the study *Translanguaging Space* are as follows: (1) Li and his co-authors advocating a translanguaging perspective are apparently aware of integrationism and they consciously align with Harris' integrational approach (see e.g., LI; HO, 2018, p.36); (2) in *Translanguaging Space*, the attention to the role of time and the personal perspective in communication touches on some integrational ideas, although superficially; (3) the 2011 study provides a primary account of influential definitions and widely accepted premises in the translanguaging discourse. Therefore, *Translanguaging Space* provides an important text with which an integrational critique can illuminate the hybrid nature of translanguaging theorisation and respond to the superficial alignment with an integrational approach.

As for a road map, firstly, this article will provide some background knowledge of translanguaging space. This part will highlight the interrelationship between the notion of translanguaging space and the definition of translanguaging, to show the status of translanguaging space in the theoretical discourse. Then, focusing on the study *Translanguaging Space*, the article will proceed to outline the ambiguities in its explanation and reveal the hybridity inherent in the translanguaging approach, from an integrationist viewpoint. Finally, to further an integrational critique, a set of preliminary questions is offered for consideration.

3 AN ENCOUNTER WITH TRANSLANGUAGING SPACE

In 2011, Li published the study *Translanguaging Space*. The article, in Li's (2011) words, retells a story of three Chinese-British students, showing a selected corpus of their language use and their discourse about culture or identity, combined with the analyst's interpretations.

Via this case study, Li developed the notion of translanguaging space. What is translanguaging space? At first glance, the metaphor of space is scattered in the analysis. Translanguaging space may refer to a physical place such as the University in the UK that the three informants attend. Used interchangeably with multilingual space, it implies a safe space (or comfort zone) for using different languages. It also refers to a social space and serves as a metaphor for social networking. For a clearer view, the notion of translanguaging space can be explained in two aspects. Firstly, it refers to the phenomenon under investigation, i.e. "[...] a space for the act of translanguaging as well as a space created through translanguaging" (LI, 2011, p.1222). Secondly, translanguaging space is an analytical notion, informed by various scholarly works related to Space and Spatiality (LI, 2011). Particularly, as an analytical perspective on multilingualism, it is put forward to capture (1) a sense of connectedness created via multilingual practices, which is held to consequently influence the identity positioning of the three young people, and (2) the creative and critical language use of multilinguals (LI, 2011). This primary effort in theorising the notion of translanguaging space provides a foundation for subsequent studies by translanguaging proponents.

Li's study in 2011 is his first theoretical attempt to explain translanguaging space as well as translanguaging. The explanation in this study provides a collection of definitions that is cited in the consecutive works by Li and other translanguaging advocates (e.g., GARCÍA; LI, 2014; LI, 2016, 2018A, 2018B; LI; ZHU, 2019; ZHU; LI; LYONS, 2017). Given the status of *Translanguaging Space*, it is interesting to see how the ideas of translanguaging and translanguaging space interact with one another. As Li (2011, p. 1222) claims, translanguaging is "[...] both going between different linguistic structures and systems and going beyond them". This

beyond-ness can be connected to the rhetoric of transcendence:

It includes the full range of linguistic performances of multilingual language users for purposes that transcend [emphasis added] the combination of structures, the alternation between systems, the transmission of information and the representation of values, identities and relationships. The act of translanguaging then is *transformative* [emphasis added] in nature; it creates a social space for the multilingual language user by bringing together different dimensions of their personal history, experience and environment, their attitude, belief and ideology, their cognitive and physical capacity into one coordinated and meaningful performance, and making it into a lived experience. (LI, 2011, p. 1223)

I would like to draw attention to the idea of transformation and transcendence. If one could temporarily suppress the scepticism about how the analyst penetrates the minds of language users and find out their purposes, s/he would soon find another difficulty in comprehending the proposal of transcendence. While alternation between the aforementioned aspects is relatively easy to imagine, the proposal of a *transformative* and thus *transcendent* point, which implies something new, emerging, and unknown, is rather abstract to grasp. What on earth is the transformed that goes beyond the combination or alternation? It is from here a tangible form of transformation is required for explanation: Arguably, Li (2011) thus visualises/conceptualises the transformation by introducing the notion of *translanguaging space*. In other words, the translanguaging space resembles a chemistry bottle where personal, historical, environmental resources come together and react with each other. Then, observing and analysing this translanguaging space can thus provide evidence for transcendent/transformed “things” in communication and therefore certify that the translanguaging act is transformative. In this way, the study of translanguaging space(s) can be regarded as a pivotal link to the essential value of translanguaging, i.e. being transformative as well as offering a sense of “beyondness” as an “innovative” theoretical construct.

Apart from this transformative character of the translanguaging space and translanguaging, there are other claims that Li seeks to establish, which are of interest to an integrationist. To offer a preview, of particular relevance are:

- (1) Translanguaging invites us to see the momentariness and the fleeting aspect of human activities, including communication;
- (2) Translanguaging values the individual’s perspective in the communication process.
- (3) A translanguaging space and translanguaging (act) are *in nature* transformative.

However, as the following discussion will disclose, it is contentious whether Li (2011) successfully supports and coherently upholds these claims. While the extent to which *Translanguaging space* achieved to defend these claims is under investigation, it is debatable whether the subsequent adoption of these values/functions of the translanguaging approach or the translanguaging space extracted from this piece is reliable. Also, it is argued in this paper that, regarding the understanding of ephemeral and personalised communication experiences, the translanguaging approach is rather different from an integrational approach.

4 AN INTEGRATIONAL CRITIQUE

Previous integrational critiques have indicated the possible flaws of the translanguaging theory, for example, the reliance on notions of codes and systems despite a superficial rejection of the segregational assumptions (see more from MAKONI, 2012; ORMAN, 2012, 2013). For an integrationist, additional ambiguities, potential paradoxes and points of contention in translanguaging theory are as follows.

4.1 THE ROLE OF TIME

Moment analysis is proposed as a methodology “to investigate translanguaging space empirically” (LI, 2011, p.1224), with an emphasis on the role of time in communication. Li (2011, p.1224) attaches significance to the “[...] spontaneous, impromptu, and momentary actions and performances of individual”. Later, he highlights the fleeting, spur-of-the-moment feature of everyday activities that “all of us take in context” (LI, 2018b, p.26). In a recent presentation by Li (2020), he explains that the suffix of translanguaging, -ing, brings to the fore the “momentariness, instantaneity and the transient nature of human communication”. One may notice the string of words that describes the subtly different duration of time and ask for further clarification. However, the point here is to see that the theorist realises the importance of time which continually shapes and reshapes communicational experience. More importantly, my intention here is to highlight that the definition of translanguaging, or more precisely, its value connects to the understanding of time, thus to moment analysis: the momentariness of communicative activities is seen as the essential quality of translanguaging. As such, if moment analysis fails to coherently explain the momentariness of communicational events, Li’s conception of translanguaging and the translanguaging perspective would fall short of its proposed values.

Indeed, moment analysis acknowledges the temporal dimension of communication while fails to uphold the idea of temporality as a fundamental principle for the communicational experience. As Li (2011) claims, his study is conducted through a collection of creative and critical moments. Moments, in this fashion, presumably refer to the data for the empirical study of the translanguaging space. To be specific, the paradoxical explanation of the momentariness is demonstrated when Li (2011, p.1224) defines a moment as follows:

A moment can be a point in or a period of time which has outstanding significance. It is characterised by its distinctiveness and impact on subsequent events or developments. People present at such moments would recognise their importance and may adjust their behaviour according to their interpretation of them. Once it has occurred, a moment becomes a reference point or a frame; patterns can be detected by comparing the frequency and regularity of such moments. [...] Moment Analysis focuses on the spur-of-the-moment actions, what prompted such actions and the consequences of such moments including the reactions by other people.

It seems Li exploits the notion of moment with two layers of meaning: (1) a moment as a point or a period of time, referring to the temporal aspect of communicative events, (2) a moment as a communicative event/act. The role of time begins to be puzzling when Li defines these moments as linguistic acts that show patterns to an observer via frequency and regularities. Since, to identify the frequency and regularity of a moment (a linguistic act), the presupposition is that the moment (the linguistic act) remains the same to the analyst-observer. In other words, the linguistic act is held to be invariant for the *post hoc* detection for the convenience of data collection on the part of the analyst i.e. to remain unchanged over time.

To an integrationist, what is odd lies in the idea of wedding the notion of momentariness with data collection. From an integrational perspective, firstly, if it is true that communication is time-bound, “[...] every linguistic act is integrated into the individual’s experience as a unique event, which has never before occurred and will never recur” (HARRIS, 1990, p. 48). Therefore, data collection based on the analyst’s identification of the same linguistic acts strikes an integrationist as paradoxical to the ephemeral aspect of communicating experience. In addition, one of the reasons for the uniqueness of every moment lies in the complex integration between “linguistic” and “non-linguistic” events in daily experience, which renders the situation non-repeatable. What are repeatable, i.e. recorded and analysed, are often linguistic events that are segregated from the concurring situation i.e. non-linguistic events. Thus, this integrationist insistence on *cotemporality* is to reject the segregational view that there is a distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic domains (HARRIS, 1998). On the contrary, in Li’s collection of “creative moments”, it is exclusively the linguistic corpus that is collected and segregated from the contextualised non-linguistic events – a linguistic corpus of puns, nicknames, translations, etc. The momentary acts are derived from specific situations. Finally, what

underlies the moment analysis is still the segregational assumption i.e. linguistic events can be studied independently of non-linguistic factors. In the similar vein, other moments represented in the study *Translanguaging Space* are also problematic in terms of the loss of uniqueness and situatedness due to the change of time. In this sense, an integrationist comment would be that *each* of the moments extracted as data are not the original episodes that are instantly integrated with a personal history and contextualised with non-linguistic factors, which can only be known to the situated individual *him/herself*. To be more explicit, Li's (2011) idea of moments may be more about a supplementary tacit for a micro-level of the study of interaction than an attempt to defend the ephemeral and transient nature of communication: As he later suggests, the traditional approach revealing "general patterns or trends" is a product of the era of big data while moment analysis is proposed to reorient the analytic attention towards small moments and small stories (LI, 2018B, p.25-26). The role of time in the translanguaging theory is ambivalent and the implied assumptions about communication are thus incoherent. Also, this proposal of moment analysis within an empirical framework is incompatible with the integrationist principle of cotemporality.

4.2 THE ROLE OF THE FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE

Another difficulty in the study *Translanguaging Space*, from an integrational viewpoint, is visible in dealing with the respective prioritisation of an analyst's perspective and an individual participant's perspective.

At first sight, moment analysis is held to have "a clear focus on the individual" (LI, 2011, p.1224). The significance of moments derives from "actors and their subsequent actions" (LI, 2011, p.1222). As for the alleged rationale, Li (2011) explains that the proposition of moment analysis is out of his dissatisfaction with the traditional paradigm which is characterised as "frequency and regularity oriented, pattern-seeking approaches" (p.1224), a paradigm which ignores the original acts of individuals and specifics of individuals' experiences. In terms of the interview, the analyst also explains to the informants in advance that he "[...] wanted to know if there were any particular moments in their lives that they felt had a significant impact on the way they saw the world, the way they behaved and the decisions they made for themselves" (LI, 2011, p.1225). Li later emphasises the importance of the individual's perspective, saying that the momentary actions are particularly meaningful to "the participants themselves" (LI, 2018B, p.26). At this point, attention is drawn to the priority assigned to the individual's specifics and perspective. Thus, according to these explanations, it seems that personal experiences and personal perspectives are important to the study *Translanguaging Space*. This focus on the individual, as Li alleges, is so "radical" that he worries it "may appear to be ahistorical and asocial" but he insists that the focus is "a corrective and balancing act" (LI, 2011, p.1224).

Although Li (2011) shows his attention to personal communicative biographies, this acknowledgement does not accordingly follow a methodological priority of the unique perspective of individual participants. In Li's previous account, communication seems to be understood in terms of its unique aspect by particular individuals. Yet soon he opens Pandora's box by reclaiming the role of the analyst. Li (2011, p.1224) believes that after collecting the metalanguaging data, it is the analyst's job to "[...] detect any changes in the course of their presentation, themes and links that emerge from the narratives". Besides, it is worth noting that the study never provides any direct claim by the youth of their recognition of the particular significant moments i.e. the moments that are important to their subsequent activities, as previously emphasised by the analyst. It is a legitimate question here to ask whose recognition of these moments it is and whose interpretation of the meanings of these moments it is. Readers are also told, then, it is the linguist's responsibility to reveal the meaning of the translanguaging space, which manifests in these "moments" (LI, 2011). Therefore, the comments from the linguists are not particularly avoided to reduce the representative distortion from a third-person perspective, by which the authorial voice of the analyst is maintained.

It seems that, although Li emphasises the significance of a personal and individual perspective on one's own linguistic experience, the priority has never been genuinely given to the first-person perspective. Instead, the analyst's detection/grouping subtly replaces the reflective relevance that should have been provided by the individuals themselves. More curiously, the observer's

monologue reads “this paper retells the story of three Chinese youths in Britain” (LI, 2011, p.1222), “I thought of these interviews as open discussions and I believe they felt the same” (p.1225), and more demonstratively “the discussion is intermingled with my own interpretation and comments on what I observed and heard” (LI, 2011, p.1225). On the one hand, an integrationist would appreciate these honest claims about the interpretative role of the analyst in understanding others’ communicational experiences. For it shows awareness of the fact that linguistic analysis is ultimately a creative interpretation that subjects to the analyst’s viewpoint. On the other hand, an integrationist will point out that these claims do not follow a method avoiding the analyst’s distortion: the analyst’s narrative still monologises the different individuals’ reflexive accounts by maintaining a monological authority who selects metalinguistic materials on behalf of the individuals and summarises one common theme of their communication experiences – to establish translanguaging spaces. It seems that the analyst has admitted the unique first-person perspective of each communicating individual but returned to the comfort zone – a third-person perspective of the linguist.

From an integrational viewpoint, what is problematic here is that the linguist-analyst is assumed to have access to the language user’s perspective and be able to give a factual report of their linguistic experience. Although Li (2011) has indeed collected a set of metalinguistic commentaries, what the study shows is a process of recontextualisation and reinterpretation of these commentaries. It is still the linguist who is authorised to map out the relations among the metalanguage commentaries, previous language uses and the “inherent” thematic meanings, which together constitute the translanguaging space i.e. the spatialisation and visualisation of a group of linguistic and social “facts” organised from the analyst’s perspective. The personal experiences are intermingled with the analyst’s viewpoints and grouped according to the analyst’s thematisation (LI, 2011, p.1226-1233). This move rules out the interference of the linguist in the communication process, i.e. when he interprets and groups these comments. To what extent a linguist can accomplish this is contentious. What the relevant contextual factors are and how they are captured by the linguist are also open to debate. What is certain for now is that the prioritisation of the linguist’s perspective in linguistic analyses constitutes a segregational move which overlooks communication as a radically personal process.

How the prioritisation of a third-person perspective could render a factual report of first-person experience is at least debatable. For an integrational approach, it is impossible to access the first-person perspective as each individual has unique communicational experiences. Although Li (2011) claims that his work settles the problem of the gap between the individual and the societal in his interpretation of communicational experiences, how the analyst achieves the understanding of personalised experiences remains to be further discussed and cannot be accepted blindly.

4.3 THE UNDERSTANDING OF MEANING

In the study *Translanguaging Space*, the notion of meaning is blurry and marginal, as if how meaning comes into being in the communication process is assumed as a given. But is it an unproblematic given?

One direct reference to meaning is found in the remarks that “it is part of the individual’s cognitive capacity to [...] give meaning to the choice and alternation between languages” (LI, 2011, p.1225) and “indexical meanings” (LI, 2011, p.1224) in the translanguaging space. Where does this understanding come from? As Li (2011) suggests, he based the study *Translanguaging Space* on his previous works on language choice and code-switching, in which one key argument is that language choice is a deliberate act and thus meaningful in communication (see e.g., LI, 1994). This understanding of meaning is taken for granted, based on the idea that language choice (i.e. code-switching, language mixing, or translanguaging) has its own symbolic meaning (see also LI; WU, 2008). Thus, it is firstly worth noting that this notion of meaning is an ideological artefact i.e. meaning is what an analyst is primarily interested in and aims at revealing. Secondly, it is hardly an adequate account of meaning in terms of daily communication experiences. Since, to the participants, even they are observed using or choosing between different “languages” in speech, what is meaningful does not have to be (exclusively) the intended choices they made. It also involves a question concerning the perspective from which the utterance is meaningful.

One may find that the analysis also suggests an account of meaning produced in interactions. For example, a episode captured by Li offers a conversation among the three students:

Chris: 以后工作就当“白领狗”，给人公司打工！

(*In the future (I will) work as a “white-collar dog”, working for someone’s company.*)

Lawson and Roland both laugh.

Roland: you are already a bilingual.

Lawson: Good one.

Chris: That’s what I mean. (LI, 2011, p.1226)

The transcript, as Li (2011, p.1126) interprets, shows the making of a pun, which “Chris evidently intended and which is understood by the other two to good effect”. In Li’s (2011) explanation, the pun works as follows: the Chinese phrase “白领狗” (pronounced as bai ling gou) sounds similar to the English word “bilingual”; when Chris uttered the Chinese phrase “白领狗”, he was assumed to intend its relation to the English word “bilingual”. The linguist believes that the other two students decoded this relation. How does the analyst know that this intention is detected by Lawson and Roland? The analyst later provides the following reasoning: The recognition of the implication of “白领狗” as “bilingual” is indicated in Lawson and Roland’s laugh (LI; ZHU, 2013, p.523). Also, it seems to be suggested that Roland’s reply of “you are already a bilingual” also confirms his successful decoding of the pun. Similarly, Lawson’s “good one” also confirms his decoding of Chris’ intended pun-making. In other words, the intended meaning of “白领狗” is held to be “bilingual” from the start of this episode and it is believed that the episode captures the meaning/intention-transference from Chris to the other two students.

However, a no less sound interpretation of this transcript can be offered as an alternative, which hopefully would help reveal the problem underlying. The alternative is discussed as follows. One alternative point to start with is that the first utterance by Chris invokes laughter because “白领狗” is a sarcastic phrase, in which the Chinese word “狗”(dog) could suggest a low living standard, i.e. living like a dog. The second alternative point is that, if there is an association between “白领狗” and “bilingual”, it more likely starts from Roland’s speech, who relates the Chinese phrase to the English word “bilingual” in this episode. As Li himself mentioned, he is uncertain about whether Lawson understood immediately about Chris’ intention or after Roland’s “prompt” (LI, 2018B, p.26). The questions are: What if Roland’s speech is not a “prompt” but the creation of the pun? How could the analyst rule out this possibility? The study does not provide answers. Thus, it is uncertain whether Chris intended “白领狗” (bai ling gou) as a pun on the pronunciation of “bilingual” (unless Li confirmed afterwards with Chris, which is at least not presented as the case). As for reasons for the alternative interpretation of this episode, Chris’ reply, “that’s what I mean”, is not necessarily a robust verification of the “fact” that the pun is intended by himself (e.g., imagine the tonal difference between an emphasis on “I” and no emphasis at all, which is not provided by the linguistic transcript). In this transcript, Chris’ last utterance could have been a reply to Roland’s mention of “bilingual”. In other words, Chris could have not intended to link the Chinese phrase to the English word. In his last utterance, he simply agreed on Roland’s association between Chinese and English (here, the utterance of “that’s what I mean” could be an alternative of “I agree” or could imply that the association drawn “works for me”). In a similar vein, Lawson’s reply “good one” could be a response to Roland’s utterance.

The point of this alternative interpretation is not to argue for a “true” report of this episode but to unveil the assumed theory of meaning lurking behind the analysis in the 2011 study. This alternative reading suggests that the comments “good one”, “that’s what I mean”, and the behaviour of laughing do not point towards the one “true” meaning of this episode as interpreted by the linguist, unless it is presumed that the meaning is determinate and is shared by each of the participants, including the analyst. Again, the analyst fails to offer a genuine first-person perspective but assumes a third-person perspective instead, from which the recognition of the so-called linguistic or social facts is contentious.

From an integrational viewpoint, what is overlooked in Li's analysis is that the meaning could be different to different participants. The meaning must be determinate, as Li's analysis assumes. In his analysis, the meaning is held to be intended in the beginning and the communication process is regarded as the circulation of the intention. This consequently shows a lack of theoretical effort in explaining communication as well, which remains entrenched in segregational assumptions. The integrationist will point out this mode of thinking is *intentionalist* (HARRIS, 1996). The intentionalist understanding of meaning assumes that the question of how A communicates with B is about how one's feeling and experience (intention) can get through to others (HARRIS, 1996). This model of communication then reveals the translanguaging analysis to be based on a segregational assumption that communication is user-independent in the sense that there are no individual differences in the meaning-making process. As there is no accounting for the individual differences in communication, this mode of thinking in *Translanguaging Space* also thwarts the previous promise to highlight individual specifics in the analysis of the meaning-making process.

5 TRANSLANGUAGING SPACE AS A SUPER SPACE

As the discussion shows above, the study *Translanguaging Space* keeps falling back on old segregational assumptions and thus fails to coherently support the "new insights" into ephemeral and personalised experiences. *Translanguaging Space* gives priority to the construction of a data-based space over time, priority to a third-person perspective over a first-person perspective.

Moreover, is there such an object as a translanguaging space that can be empirically investigated? Or is it primarily an abstraction? The amalgamation between an analytical notion and the phenomenon under investigation has hinted at the answer. As an analytical abstraction, the notion of translanguaging space created by the linguist is not impartial. The rather heavy-loaded intellectual investment in the notion of space, inevitably implies the presumed interests of the analyst-observer. Besides, the correspondence between the analytical abstraction of a translanguaging space and the phenomenon investigated as a translanguaging space cannot be taken for granted as a "fact" simply waiting for the analyst's detection. The questions that one should bear in mind are (1) whether what the linguist observes as a "fact" is the same for the informant(s) and (2) whether the essential function proclaimed by the linguist is sensible and desirable for every individual at any point in their lives, given the fact that translanguaging values are generalised in the consecutive works of translanguaging scholars. If there is a hesitation before the utterance of an answer, then the generalised values, benefits, and functions of the translanguaging space are open to debate.

The translanguaging space can be seen as a super space because it is made to operate on the supra-level above specific individuals and situations, especially when it is theorised as a self-evolving space. As Li repeats in his work, it is the translanguaging act in this space that "enables *criticality* and *creativity* in the language user" (LI, 2016, p.8). Later, Li explicitly claims that "[...] Translanguaging Space has its own transformative power because it is forever evolving and combines and generates new identities, values and practices" (LI, 2018a, p.23). In this account, one could notice Li's personification of the translanguaging space. It is clothed with the capability to transform the sign, subjectivities, individuals, languages, cultures, and societies; it is even self-evolving and productive (see GARCÍA; LI, 2014; LI, 2016, 2018a). While this account is reinforced through consecutive publications, it is not clear that why the translanguaging act is inherently transformative and encourages creativity and criticality. Although the analyst assumes the translanguaging space to be an analytical tool *to focus* on a creative and critical act in the 2011 study, it does not follow that translanguaging act itself is in nature creative, critical, and even transformative. Overall, a very subtle manoeuvre is that the creative and critical capability of meaning-makers, sign-makers, or language makers is transplanted onto an abstraction i.e. the translanguaging space.

From an integrationist point of view, the translanguaging space as an abstraction ignores the fact that a translanguaging space (if there is one experienced/ "seen" by the participants) as a phenomenon is primarily a product of communication. Outside the specific communicational continuum, there is no transformative power essentially attached to this space. It is thus misleading to

say that the translanguaging space (or translanguaging) itself is capable of the changes in meanings, the signs, the lives of individuals, and even in society, etc. Although attaching this abstract power to the translanguaging space can be beneficial in that it promotes the benefits of communication in "different languages", it does so by employing a distorted view of communication as the leverage of a translanguaging strategy. For an integrationist, there are no abstract skills or strategies of communication that could survive without the consideration of the ever-changing circumstances. This is where an integrational perspective departs fundamentally from the translanguaging perspective.

After all, communicating and reflecting on communication are constant and endless processes, in the way that we do not only develop the necessary skills of sign-making, but more importantly "[...] acquire the sole, the permanent, the ineluctable responsibility for making these processes work" (HARRIS, 1996, p. 264). If translanguaging pedagogy is devoted to applying one strategy to all possible communicational situations, it is problematic. This is because the implications are (1) following from this super space, what is needed is to provide as many translanguaging spaces as possible; (2) The individual's responsibilities to learn from the specific situation in which they find themselves and to develop suitable skills accordingly are assumed to be replaced by the power of the translanguaging space.

