Pierre Bezukhov Becomes (Really) Russian: Some Issues of National Identity in Tolstoy’s Narrative and Life Experience

Abstract: This article seeks to analyze the weight and effects of the Western gaze (France’s in particular) in Tolstoy’s own life experience, and how it affected his literary production. The psychology of stigma provides some interesting insights as to how French opinions about Russia may have affected Tolstoy’s identity as a Russian, thus conditioning his choice of “identities” for the characters of some of his novels (for example, that of Pierre Bezukhov in War and Peace).

Keywords: Russian national identity, stigma, Tolstoy, France, civilization.

War and Peace, Love and Hate: as it is well known, Tolstoy’s narrative and political ideas are symbolically organized in fundamental dichotomies, which become visible in the very titles he gave to some of his works. This binary thinking often appears in his writings in the form of an initial situation marked by contradictions, anxieties and/or injustices (be it Russia’s present, or the life of one of his characters), which may somehow lead to another situation of reconciliation, inner tranquility, and/or social cohesion. Both his main political essays and his better known novels are really about proposing possible paths from the former to the latter. As many commentators of his
works have noted, this intention was not only aimed at finding ways out of the social turmoil of his times, but also at reaching that state of internal peace that Tolstoy’s tormented soul needed so badly. I would like to analyze here some issues of national identity in the way Tolstoy envisioned this “reconciliation”. Particularly, I am interested in understanding why Tolstoy used France and things French so often when he wanted to talk about a situation of lack of unity/inner peace that needed to be resolved (and, conversely, used Russia and things Russian to bring about that resolution).

Hints of this use of things French can be found in many of Tolstoy’s works, from Levin’s disapproval of Dolly’s “antinatural” way of speaking (in French) to her own daughter in Anna Karenina, to the many indications of a similar obsession for that language (or even for speaking Russian with a French accent) whenever he wanted to denote lack of sincerity in some of the characters of War and Peace (Figes, 2006, 151-52). But the best example is probably the famous episode of the encounter of Pierre Bezukhov and Platon Karataev in War and Peace. Pierre was a young aristocrat looking for authenticity and a sense of purpose in his life, like many Russians of his generation. Tolstoy used this character to symbolize the alienation of the Westernized elite with regards to Russia: Pierre was educated abroad; his very name was French. In addition, to emphasize his weak roots as a person, Tolstoy makes him a bastard son of a prominent count of the times of Catherine II. While in prison, Pierre learns about the execution of other prisoners, and he falls in a deep state of desperation and loss of faith. But then he meets Platon, another fellow prisoner who was, unlike him, an authentic Russian peasant. By being exposed to his deep religious faith and his typically “Russian” sense of community (which contrasted to the aristocrat’s individualism), and by listening to his simple words, Pierre finally experiences a sort of spiritual regeneration. Through this contact with the quintessential values of Russianness, Pierre finally becomes reconciled with himself and finds a way to a meaningful life (Tolstoy, 1966, I, pp. 1389-94 and 1496). In Tolstoy’s novel, the background of this story of personal regeneration is that of the defeat of the French armies, accomplished by the common effort of all Russians, finally fighting as a united nation.

This use of things French (bad) as opposed to things Russian (good) could easily be interpreted as simple “nationalism”, a typical 19th-century Russian quest for national authenticity and improvement in the situation of the narod. However, it appears to me that there is
more to be explored in this notable juxtaposition of nation, class and culture ("French"/upper/elite in the case of Pierre; Russian/lower/peasant in Platon) in the way the author presents his dichotomy. I will argue that, to some extent, this story of “reconciliation” by getting more in touch with things Russian (and conversely, by removing oneself from the “French” customs) can be interpreted also as an intellectual strategy to deal with the author’s own wounded identity as Russian. For Tolstoy’s sense of personal identity, like that of many 19th-century Russian intelligentsy, was deeply affected by the gaze of the French “other”. Let me explain myself.

