THE DRAGON AND THE CAPTAIN: CHINA IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF BRAZIL ́S NATIONALIST RIGHT

Since 2009 China has been Brazil ́s biggest trade partner, and its important ally. However, the nationalist right that won the 2018 elections has a critical perspective of the country. This paper maps the views on China held by the new Brazilian government, both in terms of the economic arguments (protectionism of industry, fear of Chinese control of infrastructure and natural resources) and political concerns (the desire for a diplomatic rapprochement with the United States and anticommunism hostility towards Beijing). The paper claims that these positions are important for foreign policy decision-making and that they complicate relations with China, but that is also necessary to take into account more moderate views from other groups in the administration.


Introduction
The current decade is one of rising nationalist and populist forces against liberalism in Europe and in the Americas. In Brazil the trend has been exacerbated by difficult conditions: the worst economic recession in the modern history of the country and a series of scandals which weakened the major political parties and opened the way to outsiders.
In 2018, Jair Bolsonaro won the presidential election in Brazil. A former Army captain, he ran as the candidate of a small conservative party and his victory The first section seeks to explain the context of the rise of the nationalist right in Brazil, and how it managed to leave its marginal position in the country´s political landscape since the return of democracy to become again a major force, able to win elections. This change is exemplified by the changes in the career´s fortune of Bolsonaro, who was for most of his career a backbencher in Congress, without any meaningful responsibilities.
After that, the paper analyses the views on China by the nationalist right, divided in three major lines of thinking: economic policy, national security and cultural identity. This article highlight that the conservative nationalists are divided in two contending groups: the senior military officers, more moderate and closer to the traditions of Brazilian diplomacy, and the anti-globalist faction, with similar agendas to the populist movements in the United States and Europe.
The third and final section addresses how the nationalist right influences the decision-making process of Brazil´s foreign policy toward China under Bolsonaro, stressing that its ideological aims have been undermining by its internal divisions and by the economic pressures of interest groups linked to Chinese trade and investments.

The rise of the nationalist right in contemporary Brazil
Brazil made its transition to democracy in 1985, after a 21-year military dictatorship. The authoritarian regime was fiercely anti-communist, but it did not follow blindly the American leadership in the Cold War. Especially during the economic booms of the 1970s, Brazilian generals pursued an autonomous foreign policy that aimed at increasing ties with other developing countries in Africa and the Middle East. The military also opposed the non-proliferation international regime and developed a nuclear program which was often at odds with Western attempts to control the spread of atomic technology. (Vizentini, 1998;Bueno and Cervo, 2003).
In the first decades of the new democracy, the nationalist right was in a difficult political moment, weakened by its association with the dictatorship and by the effort of conservative parties to reinvent themselves as the defenders of a liberal economic agenda, supporting reforms such as lowering tariffs, promoting privatization and inserting Brazil in a more open and integrated global economy. (Mainwaring, Meneguello and Power, 2000).
In the 1990s Brazil joined several international regimes forbidding weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, nuclear) and protecting human rightsthe opposite of the policies of the authoritarian regime. Right-wing nationalist politicians were relegated to the fringe of the public debate, often seemed as outdated or even comical figures whose time has passed. This scenario started to change after the global financial crisis of 2008 and after Brazil plummeted into deep economic and political turbulence in the following decade. Widespread corruption scandals affected the major parties, the country faced a severe recession with over 8% of GDP loss and record unemployment levels of 12%.
The nationalist right started to rise again with an anti-left rhetoric that blamed Brazil´s progressives presidents for the crisis, and playing the nostalgia card for the dictatorship, when growth rates were high. This economic agenda went together with a conservative movement critical of ethnical and sexual minorities, feminist groups, artists and intellectuals. On the whole, there were many similarities with the Donald Trump in the United States and the populist parties in Europe. These points in common were noted both by observers and by the Brazilian nationalist politicians and his supporters, who highlighted their shared values (Sedgwick, 2019).
The most important leader of the new nationalist right in Brazil is Jair Bolsonaro. A military court retired him from the Armed Forces in the early 1990s, with the rank of captain, after he made illegal demonstrations in support of a pay rise for the troops. Then he launched a political career and spent the next three decades as a Congressman. Although Bolsonaro was always reelected, he never managed to approve any meaningful bill, and was basically a backbencher acting as a trade union leader for low-ranking soldiers and police officers.
Bolsonaro´s fortunes changed with the crisis of the current decade and he rose in popularity as a symbol of anger and discontentment with the problems of the Brazilian political system. He presented himself as an outsider who was never trusted by the country´s political establishment and who would fight against corruption and make Brazil great again. He surprised most observers by winning the presidential election of 2018 without the support of major political parties and with almost no TV time, using mostly social media to spread his slogans and to mobilize his supporters. (Winter, 2018).