6 FURTHERING AN INTEGRATIONAL CRITIQUE

There is certainly more to do, after the integrationist critique laid out in this paper. The overarching question that follows is: in the end, if there is no coherent understanding of language and communication, what is left for translanguaging as a theory of language and communication? It is one thing to propose an appeal with good intentions but quite a whole other thing to provide theoretical support to the appeal.

Although the present critique has been carried out from an integrational perspective, this work does not propose an integrational monologue but intends to initiate a dialogue with translanguaging scholars. Via the preliminary comparison between the two frameworks, the difference between an integrational approach and a translanguaging approach has been laid out: An ambiguous and indecisive attitude between integrational and segregational assumptions about communication experience is not acceptable for an integrationist. However, for discussion, an integrationist would suggest several questions for translanguaging scholars: (1) what is the translanguaging theory of communication and meaning? (2) what is the semiological basis for the understanding of language in a translanguaging approach? (3) what are the theoretical status of the ephemeral aspect of communication and personalised perspective, respectively? Again, these questions suggest the criteria for being an integrational approach is a matter of explicit choice but not of extent. They require clear answers before translanguaging scholars claim an integrational approach.

To take on contemporary and recent constructs such as the translanguaging theory, a more nuanced, detailed integrational critique is required to offer up-to-date and specific analyses on the particular theorisation trajectories. Firstly, for example, in terms of translanguaging, an integrationist critique needs to develop an insight with regard to its pragmatic orientations and sociopolitical commitments, which is helpful in debunking the rationales of the theoretical moves made by translanguaging scholars. Besides, an integrational response can be addressed to the claim of the interpretative approach in translanguaging discourse. It has been observed that one of the key features in the tradition of modern linguistics is the pursuit of scientific objectivity, in the account of the defenders of linguistics as science (see more discussion about objectivity, DUNCKER, 2019). Yet, different from the previous segregational forerunners, translanguaging scholars explicitly dismiss the need for an accurate explanation of linguistic phenomena and opt for an interpretative approach to linguistic phenomenon (see e.g., LI, 2018a). Then, there is a divergence, or at least a sense of complexity, in the motivations behind the theoretical twists and turns: for translanguaging scholars, it is no longer the rationale at work to simply preserve inner conceptual coherence or correspond to an independent reality which is perceived as an ideal object in the sense of natural sciences. Instead, driven by the desire or anxiety to bring about a change in society via a

political campaign in linguistics and/or language education, the validity of translanguaging theory inclines towards sociopolitical implications and thus an anticipated, futuristic “reality” (see LI, 2018b; LEE, 2018). Then, the question is what translanguaging scholars are seeking, if not (wholly) scientific objectivity.

One possible answer is suggested here: the translanguaging discourse explores *artistic objectivity* in representing the communication experiences of individuals. Instead of objectivity in the sense of natural sciences, i.e. with a presumably perspective-neutral and thus ideally independent object for observation and measurement, I suggest translanguaging research could be looking for a different understanding of the object of study, i.e. in an artistic sense. In this sense, the object is acknowledged as represented and interpreted, not independent from the interpreter’s viewpoint. Then, the represented reality in translanguaging research may imply the idea of finding the value of truth and thus validity in (the process of realizing) the translanguaging belief. For example, Li (2018a) conveys the idea of verifying the value of the translanguaging perspective in the application of translanguaging theory. Besides, in terms of *Translanguaging space*, the analytic writing that is presented as re-telling of a story to some degree resembles a literary narrative. Also, the tendency to create more opportunities for the researched to speak on behalf of themselves via metalanguage data reminds one of the literary form of “polyphonic novels”, which is believed to offer freedom to different individuals’ “ideological voices” (BAKHTIN, 1984 [1929]). This parallel between artistic (literary) creation and the analytic representation may explain what translanguaging scholars are exploring, if not scientific objectivity in analysis. However, then the questions for translanguaging scholars include (1) whether linguistic research would allow an artistic structure of representation and avoid authorial conclusions and (2) whether translanguaging advocates would wholly abandon the quest for scientific objectivity. If the answer to the second question is no, would this quest be compatible with artistic objectivity?

Overall, within the scope of this paper, an integrational critique reveals the theoretical weakness/difficulty of the translanguaging construct in offering a new theory of communication that is decisively different from a segregational one. It is worth repeating that the integrationist does not deny the usefulness of the notions in the translanguaging theory in certain circumstances. Here, the main points of contention are (1) whether the theorisation provides a valid basis for the bright promises offered by the translanguaging perspective, and (2) what is at the expense for the theoretical strategies, which provide translanguaging scholars with an escape from a coherent explanation of language and communication. Beyond the discussion of this paper, the questions offered above expect answers from translanguaging scholars.

7 A CONCLUDING REMARK

Space is a dangerous metaphor. For space constitutes the desires of the observer – what the observer sees in a space are the questions and answers he/she desires (CALVINO, 1997). In the discipline of linguistics, “spaces” occur in the form of theories, created by linguists with their questions and anticipated answers, including the notion of the translanguaging space.

To conclude, the notion of the translanguaging space is worthy of an integrational critique and further interrogation. The study *Translanguaging Space* acknowledges the importance of momentary and personalised aspects of communicational experience. Yet, the study does not accordingly support these claims with a decisive departure from segregational assumptions about communication and meaning-making process; the analysis also fails to understand communication as radically contextualised according to temporal and personal differences. These are all fundamentally different from Harris’ integrational approach. Moreover, the translanguaging perspective and its relevant functions in reorienting the analysis towards the transient and personalised communication experiences, derived from the notion of the translanguaging space, could be problematic or at least ambiguous. The status of the translanguaging space as a transformative site for the theory of language and communication, individuals and society is also contentious.

An integrational critique here firstly clarifies the integrationist position towards the purported/potential similarity of the translanguaging approach and secondly sharpens awareness of the possible directions and limitations of the translanguaging theory in linguistics. Additionally, in *Translanguaging Space*, the tension between the realisation of some integrational principles of communication and the failure to defend them suggests more to discuss between the two frameworks: the study of translanguaging space epitomises the difficulty in dealing with the integrational principles of communication and thus provides an example with which an integrationist can offer further inquiries for both sides to ponder on.

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TEXT-IMMANENT MEANING: INTEGRATIONIST AND TERMINOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE INDETERMINACY OF THE SIGN

**SIGNIFICADO TEXTO-IMANENTE: ABORDAGENS INTEGRACIONISTAS E
TERMINOLÓGICAS PARA A INDETERMINAÇÃO DO SIGNO**

**SIGNIFICADO TEXTO-INMANENTE: ENFOQUES INTEGRACIONISTAS Y TERMINOLÓGICOS
A LA INDETERMINACIÓN DEL SIGNO**

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ABSTRACT: In this article, I put the fields of terminology and integrationism in conversation over the question of the indeterminacy of the sign. I employ the lenses offered by both paradigms to discuss data on the indeterminacy of terms in a text on legislative procedure. I argue that the data appear to confirm several related integrationist notions, including meaning-making as idiosyncratic contextualization and the reflexivity principle, thus making it apparent how the field of terminology can leverage on the integrationist philosophy of language to enhance its explanatory power. However, I also argue that theoretical insights from text-based terminology can serve as a corrective to perceptions of radical indeterminacy of the sign in integrationism.

KEY WORDS: Terminology. Integrationism. Indeterminacy.

RESUMO: Neste artigo, coloco os campos da terminologia e do integracionismo em discussão sobre a questão da indeterminação do signo. Emprego as lentes oferecidas por ambos os paradigmas para discutir dados sobre a indeterminação dos termos em um texto sobre processo legislativo. Eu defendo que os dados parecem confirmar várias noções integracionistas interrelacionadas, incluindo a construção do significado como contextualização idiossincrática e o princípio da reflexividade. Isso evidencia como o campo da terminologia pode alavancar a filosofia integracionista da linguagem para potencializar seu poder explicativo. No

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entanto, também argumento que os insights teóricos da terminologia baseada em texto podem servir como um corretivo para as percepções de indeterminação radical do signo no integracionismo.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Terminologia. Integracionismo. Indeterminação.

RESUMEN: En este artículo pongo en conversación los campos de la terminología y el integracionismo sobre la cuestión de la indeterminación del signo. Utilizo las lentes que ofrecen ambos paradigmas para discutir datos sobre la indeterminación de términos en un texto sobre procedimiento legislativo. Sostengo que los datos parecen confirmar varias nociones integracionistas relacionadas, incluida la creación de significado como contextualización idiosincrásica y el principio de reflexividad, lo que hace evidente cómo el campo de la terminología puede aprovechar la filosofía integracionista del lenguaje para mejorar su poder explicativo. Sin embargo, también sostengo que las percepciones teóricas de la terminología basada en texto pueden servir como correctivo a las percepciones de indeterminación radical del signo en el integracionismo.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Terminología. Integracionismo. Indeterminación.

1 INTRODUCTION

In language and communication, the notion of indeterminacy jolts us out from an uncritical mentalism about, for instance, word meanings. It does so by problematizing the knowability of what meaning attaches or will attach to the use of a word in advance of such use, and without some further observational cues (QUINE, 1960). Quine argues that the fact of language being a social art, on the one hand, compels its users “to depend entirely on intersubjectively available cues as to what to say and when” (or what to mean) and, on the other, removes any “justification for collating linguistic meanings, unless in terms of [users’] dispositions to respond overtly to socially observable stimulations” (QUINE, 1960, p. ix). Rejecting this behavioralism, an even more radical approach to meaning problematizes the very idea of the pre-existence of meaning understood as “[...] a conceptual content to be identified – correctly or incorrectly – in verbal communication” (HARRIS, 1996, p. 233).

It is this same question of the indeterminacy of context-independent reference, and of the conditions under which some determinacy is achieved, that underlies Wittgenstein’s philosophical reflections on language-games (WITTGENSTEIN, 1953). For language philosophers Quine and Wittgenstein, then, whether it is a linguist trying to make sense of *gavagai* uttered (in a language of interest) by a local on spotting a rabbit, or of *water* that is uttered among interlocutors who share a common language, momentary determinacy is purchased ultimately through observational behaviour. These are not simply pastimes of buffs of philosophy. These questions involve discussions of meaning-making, and have practical import for text readers, students, translators, lexicographers, among others.

The above tradition of reflecting on the in/determinacy of the sign is one that has been continued, sometimes in fundamentally different ways, in two relatively less well-known bodies of linguistics scholarship, namely, integrationism (HARRIS, 1996; 2015; DUNKER, 2019; BADE; PABLÉ, 2012) and terminology (SAGER, 1990; WRIGHT; BUDIN, 1997; CABRÉ, 1999; PICHT; DRASKAU, 1986; ANTIA, 2000; 2007). Regrettably, both bodies of scholarship have had precious little contact with each other, with the consequence that they have not been able to leverage on their respective insights for a number of purposes, e.g., to enhance their explanatory power, gain traction beyond a narrow circle of buffs, and perhaps self-correct. Thus, in its engagements with indeterminacy, terminology has not been able to draw on integrationism’s demythification of language and the associated metadiscursive regime. On the other hand, the view that integrationism has traditionally had a relatively thin database (MAKONI, 2014) means that this approach could well do with subjecting its tenets to wider scrutiny in more naturally occurring contexts.

In this article, I put the fields of terminology and integrationism in conversation with each other over the question of the indeterminacy of the sign. I employ the lenses offered by both paradigms to discuss data on the indeterminacy of terms in a text on legislative procedure. I argue that the data appear to confirm several related integrationist notions, including meaning-making as idiosyncratic contextualization and the reflexivity principle, thus making it apparent how the field of terminology can leverage on the integrationist philosophy of language to enhance its explanatory power.

However, I also argue that theoretical insights from text-based terminology can serve as a corrective to perceptions of radical indeterminacy of the sign in integrationism. Specifically, I suggest that some models of the term/sign in text-based terminology allow for a version of indeterminacy of the sign that is quite compatible with some notion of the sign being established by practices in a community; in other words, the sign's culturally underpinned or macrosocial stability. This conclusion is shown to be supported by the scholarship on complex systems.

There is an important caveat. In pursuing the above ends, this article is no doubt one of an increasing number of contributions by individuals who have had different career trajectories and interests dialoguing with integrationism. Ordinarily, this is an enterprise that is fraught with a range of conceivable risks; thankfully, however, integrationists are by the very precepts of their scholarship committed to the idea that sense-making (including of the integrationist paradigm) occurs within the context of variant experiences. This openness is exemplified by integrationist scholar, Peter Jones, with whom I have had discussions and for whose generosity I am grateful. Indeed, this is what makes dialoguing with integrationism less foreboding. Thus, in a recent volume (MAKONI; VERITY; KAIPER-MARQUEZ, 2021), non-integrationists are able to dialogue with integrationism from the standpoints of, for instance, rhetoric (CHIRINDO, 2021), multisemioticity (ANTIA; MAFOFO, 2021) and a theory of languaging without language (SABINO, 2021). They point out unique insights which integrationism is seen to offer the research areas from which they write (and at the moment of writing); but in integrating integrationism into concerns in these research areas, they also point out its weaknesses.

2 INTEGRATIONISM AND TEXT-BASED TERMINOLOGY

Integrationism lays bare a number of what are considered as myths and fallacies around Western European conceptions of language, in a bid to move away from an understanding of language as some specimen or extract that is placed in a cold and detached laboratory space for observation. Integrationism seeks to re-place language in the real world, and thus reclaim the lay-inflected experience of language as the basis of scholarship. It deprecates a code or pre-engineered view of language, seeing such a conceptualization as being at the heart of putative fallacies relating to the determinacy of the sign. One such fallacy is 'segregationism', the assumption that linguistic signs can have meaning independently of the real-world activities of sign-users/makers, and of other semiotic systems. Another involves 'telementation', a fallacy grounded in mechanized transmission that sees communication as transfer of pre-determinate signs in a pre-established code from one head to another. An important assumption of these fallacies is a putative myth of social convention underlying language use. Harris, pioneer and foremost theorist of integrationism, argues that to understand sign and signification, it is erroneous "[...] to start with the notion of a social convention already *in situ*. For our own experience tells us that we attribute significations to things and events, irrespective of whether there is any social convention about the matter or not. Signs do not necessarily have a social dimension at all" (HARRIS, 1996, p. 67-8).

Integrationism substitutes for these fallacies a number of ideas that both highlight the radical indeterminacy of signs and the conditions under which one can speak of (momentary) determinacies. It sees signs as the products, rather than requisites, of communication. The integrationist argument is that a sign is "[...] the product of creative and purposive activity [and it] does not preexist that activity as something one finds, takes and interprets" (BADE; PABLÉ 2012, p. 57). This echoes the view by Harris that what "[...] constitutes a sign is not given independently of the situation in which it occurs or of its material manifestation in that situation" (HARRIS, 1996, p. 154). Communication is seen as ineluctably unfolding in the context of episodes in the real lives of the individuals communicating. It is into these episodes (comprising, among others, biographical dimensions, spaces, activities, and temporalities) that signs are simultaneously integrated and from which they derive their idiosyncratic meanings. Beyond the particular instances or episodes, what are left of the used or constituted signs are traces, but these traces do not obviate the need for subsequent active processes of sign-making and sign interpreting. We may have memories (*sensu* traces) of particular kisses, smells or headaches, but these particular events are singular, as Duncker argues. In brief, the "[...] integrational sign is a unique event, and it has no mode of existence outside the communicational episode in which it happened" (DUNCKER, 2019, p. 121).

Just how, then, are humans able to communicate? The integrationist's communication infrastructure resides in "[...] what the human being is physiologically equipped to do, what the human being is collectively conditioned to do, and what the human being is individually aiming to do in given circumstances" (HARRIS, 1984, p. 280 *apud* DUNKER, 2019, p. 22). Respectively, biomechanical, macrosocial, and circumstantial factors constitute the pillars of the integrationist's sign-making or communicational proficiency. To cite Dunker (2019: 108), the "individual participant must be able to integrate, to "fit together" the exercise of various biomechanical capacities with acquaintance with "[...] culture-specific patterns of organisation within which the current communication situation occurs", in a way that makes sense to this person (HARRIS, 1993, p. 322)". The singularity of every sign derives from the unique factors or perspectives integrated by the sign maker to birth it. While the addressee is biochemically incapable of adopting the original sign maker's perspective in "any absolute sense", they are nonetheless able to imagine it (DUNKER, 2017, p. 149). For a sign that is by definition private to become public, a minimum requirement is that "[individual] A assign a semiological value to x, and [individual] B assign a semiological value to x, and that A and B both carry out mutually integrated programmes of activity on that basis" (HARRIS, 2000, p. 70 quoted by DUNKER, 2017, p. 116). The constant action required in sign-making, the idiosyncrasy in perpetuity, means that reflexivity is a feature of communication. This idiosyncrasy is also a statement to the effect that scholarly interest in language should proceed from, or at least privilege, the (first-person) perspective of the language/sign user.

Let us turn now to terminology, which is far from just being about dictionary-making. Scholarship in terminology focuses on "[...] specialised or specific subject areas within which it studies knowledge (units, structure, representation, evolution, acquisition, etc.) in its relation to expression (ANTIA, 2000, p. xv). Specialized knowledge contexts, unlike so-called general language use/texts, are contexts in which language has traditionally been used in a manner that is assumed to be more controlled on account of the specificities of the knowledge content, the participants in these discourses and the settings in which such discourses take place (CABRÉ, 1999). In studies of the behavior of terms in text (that is, text-based terminology), indeterminacy is widely considered as instability of the concept-term link which then raises different degrees of difficulty of correlation (GERZYMISCH-ARBOGAST, 1996; BOWKER, 1997; ROGERS, 2003; 2007; ANTIA, 2000; 2002; 2007; ANTIA; KAMAI, 2016). Consider the following sets, with the items in each set being used interchangeably for a common reference: *central nervous system* vs. *brain and spinal cord*; *azotobacter* vs. *nitrogen fixing bacteria*; *life boat* vs. *pneumatic boat*. If we assume experts of the respective subject areas may have no difficulty establishing equivalences of this kind, this is not a given for all text readers.

Analysis of terms in specialized text corpora (genetics, optical scanning technology, glaciology, muffling system in breathing aids, monetary economics, textbook biology, etc.) has led text-based terminology to rebut the claim that terms "bring their contexts with them" (NEWMARK, 1996, p. 194), or that terms are "precise and context-independent" (FLUCK, 1991, p. 47), or that terms need to be seen as determinate in contrast to ordinary words because of the contexts in which they occur. An example of this generic exceptionalism, disputed by text-based scholars of terminology, is seen in the following view by William Labov (1973, p.341):

Words have been called slippery customers, and many scholars have been distressed by their tendency to shift their meanings and slide out from under any simple definition. A goal of some clear thinkers has been to use words in more precise ways. But though this is an excellent and necessary step for technical jargon, it is a self-defeating program when applied to ordinary words.

Text-based terminology locates several of the processes that produce indeterminacy in a number of interrelated sources, including the following:

1. Ontological multidimensionality, perspectivization or the notion of ways of seeing (BOWKER, 1997; GERZYMISCH-ARBOGAST, 1996; ANTIA, 2000; ANTIA; KAMAI, 2016). On account of the possible multiplicity of its dimensions, constituents, functions, users, and so on (recall the anecdote of the different tactile impressions of the proverbial elephant), a piece of intersubjectively verifiable reality can be designated, classified, or defined differently within and across texts, depending on what perspective is activated: *color flatbed scanner* vs. *flatbed color scanner*. There is thus a sense in which the viewpoint creates the (disciplinary) object.

2. Textual considerations (HALLIDAY; MARTIN, 1993; LEMKE, 1990; ROGERS, 1999, ROGERS, 2007; 2008; CONDAMINES, 2010; PECMAN, 2014; ANTIA, 2002): On this view, explanations for variation in terms need to be sought in textual genre differences (including different text sections, e.g., title, introduction, body, etc.); in the constraints of thematic progression which may require nominalization and abridgement strategies, or contrarily, in the explication of previously densely encoded terms (e.g., *release of hydrothermal event plumes* --> *mega plumes*); in the constitution of the lexical chains through which text cohesion is achieved; in the deliberate action of the author to direct reader attention, or to sustain reader attention, curiosity and involvement; in the un/intended and co-text motivated shift in author focus, leading to what has been called author-specific contamination. See discussion below on Gerzymisch-Arbogast (1996).

3. Epistemological histories (AHMAD, 1996; CONDAMINES, 2010). On this view, explanations for variant terms and meanings may be obtained from a life-cycle perspective on concepts (form and meaning proliferate when concepts emerge, but are streamlined on consolidation); the nature of disciplines, especially the extent to which 'poetic license' in meaning-making is allowed; different schools of thought within disciplines or across disciplines in interdisciplinary areas (such as the 'environmental sciences')

To flesh out the point on ontological multidimensionality/perspectivization, which is somewhat relevant to the other dimensions listed above and is foundational for the ensuing analysis in this article, a brief overview of an aspect of Gerzymisch-Arbogast's (1996) term model is offered. The overview draws on the account in Antia & Kamai (2016). The model's structuralist 'feel' and its infelicitous choice of terms (e.g., contamination) easily belie the key message, and as such reader perseverance is required.

In her approach to indeterminacy, Gerzymisch-Arbogast is keen to describe how, in special purpose communication, system-level specifications or abstractions of meaning, such as may be contained in normative resources (dictionaries, key texts) and/or may shape our expectations, can in fact be different from parole-level instantiations. Figure 1 is an adapted and simplified form of Gerzymisch-Arbogast's original model.




Figure 1: Adaptation of Gerzymisch-Arbogast's 1996 system-text terminology model

Source: Antia and Kamai (2016)

Starting from the bottom right pane of Figure 1, which is an individual, non-system level: in the ontological space or furniture of the universe that is of interest to specialists (e.g., economists, power engineers, geologists), there is a set of individual material or immaterial objects I_1 – I_8 . Different specialists, in other words, different groups of individuals, may associate features or properties with each of the objects. Interestingly, being specialists within each of the disciplines only means that the concerned individuals

have overlapping rather than identical properties for each of the objects. Thus, from the range of possible properties $P_1 - P_{11}$ associated with material individual objects $Coal_1, Coal_2, Coal_3, \dots$ there will be within each discipline a core of indispensable features, but also a conceivable set of excluded features, that gives rise to that discipline's concept of coal - C_0, C_1, C_2 , etc. In other words, each discipline's viewpoint creates the (philosophical) formal object. Among the properties constituting the geologist's coal is the idea of a rock; the power engineer's coal would include source of electricity; the economist's coal might include a commodity caught up in price share movements; and so on (FELBER, 1994, p. 213; ANTIA, 2000, p. 90-92).¹

At the system level at the top right pane, then, the different disciplinary concepts of coal will be made up of three categories of characteristics corresponding to the previous properties. Each discipline's concept of coal will comprise compulsory, optional and excluded characteristics. Many definitions of concepts in the discipline will draw attention to the compulsory characteristics, sometimes optional conceptual characteristics, but seldom excluded characteristics for pragmatic reasons. In sum, concept C_0 has P_1 as compulsory characteristic; $P_3, P_4, P_5, P_9, P_{11}$ are specific to some instances of concept C_0 ; while P_2, P_6, P_7, P_8 , and P_{10} are excluded from all instances of Concept C_0 .

Terminology traditionally distinguishes between a concept and its designation. At the top left pane, which is still at the system level of dictionaries and other normative resources, designations are assigned these concepts in a relatively context-independent manner. At this citational level, C_0 is designated D_0 , C_1 designated D_1 , etc. In the bottom left pane, where a process of contextualization leads to text-level realizations, we find the rather infelicitous 'contamination' of system-level assignments of term and concept. While there will be situations where the normative relation of term to concept arguably obtains, there will be many other instances of system-text term variation that then give rise to several categories of what Gerzymisch-Arbogast regards as 'contamination'. From the perspective of the term, contamination can manifest when:

- a) a term other than the one specified at the system level is used interchangeably to represent the same exact concept. This is referred to as contamination of similarity, and is illustrated by example (A) in the lower left pane of Figure 1;
- b) a hyperonym (superordinate term) and a hyponym (subordinate term) are used interchangeably so as to represent the other concept. This is referred to as contamination of inclusion, and is illustrated by example (B) in the lower left pane of Figure 1;
- c) two terms are used interchangeably so as to represent concepts which intersect at the system level. This is referred to as contamination of intersection, and is depicted as example (C) in the lower left pane of Figure 1.
- e)

From the perspective of the concept, contamination, according to Gerzymisch-Arbogast (1996), may also manifest in several ways, including:

- f) the activation at text level of only a part of the system level concept. This is referred to as partial activation;
- g) the use of a term at text level in such a way that the concept which is activated differs from the concept at system level. This is referred to as author-specific usage.