I would like to argue that the normative pretension of the narrative of Western “civilization” –that is, the implicit and explicit regulation of what is “good” or “bad”– is bound to affect the self-perception of non-Westerners. The evidence of the subaltern role assigned in that narrative to the other nations, and their failure to measure up with the implicit norm of good (“civilized”) society, is very likely to condition the formation of their identities in a negative way, by introducing elements of frustration, anxiety, shame, guilt, and self-deprecation. And if this applies to any non-Western nation, it is especially so in the case of Russia. For my recent book Euroorientalism: Liberal Ideology and the Image of Russia in France, c. 1740-1880, I have carried out a comprehensive study of perceptions of Russia in France, from c. 1740 to c. 1880. In the period of my research, the narrative of Western identity made extensive use of Russia as an other through which to delineate itself. At least in nineteenth-century France, Russia was constantly and insistently depicted as Asiatic, barbarous, despotic, imitative, brutal, and void of all the elements that characterize civilization. As far as I know, similar stereotypes were also continuously repeated in Britain, Germany, and other countries. The amount of such deprecatory allusions is such, that one may confidently call it cultural harassment. And it is important to note that it was not just anyone’s views, but the gaze of the very nations that were supposed to embody the norm of civilization (sometimes even expressed in the works of the most authoritative and admired writers of the time: Rousseau, Diderot, Ségur, de Pradt, Custine, Hugo, Tocqueville, Michelet, Saint-Marc Girardin, etc.). The feeling of European “superiority” rested, to a large extent, on the construction of the other’s “inferiority”.¹ Undoubtedly, this sense of superiority helped not only to foster European identity, but also (as in self-fulfilled prophecies) to make that superiority “real”. But how can we assess the impact of this cultural harassment in the making of
Russian identity? What was the effect of the gaze of the “civilized” other on Russians?

In thinking through this issue, I found that the psychology and sociology of stigma might provide useful insights on the reactions of Russian culture to French/Western cultural harassment. The effect of stigmatization on the identity and psychology of racial minorities and other marginalized social groups –disabled, diseased, gays, women, unemployed, poor people, and certain “dishonorable” professions– has been the subject of numerous studies. Scholars have found that stigmatization usually “involves dehumanization, threat, aversion, and sometimes the depersonalization of others into stereotypic caricatures”, which can manifest itself from passive, seemingly “harmless” ways to the most violent forms (Dovidio et al., pp. 1-30, 1). Stigmatizing the other may serve a number of purposes, including fostering one’s own sense of self-esteem, dominating or excluding other groups, finding a scapegoat to channel social anxieties, controlling certain resources, and reinforcing social identities and/or hierarchies (Idem, p. 7). Charles Stangor and Christian Crandall have studied a particular type of stigmatization, directed against those who endanger “the belief in a just world”. Social order relies on the premise that the world is more or less fair for everybody. So, in order to protect this belief, factual evidence pointing to the opposite conclusion must be neutralized, by blaming the unfortunate for his or her own misfortune. Thus, for example, instead of considering that poverty constitutes a regrettable fact of an unfair world, it is explained by the “laziness” or “lack of intelligence” of the poor. In that way, the stigma becomes the revelation of the character or “essence” of the stigmatized, and the belief in a just world is thus maintained. Not surprisingly, scientific surveys have shown that those who have a strong “social dominance orientation” –that is, those who approve of strong hierarchies and social inequality– are more likely to stigmatize others.² The ideological function of the narrative of civilization, and the implicit subalternization of the non-Western other, may be analyzed in this light as a form of stigmatization.

But we are interested here in the possible effects on the subjectivity of the stigmatized. Scholars agree that stigma affects the formation of identity in a strong way. Stigmatized individuals, for example, tend to suffer from lack of self-esteem. Studies disagree on the level or continuousness of this affliction, but it is clear that the self-esteem and self-confidence of stigmatized individuals is damaged at least in some social situations.³ Stigmatized individuals may also suffer
from “stress” or “minority stress”, meaning a situation in which the “environmental demands, internal demands, or both tax or exceed the adaptive resources of an individual”; this kind of stress may seriously affect behavior and emotions. Stigmatized individuals often “internalize” the values conveyed in the stigmatizing regard of the other. This may result in self-hatred and victimization, “various patterns of withdrawal and defensiveness, passivity, in-group hostility and identification with the oppressors, as well as seriously impaired self-esteem”. In sum, stigmatization may produce a “devaluation of identity” or even a “spoiled identity”, which in turn may turn stigma into a self-fulfilling prophecy – the stigmatized ends up behaving in the way the prejudiced stereotypes presuppose.

