Artigo

INTERthesis

Those who can give orders, do so; those who are smart, obey: an anarchist critique of neoliberal “smartness” in the context of smart cities

Aqueles que podem dar ordens, o fazem; aqueles que são smart, obedecem: uma crítica anarquista à “inteligência” neoliberal no contexto de smart cities

German Gregório Monterrosa Ayala Filho
Mestre em Geografia
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina/Departamento de Geociências
gg.ayala@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2435-0243

Peterson Roberto da Silva
Doutor em Sociologia e Ciência Política
Departamento de Sociologia e Ciência Política
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
peterson.235@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6206-2002

Informações completas sobre autoria estão no final do artigo

Abstract: Smart cities are a growing urban trend, yet their definition remains elusive, often shaped by the interests of their project designers. Although smart cities did not originate in the Global South, they became a current discussion in Brazil, presented as a necessity for cities to compete for investments. In 2018, a group of local associations along with the Florianópolis City Hall in southern Brazil launched the “Smart Floripa” reports. This research aims to provide a critique of the conceptualisation of “smartness” implied in the reports, informed by anarchist theory and critical geography, uncovering it as a rhetorical move in conflicts concerning urban policies and principles of sociopolitical organisation. As method, we chose a documentary analysis of two reports: “Smart Floripa 2030: transforming Florianópolis into a smart city” and “Smart City Florianópolis: the journey to creating the innovation path of a tourist island”. We begin the article by considering neoliberalism and its impacts on Brazilian municipalities. We then discuss smart cities and the Smart Floripa reports, which reinforce neoliberal urbanization policies, verified by critical literature as an urban development paradigm. We conclude with remarks on the meaning of neoliberal “smartness”.

Keywords: Smart cities; neoliberalism; Florianópolis; obedience; anarchism.

Resumo: As cidades inteligentes são uma tendência urbana em crescimento, mas sua definição permanece indefinida, frequentemente moldada pelos interesses de seus idealizadores. Embora as cidades inteligentes não tenham se originado no Sul Global, tornaram-se um tema de discussão no Brasil, apresentadas como uma necessidade para que as cidades possam competir por investimentos. Em 2018, um grupo de associações locais,

juntamente com a Prefeitura de Florianópolis, no sul do Brasil, lançou os relatórios “Smart Floripa”. Esta pesquisa busca oferecer uma crítica à conceituação de "inteligência" implícita nesses relatórios, fundamentando-se na teoria anarquista e na geografia crítica, revelando-a como um artifício retórico em disputas sobre políticas urbanas e princípios de organização sociopolítica. Como método, escolhemos a análise documental de dois relatórios: *“Smart Floripa 2030: transformando Florianópolis em uma cidade inteligente”* e *“Smart City Florianópolis: a jornada para criar o caminho da inovação em uma ilha turística”*. Iniciamos o artigo considerando o neoliberalismo e seus impactos nos municípios brasileiros. Em seguida, discutimos as cidades inteligentes e os relatórios Smart Floripa, que reforçam políticas de urbanização neoliberais, verificadas pela literatura crítica como um paradigma de desenvolvimento urbano. Concluímos com reflexões sobre o significado da “inteligência” neoliberal.

Palavras-chave: Smart cities; neoliberalismo; Florianópolis; obediência; anarquismo.

Introduction

The old Brazilian adage in the title begs the question: what does it mean to be “smart”? In this article, we analyse the premises behind neoliberal rhetorics of “smart cities” through a case study of Florianópolis, a city in the south of Brazil – specifically, the “Smart Floripa” reports aiming to position the city as a national reference in this regard (Yigitcanlar; Costa; Sabattini-Marques, 2018).

Despite the trendiness of the term, an exact definition of “smart cities” remains elusive (Kitchin, 2015). Wyly et al. (2018) define it as “the newest label for the latest ensemble of technologies that have defined urban life for an ever-increasing share of the planet’s population”; technologies that have become “ever more pervasive, efficient and adaptive”. In common parlance, they more often mean urban landscapes with which technologies such as screens and sensors are integrated, the ostensible goal being to optimize resources, generate new wealth, and influence the behaviour of inhabitants (Moroz; Bria, 2019).