Concept contamination d) and e) above is not shown in Figure 1.

While broadly speaking both integrationism and text-based terminology are keen to interrogate the determinacy of a pre-contextual sign (which in fact does not exist for integrationism), there are noticeable differences in approach. Integrationism probably rejects as weak segregationism those parts of the terminological account (e.g., accommodation of core features with optional and unforeseeable features that reflect the sign-maker's agency); it rejects any account of the sign that does not pivot on specific communication episodes and activities of the human sign-maker; it probably rejects some of the metalanguage (e.g.,

¹ While a conceivable integrationist reaction is to question when a meeting to agree on this convention was held' (a question to which in fact many disciplines may have an answer), Dunker (2019, p. 116), in a recent book clarifying and updating positions in integrationism, offers some validation for this account by referring to repetition. She writes that a "widespread way of reducing indeterminacy in the long run involves repetition directly in making private signs become public. All it takes, in principle, is that a participant identifies a linguistic event as a likely candidate for recontextualization and decides to turn it into a model for repeated self- or other-imitation, each time assigning the "same" semiological value to it, and that other participants treat the model in a similar way"

system vs. text, term vs. concept or signifier vs. signified and similar binaries like type-token to be seen below) and understands a term like contextualization as the birthing of the sign as a result of the integration of the biomechanical, the macrosocial and the circumstantial.

The terminologist may wonder about how or whether, in the integrationist imagination, language in society aligns to Rousseau's account of social formation, that is, of the relationship between individual rights and collective benefits that underpins the social contract. Stated differently, this is a question of whether integrationism's macrosocial parameter can be a communication correlate of the idea that individuals give up aspects of their individual sign-making rights to conform to a collective pattern, so that the sign-maker's interests are better advanced or protected by the might of the collective. Adopting integrationism-speak, terminology may argue that what it considers the system level are collectively shared and sedimented core traces of sign-making episodes, which do not however deprive humans and other parties in communication of their unique agency, their communication aims, and so on. Indeed, terminology may argue that it extends the integrationist's activities (to which humans integrate signs) into the area of assemblages in which signs appear to be agentive, dictating to humans how they integrate subsequent signs (see a discussion on LEMKE, 1999 below).

3 DECONSTRUCTING A TEXT

As a means of fostering dialogue between terminology and integrationism, I revisit and extend a previous analysis of a text on parliamentary procedure (ANTIA, 2002). The text is taken from Paul Silk's *How Parliament Works*, one of several books on the subject by the author. As the title suggests, the book explains parliamentary procedure to a wider public. The interest of the material selected is that it begins with several conceptual/terminological clarifications, which means that one is able to track how consistently these specifications are applied. The excerpts presented are contiguous, with the exception of a later passage containing statistics (and this is indicated below).

In the data sets that excerpts from the book are placed on the left, while to the right are comments I have made to guide reflection and analysis. I am aware that the very metalanguage employed probably skews the suggested analysis and that other analyses are possible. Excerpt 1 below sets the stage.

Excerpt 1	Analytical comments
<p>This chapter will look in some detail at these Acts of Parliament¹ – the basic foundation blocks of the law¹ – and explore the role which Parliament in practice plays in their making. It will describe the parliamentary procedures which govern delegated legislation, that is <i>legislation</i>¹ made directly by the government and other bodies who have been authorised by Acts of Parliament¹ to do so.</p>	<p>¹In the six instances of this superscript, we infer a sequential relationship between Act and Law/legislation (cf. the basic foundation blocks, have been authorized, and part of)</p>
<p>First a few basic definitions are needed. When a proposal for a law² is being considered by Parliament, it is known as a bill². When the parliamentary process is complete, if the bill has been agreed to, or '<i>passed</i>'³, the bill becomes an Act of Parliament^{1,2} and part of the statute law¹. It is always referred to by the year in which it was passed³. Bills are made up of 'clauses', but when they become Acts² the clauses become known as 'section'.</p>	<p>²In the four instances of this superscript, we see that a bill is not a law but a proposal for a law, and that it has a sequential relationship to Act (cf. become/s)</p>
	<p>³In the two instances of this superscript, '<i>passed</i>' appears to be introduced as a special collocate of bill (cf. quotation marks) that means agreement.</p>

As the analytical comments show, excerpt 1 sets the stage through a set of explicit and implicit conceptual/terminological clarifications. These clarifications are incidentally quite consistent with the following entries in P.H. Collins' *Dictionary of Law* (4th edition). London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004.

act *noun* a statute which has been approved by a law-making body (NOTE: Before an Act becomes law, it is presented to Parliament in the form of a Bill. See notes at **bill**.)

bill *noun* 5. a draft of a new law to be discussed by a legislature. *The house is discussing the Noise Prevention Bill. The Finance Bill had its second reading yesterday.*

pass *noun* 2. to vote to make a law. *Parliament passed the Bill which has now become law.*

Legislation *noun* the set of laws that have been agreed by Parliament and are implemented by the courts.

law *noun* 1. a written or unwritten rule by which a country is governed and the activities of people and organisations are controlled. A written law in the UK is an Act of Parliament which has received the Royal Assent [...].

I turn now to the analysis of a next set of excerpts, against the backdrop of the clarifications in excerpt 1. In considering excerpt 2 below, the suggested question is: what is the meaning of *legislation* in this excerpt?

Excerpt 2	Analytical comments
<p>Bills and Acts can be divided into two types – public and private. We will consider each separately, but by far the more important are public bills and Acts. These apply throughout the country (though some apply only to Scotland and or only to England and Wales etc.). Private bills and Acts have only a particular local application and are subject to different procedures. For example, a private Act would allow a particular local authority to close a particular cemetery or London Transport to construct a particular new railway line in London’s docklands. If new requirements were to be applied to all cemeteries throughout the country or to all new railway lines, these would be contained in public legislation.¹</p>	<p>¹Does legislation in (public) legislation mean: - a hypernym of both (public) bill and (public) Act? - (public) Act? - body of laws</p>

In excerpt 2, the focus is on *bills* and *Acts*, their types, and the scope/application of each type. On my reading, altogether, there are seven tokens of *bills* and *Acts*, out of which six appear in three iterations of the conjunctive pair *bills and Acts* – qualified either by *private* or by *public*. The one exception, *private Act*, is used to exemplify a previously defined scope of *private bills and Acts*. It is in the context of exemplifying the other, the *public* type, that *(public) legislation* is used, which then raises the question as to whether the meaning attaching to it is:

- that of the conjunctive pair of *(public) bill and Act*, or
- *(public) Act* alone, as in the preceding exemplification of *private Act*, or
- what a *(public) Act* that has been successfully processed ultimately becomes (that is, a *law*).

Correlating *legislation* with the conjunctive pair of *bill and Act* is inconsistent with the understanding of *legislation* in excerpt 1; correlating it with *Act* erases the sequential relationship in excerpt 1.

Consider excerpt 3:

Excerpt 3	Analytical comments
<p>¹Although public legislation applies generally throughout the country, some Acts of Parliament are of far greater importance than others. For example, the 1984–85 session saw proposals for public legislation which ranged from the Local Government Bill, ²with its wholesale reform of the metropolitan counties, and the Finance Bill, which implemented the budget proposals, to the Hill Farming Bill, the Race Relations (Welsh Language) Bill and the sale of Alcoholic Beverages from Garage Premises Bill (the last two of these did not become law).</p>	<p>¹In the first sentence, is <i>legislation in (public) legislation</i> synonymous to <i>Acts of Parliament</i>? ²Has the manner in which the goal of the two bills is stated caused the bills to be understood as <i>Acts/laws</i>?</p>

Excerpt 3 complicates matters even further. In what I see as the apparent synonymous use of *public legislation* and *Acts of Parliament*, there are several things taking place. Firstly, the sequential relationship highlighted in excerpt 1 is not upheld. Secondly, a more generic concept (*Acts of Parliament*), which is an earlier stage of a process, becomes equated with a later stage that is a more specific outcome (*public legislation*). Thirdly, *bill* appears to semantically morph into *Act*, again somewhat inconsistently with the specification in excerpt 1. Although the passage informs us that the *Local Government Bill* and the *Finance Bill* were two bills that eventually became law, the terminology used (i.e., *bill*) at the point in time it appears in text is inconsistent with the description. Compare the text's "with its wholesale reform of ..." with a possible alternative: "with its objective of a wholesale reform of...". Compare also the text's "which implemented the budget proposals" with what might have been an alternative consistent with excerpt 1: "which sought to implement the budget proposals". Is meaning sliding from under a definition in the course of text production?

Excerpt 4 is preceded by statistics (deleted) detailing the volume of work done by Parliament.

Excerpt 4	Analytical comments
<p>From this it will be obvious that statistics about the number of Acts of Parliament passed¹ every session are not particularly meaningful. More interesting might be figures for the number of pages of legislation passed¹ every year. Excluding Consolidation Acts (these are Acts which bring together old legislation in a more convenient way: they do not make new law), in 1980, 1965 pages of public Acts of Parliament were passed¹ – an average of more than ten pages for every day the commons sat. (Thirty years previously only 430 were passed,¹ a three day a page average.) A considerable amount of the time of Parliament is occupied in considering the bills which will ultimately become these Acts – in the 1983–86 session almost a third of the Commons' time went in debates on public bills (506 hours out of 1542), and 58 percent of the Lords' time was taken up in this way.</p>	<p>¹By virtue of being made to collocate with 'passed' (a special collocate of 'bill' specified in excerpt 1), should the following also be understood in terms of <i>bill</i>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [number of [Acts of Parliament]] - [number of pages of [legislation]] - [pages of [public Acts of Parliament]] - ten pages 0, 430 0, a page 0?

On my reading, excerpt 4 provides counterfactuals that invalidate the suggestion or inference in excerpt 1 on *pass/ed* being a technical verb associated with *bill*. The inference is not unreasonable considering that the parliamentary term with which *passed* collocates the most in general usage is *bill* (see Figure 3). So, *passed* can reasonably be said to prototypically collate with *bill*. If *passed* were correctly specified in extract 1, we would have to interpret all of its collocates in extract 4 as *bill*. Thus, *bill* would be the actual referent for: (*public*) *Acts of Parliament*, *legislation* and the meronymic *pages*.

4 A DIALOGUE OF TWO PARADIGMS OVER TEXT

The above text confirms that terms, not just general language words, can also be "slippery customers", shifting "their meanings and [sliding] out from under any simple definition" (LABOV, 1973, p. 341). The text as I have analyzed it above hopefully provides some evidence for sign indeterminacy. In the apparently shifting meanings of *passed*, *bill*, *Act* and *legislation*, the integrationist sees evidence for the view that "the sign does not 'have' its own meaning: it is 'made to mean' whatever the circumstances require" (HARRIS; HUTTON, 2007, p. 202).

The phrases "made to mean" and "whatever the circumstances require" highlight for me two points in a discussion of in/determinacies: the role of the sign-maker (their semasiological proficiency, goals, interests) and the agency of circumstances (influencing the sign-maker's signs, sometimes independently of the sign-maker or in a manner that was unplanned for, unforeseeable). The foregoing then makes constant monitoring or reflexivity a feature of communication.

Across excerpts 2 – 4 in relation to excerpt 1 and the dictionary entries, indeterminacies, however they are accounted for, pretty much rule, whether it is concern about:

- how I as a reader am made to grapple with possible understandings of *public legislation* – as a conjunctive pair of *public bill and Act*, or as *public Act* alone, or as what a *public Act* that has been successfully processed ultimately becomes;
- the inconsistency in the logical/sequential relations declared between *bill* and *Act*, *Act* and *law*; or what is happening when a more generic concept (*Acts of Parliament*), which is an earlier stage of a process, becomes equated with a later stage that is a more specific outcome (*public legislation*);
- how I am to decipher if every noun made to collocate with *pass/ed* is a bill.

Clearly, I am monitoring the signs placed on the page by author Paul Silk. Silk is making his signs and my reflexivity shows that I am not passively assimilating Silk's signs. I am using my creative interpretative faculties. In other words, telementation is not at work here, at least not for me as a trained text analyst. But how far should reflexivity be pushed here? Not every sign in the text was indeterminate. It is a moot point whether a reader with a different semasiological proficiency would have processed the selected signs as dynamically as I have done to identify indeterminacies, or the reader would have proceeded synoptically and have been less alert to indeterminacies.²

In introducing the second point, that is, the circumstances into which signs are integrated, let me refer to Lemke's work on how co-texts may affect the constitution of a sign:

We all have had this experience in writing. We begin to write about something, and in the course of writing, we happen to choose a particular word when we might just as well have used another; then a particular grammatical construction that also was only one possible way-of-saying, and the result is that two unplanned words are brought into an unexpected juxtaposition and ... lead to a formation not part of our original plan. (LEMKE, 1991, p. 34)

Elsewhere, Lemke (1991, p.33) writes:

What we first wrote or said was one way of instantiating a part of the original text plan, and only some its features were specified by that plan. Now we must go on to instantiate another part of the text plan, and again it will specify only some features. But how we instantiate those features now depends not just on the text-plan requirements, but also on how we happened to instantiate those of the previous portion(s) of the text. Principles of consistency now come into play that make previously irrelevant, 'incidental' features highly relevant for text production.

Lemke would seem to be hinting at assemblages, that is, the temporary arrangement of things, the bringing together of things to function in new ways. For Pennycook (2017) assemblages enable us to reflect on how agency, cognition, and language may be distributed in ways that de-center the human. Given its rejection of the "distance principle" (DUNKER, 2017, p. 164), integrationism probably denies that words/assemblages have any force independent of their human users, ostensibly because the assemblages reflect the communicational experiences and proficiencies of particular individuals. Building on Lemke, terminology would claim that a range of communicational considerations (e.g., perspectivization, textual factors) do produce indeterminacies. Sometimes these factors are unplanned and independent of the text author; at other times they may be planned but with consequences the author may not have anticipated. Let me illustrate.

Excerpt 1 comes across as a pedagogical context; it teaches in such a way that the signs it uses (*bill*, *act*, *law*) are in an ideal, uncontaminated relationship with system level specifications. Adopting integrationism-speak in part, terminology might suggest that the manner in which Paul Silk has constituted a set of signs (*bill*, *Act*, *law*), that is, integrated them into the pedagogical-type

² Lemke (1991) distinguishes dynamic and synoptic processing of signs in text. In dynamic text processing, "one enters into the flow of events and asks what is the meaning of an utterance *as it occurs* and what meaning attaches to how and when it is occurring. [...] Meanings are taken to be more tentative ... their timeliness and manner more signifying" (LEMKE, 1991, p. 26). This is evidently how much of the analysis of the legislative text has taken place and has unearthed examples of momentary indeterminacies. In the synoptic perspective, we "step outside the flow of events and examine meanings retrospectively, in the full context of a social event as it has occurred ... focusing the what-could-be-meant of dynamic meaning into the what-evidently-must-have-been-meant of synoptic meaning" (LEMKE, 1991, p. 26).

situation in excerpt 1, does not differ from a core of sedimented conventionalized traces, at system level (e.g., Collins' dictionary), of previous constitutions of replicas of these signs.

In excerpt 2, we see how a concern for pedagogy (e.g., 'Bills and Acts can be divided into two types') raises a text production constraint: the inefficiency of maintaining the conjunctive pair of *bills and Acts* beyond three iterations. In exemplifying the preceding functional description of *private bills and Acts*, *bill* is dropped in favor of *Act*. Thus, we move from:

“Private bills and Acts have only a particular local application ...”

to

“For example, a private Act would allow a particular local authority ...”.

However, in the following sentence exemplifying the public type of the conjunctive pair, *legislation* is used. This creates a situation where the reader, on encountering

“If new requirements were to be applied to all cemeteries throughout the country or to all new railway lines, these would be contained in public legislation”

has to wonder if *legislation* as the head of the compound is to be processed in the pedagogical sense of body of laws or in the shifting, rough-and-tumble sense of any of *Act* or hypernym of *bill* and *Act*.

In excerpt 3, the putative awkwardness of repeating public legislation in the same sentence sees the author introduce different terminology, *Act of Parliament*. But as was seen earlier, the response to this particular textual constraint produced the effect that a specific type of outcome (*public legislation*) was used with what is in fact a stage (*Acts of Parliament*) and a generic one at that, to designate a single referent. Rather than a case of hyponymy and hypernymy, what we see here are two terms whose meanings intersect.

The specific focus of excerpt 4 is on quantifying Parliament's productivity, and the collocate *passed* is applied to quantifications of each of *Acts of Parliament*, *legislation*, and *public Acts of Parliament*, but not to *bill* which one would have expected from excerpt 1. The focus on quantification in excerpt 4 sees *pages* occurring with *legislation* and *Acts of Parliament* in several of the noun phrases. As the excerpt unfolds, however, a need for economy arises. As a result, the noun phrases progressively shed *Acts of Parliament/legislation*, leaving figures and *pages* to collocate with *passed*.

To return to integrationism-speak, the foregoing discussion has shown how a set of terms have been made to mean what different circumstances required them to mean (or how different circumstances funneled meanings into certain terms). It is evident how terminology can recast its rejection of the exceptionalism of sign stability in special purpose texts as a rebuttal of telementation, or why some reflexivity ought to be integral to processing special purpose texts. On the other hand, integrationism may see that discourse structures and word collocations, not just non-verbal activities, constitute a part of the framework into which specific signs may be integrated in order to become meaningful.

5 CRITIQUING INTEGRATIONISM: PERSPECTIVES FROM TEXT-BASED TERMINOLOGY

Radical indeterminacy in integrationism, the idea that a linguistic sign does not pre-exist its context and is constantly being made and remade, is a problematic proposition in spite of how the evidence of the above text analysis may be enlisted to support it. Corpus frequencies would seem to provide a strong rationale for integrationism to pull back from the brink of radical indeterminacy. While integrationism's focus on peculiar particulars would suggest an outright rejection of corpus analysis, a recent attempt at re-theorizing the macrosocial pillar in terms of a system, specifically, how to bridge the hiatus between the individual and the population levels (DUNKER, 2017) interestingly provides legitimacy for the corpus. Dunker (2017: 136) quotes Harris as acknowledging that “[m]acrosocial features of communication show up clearly only when communicative behavior is

studied *en masse* (HARRIS, 1984, p. 280)". A corpus of legislative discourse is a resource for studying the communicative behavior of parliamentary students and practitioners.

In spite of confirmation for integrationist principles in the parliamentary text analyzed, an examination of the collocates of legislation in Hansard Corpus of the British Parliament (2020) reveals that usage in the text is after all not as idiosyncratic as one was led to believe. In the rough-and-tumble of real-world communication, *legislation* has indeed been used as a hypernymous synonym of *Act* and *bill*. Consider Figure 2.

Hansard Corpus (British Parliament)																							
SEARCH		FREQUENCY										CONTEXT					OVERVIEW						
ON CLICK: <input type="checkbox"/> CONTEXT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TRANSLATE (??) <input type="checkbox"/> GOOGLE <input type="checkbox"/> IMAGE <input type="checkbox"/> PRON/VIDEO <input type="checkbox"/> BOOK (HELP)																							
HELP ?		ALL	1800	1810	1820	1830	1840	1850	1860	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
1	<input type="checkbox"/> INTRODUCE	30704	4	1	4	14	20	44	60	58	208	424	1201	1373	1871	2693	1515	2825	4186	4011	4419	4295	2411
2	<input type="checkbox"/> PIECE	13352		1	9	56	47	88	80	120	138	127	151	186	227	477	375	683	1181	2613	2656	2984	1889
3	<input type="checkbox"/> PASS	13028		1	3	11	18	25	33	62	199	395	554	821	874	1308	795	843	1262	1969	1734	2143	1190
4	<input type="checkbox"/> EXISTING	9919				3	7	22	28	75	64	84	103	113	231	435	324	648	1051	1440	1962	2050	1237
5	<input type="checkbox"/> PRIMARY	6547			1		1		1	1			1	1	2	3	5	3	7	350	1840	4617	3001
6	<input type="checkbox"/> AMEND	5171			1		5	6	3	10	10	30	91	130	239	441	284	529	742	668	800	981	506
7	<input type="checkbox"/> RETROSPECTIVE	4983				1		26	27	12	38	26	25	64	384	281	337	689	824	644	869	645	116
8	<input type="checkbox"/> PROPOSED	4767			1	3	12	33	57	109	113	119	147	94	120	181	111	153	374	594	978	1019	558
9	<input type="checkbox"/> SECONDARY	4604				1		1		1	3	2	3	2	1	3	2	1	5	465	438	2059	2004
10	<input type="checkbox"/> DELEGATED	3569									1			1	3	12	590	720	302	565	213	751	401
11	<input type="checkbox"/> ENACT	2728	1	1	1		1	6	6	9	16	23	25	40	53	84	102	165	223	554	668	766	333

Figure 2: Collocates of *legislation* in Hansard Corpus

Source: Hansard Corpus (2020)

As Figure 2 shows, from text corpora dating back to the 1800s, *legislation* (in the British Parliament) has been *introduced* and *passed* (sensu bill?), *amended* and *enacted* (sensu Act?), and made to collocate with *existing* (sensu law/body of laws?). The foregoing is in part confirmed by Figure 3 which displays *introduce* as a collocate of *legislation*.

the Government to prevent hon: Members from exercising their right to introduce private Members' legislation in the House? §
of tonight's debate: The Government had an opportunity to introduce the television licences legislation earlier, if indeed they needed to introduce it at all, but they are
: formula for widows' entitlement to SERPS, which was introduced in the 1986 legislation ? Indeed, will he confirm that they carry that formula through into the state
1979 and 1997: The hon: Gentleman represents the party that introduced the British nationality legislation , that brought in the primary purpose rule and that in 1993 at
the Member for Mid-Sussex could have guaranteed it when it was introduced in the 1996 legislation : That is fair enough, but we have been told time and again in
sure that they have been very useful: They have also introduced a raft of legislation that directly impacts on young people, but they have never seriously set out to
only the Government could--; or, arguably, should--; introduce that type of legislation : We all recognise that such legislation would be controversial: Liberty still condemn
hon: Friend has assured the House that the regulations will be introduced and the primary legislation changed at the earliest possible opportunity: May I urge him to us
imposing new ones: There is no point in the Government introducing further criminal justice legislation if the police officers are not in place to enforce existing legisla
in due course, they will be given the opportunity to introduce even more progressive legislation , particularly in that sector:
of comprehensive and swiftly considered legislation: I plead guilty to introducing prices and incomes legislation ; the first Bill on consumer credit; one of the early Bills or

Figure 3: *Introduce* as collocate of *legislation* in Hansard Corpus

Source: Hansard Corpus (2020)

The first and last concordance lines of Figure 2 clearly show how *legislation* is used synonymously with *bill* in the British Parliament. These apparent synonyms occur across a variety of texts (hence contexts) in this corpus.

The problem that arises, then, is as follows. Some of what was analyzed as indeterminacies are not in fact aberrations, but they reflect a historical pattern which might suggest some social convention. Paradoxically, an attested pattern of indeterminacies still does not rule out the prospect of singular, further indeterminacies. The point as to where some of these patterns or conventions are located is as moot as a question on the location of certain forms of conduct that guide community life. Now, integrationism, as seen earlier, considers it erroneous "to start with the notion of a social convention already *in situ*. For our own experience tells us that we attribute significations to things and events, irrespective of whether there is any social convention about the matter or not.

Signs do not necessarily have a social dimension at all” (HARRIS, 1996, p. 67-8). This is a complex rhetorical move that has been traditionally interpreted as meaning that social convention plays no role at all in the constitution of the integrationist sign. Harris appears to be making two comments here. The first is that there may be social convention in the identification of a sign, but this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. If “necessarily” is not a hedge that weakens the argument to strengthen the claim, Harris’ second point is that social convention plays no role at all in the constitution of the sign.