However, different individuals and groups may respond differently and develop strategies to deal with stigma without fully internalizing it, or at least avoiding its most destructive consequences. Indeed, loss of self-esteem and the rest of the negative effects related to stigma do not follow automatically from stigmatization. For example, scientific surveys of racial minorities show that, in some occasions, the perception of the social discrimination they suffer as a group may be used to protect the individual’s self-esteem, for any personal failure or problem may be blamed on the discriminating others or “the system”. Similarly, as Derek Walsgrove has demonstrated, whilst most long-term unemployed tend to end up depressed, blaming themselves for their misfortune and “fantasizing the normal”, in some cases they may find alternative narratives that enable them to elude that fate – for example, by embracing a radical ideology that puts the “blame” in “the system”, or “the bourgeoise”. Can we find comparable effects of, and/or strategies to deal with (Western) stigmatization in Russian culture? As is well known, from at least the eighteenth century well into the twentieth century the Russian elite was educated in French; indeed, it was common practice to speak mostly French among educated Russians. Still in 1876 Dostoevsky found it necessary to mock at that custom, without much expectations to change it – as he acknowledged, that kind of criticism was by then already a cliché. The extent to which Russians were aware of, and paid attention to Western Russica – particularly of French origin – in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is also well known. The reactions to Rousseau’s criticism of Peter the Great in authors such Aleksandr Radishchev or Nikolai Karamzin have also been documented and, in general, scholars agree that comparisons with “the West” were fundamental in the making of Russian culture.
and identity.\textsuperscript{12} I believe that the weight of the Western gaze is utterly present in Russian culture, and its effects on Russian identity cannot but be profound. Signs of its presence can be found in many Russian sources.\textsuperscript{13} For example, in 1797 Karamzin described the “feeling of inferiority” and “humiliation” that Russians suffered when Peter the Great opened his “window on the West”.\textsuperscript{14} Similarly, in 1821 the writer and friend of Pushkin Wilhelm Karlovich Küchelbecker accused that Emperor of having strengthened serfdom just as he made Russia known to the rest of Europe: “he exposed us to the sight of all Europe”.\textsuperscript{15} Many more examples can be found in nineteenth-century literature; to mention but one example, the rather amusing episode recalled in Turgeniev’s \textit{Smoke} (1867), when a Russian man sitting at a restaurant in Paris plunged in “desperation” and “shame” when he realized that he had ordered food in perfect French, but still not quite in the style in use at that time.\textsuperscript{16} As it is well known, this implicit violence and devaluation of identity that the internalization of stigma produces appear with particular clarity in the first of the \textit{Philosophical Letters}, written (in French) in 1829 by Pëtr Chaadaev, which in turn unleashed the bitter controversy between Slavophiles and Westernizers that marked nineteenth-century Russian culture.\textsuperscript{17} 

There is another aspect of the theory of stigma, usually called “downward social comparison” or “downward stigmatization”, that I find useful for the understanding of Russian culture. As Erving Goffman and others have demonstrated, stigmatized individuals often tend to stratify the members of their own stigmatized group according to the degree to which their stigma is apparent. By means of this stratification, the less evidently stigmatized may behave like the “normals” with regards to the more obviously stigmatized. Thus, they reproduce and reinforce stigma whilst projecting onto the others the characteristics that are usually the cause of self-deprecation. In that way, self-hatred turns into hatred for the (more) stigmatized. This feeling can be even stronger than the contempt the “normals” develop for the stigmatized, as their self-esteem is under a stronger threat. For example, Derek Walsgrove has shown that young unemployed of a highly skilled or middle class background are more likely to develop more aggressive feelings towards other unemployed of lower class or skills, because their “respectability” is more at stake. In addition to this, as Goffman has suggested, stigmatized individuals may strive to look like the “normals” by acquiring symbols of prestige (that is, the opposite to stigma). Downward comparisons may thus be based on the stratification of the visible signs of both stigma and prestige.\textsuperscript{18}
This theoretical insight may be useful in analyzing the effects of stigma on Russian culture, by illuminating the relative interchangeability of discriminative labels of race, “culture”, and class. Lev Tolstoy’s semi-fictional memoirs *Childhood, Adolescence, Youth* reveal the way in which stigmatization might affect not only Russia’s standing vis-à-vis the West, but also the relationship between different classes of Russians. Society, Tolstoy argues, “may be divided into many categories”. He recalls that, when he was about sixteen years old, his favorite and principal division of people was into those who were *comme il faut* and those who were *comme il ne faut pas*. The latter I subdivided into those not *comme il faut*, per se, and the common people. I respected those who were *comme il faut* and considered them worthy of consorting with me as my equals; the second category I pretended to scorn, though in reality I detested them, nourishing a feeling of personal injury against them, as it were; the third did not exist for me at all: I despised them utterly. My own *comme il faut* consisted, first and foremost, in being fluent in French, particularly in having an impeccable pronunciation. A person who spoke French with an accent at once inspired in me a feeling of hatred. “Why do you wish to speak as we do when you cannot?” I would mentally inquire of him with biting irony.