In the scientific literature, urban digitization processes are often associated with state leadership and corporate interests, which tend to exacerbate existing oppressions and injustices, as well as aggressively favour neoliberal digital economies (Kitchin, 2015; Datta, 2018; Couldry; Mejias, 2019). On the other hand, these processes can also be driven by urban activists and city residents themselves as forms of resistance (Anduiza; Cristancho; Sabucedo, 2014; Treré, 2018). We focus on the first type of process, inasmuch as we examine the way elites’ discourses about smart cities conceptualise “smartness”. We aim to provide a critique of this conceptualisation informed by anarchist theory and critical geography, uncovering it as a rhetorical move in conflicts concerning urban policies and principles of sociopolitical organisation.

We begin the article by considering neoliberalism and its impacts on Brazilian municipalities. We then discuss smart cities and the Smart Floripa reports, and conclude with remarks on the meaning of neoliberal “smartness”.

Neoliberal order and brazilian municipalities

As Foucault (2008, p. 121) lectured, classical liberalism can be differentiated from neoliberalism in that, while the first encourages the state to act less so that individuals may act on their own (i.e. do what they would naturally do), the latter proposes an active role for the state in shaping individuality: “the market, or rather pure competition, [...] can only appear if it is produced[...] by an active governmentality” . Neoliberalism thus emerges as “an extension of competitive markets to all areas of human activity” (Springer, 2016, p. 4).

According to Springer (2018), neoliberalism has been interpreted in different ways within the social sciences, most importantly 1) as hegemonic ideology; 2) as forms of public policy; and 3) as forms of governability. Its reading as hegemonic ideology traces back to the tradition inspired by Karl Marx and its concept of ideology. In its most bureaucratic forms, neoliberalism has been taken to mean the restructuring of state functions toward market competition – relegating e.g social policies to a secondary concern. Neoliberalism as governability is about the transferral of political responsibility to “white-collar experts” and technocrats who dominate elite knowledge, promoting rationalities, strategies, and technologies to facilitate management from a distant perspective, especially management that encourages institutions and individuals to submit to market rules. A form of governance led by entrepreneurs prevails, undermining the political role of unions and social movements. These are not necessarily independent interpretations: they complement each other.

In Brazil, neoliberal policies were first implemented during the José Sarney government (1985-1990), being strengthened during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's presidency (1994-2002). Increasingly indebted to international financial organizations, the country deregulated markets and implemented globalised financial policies, resulting in the state losing economic power and local industrial scenes being trounced by international competitors (Hermida; Lira, 2018).

The 1988 Federal Constitution, which marked the transition from a civil-military dictatorship to a bourgeois representative democracy, rearranged the federative pact, granting greater financial and administrative autonomy to municipalities. However, it was unable to harmonise the availability of resources with the social demands that need to be

met at the municipal level (Cesare, 2005). While municipal revenues wither, the federal government invests less and less in local infrastructure (Pires, 2022). This has led to “municipal neoliberalism” as cities fall deeper into debt, relocate already scarce municipal resources in order to attract investments (competing with other cities as they do so), and privatise assets and (or) promote public-private partnerships (PPPs) (Harvey, 1996; Brenner; Theodore, 2002; Rolnik, 2015).

PPPs are currently the most widespread management and urban development promotion strategy. They encompass a wide range of associations between government entities and companies to achieve supposed common objectives. They are generally defended as means to boost economic growth, host major events, and manage urban resources. PPPs have been increasingly established for infrastructure modernization projects and to enhance the competitiveness of urban systems. Justifications for establishing such partnerships run the gamut: resource scarcity, the state’s technical incapacity, and greater agility in service delivery (Rolnik, 2015).

Despite this rhetoric, PPPs generally correspond to urban and real estate megaprojects that are often financed by the State, which ends up assuming investment risks and covering deficits when they occur. Therefore, little is expected from the private sector in providing resources for urban implementation; its goal in participating in these projects is limited to extracting income from urban land through the creation or revaluation of places (Rolnik, 2015).