To resolve the conundrum associated with apparent, corpus-derived counterfactuals to the traditional outright rejection of social convention in integrationism, a rhetorical move that builds on Harris’ first point commends itself. This is especially so in light of Harris’ view that

Where the integrationist parts company with the segregationist is not in declining to recognize [the] continuous chain of communication stretching endlessly back into the past, but in declining to accept it as a sufficient warrant for assigning to communicational codes or conventions a theoretical status which makes them both logically and pragmatically prior to their use. (HARRIS, 1996, p. 32)

The above view, in many respects liberatory and profound, reframes the problématique of the sign: does past use of a sign automatically confer sign status on a formal replica encountered later? Answering in the negative, without qualifying the answer, would raise questions of efficiency in communication. Wouldn’t the intellectual resources of my addressees be expended entirely on metacommunicating, rather than on communicating? Is limited efficiency in communicating the price to pay for rejecting telementation? Fortunately, there is as previously hinted (footnote 1) a process of securing mutual understanding that appears to dispense with constant monitoring, and that process requires no more than “[...] that individuals project on to others the kind of understanding they have developed of the linguistic interactions they themselves engage in” (LOVE, 1990, p. 109 *apud* DUNKER, 2017, p. 116).

Discourse proceeds by repetition and variation, as Johnstone remind us. In her words, a “[...] person whose discourse was completely creative – completely unlike anything previously tried – would, after all, be impossible to understand” (JOHNSTONE, 2008, p. 163). Discussing how creativity and cliché are accommodated in the design of language, Hanks similarly reminds that

[...] the creative potential of language is undeniable, but the concordances to a corpus remind us forcibly that in most of our utterances we are creatures of habit, immensely predictable, rehearsing the same old platitudes and the same old clichés in almost everything we say. If it were not so, ordinary language would become unworkable. Humankind cannot bear very much creativity. (HANKS, 2013, p. 141)

A sign model that accommodates determinacy and indeterminacy is clearly required. A model along the lines of Gerzymisch-Arbogast’s that accommodates compulsory and optional (perhaps unforeseen features) finds some support in Beaugrande’s (1997) account of the adaptive and other characteristics of complex systems. For Beaugrande, a text, theory, cognition, communication, and so on, are all instances of complex systems. In his account, a complex system is a combination of in-built and emergent features; in other words, interaction between standing constraints and emergent constraints takes place constantly in such a system. By design or by their very nature, complex systems need to be seen as existing as continua along the following dimensions:

- stability ↔ fluctuation: the extent to which the system can retain or alter its current state (shape, form),
- familiarity ↔ novelty: the extent to which the system confirms or disconfirms a known or an expected state,
- simplicity ↔ complexity: the extent to which entities in a system and their mutual interactions are few and uniform versus numerous and varied,
- determinacy ↔ indeterminacy: the extent to which “decisions among competing alternatives are clear or unclear” (BEAUGRANDE, 1997, p. 88).

An appreciation of the design parameters of a complex system spawns a mindset which does not view “[...] stability, determinacy, and so on, as fixed static qualities” but as “dynamic factors undergoing drifts and transactions” (BEAUGRANDE, 1997, p. 88). With such a mindset, “[...] we can then inquire how the ‘features’, ‘properties’, ‘structures’ and so on, we encounter may have

emerged and evolved” (BEAUGRANDE, 1997, p. 88). Ultimately, sense is made of these drifts and transactions through a mechanism of control, a further feature of complex systems. To “[...] control a domain, you apply the standing constraints specified in your model of it with the emergent constraints it is manifesting and thereby attain a convergent framework for cognitive, discursal and social moves” (BEAUGRANDE, 1997, p. 89).

Applying this model to the legislative text analyzed, we readily make connections to questions that arose around the extent to which meanings (agree to, proposal for a law, agreed to proposal, body of laws) can retain versus alter the form used to refer to them; or the extent to which forms confirm or disconfirm expected meanings; etc. The model legitimizes an inquiry into how the terminological/conceptual specification in excerpt 1 evolved across subsequent excerpts. The hermeneutic process associated with our dynamic reading exemplifies the notion of control, which involves, as was the case in the dynamic reading, level-shifting or reassignment of the text’s resources (finding meaning not in a given sign under analysis, but in other signs, discourse structures, etc.).

The model steers a middle course between the total determinacy of structuralism and the radical indeterminacy of post-structuralism. It is easily seen as contextualizing, within this middle space, a number of integrationist concepts, even with some commitment to the role of social convention in the constitution of the sign. To view the sign/term through the lens of Beaugrande’s complex system is: (1) to reject the myth that language is all completely pre-engineered ahead of specific contexts of use; (2) to acknowledge that, in meaning whatever the circumstances require it to mean (because of emergent constraints), the sign need not be cut off the apron strings of social convention (ANTIA; MAFOFO, 2021); (3) relatedly, to acknowledge that some reflexivity or monitoring is an integral feature of language use; (4) thus, to rule out transmission or telementation as a principle that adequately describes meaning-making; and (5) to draw on the preceding points to make critical learning possible.

6 CONCLUSION

In their respective scholarship, integrationism and text-based terminology continue a tradition of jolting us out from an uncritical mentalism about signs, for instance, word meanings. They both draw attention to the weaknesses of not engaging with the sign in the particular contexts of its occurrence. They do so in different ways. Integrationism understands the sign in a way that denies it a pre-context existence; it argues that there are factors in the circumstances of the use of a sign that make every such (contextually) constituted sign unique; it thus underscores the singularity of a sign’s occurrence; it holds that traces left by a unique sign do not obviate the need for a fresh sign reconstitution on another occasion; the ineluctable creativity or novelty associated with every sign, and the attendant indeterminacies, makes monitoring integral to the processes of communicating; the latter underscores why communication is not telementation. Text-based terminology recognizes that terms and the concepts they designate are constituted in ways that accommodate a core of features that are conventionally regarded, for a time, as essential, and features that are optional (and perhaps unforeseeable). Dictionaries (including electronic ones) and databases are representations of time-bound conventionalized or patterned accounts of these terms-concepts, with the affordances of technology being leveraged to identify core and aberrant acceptations in an unprecedented manner. Terminology’s decompositional approach to the sign, reminiscent of the structural semantics tradition, allows it in part to explain indeterminacies in terms of contextual perspectivization, a range of textual considerations, and so on.

Terminologists would find aspects of the integrationist conception of language and of the sign in particular as enriching their own metalanguage and conceptualization; they would easily see the special purpose text analyzed in this article as confirming several tenets of integrationism. Terminologists, however, would find it difficult to totally deny social (in their case, disciplinary) convention in their approach to the term as a sign; they are more at ease with a view of the sign as a dynamic interaction between standing constraints (admittedly capable of shifting) and emergent constraints. They find corpus evidence for signs that conform to models that highlight core or standing constraints alone, but that also conform to models of both constraint types. Terminologists are not sold on integrationist criticisms of corpus linguistics, and they might wonder about the implications of integrationism’s radical indeterminacy in a range of text comprehension tasks.

Perhaps, ultimately, the difference between both paradigms is one of degree, rather than of kind – degree or granularity of description of what a sign is. Given their respective takes on the role of antecedence and the nature of (situational) relevance, integrationism has a much higher threshold for defining what a sign is in comparison to terminology.

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INTEGRATIONISM: ROY HARRIS ARTSPEAK, ARTISTIC CREATIVITY, AND HUMAN DIVERSITY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

INTEGRACIONISMO: AARTSPEAK DE ROY HARRIS, CRIATIVIDADE ARTÍSTICA E
DIVERSIDADE HUMANA NA ERA DA GLOBALIZAÇÃO

INTERGRACIONISMO: ARTSPEAK DE ROY HARRIS, CREATIVIDADE ARTISTICA
CREATIVIDAD ARTÍSTICA Y DIVERSIDAD HUMANA EN LA ERA DE LA GLOBALIZACIÓN

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ABSTRACT: This study provides a perspective on how Roy Harris's work especially integrationism can be used beyond linguistics and communication studies toward fields of studies such as social and public policies and related fields. This study proposes that integrationism should also address issues related to the fields of global studies, sustainable development, and other related fields. It argues that the influence of integrationism on linguistics and communication analysis should be expanded to social and public policies to foster epistemic equity, diversity, and other intercultural values across academic disciplines and professional practices across the world. We address the question: How can integrationism promote artistic creativity, human diversity, and sustainable development for all in the age of globalization? In conclusion, we argue that applying an integrationism approach in social and public policies may promote what I am calling *existential justice*, *existential literacy*, and *sustainable transformational interculturality*. Hence, scholars, students, and professionals in different disciplines and careers may enjoy human, cultural, and epistemic diversity in all its creativity as they acquire competence in existential justice, existential literacy, and *sustainable transformational interculturality*.

KEYWORDS: Integrationism. Artistic creativity. Artspeak. Human diversity. Existential literacy.

RESUMO: Este estudo fornece uma perspectiva de como o trabalho de Roy Harris pode ser usado para além dos estudos de linguística e comunicação, incluindo campos de estudos como políticas públicas e sociais e campos relacionados. Defendo que a influência do integracionismo na linguística e na análise da comunicação deve ser expandida para políticas sociais e públicas, com fins de promover a equidade epistêmica, a diversidade e outros valores interculturais em disciplinas acadêmicas e práticas

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profissionais. Abordamos a questão: como o integracionismo pode promover a criatividade artística, a diversidade humana e o desenvolvimento sustentável para todos na era da globalização? Concluindo, argumentamos que a aplicação da abordagem integracionista em políticas públicas e sociais pode promover o que estou chamando de justiça existencial, alfabetização existencial e interculturalidade transformacional sustentável.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Integracionismo. Criatividade artística. *Artspeak*. Diversidade humana. Alfabetização existencial.

RESUMEN: Este estudio proporciona una perspectiva sobre cómo el trabajo de Roy Harris puede usarse más allá de los estudios de lingüística y comunicación, incluidos campos de estudio como la política pública y social y campos relacionados. Sostengo que la influencia del integracionismo en la lingüística y el análisis de la comunicación debe extenderse a las políticas sociales y públicas, con el objetivo de promover la equidad epistémica, la diversidad y otros valores interculturales en las disciplinas académicas y prácticas profesionales. Abordamos la pregunta: ¿cómo puede el integracionismo promover la creatividad artística, la diversidad humana y el Desarrollo sostenible para todos en la era de la globalización? En conclusión, sostenemos que aplicar el enfoque integracionista a las políticas públicas y sociales puede promover lo que llamo justicia existencial, alfabetización existencial e interculturalidad transformacional sostenible.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Integracionismo. Creatividad artística. *Artspeak*. Diversidad humana. Alfabetización existencial.

1 INTRODUCTION

I had no idea that I'd just experienced public art; nor did it matter. What did matter was that the image, and the message, provoked me to pause, think, learn, and act. (PASTERNAK, 2012, p. 7)

To show how integrationism is an overarching theoretical framework before explaining its influence on other notions such as artspeak, existential justice, existential literacy, and sustainable transformational interculturality, I would like to start by presenting the way some scholars have used art works to express, in my opinion, their unconscious integrationist thinking. For example, in their volume entitled *Culture, Technology, Communication: Towards an Intercultural Global Village* (2001), Charles Ess and Fay Sudweeks thank the representatives of the curator of the Kluge-Ruhe Aboriginal Art Collection, University of Virginia and the Aboriginal Artists Agency, Cammeray, Australia for acquiring the permission to use Dini Tjampitjinpa Campbell's painting. They write:

The painting is a conceptual map of connections between important places—typically, waterholes, important geological formations embedded in the religious/philosophical stories of specific peoples, etc.—And thus, serves as a powerful visual metaphor for the Web as connecting information centers” (ESS, SUDWEEKS, 2001, p. xiii).

The authors add that “The painting is an artifact of the oldest continuous human culture on the planet (estimates range between 30,000 to 60,000 years) and is thus most appropriate for a volume examining culture and cultural changes, especially in the face of various forms of what may amount to electronically-mediated cultural imperialism” (ESS, SUDWEEKS, 2001, p. xiii). They insist that by its creativity, for example, “[...] in using the dot style, the painting incorporates modifications of aboriginal art that are designed to conceal elements of the map/story that are reserved only for those deemed by tribal elders/knowledge-holders to be worthy of learning the more complex and intricate aspects of the basic map/story” (ESS, SUDWEEKS, 2001, p. xiii). Finally, the authors argue that the painting specifically reflects a cultural change made in response to the European colonization of Australia - and thus, visually represents a specific solution to their volume's central question: “In the face of threats to cultural identity through a homogenizing globalization - how may we preserve distinctive cultural identities while also participating in a global mode of communication? In my opinion, this question is substantially in line with integrationist thinking; that is the rejection of linguistic domination through homogenizing Western linguistic analysis discourse and artspeak (HARRIS, 1998; 2003). In addition, the explanation about the use of the painting in their volume is of relevance to how Roy Harris's work in the age of globalization and critical interdependence can help us reduce unnecessary conflicts and epistemic and social injustice (FRICKER, 2007; GUILHERME, 2002; HARRIS & WOLF 1998; MITTELMAN, 2010).

Another reflection on how the appreciation of artistic creativity understood from the perspective of integrationism comes from the French philosopher, playwright, and music critic, and a leading Christian existentialist philosopher Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973). In the section “the reintegration of honor” from his book entitled *Man against Mass Society* (MARCEL, 2008 [1952], p. 188-192), Marcel reflects about the influence that “[...] hearing the music of Bach with examples partly drawn from the life of the Spanish soul” had on his understanding of the complex and agonizing situation of contemporary man and on how artistic creativity is a transcendental gift (p. 190). He writes:

Into Bach, it seems to me, as into the very structure of the Spanish soul, we must see how impossible it is to introduce anything like the opposition, so current among French rationalists, between reason and faith. In one sense, no music can be more satisfying to the reason than that of Bach, but on the other hand this satisfaction, obviously represents a response to some gift which reason reduced to its mere self would never have been able to lavish on us. (MARCEL, 2008 [1952], p. 191)

To argue against those rationalists who rejected artistic creativity as a transcendental gift and who merely focused on reason, Marcel explains that this attitude “[...] can sometimes reduce and dissolve” the natural artistic gift (MARCEL, 2008 [1952], p. 191). In closing his argument on this concern, Marcel admonishes us that if we are to foster honor and hospitality in the fundamental human relationships, we need to be welcoming to all artistic creativity beyond “[...] hierarchies founded either on money or on educational qualifications whose human significance is practically nil” (MARCEL, 2008 [1952], p. 192; see also PABLÉ, 2017, p. 5; HUTTON, 2017, p. 33). Indeed, Marcel’s suggestion reflects intercultural justice (NATHAN, 2010) and a notion of integrationist thinking in that human experience is not appreciated as a pre-established experience, but as current circumstances dictate (HARRIS, 1998; 2010; FELICE, 2016; JACKSON, 2012; PASTERNAK, 2012; TOOLAN, 1996; 2009).

First, I choose the epigraph from Pasternak (2012), the painting narrative from Ess & Sudweeks (2001), and the appreciation of Bach music from Marcel (2008 [1952]) to explain how these narratives support the notion of integrationism. Second, to support my proposed definition of *artistic creativity*; that is, an integrated human value reflecting moral, cultural, philosophical reflection, and human transcendental gift or capability/skill of an individual or group of individuals (LASSWELL, 1976; MARCEL, 1965; SEN, 1999; THOMPSON, 2012). Third, to explain how the connection between integrationism and Harris’s work, *The Necessity of Artspeak: The Language of the Arts in the Western Tradition* (2003) provides us a significant theoretical and practical framework toward notions of *existential literacy* and *existential justice* (BALOSA, 2020) and more balanced social and public policy for sustainable development and a better common future for all. In a world dominated by social injustice and social exclusion, artistic creativity, and other human performances in all their complexity and diversity, need an integrationist thinking if they are to receive the equitable treatment that they deserve (BECKER, 2008; MITTLEMAN, 2010; 2011). Hence, integrationism should help scholars, researchers, and students in social sciences and humanities understand the reality of complex modern life issues to try to solve them with a more intercultural justice mindset for a better common future for all (BENHABIB, 2002; GUILHERME, 2002; SACHS, 2020). This study uses the theoretical framework of integrationism (HARRIS, 1996; 1998) and philosophical reflection (MARCEL, 2008 [1952]; 1965) to address its research question: How can integrationism promote artistic creativity, human diversity, and sustainable development for all in the age of globalization?

2 INTEGRATIONISM

I have chosen the epigraph of this study as a relevant example of what integrationism means and how it can be used in everyday practices across disciplines and professions. This epigraph, “I had no idea that I’d just experienced public art; nor did it matter. What did matter was that the image, and the message, provoked me to pause, think, learn, and act” (PASTERNAK, 2012, p. 7), supports the idea of human experiences as being processes of integration. It assures us that human capability to acquire and produce experience/knowledge involves a self that is nonetheless an integrated one; that is, “one’s mental activities are jointly integrated with one’s bodily activities and one’s environment” (HUTTON, 2017, p. 33). What then is integrationism? Roy Harris, “the founder of integrational linguistics” also known as integrationism (PABLÉ, 2017, p. xi) defines integrationism as “[...] an approach to linguistics and communication as contexts-oriented and self-communication or ‘thinking’ involving biomechanical, macrosocial,

circumstantial factors (HARRIS, 1998, p. 28-29). He explains how integrationist perspectives differ from segregationist ones. Within segregationism, modern linguistics misrepresents the relationship between language and communication, and in so doing misrepresents language. For example, in analyzing our everyday linguistic activities, this perspective sustains that “[...] linguistic and non-linguistic phenomena constitute two academically segregated domains of inquiry, and that a domain pertaining to languages is to be segregated from the rest (let’s say, for example, the domain of the study of communication)” (HARRIS, 1998, p. 10).

Contrary to segregationist understanding, integrationism sustains that “a theory of language without a theory of communication is vacuous or empty”. That is to say that the manifestation of language is in that spectrum of “[...] human abilities that are brought into play in the processes of verbal communication - Hence, we cannot in practice segregate linguistic knowledge from extra-linguistic knowledge since these two domains are integrated, not segregated; and they are integrated in highly complex ways” (HARRIS, 1998, p. 10). In the same vein Toolan (2009) argues that “communication is not achieved via preexisting signs” (P. 1). From integrationist perspective, Toolan explains, “[...] people use signs to communicate, but signs do not come ready-made and predetermined, any more than communicational situations do. New communicational situations require us to adapt as best we can” (HARRIS, 1998, p. 10). This adaptation involves our mental-self, body-self, and environmental-self as we create new signs to accommodate this situated communicative experience (HUTTON, 2017; MARCEL, 2008 [1952]).

As I alluded earlier, the epigraph helps us appreciate this situated communicative adaptation in that the outcome of the interaction between the author and the image created an instant integrated experience. In the epigraph: “The image, and the message, provoked me to pause, think, learn, and act,” there are no signs as “the prerequisites of this communication” (HARRIS, 1997, p. 11). The author is circumstantially exposed to new signs and expected to participate by doing the same. We can argue that the same analysis applies to the Ess & Sudweeks (2001) painting experience and Marcel’s (2008 [1952]) appreciation of Bach music. The lesson to draw from this analysis is that all these experiences are integrated experiences and that they shed significant light in relation to why we should adopt the notion of integrationism in our research and problem-solving processes in today’s interconnected and interdependent world (CANCLINI, 1995; FELICE, 2016; TOOLAN, 1996).

2.1 INTEGRATIONISM AND ARTISTIC CREATIVITY

In his book *The Necessity of Artspeak: The Language of the Arts in the Western Tradition* (2003), Harris argued: “Fischer’s failure either to recognize or to address the question of *artspeak* might perhaps be explained by reference to the development in the twentieth century of another *artspeak* genre; that is, the dictionary or glossary of art terms” (p. 4). Harris was referring to Ernst Fischer’s book entitled *The Necessity of Art* (2010 [1971]). Ernst Fischer (1899-1972) was an Austrian journalist, politician, and philosopher. He argued that “art has been, still is, and always will be necessary” (FISCHER, 2010 [1971], p. 15). To support his conviction, he attempted to ask and answer the following questions:

Does art not also express a deeper relationship between man and the world? Can its function be summed up at all in a single formula? Does it not have to satisfy many and various needs? As we have become aware of its initial function, has not that function also changed with the changing of society, and have not new functions come into being? (FISCHER, 2010 [1971], p. 15)

What connection can we then establish between integrationism and artspeak? What is then artspeak? These questions are going to be to focus of this section.

Harris (2003, p. 4) defines artspeak as “[...] the way we talk about art—the availability of a taken-for-granted terminology in which to discuss and identify certain works and activities as art (whatever that might be), together with a ready-made rhetoric of praise and blame with which to evaluate them”. He argues that if we were restricting our attention initially to English, that vocabulary would have to include: the word *art* and its cognates and their derivatives (artist, artistic, artifact, etc.) as key terms. Words semantically related to these key terms such as the designations of art forms (film, dance, lithography, etc.); of their practitioners, and of their art products (symphony, play, portrait, etc.). Expressions identifying various subcategories of art (fine art, abstract art, verbal art, poetry,

etc.). Critical terms used “in appraisal of the arts and their products (beautiful, ugly, original, inspired, tasteless, well-made, etc.)” (p. viii). For languages other than English, Harris (2003, p. viii) argued that “[...] similar lists could be compiled, and such lists would presumably be open-ended, but that in principle they could be drawn up along the same lines as a linguist might seek to compile any other specialized lexicon of terms relating to a particular field – from nuclear physics to climatology”. Regarding the historicity of artspeak in the Western tradition, Harris reveals a divided position between the sceptics and less sceptical. He argues that “artspeak has been a locus of controversy and which for sceptics, its main function has always been to create a mystique surrounding the work of certain artists - poets, painters, and musicians in particular” (HARRIS, 2003, p. ix). However, for less sceptical, Harris states that for this category of people,

[...] the very existence of artspeak bears witness to the heights human civilization has reached; for artspeak is seen as a language forged in order to express lofty truths about human creativity and spiritual goals, truths which it would be impossible to express adequately in any less rarified discourse, truths to which less privileged cultures have yet to graduate. (HARRIS, 2003, p. ix)

How does integrationism apply to artspeak? Harris reminds us that it is a mistake for linguists to prefer to keep out of the analysis of artspeak and to leave it to aestheticians. He argues that it is a mistake because “[...] the language of aesthetics is only a relatively recent dialect of artspeak and does not go back earlier than the eighteenth century - Western artspeak has been many more centuries in the making and drawn upon linguistic tools supplied by many languages” (HARRIS, 2003, p. x). Harris articulates the importance of artspeak as an integrationist notion. He writes:

I believe that there is something seriously wrong with the education system of a society that does not understand, cannot be bothered to understand, its own artspeak. That failure would betoken a failure to understand something more fundamental – the role that words play in articulating the social structures of culture. (HARRIS, p. viii)

Harris (2003, p. viii) laments the fact that “[...] both experts on the arts and experts on society have profoundly underestimated the role of artspeak today and that they cannot see that a theory of language engages both (the arts and society).”

What then is art and what is required for its production? Rothko (2004, p. 10) defines art as not only a form of action, but it is also a form of social action; “[...] for art is a type of communication, and when it enters the environment, it produces its effects just as any other form of actions does”. Becker (2008, p. 272) argues that to produce the arts and crafts requires technical skills and that “[...] artists contribute something beyond craft skill to the product - something due to their creative abilities and gifts that gives each object/performance a unique and expressive character” (see also SEN, 1999). We should appreciate this definition of art and what is required to be produced because of the involvement of the notion of human capability. Thanks to this quality, human beings are capable to produce symbolic language and its implied symbolic power that affect human feelings (BOURDIEU, 1991; FROMM, 1947; FUNK, 2019). In this regard, in his book entitled *Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics* (1947), the American-German social psychologist, psychoanalyst, sociologist, and philosopher, Erich Fromm (1900-1980) expresses his understanding of art as living itself. He argues that

[...] not only medicine, engineering, and painting are arts; living itself is an art—in fact, the most important and at the same time the most difficult and complex art to be practiced by man. Its object is not this or that specialized performance, but the performance of living, the process of developing into that which one is potentially. (FROMM, 1947, p. 17-18)

Fromm goes on saying that “[...] in the art of living, man is both the artist and the object of his art; he is the sculptor and the marble; the physician and the patient.” (FROMM, 1947, p. 18). Commenting on this understanding of art, Funk (2019, p. viii) argues that the necessity of an art of living “[...] expresses itself through particular psychic needs, especially the need to relate to reality, to other people, and to oneself”; and that this possibility is “[...] manifested in the different ways that people can relate to themselves, to each other, to the natural world, to work, or to reality; mindfully, calculatingly, lovingly, patronizingly, contemptuously, appreciatively,

exploitatively, caringly, and so on". Funk explains that for man, "[...] life itself is an art, because what allows man and society to flourish can only be recognized by the transformative effects of the art of living" (FUNK, p. ix).