The other conditions of being *comme il faut*, for the young Tolstoy, were “the appearance of one’s fingernails” (these had to be “long, well-kept and clean”), to know “how to bow, dance and converse properly”, to show “indifference to everything and a perpetual air of elegant and supercilious ennui”, and also other exterior signs such as furniture, carriages, or clothing. As Tolstoy sadly recognizes, this stratification of people meant that he felt “hatred and contempt” towards “nine-tenths of the human race”, and believed in the idea that the *comme il faut* were “superior to the greater part of humanity”. A subtle observer of human behavior, Tolstoy remembers the permanent, daily pains he would go through in trying to be *comme il faut*, and concludes by saying:

How odd that I, who was positively incapable of being *comme il faut*, should have been so obsessed by this conception. But perhaps it took such strong hold of me for the very reason that it demanded a tremendous effort on my part to acquire this same *comme il faut*.19
Tolstoy’s remarks allow us to visualize the overlapping of categories of race (or in this case, properly speaking, “nationality”), culture, and class, and the management of the violence implicit in stigma. For the young Tolstoy, being “superior” meant at the same time being “more French” (or “less Russian”), mastering “high” culture and “cultured” manners, and owning the necessary wealth to acquire the proper symbols of status. Thus, in his symbolic organization of society, being poor, uncultivated, or completely “Russian” all meant more or less the same thing.

The overlapping of hierarchies of “culture”, manners, and wealth is typical of the process of civilization, as Norbert Elias has demonstrated in his classic study. In the example we are analyzing, however, there is an additional element: race. Civilization in Russia—at least, in Tolstoy’s experience—meant the development of the apparatus of self-restraint, the acquisition of higher culture and a proper degree of wealth, and the ability to dissimulate or repress at least some of the elements of one’s own race or “nation”. The concealment of, or withdrawal from, the awkward evidences of the “natural” world typical of the process of civilization everywhere else, also meant for Tolstoy the dissimulation of his Russianness and the willingness to adopt the “normal” nationality. At the age of sixteen, Tolstoy had already internalized both the stigma implicit in, and the standards of “good” society projected by, the narrative of Western civilization. For Tolstoy, as for Russia, being comme il faut meant ceasing to be what they were.

It is interesting to note how Tolstoy would manage his own stigma and the anxieties of his wounded identity by channeling downwards the violence he was subject to. The reassurance of his own self-esteem would rely on the deprecation and deep hatred of those perceived as “inferior”—not only the lower classes, but also those who were more “Russian” than he. As Tolstoy recognizes, these almost unmanageable feelings seriously affected his potential relationships with “nine-tenths” of the population.

This brief incursion into Tolstoy’s life experience and into the problems of his wounded identity as a Russian under the gaze of the “civilized” Master, may help us better understand the frequent use of fantasies of “reconciliation” with his own Russianness which, like the story of Pierre Bezukhov, also involves “social reunification” with the lower classes. I do not imply by this that there was anything “fake” in Tolstoy’s commitment to social change and to the poor, but rather that his own identity was also involved in this political choice.
Notes

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8. Walsgrove, “Policing Yourself”.

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13. The extent to which the Western gaze is present in Russian culture becomes extraordinarily clear in Aleksandr Sokurov’s recent masterpiece Russian Ark. The film portrays Russian history as seen from the Hermitage, which is metaphorically construed as a biblical “ark” that conserves the legacy of the past while sailing through difficult times to an unknown future. In such an enclosed microcosm, all the periods of Russian history –from Peter the Great to the present– coexist in a timeless space. Interestingly enough, the leading role is a European “stranger”, who acts as the spectator’s guide to the different rooms-periods of the Hermitage-Russia. This stranger is none other than Marquis de Custine’s ghost (the French writer who published a travel account in 1843 depicting Russia in the worst colors), who represents the “eternal” Western gaze, at the same time admiring and depreciating everything he sees. It is worth noting, however, that in Sokurov’s film the Western observer is himself observed by an invisible Russian ghost –his voice is Sokurov’s own–, who in turn makes ironical remarks to Custine’s judgmental comments. These unlikely partners in the tour through the “Russian ark” are at the same time familiar and antagonistic. Although they meet for the first time at the beginning of the film, it is clear for the spectator that they have known each other for a long time. Aleksandr Sokurov, Russkii Kovcheg/Russian Ark (film), directed by A. Sokurov, written by A. Sokurov & Anatolii Nikiforov, (Saint Petersbourg, 2003).


19. Lev Tolstoy, Childhood, Adolescence, Youth, (Moscow: Progress, 1981), 323-26; French as in the original.


Ezequiel Adamovsky, Pierre Bezukhov Becomes (Really) Russian:...
References