The Place of China in Brazil´s nationalist right worldview
Bolsonaro´s campaign manifesto was a document written in bullets points and small sentences in the manner of a power point presentation. It had just one page dedicated to foreign policy, where the candidate promised to build strong ties with the United States, Israel and Italy, and to distance Brazil from left-wing governments in Latin America.  During the campaign, Bolsonaro also broke Brazilian diplomatic tradition visiting Taiwansomething that no other leader of Brazil ever did. The trip was part of an Asian tour that included Japan and South Korea and ostensibly left out the People´s Republic of China. In Taipei, he praised Taiwanese society as a synthesis of the best of American and Japanese culture. Chinese diplomats in Brazil feared that it was a sign of ending the "One China policy" that all Brazilian administrations followed since 1974, and reacted sending a letter to all members of Brazil´s Congress highlighting how important this issue is to Beijing. (Santoro, 2018). National Security is a more common option for the nationalist right in its criticism of China. This is usually expressed as a concern about Chinese control of natural resources and infrastructure in the country. The most famous statement from Bolsonaro on the issue is his line that: "China is not buying in Brazil. China is buying The president is not alone in this view, which is shared by many officers in the Armed Forces. They do not like the idea of having a foreign dictatorship in charge of key assets in Brazil. Chinese investment just started to being meaningful in the 2010s, concentrated in agriculture, energy and mining.
The last line of criticism is the one that is more specific of the nationalist right: Cultural Identity. This is the casedear for Bolsonaro and ambassador Araújothat Brazil should seek a special relationship with the United States and closer ties to the Western nations. It often has a religious approach, emphasizing the Brazilian Christian heritage and highlighting that China has very different values and political system: Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo has been has been perhaps the most strident anti-China voice. A career foreign service officer who worked for several years in Washington, Araújo has said he opposes the Paris climate deal because such "dogma" favors China. "We want to sell soy and iron ore, but we're not going to sell our soul," he told an audience of diplomats in March. Eduardo Bolsonaro, a member of Congress and the most influential of the president's three sons on foreign policy issues, has taken an even tougher line, saying Brazil drew close to China for "ideological reasons," much like a previous Brazilian president did with Adolf Hitler's Germany in the 1930s. (Lapper, 2019) Statements like these contradict the traditional pillars of Brazilian foreign policy, such as support for multilateralism, and a pragmatic approach regarding to international trade. For example, it was the dictatorship that recognized the PRC in 1974. Despite the anti-communism of the military regime, the decision was motivated by economic opportunities, and it was following the Washington-Beijing rapprochement of the 1970´s. (Spektor, 2010).
How influent is the nationalist right in the decision-making process of Brazilian foreign policy towards China? Do their opinions carry weight? Or they are just a rhetorical tool for the president, without any real political power?

The nationalist right in Bolsonaro´s foreign policy
The foreign policy of Bolsonaro will be the result of conflicts between several groups that are part of the government. The nationalist right is divided in two contending factions: the anti-globalists and the military officers. And there also the technocrats in the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economy and Agriculture. The relationship with China is one the major disagreements between them.
The anti-globalist positions break the foreign policy consensus about China that has been guiding Brazil´s relations with Beijing since 1974. In general lines, the diplomatic approach of Brazilian presidents towards the Chinese is that they are important partners, with many similar interests in global forums. China is perceived as a key player in international affairs, and that Brasília should engage with Beijing to diversify its options regarding traditional allies in the Americas and Western Europe.
From the 1990s, it has been also a big economic market for Brazil´s exports. (Oliveira, 2004).
Anti-globalists are usually young and somewhat of outsidersambassador Araújo, for example, was until a few months ago a middle-rank diplomat, who was never the head of a foreign mission or held high office in the ministry of Foreign Affairs. They usually have a strong social media presence, but tend to be mocked by the traditional press outlets, who often present them as radicals.
The main adversary of the anti-globalists in the administration have been the senior military officers in the ministerial cabinet and state agencies. The conflict led to disagreements and offences exchanged through the media and to the firing of many officials, including cabinet ministers, aligned with both groups.
The vice-president Hamilton Mourão, a retired Army general, rose as the key player for the Brazilian groups searching for a pragmatic relationship with China.
Mourão stressed the importance of the Chinese market and investments for Brazil, and that Brasília should not take sides in the trade war between Washington and Beijing, and instead try to use the conflict as an opportunity to boost the country´s national interests.
The vice-president stated that the government will not veto Huawei business in Brazil and that the Chinese company will be able to take part in the auction to implement the 5G Internet pattern. He also expressed caution about the possibility on Brazil joining the New Silk Road, but highlighting that China´s investments are welcomed. (Santoro, 2019a). The tensions did not escalate into a major change of foreign policy, but they raised the mistrust in Brasília-Beijing relations in the middle of the delicate situation of the pandemic, and stimulated state governors to pursue their own medical diplomacy with China, in search of masks and respirators. 6 Episodes that exemplify the new elements of instability that are now part of the Sino-Brazilian bilateral agenda.

Final Considerations
The nationalist right returned to power in Brazil in the wave of the crisis of the 2010s after a hiatus of more than 30 years. In the new democracy it was traditionally associated with the military dictatorship and perceived as outdated in face of conservative parties who were trying to adapt themselves to a new context of globalization. The nationalist right is divided in two contending groups. One, more moderate and closer to traditional conservatives, is the senior military officers in the Bolsonaro administration. The other is the anti-globalist faction, which has many similar points with the new conservative and populist movements in the United States and Europe.
It breaks the consensus of the foreign policy elites and clashes with several organized interests who benefit from Chinese trade and investments.
The new nationalist right rise is important to Brazilian diplomacy. It does not set the agenda, but it influences the relationship with China, sometimes creating frictions. A pragmatic approach, more open to economic partnership with Beijing, has been in course, based upon an alliance between the military officers and technocrats.
In practice many of their criticism of the Chinese have been sidelined in face of the difficult economic situation of Brazil and it will probably be so in the near postpandemic future, when Asia´s markets will be even more important for Brazilian products.