The comments above about art are examples that support Harris's definition of artspeak. In addition, we notice the symbolic power of language that art communicates to human beings. This power demonstrates the human capability or human being's artistic creativity. Fromm (1951, p. 12) defines symbolic language as

[...] a language in which we express inner experience as if it were a sensory experience, as if it were something we were doing or something that was done to us in the world of things. It is a language in which the world of outside is a symbol of the world inside, a symbol for our souls and our minds. (FROMM, 1951, p. 12; see also HUTTON, 2017, p. 33).

This definition reinforces Harris's argument on the importance of artspeak and how it cannot be segregated from the theory of language (theory of language engages both the arts and society). From this understanding, we can deduce that life itself is an integrationist phenomenon and that using integrationism as theoretical framework in designing, implementing, and analyzing social and public policies may generate inclusive and equitable outcomes. That is, taking into consideration all elements and all subjects involved in each process such as "[...] person's action, interest, and the freedom to achieve well-being" (SEN, 1999, p. 3). Integrationism should then lead us to a balanced and equitable society. Hence, everyone should succeed to be, as the English psychoanalyst Adam Phillips puts it, "[...] one's authentic self - one role or version of the self among many others" (PHILLIPS, 2010, p. 106).

Artistic creativity denotes one's capability, one's existence, or one's integrationist thinking skill that needs to be deservedly appreciated and supported rather than marginalized or discriminated against. In my opinion, this kind of appreciation and support constitute the politico-economic, sociocultural, moral, technological, and environmental mindset in fostering social justice, secure and peaceable community, individual empowerment, and sustainable development (ADAMS *et al.*, 2016; BLEWITT, 2008; MITTLEMAN, 2011; ROTH; BRIAR-LAWSON, 2011). For example, by equitably treating any artistic creativity, we give the artist the opportunity to become a participatory communicative agent of the community. This participation which can begin at the local level, may become regional, national, and then international or global. In his book entitled *Community, Empowerment, and Sustainable Development*, John Blewitt (2008, p. 187) defines participatory communication as "[...] effective communication, which creates bonds between localities and groups, often serving as a foundation for collective action". Blewitt goes on explaining that although there is no one ideal model for participatory communication, common characteristics may be derived from the many practical communication projects developed over the years and in which "power and identity" are always addressed.

In this context, Blewitt (2008, p. 187) defines power as "[...] the demonstration of communication cuts through the issue of power; that is, a participatory approach attempts to put decisions-making in the hands of the people". It consolidates "[...] the capability of communities to present their own ideas about development to professional development planners and technical staff and from the community itself, derives the strengthening of internal democratic processes" (BLEWITT, 2008, p. 187). In relation to identity, Blewitt (2008, p. 187) argues that

[...] especially in communities that have been marginalized, repressed, or simply neglected, participatory communication helps to install cultural pride and self-esteem. It reinforces the social fabric through strengthening local and indigenous forms of organization and by protecting tradition and cultural values while facilitating the integration of new developments.

If we agree with Blewitt's argument, we should also agree to treat all works of art with an integrationist understanding; that is, without discriminatory or segregationist attitude which is destructive to more humane relationships and to "intercultural justice" (BENHABIB, 2002, p. 8; NATHAN, 2010, p. 3).

Benhabib (2002, p. 8) argues that "[...] intercultural justice between human groups should be defended in the name of justice and freedom and not of an elusive preservation of cultures" (p. 8). Nathan (2010, p. 3) argues that intercultural justice should "[...]

address the claims of culture relying not on a theoretically impoverished essentialist conception of society but rather on one which gives importance to individual agency, to ways, and to the context in which culture matters for claims for justice". That is, Nathan (2010, p. 3) explains,

[...] we need to reframe the debate on multiculturalism, but not based on cultural membership as a primary good, for which many essentialists argue. Rather, we must combat circumstances of injustice due to cultural differences and practices of citizens with their particularities in multiple dimensions – economic, social, political as well as cultural.

He insists that the politics of non-domination, emphasizing freedom as non-domination, is complementary and important, but more importantly, "[...] multicultural social justice should be concerned with the politics of capability to function with their particularities as citizens of equal status, which requires both social recognition and non-domination as minimal and common normative conditions" (NATHAN, 2010, p. 3). In the same vein Ross (1998, p. 191) argues that cultural justice is not distinct from the transformation of socioeconomic conditions. That is, "[...] they are part and parcel of the same revolution, although some aspects of cultural justice are more easily abstracted from the economic environment than others". Ross defines cultural justice as "[...] the respect for people's cultural identities such as gender, race, sexuality, nationality, and ethnicity with equal access to income, health, education, free association, religious freedom, housing, and employment" (ROSS, 1998, p. 191). Ross goes on and explains that "[...] many who have suffered socioeconomic injustice perceive their hardship as motivated by, or indistinguishable from, cultural disrespect, prejudice, and race hatred" (ROSS, 1998, p. 198, p. 191). Here again, we can understand the destructive effect of segregationist thinking and decide to adopt integrationism to counteract anti-intercultural attitudes and actions for social justice and human dignity for all.

2.2 INTEGRATIONISM, HUMAN DIVERSITY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Harris saw integrationism as existentialism. He argued that "[...] philosophically, integrationism is a form of existentialism. More exactly, it is a form of humanism in the Sartrean sense" (HARRIS, 2013a, p. 56, *apud* PABLÉ, 2017, p. 3, see also SARTRE, 2007 [1947], p. 18). What then is humanism and how does it relate to human diversity and sustainable development? Fromm (1964, p. 69) defines humanism, both in its Christian religious and in its secular, or nontheistic manifestations, as a perspective "[...] characterized by faith in man, in his possibility to develop to ever higher stages, in the unity of the human race, in tolerance and peace, and in reason and love as the forces which enable man to realize himself, to become what he can be". Fromm (1964, p. 70) goes on and explains that

[...] the most fundamental thought of humanism is the idea that mankind – humanity is not an abstraction but a reality: that in each individual all of humanity is contained; that each man is all men; that each individual represents all of humanity and, hence, that all men are equal, not in their gifts and talents, but in their basic human qualities.

In his volume entitled *Critical Humanist Perspectives: The Integrational Turn in Philosophy of Language and Communication* (2017) and on his chapter *Secular Humanist Discourses on Rationality: Exploring questions in the Philosophy of Language and Communication*, Adrian Pablé (2017, p. 13) explains what it could mean to be a humanist in the nineteenth century. Pablé demonstrates that to be a humanist then meant "[...] the conviction of the centrality of the human itself". Considering this understanding of humanism without engaging in the analysis of the assumptions of the "New Humanists" (PABLÉ, 2017, p. 13), Fromm (1964) and (Pablé, 2017) help us understand the connection between integrationism/existentialism and humanism. They also help us understand the impact of a critical understanding of humanism upon the treatment of artistic creativity; that is, "[...] the powers of individual subjects, individual humans" who are inside any scholarly or political discursive system vis-à-vis artspeak (SAID, 2004, p. 9).

From the above definitions of humanism, how then is humanism connected to existentialism as argued by Sartre (2007 [1947], p. 18), *Existentialism is a Humanism?* Sartre defines existentialism as "a doctrine that makes human life possible and also affirms that every truth and every action imply an environment and a human subjectivity". He explains that existentialism is "[...] public

knowledge that the fundamental reproach brought against us (existentialists) is that we stress the dark side of human life” (SARTRE, 2007 [1947], p. 18). How then is existentialism a humanism? Sartre (2007 [1947], p. 22) answers saying that, “Man possesses a human nature; this human nature, which is human, is found in all men (human beings), which means that each human being is a particular example of a universal concept - man (human being)”. To articulate how existentialism is humanism, Sartre (2007 [1947], p. 23) argues that

[...] the first effect of existentialism is to make every man conscious of what he is, and to make him solely responsible for his own existence - We do not mean that he is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men (human beings).

Morris (1966, p. 1) supports this definition of existentialism and argues that “[...] existentialism is a theory of individual meaning. It asks each person to ponder the reason for his existing”.

From this perspective, it is reasonable to deduce that Fromm’s definition of humanism agrees with Sartrian existentialism; that is, human being as a particular example of a universal concept of human being and responsible not only for one’s own individuality, but also responsible for all human beings. In my opinion, this existential/humanist reality is also an integrationist reality. In his book entitled *The Philosophy of Existentialism* (1995[1956], p. 17-27), Gabriel Marcel sees existentialism as a perception of “[...] being as a whole and of oneself seen as a totality—as the world of reality”. Again, although Marcelian existentialism is described as the Christian existentialism, thus, different from Sartrian existentialism, which is described as the “atheistic existentialism” (SARTRE, 2007 [1947], p. 20), we notice that both existentialist trends stress being as a whole and as oneself seen as a totality or as an integrated phenomenon. These trends agree with the definition of humanism provided by Fromm (1964) and Pablé (2017).

How then does integrationism involve human diversity? Nathan (2010, p. 239) argues that “People belong to various social organization and have multiple affiliations and identities that provide them with a sense of belonging within different social contexts and the capability to carry out activities individually and collectively”. As such, he insists, “[...] the notion of cultural belonging-membership in a culture, and a singular identity mainly constituted by monoculture is misleading when attempting to understand how individuals relate to culture” (NATHAN, 2010, p. 239). Regarding human diversity and our multiple identities, Marcel (1965, p. 153) argues that “[...] to identify is in fact to recognize that something, or someone, has, or has not, such-and-such a character, and, conversely, such-and-such a character is relative to a possible identification”. Thus, in the context of human diversity, we need to recognize the difference that characterizes our races, our cultures, our languages, our environments, and our capabilities as we realize our integrational connections and try to be communicationally proficient members of a community and “responsible” for all human beings (CANTELE, 2005, p. 147). Hence, the process of equitable identification becomes a process of social justice, human rights, and human dignity. That is, a process considering that a human being is an example of the universal representation and must be treated with justice and care like any other human being, if we have, as the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur once alluded, “[...] to invent a future, and one as just as possible, at the heart of our democracies, our unsurpassable horizon” (RICOEUR, 2020 [1997], p. 59).

In today’s world of marginalization and discrimination of certain human beings based on their ethnic groups, classes, races, genders, sexuality, languages; human capacities, such as certain artistic creativities are also marginalized and discriminated against (ADAMS *et al.*, 2016; FRICKER, 2007; STIBBE, 2011). Instead of identifying and recognizing different creativities as values for our common humanity, today’s discriminatory practices choose to maintain a segregationist mentality rather than solidarity and equitable partnership to service the common humanity (LODGE 1995; LODGE; WILSON, 2006).

To transform this mentality into an integrationist one, Marcel (1965, p. 153) exhorts us to go beyond the dichotomy of “[...] the world of the Same and the Other and manage our recognition processes within the existence/being basis”. Here again, Marcel supports the notion of integrationism; that is the consideration of the totality of an object, a subject, or an individual (HARRIS, 1998).

How then does artspeak relate to integrationism/existentialism? Marcel's description of the role of music and theater in his life and his work supplies an answer to this question. In his book entitled *Music and Philosophy, Marcel* (2005, p. 41) argues that music has given him what no writer has even given him. He writes:

It is very clear for me today that J.S. Bach has been in my life what neither Pascal nor Saint Augustine, nor any spiritual writer has been; that I found in the Beethoven or the Mozart of the Sonatas and Quartets, or in an infinity of others, from the German Romantics to the Russians and the Spanish, from Rameau to Fauré and Debussy, what no writer has ever given me.

Marcel goes on saying that, "When I try to look at my past life, I note that music has not only played a great role - it has been one of the original components of my very being. I can say without exaggeration that music was the only escape from this task-filled world" (MARCEL, 2005, p. 42). Although theater also played an important role in Marcel's work, music occupied a bigger space than theater. Marcel started practicing when he was only seven years of age. In this regard, he says: "Of course, there was also the theater. I loved it passionately, but I was taken to it only rarely" (MARCEL, 2005, p. 43).

Marcel's description of music and theater supports the arguments of Atkins (2013 [1990]) and Harris (2003) regarding the symbolic and transformative power of art works in life. For example, Atkins (2013 [1990], p. 62) reminds us that "[...] a vital and effective outpouring of public art helped transform opinion and catalyze action during a decade characterized by U.S. President Ronald Reagan's failure even to mention AIDS". Harris (2003, p. 120) reveals that those Western artspeak, who for example, segregate art and Africa take Africa for granted. He writes: "As far as they are concerned, 'art' is universal: the question of whether the African objects are works of art at all in their African context is not allowed to arise. In spite of their disclaimers, these scholars are engaged in the same enterprise: applying Western artspeak advocates distinctions to a non-Western tradition". We can learn from Harris that speaking about art is also an area of inter/cultural justice. Thus, it should be of interest to linguists, philosophers, social scientists, and related field of inquiries. Marcel has clearly helped us appreciate the closeness of his thought to integrationist thinking when it comes to artspeak. For example, when he said that "[...] it (music) has been one of the original components of my very being" (MARCEL, 2005, p. 42).

Furthermore, the relationship between artspeak and integrationism/existentialism is also supported by Collingwood (1958 [1938], p. 1). Collingwood reminds us that "[...] the word art means several different things; and we have to decide which of these usages is the one that interests us". He adds that, "They are very important for our inquiry; partly because false theories are generated by failure to distinguish them, so that in expounding one usage we must give a certain attention to others; partly because confusion between various senses of the word may produce bad practice as well as bad theory" (p.1-2). In addition, Collingwood insists on the importance of defining concepts in the way that integrationists would argue. He writes, "Defining the thing is like explaining where the house is or pointing out its position on the map; you must know its relations to other things as well, and if your ideas of these other things are vague, your definition will be worthless" (COLLINGWOOD, 1958 [1938], p. 2).

How does then integrationism support sustainable development? Sachs (2015, P. 1) defines sustainable development as "[...] a central concept of our age which is both a way of understanding the world and a method for solving global problems. It entails a development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs". We can observe the integrationist ingredients in the definition of sustainable development such as to meet the needs of the present generation, to foster the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, a way of understanding the world, and a method for solving global problems. In short there cannot be a sustainable development within segregationist framework. The idea of fostering the ability of future generations to meet their own needs is tantamount to fostering artistic creativity. An equitable appreciation and support of individual ability in diverse domains of life is the meaningful way that human beings can sustain their existence, their humanity, and the well-being across generations. Arguing on the importance of this interdependency, Nathan (2010, P. 4) argues that

[...] we are interdependent beings within the social world in many dimensions – economic, social, cultural and ecological. Due to the limitations of human existence, the needs inherent in human nature are satisfied, not through the isolated activity of the individual, but through shared human labor and through what is inherited from previous generations.

Indeed, to have better outcomes in the process of sustainable development, we need to integrate our thoughts and our actions; and as global intercultural citizens (BALOSA, 2020; GUILHERME, 2002), to interdependently operate in mutual respect of our rights and human dignity (FELICE, 2016; MARCEL, 1963; ROSENAU, 1980).

Employing philosophical reflections, this study addresses the question: How can integrationism promote artistic creativity, human diversity, and sustainable development for all in the age of globalization? What then does the philosophical reflection method entail? Philosophical reflections entail critical analysis of issues affecting human lives using philosophical insights or arguments in finding solutions to problems affecting human societies. For example, Marcel (2008 [1952], p. 30) argues about reflecting on how to counteract “the techniques of dehumanization” used by the dominant powers over the vulnerable human beings. In his book entitled *Philosophy and Public Policy*, Sidney Hook (1980, p. 6) proposes that “[...] we consider afresh the relation between philosophy and public affairs and draw some insights in relation to philosophy as a study of existence and possibility from the standpoint of value and its bearing on human conduct”. Hook adds that a “[...]it is altogether natural for the community to turn to the philosopher in expectation of finding some wise guidance or some integrated outlook on life. For whatever else wisdom is, it is insight into the nature, interrelation, and career of values in human experience” (HOOK, 1980, p. 6).

Arguing about “the necessity of art,” Ernst Fischer reminds us that “[...] man takes possession of the natural by transforming it. Work is transformation of the natural. Man also dreams of working magic upon nature, of being able to change objects and give them new form by magic means. This is the equivalent in the imagination of what work means in reality” (FISCHER, 2010 [1971], p. 24). If Fischer is right, a human being with this exceptional capability, can do more common good if s/he can use his or her thinking skill well. In this regard, Simone Weil once said: “What we know in advance is that life will be proportionately less inhuman according as the individual ability to think and act is greater” (WEIL, 1973 [1955], p. 122). In the same vein, Sandel (2005, p. 168) argues: “As a self-interpreting being, I am able to reflect on my history and in this sense to distance myself from it”. Indeed, using philosophical reflections, human beings may solve many of their problems, establish better and durable relationships among themselves, and reduce their misunderstanding, humiliation, division, and suffering (see appendixes [poems] A, B, C, D). In the same vein, Harris (1996, p. xvi-xvii; see also HARRIS, 1997, p. 1)) reminds us of the crucial importance of verbal messages in human life. He writes:

Verbal messages, on the other hand, are not subject to any such limitation (comparing to limitation of the traffic lights and the system of signals indicating ‘stop’, ‘go’, etc.). We can and do – apparently - discuss words by citing them. We argue about what they mean. We advocate - or denounce - linguistic innovation”. Here again, in my opinion, we should appreciate the fact that philosophical reflections are the outcome of the verbal messages and their connection that makes communication possible in human beings’ existence - hence, an outcome of integrationism as “[...] a view of human communication in general (HARRIS, 1998, p. 8).

How can integrationism promote artistic creativity, human diversity, and sustainable development for all in the age of globalization? Integrationism can influence three dimensions: *existential justice*, *existential literacy*, and *sustainable transformational interculturality*. By *existential justice*, I refer to the understanding that as human beings, beyond our cultural, racial, class, gender, sexuality, and age difference, we are all endowed with unalienated rights and dignity and that we all and our distinct environments deserve to be treated with the absolute respect and recognition. It is through this respect and recognition that our capabilities are adequately recognized, praised, used, supported, and rewarded. Hence, no human being deserves less respect than another human being (MILLER, 2013; SANDEL, 2010). By *existential literacy*, I refer to the strategic capability acquired through various mindful life experience (family, schooling, community, friendship, media, sport, and so on) that facilitates the circumstantial adjustment to the acquisition of new mindful experiences and to the creation of new capabilities leading one to living a more humane life and enjoying a dignified human existence within the responsibility for self and others (DWORKIN, 2006; GEE, 2017; JACOBS, 2014; NUSSBAUM, 2011). And finally, by *sustainable transformational interculturality*, I refer to an exemplary leadership mindset,

sensitive to human diversity, appreciative and supportive to individual and collective creativity, and caring for cultural diversity as universal cultural resource for our common humanity. It reflects the understanding of communicating beyond language in building durable relationships and in fostering equitable prosperity for all and unity within diversity (Blewitt, 2018).

Rymes (2014) shares with us an observation regarding how, drawing on their own skills, students in a classroom created projects that were compelling to them and to their peers. For example, Rymes (2014, p. 115) writes: “They were not only communicating with their teacher, or some imagined ‘academic English’ speaking audience. They were communicating with their peers, speakers of at least 15 different languages”. Why is this observation important in the context of *sustainable transformational interculturality*? Rymes (2014, p. 115) explains:

This is important not only to the group formation within this classroom but to their future as communicators outside of this classroom. In the poetry in Translation assignment, students were nudged to call on a communicative repertoire that includes not only multiple languages but, through the web and movie-making software, multiple modalities”.

She adds: “They were being prepared, by communicating beyond language, for everyday encounters with diversity” (RYMES, 2014, p. 115). I agree with Rymes that students in this observation were being exposed to strategies of handling communication and intercultural lifestyle in an intercultural world (GUILHERME, 2002). They were also being exposed to existential literacy and sustainable transformational interculturality in that, the understanding of these strategies related to existing or being present in a multilingual/multicultural space - a space where using multiple languages within a communicative event should not be perceived as a problem but as an important communicative self-and-group-management skill. This integrationist thinking helped these students understand that all cultures and all languages matter in managing learning processes in the age of globalization and enjoying this age of interdependence and diversity (LODGE, 1995; STIBBE, 2011). This mindset should help everyone adjust to circumstances of life in the age of globalization, prompting one to think and act for the common good at the best of his or her ability all the time, if one is to participate in building a common better and dignifying future for all (HUTCHINSON, 2016; LANZÓN, 2009; RICOEUR, 2020 [1917]; VERA; KENNY, 2013).

3 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this study has analyzed how the work of Roy Harris, especially his theory of integrational linguistics, also known as integrationism, and his analysis of *artspeak* can be a significant theoretical and practical resource for the humanities, the social sciences, and related fields of investigations in the age of globalization. The relevance of integrationism in fostering artistic creativity was demonstrated by the fact that we are “interdependent beings” (NATHAN, 2010, p. 4), hence, segregationist thinking is misleading and may not reinforce our capabilities in dealing with other social realities in an intercultural and complex world (CANCLINI, 1995; 2014; GUILHERME, 2002; NUSSBAUM, 2011; TUBINO, 2015). On the contrary, integrationism advocates for solidarity or unity within diversity. Hence, if applied in social and public policies across sociocultural, politico-economic, moral-environmental, and technological individual or collective planning, individual and collective’s chances for sustainable development may increase. This study has proposed three dimensions in which integrationism promotes artistic creativity, human diversity, and sustainable development for all in the age of globalization: existential justice, existential literacy, and sustainable transformational interculturality. In a world of multiple identities and complexities, integrationism rejects epistemic injustice and all its dominant-culture paradigm implication (FRICKER, 2007; SHERMAN; GOGUEN, 2019). It promotes a discourse of justice as freedom and prosperity for all (BALOSA, 2020; BENHABIB, 2002; CANCLINI, 2001).

As observed in the analysis of *artspeak in this study*, the capability of human beings to transform nature demonstrates that if human beings can think and act in the right way, they are able to reduce the inhumane way of life and of relationships between diverse human beings and diverse cultural, linguistic, and environmental landscapes (SANDEL, 2010; FELTEN; LAMBERT, 2020; WEIL, 1971[1934]). I hope scholars, students, and interested individuals who would be interested in Roy Harris’s work, will find a way that integrationism fits their interest. I also hope that this study has set a tone for that purpose. The three dimensions I have proposed in

response to my research questions (existential justice, existential literacy, sustainable transformational interculturality), none of them operates in a segregationist way. On the contrary, as a continuum, they are interdependent and operate within an integrationist framework. Human, cultural, and epistemic diversity contribute to the creation of a significant landscape of capabilities in fostering existential justice, existential literacy, global intercultural citizenship, human dignity, and a better common future for all (RICOEUR, 2020 [1997]). I hope that when most people become aware of integrationism and start applying this set of capabilities in their work and their lives, they may become more conscious of our common humanity. That is, there may occur public and social policies based on a more meaningful balance and on more politics of empowerment in handling relationships and adjusting to intercultural imperatives of the age of globalization (BATES, 2005; MORITSUGU ET AL., 2017; WEISSBERG, 1999). Hence, this new mentality acquired through integrationism may prevent them from engaging in unnecessary conflicts, mutual disrespect, and exclusion that are contributing to poverty, underdevelopment, humiliation, self-destruction, destruction of minority individuals and their community artistic creativity, leading to generalized inhumane injustices that cause the misfortune of mankind across the world (HOFFMAN, 2000; MITTLEMAN, 2010; SACHS, 2020; STETSON, 1998).

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APPENDIX A

All The Saints Cannot Swim - poem

All saints are not the same
 No Saint has a namesake
 Nor they play the same role.
 Like integrationist thinkers
 Saints are creators and actors
 in the global space.
 Swims who may swim
 Flies who may fly
 Runs who may run
 Walks who may walk
 All saints cannot swim
 But they remain saint.

-David Balosa

Appendix B

The HOUSE City – Poem

Where are integrationists today?
 In the HOUSE city!
 Which city is that?
 The HOUSE!
 H as Humanity
 O as Order
 U as Unity
 S as Security
 E as Equity.
 Oh my God!
 Indeed!
 Take these roads
 They will lead you
 To the HOUSE city.
 There, integrationists
 Meets and plans.
 You are welcome to stay.

-David Balosa

Appendix C

The Mind of Integrity - Poem

Capability, sagacity, equity,
 Legitimacy, humanity, humility

Build solid community!
 Like the competency of a spider
 In building its existential web.
 It is a reality, a legality in integrity
 In navigating inclusivity and diversity
 Toward the festivity for infinity
 At the end of corruptibility,
 Criminality, and partiality,
 The head, the heart, the hands
 The feet and the land of segregationism.
 A mind of integrity kind like time
 But firm and straight like a line.
 A second is a second,
 A minute is a minute,
 An hour is an hour,
 Firm and fine
 Like a line once upon a time
 Putting order in life
 Side by side like the wheels
 Of a machine running
 In harmony, integrity
 Humility in the same direction.
 It is to your credit
 Our invention, convention,
 intervention, integration.
 You mind of integrity!
 You shine like a morning sun
 Your eyes and feet are awake
 To save the world in decline.
 You taste like exemplarity,
 Touch hearts like sensitivity
 Operate like complexity and flexibility
 Simplicity, sincerity to infinity.
 You smile when you look at plurality
 Beauty, creativity, diversity
 harmony, humanity, equity
 fraternity, humility, unity.
 It's like smelling the great perfume of enjoy
 Peace and security being a mind of integrity,
 The mind of universality, particularity, interculturality
 The mind of creativity, diversity, and dignity.

-David Balosa

Appendix D

Existential Unity - Poem

To you,
 Humiliations are tasteless
 Words of domination useless
 People from all poles kindless
 Their policies worthless and mindless
 Their talk about peace pointless

To you,
 the world glories crucify humility.
 Like under the boiling water,
 they terrify minorities and individualities.
 Capital and local regions testify,
 communication and segregation in society signify,
 integrationism as existentialism may notify
 individuals' creations to identify
 not within discriminatory humanity
 but within human dignity!

To you,
 the discriminatory humanity has grown
 no trees, no spaces, no peace
 in communities for all humanity to dignify!
 All is dry no matter how much cry!
 It is right to write about it this night,
 no matter what the fight for might may be!
 Who would call for an existential unity
 in modern circles of glories?
 Who would proclaim our common world of fraternity
 to pacify, to purify, and to dignify?
 Who would teach peace to our birds, fish, and animals
 —our forests and mountains, valleys and hills, rivers, and seas?
 Who would communicate with peace
 to our children,
 to people of all races, all ages,
 to all cultures about divine unity and diversity?

To you, when an existential unity will inhabit our minds and hearts,
 Curses and humiliations will leave the hands of the humiliators
 and will clean the mouths of the oppressors and tormentors.
 Afresh, a dignified universal brotherhood will ring our doorbells
 and will disseminate messages of solidarity in our cellphones—
 Unity within diversity and integrity is an existential reality and stability
 empowering individual creations and communications to their elevation.
 At the evaluation, we shall all share hugs of unity, equity, diversity, and dignity!

-David Balosa

“RACIALIZAR” A LINGUÍSTICA OU QUESTIONAR O VERBO “RACIALIZAR”?

¿“RACIALIZAR” LOS ESTUDIOS LINGÜÍSTICOS O CUESTIONAR EL VERBO “RACIALIZAR”?

ON ‘RACING’ LINGUISTICS OR ON QUESTIONING TO ‘RACE’ AS A VERB?

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RESUMO: É muito comum, sobretudo nesta atual geração de pesquisadores dos estudos linguísticos, o uso da palavra “racializar” como problematização do racismo nos estudos de linguagem em geral. Boa parte desses usos também tem ocorrido no Norte global, com o uso de termos como *linguagingrace* ou *racinglanguage* (ALIM, 2016), que Severo (2019) nomeia como “linguistificação da raça” ou “discursivização racial da língua”. Porém, a palavra que mais tem crescido é justamente o termo “racializar” que, entre seus mais diversos usos, tem sido usado como forma positiva de marcar o sujeito branco e o racismo por trás das instituições. Eu mesmo, em Nascimento(2019), propus *racializara* branquitude no discurso. Neste ensaio me proponho a debater criticamente os mais diversos usos de racializar para, a partir daí, propor uma crítica ao termo, tendo em vista seus limites.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Racismo. Racializar. Linguística.

RESUMEN: Es muy común, especialmente en esta serie actual de investigadores de los estudios lingüísticos, el uso de la palabra “racializar” como problematización del racismo en los estudios lingüísticos en general. Gran parte de estos usos también se han producido en el Norte global, con el uso de términos como *racing a language* (ALIM, 2016), que Severo (2019) denomina como “lingüistificación de la raza” o “discursivización racial de la lengua”. Sin embargo, la palabra que más ha crecido es precisamente el término “racializar” que, entre sus usos más diversos, se ha utilizado como una forma positiva de marcar el sujeto blanco y el racismo detrás de las instituciones. Yo mismo, en Nascimento (2019), lo propuse racializar la blancura en el discurso. En este ensayo propongo debatir críticamente los más diversos usos de la racialización para, a partir de ahí, proponer una crítica del término, en vista de sus límites.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Racismo. Racializar. Estudios lingüísticos.

ABSTRACT: It is very common in these days the use of *to race* as a verb by scholars in language studies. A great range of these uses come from the global north with the use of *linguaging race* or *racing language* (ALIM, 2016), what Severo (2019) terms in

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Portuguese as *linguistificação da raça* or *discursivização racial da lingua*. Although, the use has been increasingly present rather than what we have been said through diverse uses. I myself in Autor (2019) proposed that name as a way to mark whiteness in discourse. In this paper I seek to discuss to embrace the criticism to the many ways of how to use that verb (*racing*) to understand the existing boundaries in the use of that word in linguistics.

KEYWORDS: Racism. Racing. Linguistics.

1 A INVENÇÃO DA RAÇA: UMA DISPUTA NECESSÁRIA

Durante muito tempo, o termo *raça* foi um item presente com bastante naturalidade em estudos biológicos ou sociais, graças ao raciocentrismo, isto é, uma formação ideológica vigente e raciológica, que é comumente chamada de racismo, mas, na verdade, é sua versão ideológica. A essa versão ideológica do racismo temos chamado de racialismo (APPIAH, 1997) e racismo científico (MUNANGA, 2004).

De fato, o racismo científico não é tão científico quanto parece, se por ciência esses estudos entendem evidências analisadas em sua completude. Estudos demográficos e sociológicos, com alto teor biologicista, sobre o negro vão se amontoar nos últimos séculos de escravização¹ formal, e não desde o início, comprovando a ideia de que esses supostos estudos não passavam de um *mea culpa* do europeu travestido no seu pior, a tentativa de culpabilizar o africano por ter sido escravizado. Ou seja, o racismo científico é a visão ideológica do racismo que, confrontado pelos próprios escravizados, busca uma saída para que não possa dividir o mundo do trabalho livre com negros e mestiços com essa culpa em suas costas. Mais do que isso, como lembra Moura (2014), essas visões levam a crer que os escravizados não são capazes de se adaptar ao mundo livre.

A palavra *raça*, que vem sendo difundida no ocidente, pelo menos, desde o século XVI (MBEMBE, 2014), quando se deu o início do apogeu do tráfico negreiro, foi sendo incorporada por essa raciologia da invasão colonial no mesmo momento em que línguas modernas eram inventadas (MAKONI; PENNYCOOK, 2006). Essas línguas modernas são invenções também coloniais namedida em que elas surgem para dissimular no europeu a ideia de uma cidadania moderna, que aqui identificamos como branquitude. Isto é, ao passo que a *raça* se torna um conceito usado na modernidade, a escravização dos africanos é expandida e as próprias línguas modernas, como invenção desse europeu branco, são difusoras de uma ideia de *raça*.

A partir da década de 60, com os estudos culturais, o pensamento das ciências humanas começa a questionar a palavra *raça*, sobretudo por causa dos desdobramentos da Declaração das Raças da UNESCO em 1950, que considerava que só existia uma *raça*, a *raça humana*. Como sabemos, esse pensamento também foi apropriado pelas forças racistas no ocidente já que, com esse entendimento, vários foram os movimentos que argumentavam em favor da não existência do racismo, tendo em conta que a *raça* não existia.

Como Hall (2003) argumenta, não basta mudar *raça* por *etnia*, pois ambas são categorias discursivas, simbólicas e sociais. Mais do que isso, é preciso combater aqueles que acham que *raça* surgiu antes do racismo. Como estou tentando argumentar aqui, *raça* passa a ser um construto da formação ideológica que chamamos de racialismo, que é um conjunto de entendimentos dos últimos séculos de escravidão oficial. Porém, esse conceito, usado primeiro no mundo da Botânica, é uma consequência direta do racismo como formação histórica e de sua apropriação nas diversas sociedades ocidentais. Ou seja, mesmo queração exista biologicamente, mas sim discursivamente, racismo existe porque não depende da existência de *raça* como uma categoria, sendo uma visão ou formação histórica do colonizador branco na invasão colonial.

O retorno da categoria *raça* entre nós, em resposta a esse racismo cordial que no inglês tem sido chamado de *color-blindness*, é o que permitiu a disseminação do termo *racializar*, inclusive no campo dos estudos linguísticos. Para responder a esse racismo

¹ Nós, estudiosos das questões raciais no Brasil, preferimos o termo *escravização* à *escravidão* porque escravidão não pressupõe o processo e transparece como um produto apenas, sem a devida denúncia à genealogia do processo escravocrata.

disfarçado de uma ideia de mundo pós-racial, o uso de *racializarem* se referido a provocar uma análise discursiva da racialização em um dado campo.

O grande problema da palavra *racializarem* está nos construtos que nos trazem até aqui. Racializar, e não somente marcar o não marcado no discurso, que são formas pelas quais o racismo atua, durante séculos foi uma forma de organização da vida, uma formação histórica. Retomando Robinson (1983), o racismo é uma construção da modernidade, mas tem raízes profundas na idade média europeia, levando à criação de um sistema econômico, o capitalismo, profundamente racializado.

Essa provocação nos ajuda a entender que racializar, mais do que provocar o debate racial contra ideologias que apagam a importância do debate, promove um racismo cordial, isto é, um racismo que se torna o que é ao negar a existência do racismo para desidentificar o negro e produzir a visão de que não somos racistas (TURRA; VENTURI, 1995).

Racializar estaria, portanto, ligada não à sua linguistificação (ALIM, 2016; SEVERO, 2019) após o século XVIII, quando os estudos supostamente científicos usavam o corpo negro como *token* de estudos para justificar a supremacia branca no ocidente, e usavam a linguagem para explicar o que seria o negro em termos racioculturais em sua alugada inferioridade, mas como estruturação das condições anteriores até ali. Isto é, até que os primeiros trabalhos sobre o negro e o escravizado em geral passassem a ocorrer na voz de diplomatas, cientistas, escritores, com rumor racialista, o racismo como formação histórica, como princípio de organização e hierarquização do mundo moderno e, por consequência, do capitalismo, que passamos a chamar de capitalismo racial.

Portanto, estamos tratando de um outro uso de *racialização*, que busca responder ao racialismo e não ao racismo, mas que provoca discursivamente o espaço supostamente neutro a partir dessa leitura.

Araçá é uma invenção (APPIAH, 1997), tal como a própria África (MUDIMBE, 2013), com a ideia de gênero (OYEWUMI, 1997) e as próprias tradições africanas (RANGER, 1983). Isso implica em dizer que, se todos esses conceitos foram inventados (MBEMBE, 2014), as próprias línguas ocidentais pelas quais essa taxonomia passou a existir são invenções (MAKONI; PENNYCOOK, 2007).

Problematizar a ideia de invenção nos permite problematizar o escopo deste texto, a ideia de “racializar”. Eu mesmo, em um trabalho anterior, disse que:

Racializar [os brancos], portanto, não é praticar racismo reverso (o que é uma improbabilidade histórica). Ao contrário, é uma forma de alertar sempre ao sujeito branco que ele não é universal. É um modelo de desnudar o discurso da branquitude enquanto poder e dizer ao próprio branco que eles não são todos iguais e, entre eles, a proximidade com os povos colonizados pode gerar represálias. (NASCIMENTO, 2019, p. 109)

Pensar em invenções nos faz pensar em como nomes são inventados. Neste momento, mais do que nunca, precisamos colocar nomes em xeque porque eles não são somente partes de uma taxonomia. A palavra “racializar”, que guarda traços de sua diacronia, não tem necessariamente mais relação direta com sua origem pelo que Derrida (1973) entendia como suplementação durante o processo de *provisoriedade* do signo como elemento linguístico ou semiológico. A palavra *denegrir*, por exemplo, existe desde antes o nascimento do *negro* como concepção colonial e racista no ocidente (que passa a existir com o processo escravista). No entanto, embora a palavra no latim vulgar tivesse sido usada para falar de algo manchado, e não escurecido no sentido do racismo de séculos subsequentes, é nesses séculos de escravidão que sua diacronia, tanto linguística quanto semiológica, vai ser reconstruída dentro das línguas nacionais a partir do século XVI.

Ou seja, apesar de que a origem de uma palavra não seja racista, sua trajetória pode torná-la. O mesmo acontece com o termo *negro* que, a partir do século XVI, passa a se disseminar como algo negativo e na atualidade, principalmente a partir do movimento negro e da corrente chamada de *Negritudee* do sentimento *Black is beautiful*, tem se reconstruído. Além disso, lembrando a Gates Jr. (1988), no próprio processo de escravização, escravizados estavam sempre modificando a estrutura desse signo, como traduzi em Nascimento (2020), como segue:

SIGNIFICAÇÃO PADRÃO DA LÍNGUA

$$\text{Significação} = \frac{\text{Significado}}{\text{Significante}} = \frac{\text{Conceito}}{\text{Imagem acústica}}$$

Nesse primeiro exemplo, o significado, construído a partir do referente do mundo, o corpo negro escravizado, é alinhado ao significante [ˈneɪrɔ], ou *negro* em sua vertente escrita. Isso, portanto, do ponto de vista do colonizador branco, que passa a chamar aquele corpo de várias origens naquele continente que esse europeu já vinha chamando de africano por um único nome, ou uma unidade (GILROY, 2001; FANON, 2008).

Temos presenciado dois grandes movimentos entre as correntes mais conhecidas do pensamento negro contemporâneo, que tentaremos sistematizar. Uma delas é aquela iniciada por Fanon (2008), que critica o humanismo que desidentificou e colocou o corpo negro ao lhe impor esse conceito, numa zona de não existência, a zona do não-ser. Outros exemplos desse pensamento são Césaire (1971), Appiah (1997), Mudimbe (2013), Mbembe (2014) – entre outros pensadores. Essa corrente olha criticamente o conceito de raça, o afasta do seio africano como essência e pondera críticas ao essencialismo da razão colonial branca e da própria razão negra nas guerras pró-independência dos países africanos. Há, portanto, o projeto de um novo humanismo e da redução do pensamento branco como reeditor e revisor desse signo.

Do outro lado, há uma corrente que integra os estudos antirracismo e críticos dos Estados Unidos, como a Teoria Racial Crítica, que entendem a necessidade de pensar esse signo e editá-lo através dos direitos civis. Pan-africanistas como Alexander Crummell ou W. E. B. Du Bois² são inspiração para uma geração (CREENSHAW, 1989; LADSON-BILLINGS; TATE, 1995, entre outros) que passa a disputar, no âmbito dos direitos civis o conceito de *raça*. O próprio Gates Jr. (1988), que não está no centro dessa corrente, entende que a tal significação padrão da língua passou por edições dos escravizados durante o processo, restando assim:

SIGNIFICAÇÃO NO VERNÁCULO NEGRO

$$\text{Significação} = \frac{\text{Figura retórica}}{\text{Significante}}$$

Fonte: Retirado de Nascimento (2020), traduzido e adaptado de Gates Jr. (1988)

O vernáculo negro, já aprofundado na obra de Smitherman (1998), não deixou parado termos que vieram das significações escravocratas. Termos como *neguinho* e *nego*, usados positivamente entre pessoas negras mostram como essa disputa, independente do movimento negro institucionalizado, sempre existiu na língua pelas pessoas negras.

Embora neste texto eu esteja em parte entendendo esse papel estratégico do escravizado, também estou questionando a mim próprio e a outros linguistas que vêm falando em “racializar” a linguística. A seguir vamos tratar mais detidamente essa discussão sobre o referente (negro) para, por fim, tentar oferecer uma proposição.

2 IDEOLOGIAS LINGUÍSTICAS E RACISMO LINGUÍSTICO

A própria disputa em torno dos conceitos de ideologias linguística e racismo linguístico nos traz uma dimensão de quão atual são esses questionamentos. Como Kroskrity (2004), desde a década de 70, com Michael Silverstein, vários são as conceituações de ideologias que vão sendo disseminadas em diferentes campos dos estudos linguísticos.

² O pensador gostava de ser apresentado com as siglas, ao invés do nome na íntegra. Respeitaremos essa posição.

Silverstein(1976), seguindo Charles Peirce, analisa a linguagem e sua relação com a cultura através da performatividade. Para ele, ao apontar para algo (como indício, indiciamento ou relação de dependência com a coisa significada), o que cria as noções de uma relação que torna ambos indissociáveis, a linguagem e a coisa que ela aponta, o referente no mundo.

Isso nos ajuda a pensar em vários aspectos, por exemplo, que:

A linguagem é um sistema de comunicação que tem a mesma característica do resto da cultura. Assim, para distinguir a cultura em subpartes, nós tradicionalmente distinguimos tipos diferentes de eventos comunicativos na base da forma de apontar (indiciar). No caso da linguagem, esse meio é um discurso articulado, e eventos podem ser isolados nessa base. (SILVERSTEIN, 1976, p.13)

Ou seja, ainda que o autor estivesse preocupado em entender essa relação com o referente, ele estava prevendo apenas identificar e isolar os eventos comunicativos para entender como se formam essas ideologias que atuam na linguagem. No nosso caso, entendemos ser difícil recuperar o *corpo* por trás da linguagem somente por meio de eventos linguísticos, embora a análise seja no planolinguístico.

Kroskrity (2004) lembra também que, de maneira geral, as ideologias linguísticas são vistas como noções comuns da natureza da linguagem. Para ele, porém, isso é insatisfatório, pois não problematiza os aspectos que dizem respeito à variação de ideias, ideais e práticas comunicativas.

Na mesma visão contrastiva de Silverstein (1976), em que se buscava a relação entre a estrutura linguística e as ideologias linguísticas como atributo da cultura, Irvine e Gal (2000) enxergam a ideia de “diferenciação linguística”, isto é, como cada pessoa percebe a linguagem e a diferencia, os elementos para o entendimento de como a linguagem se relaciona com as ideologias. Ao retornar a vários desses elementos, Kroskrity (2004) apresenta a multiplicidade do que são as ideologias linguísticas como a percepção que os falantes têm das línguas que falam, a relação com as múltiplas variáveis que se relacionam com a linguagem (raça, gênero etc.), os diferentes graus de consciência linguística das práticas linguísticas em nível local, a mediação entre formas de fala e estruturas linguísticas nessas práticas e a forma como essas ideologias formam identidades sociais e culturais, como raça e etnia.

Apesar de ser bastante aprofundadas nos níveis antropológicos e linguísticos, o problema dessas definições de ideologias linguísticas é a visão ainda estática de cultura e ideologia como conceitos resolvidos. Se, por um lado, não podemos deixar um termo ideológico como *racializarse* esgotar no linguístico, não basta dizer que ele é ideológico puramente. Devemos, assim, localizar as contribuições das ideologias linguísticas recuperando a visão de ideologia na própria formação histórica, como o fenômeno que a concebe e não como aquele que vai gerar o contexto histórico homogêneo a partir de si.

O racismo, por exemplo, como tenho defendido até aqui, não é um fenômeno puramente ideológico, sendo sua compatibilidade ideológica difundida a partir do estabelecimento de línguas nacionais europeias. Daí deriva a discussão da palavra *racializar*. Se fosse apenas uma discussão linguística, nos níveis das línguas nacionais, bastava mostrar que seu uso sempre foi um horror e repeti-lo seria cometer racismo contra os brancos, o que mostraria que as pessoas negras são revanchistas.

Porém, o nível linguístico não pode se esgotar nas línguas ocidentais. É preciso recuperar os saberes ancestrais africanos para entendermos práticas pré-coloniais africanas de uso multilíngue, por exemplo (CANAGARAJAH; LIYANAGE, 2012), o que nos proporia novas relações de ideologias linguísticas.

O conceito de racismo linguístico (NASCIMENTO, 2019), por sua vez, foi cunhado para tratar não do processo de linguistificação da raça, mas de racialização da língua. Nesse sentido, a racialização jamais poderia ser entendida como algo positivo ou ativista no sentido que aqui estamos problematizando, mas das práticas linguísticas que evidenciam o racismo explícito ou implícito desde a sua forma disseminada no texto até as práticas que lhe rodeiam. Palavras com teor racista como *macaco*, com uso metafórico, mediação da fala de pessoas negras, sempre agremiadas a intérpretes ou os próprios recortes de preconceito com variantes faladas

por comunidades com alta proporção de pessoas negras são alguns dos casos elencados para argumentar sobre a existência do racismo linguístico.

Embora o racismo seja linguístico, pois ancorado nas práticas linguísticas, ele cria relações com o dependente de formas distintas como a que percebemos na ideia das ideologias linguísticas. Não estamos falando apenas de percepções ou crenças, mas de co-naturalizações históricas, ao nível do que Alim (2016) e Rosa e Flores (2017) chamam de perspectiva raciolinguística. Essa panorama de discussões nos leva a identificar que a problemática de tais ideologias nos fazem questionar coisas como desde o uso de termos que identificam negativamente na língua tudo o que é ruim como negro até a inclusão de pessoas negras na situação de *sem língua*, sendo essas pessoas o principal alvo de violência linguística na escola. No entanto, ao questionar a ideia de ideologia fora de suas formações, essas teorias, o que inclui a perspectiva raciolinguística e o racismo linguística, precisam avançar na ideia de entender o que é esse referente no mundo, que é dito *negro* e racializado. Por isso, o questionamento da *nomeação* e do seu ato como colonial é importante para a dimensão do papel de teorizações que não reproduzam, sem mexer na estrutura, palavras como se fossem apenas a troca o principal produto que se quer.

A seguir vamos falar sobre a relação de racismo linguístico e línguas como invenções.

3 LÍNGUAS COMO INVENÇÕES E RACISMO LINGUÍSTICO

A fim de problematizar a ideia de *racializar* a Linguística é necessário analisar as relações entre a formação do racismo historicamente em sua dimensão linguística e a instituição de línguas como invenções.

Línguas são invenções ou regimes metadiscursivos (MAKONI; PENNYCOOK, 2007). Isso significa dizer que, se tomamos como exemplo a instituição das línguas modernas europeias, essas línguas foram inventadas a partir da sofisticação do protorracismo do europeu na Idade Média. À medida que a ideia de modernidade se fundiu com a ideia de branquitude (ALCOFF, 2015), os modos de falar dos brancos da Idade média passaram a ser uniformizados em torno da invenção de línguas como bandeiras unificadoras de uma nacionalidade branca. Segundo Makoni e Pennycook (2007, p.1, tradução minha)³:

Quando argumentamos que línguas são construídas, nós queremos ir além da ideia óbvia de que os critérios linguísticos não são suficientes para estabelecer a existência de uma língua (a velha língua/os debates sobre do que seja dialeto), no sentido de identificar os processos sociais e semióticos que levam à sua construção. Os processos coloniais incluem, por exemplo, o desenvolvimento de ideologias coloniais e nacionalistas a partir de programas de letramento.

O construto de línguas como invenções nos ajuda a combater, primeiramente, os aspectos que faltam ao trabalho de Anderson (1991) que, apesar de destacar a ideia de imaginação de si dos europeus, se prende à ideia de línguas como unidades essenciais. O trabalho de Makoni e Pennycook (2007) vai na direção de questionar a ideia do próprio linguista que, ao só enxergar norma ou unidade nesses falares, desconsidera falares que driblam as ideias tradicionais de norma.

Um exemplo disso é o crioulo, cuja discussão teórica no Brasil tem teimado em não ser aceita, a partir de dados socio-históricos, como existente no país (LUCCHESI, 2012). Essas visões, que nos veem à deriva, num eterno limbo, querem pensar crioulo como uma unidade linguística legitimada. Entretanto, haja vista que quem fala e teoriza crioulo são os linguistas brancos, em sua grande maioria, essa legitimação tem a ver com a própria forma da branquitude de inventar línguas, pensando nelas como unidades. Fanon (2008) tratou disso quando dissertou sobre a forma dos brancos não verem nos negros nem o crioulo e nem o francês, mas um *petit nègre*, isto é, um francês deslegitimado. Essa é a forma de se observar o português falado pelos negros brasileiros.

³ “When we argue that languages are constructed, we seek to go beyond the obvious point that linguistic criteria are not sufficient to establish the existence of a language (the old language/ dialect boundary debates), in order to identify the important social and semiotic processes that lead to their construction. Social processes include, for example, the development of colonial and nationalist ideologies through literacy programs”.

Naro e Scherre (2007) estão entre aqueles que negam a existência de um crioulo (isto é, de uma regularidade linguística produzida a partir do contato entre línguas que passou a ter sistema linguístico) no Brasil. Mais do que isso, eles fazem comparações entre dados do Brasil e do Portugal para afirmar a tese de uma transmissão linguística irregular para a formação do português, em que não se garante a existência de crioulos, isto é, da nativização de pidgins de base africana, por exemplo, por causa das condições de minorização desses povos, de sua composição etc. Principalmente, não buscamos debater essas hipóteses, mas questioná-las. A busca por uma regularidade linguística é um elemento importante na invenção de línguas (MAKONI; PENNYCOOK, 2007) como regimes metadiscursivos sobre os quais passamos a creditar as limitações de nosso tempo e das formas como somos enunciados e passamos a enunciar nossos interesses. Modesto (2015) analisou vários aspectos desse debate sociolinguístico e observou que, segundo Lucchesi (LUCCHESI, 2012 *apud* MODESTO, 2015, p. 103), Naro e Scherre (2007) buscam negar a influência dos africanos para a formação de uma identidade legítima linguística, em seu contexto de nativização como crioulo, mais do que apresentar fatos.

Em nosso caso, não me posiciono sobre a existência ou não de um crioulo africano no Brasil porque isso contradiz a crítica em torno de línguas como invenções, ou regimes metadiscursivos que venho fazendo a partir de Makoni e Pennycook (2007) neste trabalho. Além disso, quero debater as contribuições reais linguísticas dos africanos que tecnologicamente se mantêm vivas.

A modo de exemplo, o grupo Cortejo Afro da Bahia, contando sobre uma festa do Olubajé⁴ no Terreiro Ilê Axé Oyá, em Salvador, na Bahia, assim narra:

No ilê de Mãe Santinha de Oyá
Nega Tonha azuelo ajeum sa
O ogandi azuane azuelou
Adô alá olubajé ja comecou

Aê ajéumbó
Olubajé ajóumbó

No ilê de Mãe Santinha de Oyá
Nega Tonha azuelo ajeum sa
O ogandi azuane azuelou
Adô alá olubajé ja comecou

Aê ajéumbó
Olubajé ajóumbó

A canção reproduz um dos pontos mais tradicionais do candomblé, recolhido a partir de narrativas orais históricas. É, talvez, a primeira vez que eles aparecem no meio de uma histórica contada, que se passa nesse Ilê, ou terreiro.

As discussões sobre línguas como invenção nos permitem identificar que, para linguistas, é difícil entender que normas são negociadas a todo modo pelos sujeitos, para além de uma agenda evolucionista. No caso da canção, é impossível traduzir, mas é possível depreender que esse falar *para dentro* conta a história de um olubajé no terreiro até se encontrar com o famoso ponto *aê ajéumbó, olubajé ajéumbó*.

Ou seja, não é possível depreender em que ponto esse falar estratégico não pode ser considerado como crioulo, mas não podemos essencializá-lo como tal. Se, por um lado, isso questiona a própria ideia de não classificar esses falares por uma lente essencialista de crioulo, por outro lado, esse falar não precisa do linguista para ser legitimado como uma língua porque já é.

⁴ O Olubajé é uma tradicional festa africana ao orixá Omulu que, normalmente, acontece a partir de agosto.

A ideia de línguas nacionais ajuda a identificar que o racismo linguístico em sua formação significa a invenção de línguas modernas e nacionais como racistas, pois o próprio construto de línguas é um construto da própria branquitude que se inventa nessas línguas.

Na seção seguinte vamos apropriadamente nos deter em problematizar a noção mais contemporânea de racializar, meu objeto neste texto.

4 RACIALIZAR UMA LINGUÍSTICA RACIALIZADA? BRANQUITUDE COMO ESPAÇO DE RACIALIZAÇÃO

Acompanhando a discussão sobre racismo linguístico, ideologias linguísticas e línguas como invenções já é possível depreender que o nosso campo guarda em si vários aspectos ou vícios da própria modernidade colonial. Um deles é a construção da branquitude como poderio supremacista no ocidente.

O conceito de branquitude entre nós já passou por diversos momentos. Na década de 30 (MOREIRA, 2014), branquitude era vista pela Frente Negra Brasileira (MACHADO, 2020) como a qualidade do branco crítico. O grande problema, como discute Cardoso (2019), é que esse retrato da criticidade é mais abstrato do que real porque, ao invés de se provocar o que não é crítico, tenta se criar uma imagem do branco excepcional. O branco excepcional é um mito do próprio branco crítico (ALCOFF, 2015) sobre sua própria identidade como uma forma de se desresponsabilizar.

Uma das melhores noções sobre branquitude vem do trabalho de Bento (2002), que tira do terreno da consciência e da intencionalidade, e propõe o argumento psicossocial do *espelho* como um lugar em que a branquitude constrói seus valores.

No âmbito dos estudos linguísticos, ao não identificar o que seria esse *referente* no mundo, quando se trata do negro narrado, discursivizado etc., ou quando as diversas variáveis sociorraciais são pouco exploradas por trabalhos de sociolinguística variacionista, por exemplo, como se não fosse relevante deter-se em estudar primeiro os sujeitos para, a partir daí, propor como essas variáveis podem sofrer diferenças de acordo com posições não estáticas dos sujeitos.

Tenho, assim, por argumento que a linguística, ao ser preenchida, ocupada e racionalizada (tal como SILVERSTEIN, 1976 propõe sobre a lógica da indexicalidade), é racializada. Ou seja, o branco se constrói como construto universal nela ao passo que minoriza o externo, aquele que ele ou ela não tem que explorar em sua completude e tampouco trazer como *corpo* negro-africano aos estudos linguísticos.

Embora a branquitude seja discursivamente universal, reproduzo Cesaire (1971) ao entender que, ao produzir racialização e horror em sua brutalização escravista, o branco também criou antídotos contra si mesmo. Esse corpo branco no poder se universaliza como humano, mas seu próprio humanismo entra em crise. Seria preciso, portanto, retornar aos argumentos do racismo como anterior ao racialismo para entendermos que, até a produção dos discursos ideológicos do racialismo, a partir do século XIX, o branco tinha racializado o outro, escravizado, construindo em si os pressupostos que busca apagar.

Na Linguística brasileira isso é difícil de negar se verificarmos que os principais projetos são mediados sem intencionalidade, mas reproduzem o olhar branco nos mínimos detalhes, inclusive nos eventos. Nascimento e Windle (2021), em um fórum acadêmico de um periódico internacional, questionaram duramente o caso do evento chamado de *ABRALIN ao vivo* (2021), cuja série passou a ser questionada por não ter pensado em acadêmicos negros para falar dos diversos temas desde a sua concepção. Outro exemplo é a própria repetição de *falante culto* não problematizado no Projeto da Norma Urbana Linguística Culta (Projeto NURC), que passa a disputar os meandros da língua nacional brasileira com dados empiricistas. O grande equívoco é que, apesar dos dados serem relevantes para um retrato de falantes de uma dada casta ou classe, suas faces e classificações raciais são propositalmente universalizadas na categoria do humano, somente sendo possível depreender que se trata de uma maioria branca, por já sabermos

previamente que, como suas variáveis envolvem pessoas com formação universitária, essa não é uma descrição de uma massa de pessoas negras na década de 70.

Veja-se o caso dos Atlas. Boa parte dos estudos que temos hoje e que envolvem fenômenos de variação no chamado português brasileiro têm contribuição direta desse material. Também da década de 60, eles se assentam em estados com vasta população preta ou mestiça, como Bahia e Minas. O que gera espanto no caso desse material é que, também com rico e farto material e com problematização a partir dos métodos de censo, a sua razão de ser não sai do exotismo que são aqueles falares, como se não fossem retratos de outras normas nesse português.

A minha defesa aqui vai no coração da afirmação de que a ausência negra na linguística é uma prova de sua racialização, ou seja, do desaparecimento do corpo brasileiro que produz grande parte das falas nesse país de maioria negro-mestiça. A seguir, para finalizar, vou propor a reflexão sobre a necessidade de racializar a linguística sem perder os rumos dessa racialização já ocorrida.

5 RACIALIZAR O BRANCO NA LINGUÍSTICA: ALGUMAS PALAVRAS CONCLUSIVAS

Apesar das pessoas brancas terem racializado a partir da escravidão, racializar nem sempre tem o mesmo contexto. Se estamos usando racializar como discursivizar (SEVERO, 2019), precisamos ter a noção de que se pode racializar marcando o não-marcado (NASCIMENTO, 2021; MENEZES DE SOUZA, 2018), desde que não se ignore que essa é uma disputa do próprio construto do termo.

É preciso lembrar que, como já discutimos, há uma disputa em torno desse signo em muitas dimensões, não podendo esquecer suas dimensões originais, mas sem deixá-las subsistir sem nossas marcas. Marcar o não-marcado, mais do que apenas *racializar*, sem essas dimensões explicativas, é marcar o lócus de enunciação de cada uso ou autor que fazemos. Não há problema em dizermos origens brancas dos autores que fazemos uso porque foi assim que pessoas negras foram narradas em toda a sua história.

Por isso, racializar nesse sentido é retomar a localização do corpo branco no discurso, é linguistificar a raça ao passo que se discursiviza racialmente a língua, lembrando e responsabilizando o ato ilocucionário com perlocução (AUSTIN, 1962), provocando a inserção das pessoas que racializaram ou seus descendentes nesse espaço de responsabilidade no discurso para que a pessoa, em perlocução, aja e se mova.

Neste texto eu procurei trazer essas dimensões para percebermos que podemos mesmo falar em *racializar* linguística, desde que saibamos que estamos falando de uma linguística branca ocidental que, ao ser racializada, isto é, ao ter o seu branco racializado, se torna menos branca e vai se transformando em complementar, com a presença do corpo branco como mais um e não como o único universal, passando todos a serem representados como *corpo local*, com suas histórias de experiência vivida.

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(DES)LUSOFONIAS E (DES)ENSINOS: POR OUTRAS POLÍTICAS LINGUÍSTICAS

(DIS) LUSOFONÍAS Y (DES) ENSEÑANZAS: PARA OTRAS POLÍTICAS LINGÜÍSTICAS

(DIS)LUSOPHONIES AND (UN)TEACHINGS: FOR OTHER LANGUAGE POLICIES

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RESUMO: Neste artigo, objetivamos refletir sobre a discursivização da lusofonia como um projeto integrador da diversidade cultural e linguística dos países lusófonos, problematizando como o ensino de língua portuguesa promove um ensino decolonial (MIGNOLO, 2011). Na perspectiva integracionista (HARRIS, 1998), defendemos uma visão de linguagem integrada aos contextos de uso assumindo a língua como prática social e pensando na internacionalização da língua portuguesa num projeto plural e integracionista. No âmbito universitário brasileiro, apresentamos algumas ações institucionais promovidas pela Universidade da Integração Internacional da Lusofonia Afro-brasileira que contribuem para a construção de uma educação linguística integracionista. Igualmente, discutimos o ensino de língua portuguesa no cenário político-linguístico do curso de Letras dessa universidade na perspectiva de letramentos ideológico (STREET, 2014), antirracista (NASCIMENTO, 2019) e de resistência (SOUZA, 2011). Concluímos que ainda há um longo percurso para criação e manutenção de políticas públicas que assumam o compromisso com um Ensino Superior integracionista e democrático.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Integracionismo. Língua portuguesa. Ensino.

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RESUMEN: En este artículo, pretendemos reflexionar sobre la discursividad de la lusofonía como un proyecto que integra la diversidad cultural y lingüística de los países de habla portuguesa, discutiendo cómo la enseñanza de la lengua portuguesa promueve la enseñanza descolonial (MIGNOLO, 2011). Desde una perspectiva integracionista (HARRIS, 1998), defendemos una visión de la lengua integrada a los contextos de uso, asumiendo la lengua como práctica social y pensando en la internacionalización de la lengua portuguesa en un proyecto plural e integracionista. En el contexto universitario brasileño, presentamos algunas acciones institucionales impulsadas por la Universidad de Integración Internacional de la Lusofonía Afrobrasileña que contribuyen a la construcción de una educación lingüística integracionista. Asimismo, se discute la enseñanza de la lengua portuguesa en el escenario político-lingüístico de la carrera de Literatura de esta universidad desde la perspectiva de las alfabetizaciones ideológicas (STREET, 2014), antirracista (NASCIMENTO, 2019) y de resistencia (SOUZA, 2011). Concluimos que aún queda un largo camino por recorrer para la creación y mantenimiento de políticas públicas que asuman el compromiso con una Educación Superior integracionista y democrática.

PALABRAS-CLAVE: Integracionismo. Lengua Portuguesa. Enseñanza.

ABSTRACT: In this article, we aim to reflect on the discursiveness of Lusophony as a project that integrates the cultural and linguistic diversity of Portuguese-speaking countries, discussing how the teaching of Portuguese language promotes decolonial teaching (MIGNOLO, 2011). From an integrationist perspective (HARRIS, 1998), we defend a vision of language integrated to the contexts of use, assuming language as a social practice and thinking about the internationalization of the Portuguese language in a plural and integrationist project. In the Brazilian university context, we present some institutional actions promoted by the University of International Integration of Afro-Brazilian Lusophony that contribute to the construction of an integrationist linguistic education. Likewise, we discuss the teaching of Portuguese language in the political-linguistic scenario of the Literature course at this university from the perspective of ideological (STREET, 2014), anti-racist (NASCIMENTO, 2019) and resistance (SOUZA, 2011) literacies. We conclude that there is still a long way to go for the creation and maintenance of public policies that assume the commitment to an integrationist and democratic Higher Education.

KEYWORDS: Integrationism. Portuguese language. Teaching.

1 INTRODUÇÃO

A compreensão dos usos hibridizados de língua a partir dos efeitos da globalização, em que estão integradas pessoas e ambientes culturalmente distantes, indica um fenômeno linguístico mais dinâmico, que difere da perspectiva tradicional do monolinguismo tomado como norma. Diante da complexidade das práticas comunicativas em tempos contemporâneos e fluidos, este artigo tem em vista uma proposta de educação linguística integracionista (HARRIS, 1998).

Nosso enfoque é discutir o projeto político da lusofonia de uma maneira que problematize práticas segregacionistas de visão de língua. Ao tomarmos a língua como parte de um projeto político poderoso que reforça a classificação e a assimetria entre os sujeitos (MAKONI; SEVERO, 2015), propomos a problematização de categorias coloniais que inventaram os conceitos de raça e língua com finalidades segregacionistas. Dessa maneira, o multilinguismo e a diversidade cultural dos países de língua portuguesa devem ser debatidos de uma perspectiva integracionista, o que implica assumir um projeto decolonial problematizador de categorias cristalizadas e cristalizantes.

No artigo, apresentamos o contexto de criação da Universidade da Integração Internacional da Lusofonia Afro-brasileira, seus objetivos e missão que apontam para uma estratégia de uma política educacional de internacionalização e para uma política linguística integracionista tendo como pretexto a lusofonia. Pensar nessa lusofonia criticamente também envolve uma reapropriação do seu aspecto “luso” e uma reconfiguração dos aspectos de sua “fonia”, inclusive em termos decoloniais. Além disso, discutimos os grandes desafios sociais e políticos enfrentados na atualidade pela UNILAB, visto que recebemos estudantes de diferentes contextos culturais.

Assim, em uma mesma sala de aula de um curso de licenciatura, por exemplo, há estudantes brasileiros quilombolas, indígenas, residentes em centros urbanos do interior da Bahia, ou de áreas rurais, além de pessoas advindas de outros estados do país. Há também estudantes guineenses provenientes de capitais de províncias e de tabancas (aldeias) mais distantes. Há igualmente angolanos, moçambicanos, são-tomenses, caboverdianos e timorenses. Nesse contexto multicultural, no Campus dos Malês, situado na cidade de São Francisco do Conde (BA), mais especificamente, no curso de Letras, dedicamo-nos a pensar a formação inicial de professores de língua portuguesa. Desse modo, esse idioma que une tantas identidades diferentes em uma única sala de aula, igualmente nos suscita reflexões críticas sobre ensino e cultura.

Ao longo do artigo procuramos debater acerca das consequências da herança colonial para o ensino do português a esses diferentes contextos, e discorrer acerca do fato de que um ensino de língua que considere a cultura dos estudantes pode ser um importante caminho a fim de se contribuir efetivamente com a ampliação das práticas de letramento – objetivo essencial da pedagogia culturalmente sensível.

2 A INVENÇÃO E A ATUALIZAÇÃO DA LUSOFONIA

A discursivização sobre o projeto de uma comunidade lusófona intensificou-se no período (pós)colonial, cujo marco foi a criação da Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP), em 1996, em que o processo fundacional se baseou na partilha comum da língua e da cultura entre territórios que foram colônias de Portugal. Atualmente, o acordo político-diplomático está firmado entre Guiné-Bissau, Cabo Verde, São Tomé e Príncipe, Moçambique, Angola, Timor-Leste, Guiné-Equatorial, Brasil e Portugal (CPLP, 2021). Um dos grandes objetivos da CPLP é criar uma rede de cooperação internacional entre nações ditas lusófonas, ou seja, países que possuem a língua portuguesa como língua oficial.

A língua portuguesa parece ter funcionado como um instrumento para a reconstrução das “relações” entre os territórios que estiveram sob o domínio colonial português. Segundo Marchueta (2003), a lusofonia pretende reconstruir as relações entre os espaços e populações que estiveram sob domínio colonial de uma perspectiva moderna em que as ex-colônias se tornaram nações soberanas. A CPLP tornou-se um ator institucional relevante na mediação das relações internacionais lusófonas, com o pretexto da língua comum para promover intercâmbio de cooperação política, econômica e empresarial, constituindo-se como bloco político-econômico no cenário internacional. O caráter empresarial da CPLP nos últimos anos, especialmente após a inclusão da Guiné-Equatorial evidenciou interesses para além das questões linguísticas ou culturais – a saber, Brasil, Angola, Moçambique e Guiné Equatorial possuem potencial petrolífero –, o que tem contribuído para intensificar uma visão mercantil da língua. Isso faz com que, muitas vezes, as iniciativas em torno da difusão linguística operam mais segundo uma lógica da “economia linguística” do que da “Política Linguística” (LEVISKI, 2018).

No século XXI, em que a globalização é caracterizada por processos diaspóricos das mais diversas ordens – política, social, cultural, econômica e geopolítica (APPADURAI, 1996) –, torna-se uma tarefa complexa definir o que se entende por língua portuguesa (MOITA LOPES, 2013). Ancorados pela argumentação de Makoni e Meinhoff (2006) sobre a construção social e, portanto, discursiva das línguas, não podemos deixar de considerar que os projetos discursivos sobre a língua portuguesa são orientados por “ideologias linguísticas” (IRVINE; GAL, 2000). Deste modo, os saberes científicos sobre as línguas, bem como suas emergências em determinados contextos, são influenciados por modelos socioculturais, crenças, práticas sócio-históricas e visões de mundo.

Seguindo esse raciocínio, e tomando por base a perspectiva de que as línguas foram inventadas, como produtos de intervenção histórica e social (MAKONI; PENNYCOOK, 2007), postulamos que a língua portuguesa é uma invenção do dispositivo da lusofonia. A reboque da invenção das línguas, as categorias de raça e etnia também estiveram intrinsecamente envolvidas na invenção de povos e línguas durante o projeto colonial europeu (MAKONI; MEINHOF, 2006; MBEMBE, 2014). Além disso, importante trazer à tona a proposta de tradição inventada, de Hobsbawm (2015), a qual assevera que, na medida do possível, a língua é utilizada como legitimadora das ações e como coesão grupal, percebe-se um movimento de ‘busca’ – tomado como

invenção – de referenciais culturais e linguísticos do passado a fim de legitimar a criação de uma Comunidade que compartilha um dado passado em língua portuguesa.

Neste sentido, a proposta que fazemos é pensar em lusofonia como um dispositivo (FOUCAULT, 2015) político gerencial da língua portuguesa composto de elementos linguísticos, culturais, identitários, econômicos e coloniais (LEVISKI, 2020). No funcionamento desse dispositivo, a língua portuguesa fez/faz parte de um projeto político que, por vezes, reforça a classificação e a assimetria entre os sujeitos (SEVERO; MAKONI, 2015). Sendo um dispositivo, a lusofonia opera (e é operada) em uma rede discursiva que perpassa por relações de poder e ideologias próprias dos contextos situacionais como o colonialismo, o neocolonialismo e os discursos operantes da globalização.

Sob uma visão decolonial (MIGNOLO, 2011), convém problematizar as relações de poder que envolvem as práticas e os discursos que operam na invenção de categorias como supranacional, transnacional e global para a língua portuguesa que recaem sobre um necessário debate acadêmico e político sobre o ensino da língua portuguesa. Neste debate, estão envolvidas questões interculturais, políticas e linguísticas, em que se deve considerar: i. as variedades do português no mundo, além do português brasileiro (PB) e do português europeu (PE), como o português moçambicano (NGUNGA, 2012; BALSALOBRE, 2017; TIMBANE, 2017; GONÇALVES, 2012), o português angolano (BERNARDO, 2017; NZAU, 2011; MINGAS, 2007; MIGUEL, 2014; ADRIANO, 2015), e assim em diante; ii. as sociedades africanas multilíngues de tradição oral (FARDON; FURNIS, 1994), em que o português recebe o estatuto de oficial e as línguas africanas são denominadas de “autóctones” e/ou nacionais.

Ao colocar, então, em relação tais considerações, podemos evidenciar tensões que, às vezes, tendem a favorecer as políticas institucionalizadas em detrimento das demandas e das realidades linguísticas locais. Consideramos que tais conflitos devem ser levados em conta na análise do que se entende por língua portuguesa como língua de escolarização. Embora exista o empenho da CPLP e dos governos brasileiro e português – especialmente por parte de intelectuais engajados com as questões linguísticas – no reconhecimento de um pluricentrismo da língua portuguesa, as políticas oficiais de difusão da língua portuguesa estão muitas vezes dissonantes das políticas promovidas pelos Estados e por práticas linguísticas locais.

Dentro desse complexo jogo, os Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa (PALOP), por se tratar de contextos multilíngues e multiculturais, talvez tenham enfrentado insucesso devido à cópia de modelos de ensino estrangeiros, sem repensar a realidade local (TIMBANE, 2017; BALSALOBRE, 2017). Podemos pensar que são sociedades que estão em processo de (re)construção da língua portuguesa, que se distancia, paulatinamente, da variedade europeia e apresenta características linguísticas próprias em nível fonético-fonológico, sintático, semântico, lexical e pragmático. Uma insistência na preservação de modelos descontextualizados de usos linguísticos pode, por exemplo, agir de forma desagregadora, ou desintegradora, justamente por não atender satisfatoriamente às necessidades culturais e identitárias dos povos usuários. A língua portuguesa praticada em contextos multilíngues e multiculturais precisa, para fazer parte do repertório linguístico desses locais, assumir as peculiaridades de cada contexto, em consonância com o que vamos discutir sobre integracionismo linguístico na próxima seção desse texto.

Segundo Ofelia Garcia (2009), a educação no século XXI precisa assumir a tarefa de ensino multilíngue no sentido de investigar as práticas heterogêneas que integram o contexto de ensino/aprendizagem. A escolarização, em diálogos com concepções locais de educação e com apoio governamental, pode ajudar a reconhecer os significados que os sujeitos atribuem localmente às suas línguas. As práticas comunicativas precisam ser investigadas, ao invés de assumidas (BLOMMAERT; RAMPTON, 2011). Esse mergulho nas realidades locais dos usos linguísticos traz efetivas contribuições para o entendimento das adaptações pelas quais as línguas passam no cumprimento de seu papel cultural, identitário e comunicativo de cada grupo de indivíduos e, no caso da língua portuguesa em contextos multilíngues, contribui significativamente para a desconstrução de hierarquias e preconceitos linguísticos decorrentes da lógica colonial de valorização de uma única língua: a do colonizador.

Para pensarmos em uma internacionalização da língua portuguesa é preciso discutir, de forma paralela e conjunta, em uma política linguística de reconhecimento e valorização das línguas locais, fazendo com que o multilinguismo não seja encarado como

problema. Igualmente, uma política linguística que considera práticas comunicativas locais também enfrentará as questões relativas ao ensino das línguas africanas. Makoni e Meinhof (2006, p. 200), nessa perspectiva, defendem que “[...] línguas africanas não necessariamente têm de ser padronizadas para ser ensináveis”, o que significa que a representação gráfica de uma língua não deve ser condição para que ela possa ser praticada, valorizada e reconhecida. Tudo isso converge para a organização de políticas de ensino linguístico que levem em consideração as práticas e necessidades linguísticas locais, atreladas aos projetos nacionais e internacionais de cada contexto, observando que a realidade cultural local não pode ser assolada por um projeto estatal. Antes, a valorização das realidades locais deve conduzir as políticas de ensino linguístico dentro de uma pedagogia culturalmente sensível, conforme abordaremos na terceira seção desse texto.

A implementação de políticas de ensino de português, portanto, deveria levar em consideração as assimetrias das complexidades linguísticas, políticas, culturais e coloniais para se estabelecer como uma proposta de emancipação para o povo a que se destina. Pensando na realidade brasileira, propomos colocar em relação tais tensões e hibridizações da língua para repensar sobre as práticas de ensino na universidade brasileira, com objetivo de construir um projeto plural e integracionista de ensino. Nesse sentido, na sequência, discutimos a criação da UNILAB, em que 50% das vagas são reservadas aos alunos da “África Lusófona” e do Timor-Leste.

3 POR UMA EDUCAÇÃO LINGUÍSTICA INTEGRACIONISTA: UM OLHAR PARA A UNILAB

É importante ressaltar que uma abordagem integracionista da linguagem se opõe a uma linguística tradicional – em grande medida alimentada pela lógica colonial abordada na seção anterior – pautada numa forma muito limitada relativa ao que é entendido por “língua”. Uma limitação que descola o objeto língua de suas práticas de produção ocorrentes no cotidiano das pessoas, com suas singularidades, identidades e culturas. Dado que, de acordo com Calvet (2007, p. 12), “[...] as línguas não existem sem as pessoas que as falam, e a história de uma língua é a história de seus falantes”, desconsiderar as práticas linguísticas do cotidiano é desconsiderar o universo – real e simbólico – em que as pessoas interagem. Em suma, pensar a língua numa perspectiva integracionista é um contraponto à promoção de uma visão (e de discursos) sobre a língua que funcionam como agentes segregacionistas na sociedade.

Roy Harris (1998, p. 1) afirma que “[...] o principal objetivo da linguística integracionista é mudar o modo como as pessoas pensam a linguagem”, algo que, na visão do autor, é foco de muitas questões políticas, culturais e identitárias, participando ativamente das “[...] relações [dos indivíduos] com outros membros do que eles chamam sua comunidade ou comunidades.” (HARRIS, 1998, p. 4). Nesse enquadramento, a língua é vista como parte integrante dos contextos em que é utilizada, praticada e produzida, não havendo como desconectá-la dessas questões que são cruciais na produção de significados e saberes constituídos. Consequentemente, seguindo o raciocínio de Roy Harris, uma postura analítica que desconsidere essas questões provoca uma série de problemas como: o entendimento enviesado do conteúdo da linguagem e de seus usuários e a produção daquilo que o autor chama de “ficções convenientes” para a sala de aula, dentre outros resquícios do pensamento colonial. Em outras palavras, estes são exemplos de práticas desagregadoras, como mencionado na seção anterior, ou segregacionistas, a partir do entendimento distorcido da língua e dos sujeitos que a utilizam.

Persistem, em variados espaços sociais, discursos que segregam a partir dessa miopia linguística e que muito tem contribuído para ações discriminatórias de toda sorte como a misoginia, o racismo, a xenofobia, dentre outras. Trata-se, na verdade e infelizmente, de práticas bem comuns, que ocorrem dentro e fora dos ambientes formais de educação. Podemos citar aqui, por exemplo, a marcação com aspas destacando formas linguísticas cotidianas que não obedecem à chamada “norma culta”, como na fala de um entrevistado em um programa de televisão que teve sua fala legendada e marcada da seguinte forma: “Eles pediram ‘pra mim’ deitar no chão e fechar os olhos [...]” (BAHIA MEIO DIA, 2021). Também encontramos a segregação linguística respaldada por normas da escrita acadêmica que prevê o uso da expressão *sic*, que significa “desse jeito” em latim, quando se quer destacar os desvios da norma culta praticados em falas transcritas nos textos acadêmicos. Mais recentemente, também ocorreu o caso da

jornalista Cecília Flesch, do canal fechado GloboNews, que publicou um comentário pejorativo a respeito da fala do ex-presidente Lula por ter pronunciado “adevogado”, em vez de “advogado”. Isso sem contar todo o aparato crítico sem fundamento que foi mobilizado pela direita conservadora e pela grande mídia contra Dilma Rousseff por conta da forma “presidenta” utilizada por ela e por seu governo nas comunicações oficiais.

A perspectiva integracionista da linguagem traz à tona a necessidade de se buscar, através de orientações teórico-metodológicas incluídas e anti-hegemônicas formas de entendimentos linguísticos mais condizentes com a diversidade e com a dignidade humanas. Que abandonem o mito do monolinguismo brasileiro (OLIVEIRA, 2009; BORTONI-RICARDO, 1984; CAVALCANTI, 2000) respeitando as mais de 200 línguas indígenas brasileiras, os falantes de LIBRAS como primeira língua, as línguas de herança, os imigrantes em situação de refúgio e a diversidade própria da variante nacional da língua portuguesa.

Para além dessas questões, é importante pensar numa visão integracionista relativamente às políticas linguísticas para a internacionalização do ensino superior brasileiro, o que significa repensar a forma como são organizados os testes linguísticos praticados, os exames de proficiência linguística, como o CELPE-BRAS, e as avaliações linguísticas feitas em concursos variados que descartam/desvalorizam variantes endógenas e exógenas da língua portuguesa brasileira. Trata-se de práticas que impõem sanções a diversas pessoas em prol de uma postura política excludente pautada em visões limitadas do que vem a ser “língua”. Trata-se ainda de buscar mecanismos que não façam da “língua” um fator de exclusão, mas antes da “diversidade linguística” um pretexto para a inclusão e integração social.

Defende-se aqui a construção de uma educação linguística que abarque o papel sociopolítico da linguagem, considerando os atravessamentos coloniais vivenciados e as imposições de um imperialismo linguístico contemporâneo, que sempre atinge incisivamente os falares subalternizados envolvendo as questões de gênero, classe e raça. Essa educação linguística, totalmente em consonância com uma perspectiva integracionista da linguagem, atua na contramão da manutenção de epistemologias eurocentradas ou brasilcentradas de uma falta de vontade em buscar entendimentos contrários ao linguicídio (NASCIMENTO, 2019) promovido historicamente no Brasil.

Diante do exposto, passamos a olhar para uma política pública brasileira que, em alguma medida, busca atender a essas questões tratadas até aqui. A Universidade da Integração Internacional da Lusofonia Afro-brasileira – UNILAB – consiste num projeto de reparação histórica quanto às questões raciais tendo sido criada pelo governo do então presidente Lula, a partir dos trabalhos de uma comissão técnica instituída em 2008 que, para além das questões próprias relativas à implantação de uma nova universidade, também estudou

[...] propostas e diretrizes elaboradas por entidades vinculadas ao desenvolvimento da educação superior no mundo, privilegiando temas propícios ao intercâmbio de conhecimentos na perspectiva da cooperação solidária, além de sua aderência às demandas nacionais, relevância e impacto em políticas de desenvolvimento econômico e social. (UNILAB, 2018)

A partir de 20 de julho de 2010, portanto, o presidente Lula sancionou a Lei nº12.289, instituindo a UNILAB como Universidade Pública Federal que hoje, 11 anos depois, possui quase a totalidade de seus estudantes negros, negras e negres, a grande maioria de baixa renda, oriundos de zonas rurais e comunidades remanescentes de quilombos. Há um grupo considerável de estudantes pertencentes à comunidade LGBTQIA+. Compõem também o corpo discente cerca de 30% a 40% de estudantes estrangeiros oriundos da Guiné-Bissau, de Angola, Moçambique, Cabo-Verde, São Tomé e Príncipe e Timor-Leste. Há também estudantes participantes do Programa de Estudantes de Convênio de Graduação (PEC-G) vindos de Gana, Togo e da Guiné Equatorial. A sede da UNILAB encontra-se na cidade de Redenção, no Ceará, primeira cidade a considerar livres os negros e negras escravizados no Brasil. No Ceará, há ainda os campi de Palmares e Auroras. No estado da Bahia, mais precisamente na cidade de São Francisco do Conde, no Recôncavo Baiano, há o Campus dos Malês.

Diante desse panorama estudantil que a UNILAB possui, cuja diversidade cultural e linguística é grande, é pertinente trazer à tona a seguinte reflexão: “A UNILAB promove um integracionismo linguístico?” O conceito de “Integração”, que aparece no nome da universidade, possui, em alguma medida, uma preocupação com um integracionismo da(s) linguagem(ns) que convivem no ambiente unilabiano?” Essas e outras questões, nada simples, ainda que necessárias, precisam ser abordadas do ponto de vista do(s) currículo(s), das dinâmicas socioculturais e das políticas institucionais existentes na universidade.

Na dimensão curricular, talvez uma das possibilidades mais marcantes desse integracionismo resida na organização do curso de Bacharelado Interdisciplinar em Humanidades (BIH), um curso de três anos de duração em que, a partir do segundo ano, os/as estudantes escolhem a segunda graduação que pretendem concluir dentre as seguintes possibilidades: licenciaturas em História, Pedagogia, Ciências Sociais ou Bacharelado em Relações Internacionais. Isso significa dizer que, em cinco anos, os estudantes podem concluir dois cursos de graduação, dentro de uma perspectiva menos eurocentrada e que traz questões fundamentais para discussão em suas trajetórias formativas, como o colonialismo, o racismo e a educação antirracista, os direitos humanos e a igualdade social, dentre outros. Na proposta formativa de BIH, há uma flexibilização da trajetória curricular escolhida pelos/as estudantes no sentido de garantir-lhes certa autonomia quanto à sua formação dentro de estudos e temáticas que escolham aprofundar.

É importante destacar também alguns componentes curriculares do chamado “núcleo comum” a todos os cursos, que cumprem também um papel de integradores das diversas realidades sociais e culturais existentes na UNILAB, como “Sociedades, Diferenças e Direitos Humanos nos Espaços Lusófonos”. No universo do Curso de Letras, é possível destacar os estudos de literatura africana e afro-brasileira e os componentes curriculares “Estudo de línguas crioulas” e componente “Políticas e Planejamento Linguístico”, ambos componentes obrigatórios do curso. Isso sem contar os estudos de letramentos de (re) existência (SOUZA, 2011) e letramentos políticos (SILVEIRA, 2020) e antirracistas que permeiam diversas discussões promovidas sobretudo nas práticas de estágio supervisionado.

Quanto à dimensão sociocultural, a presença de alunos/as e professores/as de variados contextos nacionais e estrangeiros, por si só, fomenta conversas e práticas interculturais, nos ambientes formais e informais da universidade. Essa diversidade enriquece debates e estudos, amplia o repertório sociopolítico e contribui significativamente para a formação inicial e continuada de todos. O acontecimento de uma aula corriqueira ganha um incremento diverso e multicultural, proporcionando estudos comparados e aprendizados que nem sempre são planejados pelos/as docentes em seus planejamentos.

Em termos de ações institucionais, para além de políticas afirmativas e do trabalho do setor de assistência estudantil, há na UNILAB o “Programa Pulsar” que seleciona semestralmente estudantes bolsistas para realizarem o acolhimento acadêmico de estudantes ingressantes. O Pulsar promove rodas de conversas, minicursos, atendimentos individualizados no sentido de facilitar o processo de inserção universitária dos/das recém-chegados/as. Também se destaca o “Festival das Culturas”, evento realizado anualmente, cujo objetivo principal consiste na confraternização e convívio das manifestações culturais em sua diversidade unilabiana. O evento tem impacto regional, envolvendo as comunidades de São Francisco do Conde, onde está o Campus dos Malês, e das cidades de Candeias, Santo Amaro da Purificação e Madre de Deus. Isso sem contar os inúmeros projetos de extensão existentes e uma prática calorosa de um certo “Aquilombamento”, que fortalece essa resistência necessária com relação às práticas segregacionistas.

Certamente, há inúmeras questões de ordem individual, institucional e estrutural que fazem com que a UNILAB tenha ainda um caminho a percorrer no sentido de ser considerada como instituição modelo em termos de promoção de uma educação linguística integracionista. Contribuem para essa afirmação diversas razões que vão desde o processo de desconstrução colonial das mentalidades individuais, até uma vontade política institucional mais assertiva em prol desse integracionismo que está sendo discutido ao longo do texto. A UNILAB, seguindo orientações do governo federal, precisa avançar em termos de construir políticas públicas que venham a assumir, de fato, o compromisso com o Ensino Superior promotor de uma educação linguística integracionista e democrática, que combata veementemente os mecanismos segregatórios ainda vigentes.

4 POR QUAL ENSINO DE LÍNGUA PORTUGUESA?

Conforme debatido, a discursivização da lusofonia como um projeto integrador, sem estar associado a políticas linguísticas críticas, as quais legitimem a diversidade cultural e linguística dos países cuja língua oficial é a portuguesa, tem se consolidado como uma herança colonial que perpetua uma visão de mundo eurocêntrica e limitadora. Nesse sentido, com vistas a um projeto decolonial, aos profissionais da educação dos diferentes países que têm a língua portuguesa como língua de escolarização, é necessário questionar: qual é o ensino de língua portuguesa que efetivamente desejamos?

Ao se considerar o cenário político brasileiro, é possível observar que, fundamentalmente, até o período da ditadura militar no Brasil, era estimulado que o ensino de língua portuguesa ocorresse de forma acrítica. Amplamente baseado em metodologias behavioristas/comportamentais, o foco do ensino de língua portuguesa recaía em memorização da nomenclatura gramatical e na aplicação de regras gramaticais a exercícios prototípicos que pouco contribuíam com a ampliação do repertório comunicativo dos estudantes. No mesmo sentido, as atividades de leitura e de produção de texto – quando havia – pautavam-se em questões superficiais, que pouco estimulavam processos ideológicos de letramento. *Letramento ideológico* é, pois, um conceito proposto por Brian Street (2014), segundo o qual, por meio do ensino de língua materna, o estudante tem a possibilidade de aprender “modelos culturais de identidade e personalidade, não apenas a decodificar a escrita ou escrever com determinada caligrafia” (STREET, 2014, p. 154). De acordo com o autor, se esse modelo de letramento não for privilegiado como política linguística, as consequências sociais podem ser irreversíveis: “Se esse é o caso, então, deixar o processo crítico para depois que eles tiverem aprendido vários dos gêneros letrados usados na sociedade é descartar, talvez para sempre, a socialização numa perspectiva crítica” (STREET, 2014, p. 154).

Após o fim da ditadura no Brasil, a partir de 1985, houve alguns marcos legais que estimularam uma visão de educação mais democrática. Nesse sentido, a Constituição Cidadã de 1988, a Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação de 1996, a promulgação dos Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais a partir de 1998, criaram condições para que se estimulasse um processo de educação linguística no país. Nessa mesma direção, é imperioso salientar que, pelo menos desde os anos 1970, as universidades públicas brasileiras analisavam a língua em uso no país e estimulavam a sua descrição, também em uma perspectiva crítica.

Entretanto, o ensino de língua portuguesa alicerçado em gêneros textuais, que estimula tanto a ampliação do repertório comunicativo dos estudantes, quanto processos de leitura e de produção textual mais reflexivos, não chegou a adentrar as salas de aula de todo o país. Ainda que seja necessário salientar uma série de esforços nessa direção – como a criação e expansão do PROFLETRAS, cujo público-alvo são docentes já atuantes na área de língua portuguesa no Ensino Fundamental, a partir de 2013 – efetivamente, os processos críticos de letramento continuam a ser negligenciados no cotidiano escolar. Justamente por isso, a crítica feita por Magda Soares, em *Linguagem e escola: uma perspectiva social* (2017 [1986]) continua válida:

Muitos são os fatores responsáveis por essa incompetência, mas parte significativa da responsabilidade deve ser atribuída a problemas de linguagem: o conflito entre a linguagem de uma escola histórica e socialmente criada para atender às camadas privilegiadas, cujos padrões linguísticos essa escola usa e quer ver usados, e a linguagem das camadas populares, que ela censura e estigmatiza, é uma das principais causas do fracasso dos alunos pertencentes a camadas populares, na aquisição do saber escolar. (SOARES, 2017, p. 10-11)

Contemporaneamente, o processo de consolidação democrática do Brasil encontra-se em suspenso. A partir da destituição da Presidenta da República em 2016, tem havido uma série de ameaças à universidade pública e à sua autonomia, a partir de projetos como o “Escola sem partido” e o “Future-se”. Soma-se a isso, a promulgação da Base Nacional Comum Curricular (BNCC), em 2018 – a qual não contou com um amplo debate democrático – e a implementação da Base Nacional Comum para a Formação de Professores da Educação Básica (BNC). Fundamentalmente, atribui-se às dificuldades dos processos de ensino aprendizagem brasileiros aos profissionais de educação, silenciando o desmonte sistêmico da educação a que estamos assistindo, com cortes de verbas e de investimentos, e proposições advindas de agentes privados dentro do MEC.

Diante desse cenário pouco animador, como os cursos de licenciatura têm se colocado? Particularmente, como os cursos de Letras, os quais formam profissionais da área de língua portuguesa, têm se posicionado? Ao entendermos a gravidade da conjuntura política atual como um alerta – agravada pela pandemia de covid-19 – é essencial que os cursos de Letras observem seus projetos: quais professores(as) estamos formando? Eles/elas estão sendo formados para qual realidade social? Formamos docentes para a educação básica? Para qual educação básica?

Conforme anteriormente exposto, a UNILAB tem se mostrado uma universidade pública federal de vanguarda, em função de sua vocação multicultural. Nesse sentido, o seu projeto político pedagógico mira simultaneamente na interiorização e na internacionalização, de tal forma que, em uma mesma sala de aula de um curso de licenciatura, por exemplo, há estudantes brasileiros(as) quilombolas, indígenas, residentes em centros urbanos do interior da Bahia, ou de áreas rurais, além de pessoas advindas de outros estados do país. Há, nessa mesma sala, também estudantes guineenses provenientes de capitais de províncias e de tabancas (aldeias) mais distantes. Há igualmente angolanos(as), moçambicanos(as), são-tomenses, caboverdianos(as), timorenses. Assim sendo, se a língua portuguesa é um denominador comum a esses e a essas estudantes, de igual sorte, as idiosincrasias de cada um dos povos ali representados constituem-se elementos integradores, a fim de que essa língua portuguesa seja constantemente repensada e as suas variedades linguísticas legitimadas.

Particularmente, o curso de Letras da UNILAB (Campus dos Malês) conta com uma proposta pedagógica decolonial. Assim sendo, nos componentes curriculares de práticas de estágio supervisionado – especialmente em *Práticas de Estágio 02: alfabetização e letramento nos espaços lusófonos* – temos empreendido coletivamente reflexões sobre propostas de letramentos antirracistas (NASCIMENTO, 2019) e de letramentos de resistência (SOUZA, 2011); sobre os multiletramentos (ROJO; MOURA, 2012); sobre estratégias de ampliação do repertório linguístico crítico dos estudantes (ZILLES; FARACO, 2015; SCHNEUWLY; DOLZ, 2004). Ademais, aos debates desse componente curricular, são imprescindíveis as contribuições suscitadas pela pedagogia balanta (NAMONE, 2020), pela pedagogia das comunidades quilombolas, pela pedagogia das comunidades indígenas.

No contexto multicultural visto em uma sala de aula da UNILAB, dentre muitas reflexões pedagógicas essenciais, o sentido de “lusofonia” precisa ser continuamente avaliado. Assim sendo, debatemos que em países multilíngues, particularmente, em contextos em que a língua portuguesa não é língua materna, os processos de ampliação de letramentos necessariamente devem valorizar as línguas étnicas, bem como as suas variedades linguísticas e culturais, de tal modo que o ensino de língua portuguesa ocorra em função do que efetivamente é: língua segunda, ou terceira, ou quarta, a depender do contexto. Analogamente, mesmo dentre falantes da língua portuguesa, o sentido de homogeneização linguística precisa ser continuamente combatido, uma vez que as diferentes normas linguísticas encontram contextos sociais específicos de uso e, portanto, todas são igualmente legítimas e devem ter garantidos os seus espaços de escolarização.

Em suma, alicerçados em um modelo de *Pedagogia culturalmente sensível* (BORTONI-RICARDO, 2004, 2005; CYRANKA, 2015, 2018), segundo a qual professores(as) sensíveis à variedade linguística e cultural de seus/suas estudantes criam em sala de aula um ambiente de aprendizado em que todos e todas têm suas vozes reconhecidas e legitimadas, entendemos ser possível a formação inicial docente a partir de uma perspectiva crítica e decolonial. Portanto, à pergunta “Por qual ensino de língua portuguesa?”, acreditamos que um ensino avessamente proporcional a práticas de silenciamento e à manutenção de grupos historicamente hegemônicos nos países que têm a língua portuguesa como essencial é um possível caminho. Nesse sentido, para além dos enfrentamentos políticos empreendidos por toda a sociedade na direção de lutas democráticas, os cursos de formação de professores(as) têm um importante papel a desempenhar, a fim de contribuir efetivamente com a ampliação das práticas de letramento críticas das futuras gerações.

5 CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS

A abordagem integracionista nos estudos da linguagem, como discutimos nesse estudo, propõe uma educação linguística que lide com as questões das diversidades linguísticas de forma includente e respeitosa às práticas multilíngues. Nessa perspectiva, o mito do monolinguismo tomado como norma configura-se como ato segregacionista, interferindo negativamente – e por vezes, violentamente – nas existências e identidades linguísticas que convivem socialmente. O grande desafio imposto à linguística, como ciência, e às práticas educativas encontra-se em, tomando a diversidade por norma, integrar saberes e culturas em uma formação crítica, democrática e equânime.

Discutimos a lusofonia como um projeto político que mais segrega que acolhe, dentro do qual discursos e práticas coloniais reforçam abismos sociais e distribuem privilégios a partir de uma hierarquização social construída em torno da língua, portuguesa, no caso. No entanto, trouxemos à tona, a partir do caso da UNILAB, a construção repaginada da lusofonia numa perspectiva crítica e decolonial que abarca a diversidade linguística existente no seio da comunidade de falantes da língua portuguesa, destacando as riquezas e as potencialidades que um comprometimento com a descentralização linguística do poder pode proporcionar. Evidentemente, diante das lógicas coloniais ainda cristalizadas nas mentes e dinâmicas sociais, consistem em grandes desafios e, por vezes, entraves, para ações mais amplas e significativas nesse sentido, o que nos convida a repensar o conceito de língua, de ensino de língua e o papel da universidade quanto a essa questão. Por que ensinar língua? Para quê?

Diante dessas complexidades, emerge a capital importância dos indivíduos e suas culturas, de suas identidades e projetos de vida, de suas necessidades e anseios, de sua múltipla forma de “ser”, “estar” e “conviver” na sociedade. Não se trata apenas de discutir os objetivos da educação linguística para que a diversidade “caiba” nos espaços sociais de interação humana, mas, talvez, recriar esses espaços a partir de um trabalho engajado em termos de letramentos anti-hegemônicos que desfaçam as construções sócio discursivas que historicamente discriminaram, segregaram, desrespeitaram e fomentaram as exclusões em termos de raça, gênero, credo, classe, aparência física e língua. Trata-se, portanto, de um compromisso da agenda política governamental, científica, acadêmica e, mais especificamente, linguística, em prol de um integracionismo linguístico efetivo.

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