Smart cities

The city of Songdo, located in the Incheon region of South Korea 30 km away from the capital, represents one of the largest public-private partnership real estate developments in world history. Construction began in 2003, and the city has since become a prominent subject in the debate about smart cities.

Built in an area where there was no previous history of urban occupation, it aims to demonstrate the feasibility of building completely new cities equipped with the most advanced technology. These cities aspire to fulfil the promise of a digitally interconnected and sustainable society, providing an enviable standard of living. For its investors, Songdo represents the model of the city of the future (Halpern; Gürnel, 2017; Figueiredo, 2018; Abrão, 2020).

What makes Songdo so smart, at least in the eyes of its planners, is the presence of sensors collecting data on the atmosphere, waste, electricity, and traffic, feeding into a

computational system capable of determining the most efficient way to deal with demographic and environmental changes. Thus, with computational guidance, the city is expected to predict and manage various events almost autonomously. This ranges from everyday phenomena, such as direct marketing campaigns to the population's smartphones, to more critical situations, such as informing about environmental disasters, vehicle accidents, or criminal activities (Halpern; Gürnel, 2017).

Songdo is part of a Free Economic Zone, whose master plan aims to unify three urban functions: high-tech research and development, a central logistics hub that includes the massive Incheon Airport, other port facilities, as well as financial capital services (Halpern; Gürnel, 2017). According to Halpern and Gürnel (2017, p. 56): "Together – intelligence, logistics, and finance – represent a package that, in the fantasies of its developers, is globally replicable."

Occupancy rates in Songdo are modest, and its future is uncertain. As it is situated below sea level, it is vulnerable to rising oceans, a possible ramification of climate change. As noted by Halpern and Gürnel (2017), Songdo should not be seen as a city but rather as a prototype: its major purpose is to spur new versions of smart cities, inspiring further integration of finance, computing, digital media, sustainability, and resilience everywhere. In the words of Halpern and Gürnel (2017, p. 59), “like a modernist montage, these seemingly dialectical oppositions merge into a single media product, amalgamated into a package that is currently colonizing our ability to imagine the future of human life”.

The first smart urban project launched in Brazil was Smart City Laguna (SCL). Like Songdo, it is being built from scratch, its construction having begun in 2015 by the European startup Planet Holding. Located in the municipality of São Gonçalo do Amarante (CE), about 60 km from the state capital Fortaleza, the city covers an area of 330 hectares, being designed to accommodate up to 25,000 inhabitants (Abrão, 2020).

The real estate promotional images for selling plots and houses in the SCL project are impressive, as they highlight an apparent harmony between residential, commercial functions, green areas, and leisure spaces in the project. However, in its layout, only 19% of its area is allocated to green spaces, revealing at least an inconsistency between the actual city plan and the promotional images being advertised (INBEC, 2020).

Smart City Laguna incorporates "smart" technologies such as a shared electric bike system, van stops with Wi-Fi connections, and mobile apps providing weather updates, business bulletins, access to security camera footage, transportation information, and remote control of home devices. While it offers an Innovation Hub with collective spaces like a coworking area, community library, and event auditorium, as well as small

businesses like a grocery store and beauty salon, the city—designed for 25,000 residents—still lacks health and basic education facilities (Abrão, 2020).

The first discrepancy that stands out between this Brazilian smart city and Songdo is the volume invested in each project. While $60 billion have been invested in Songdo, the budget for the Smart City Laguna project was estimated at a 1,200 times smaller: $50 million (Abrão, 2020). While Songdo is aimed at white-collar professionals, SCL was designed to serve the low-income population (hence why Planet refers to it as the "first inclusive smart city in the world"). Unlike Songdo, which is a true technology showroom, SCL is not architecturally innovative, as residences resemble the social interest housing system of the My House, My Life (MCMV) program.[1]

The real estate market in the Global North clearly doesn't operate the same way as in the South. Brazil is a country where over half of the population faces a housing deficit. SCL demonstrates that smart cities in the South do not require significant investments, nor the use of advanced architecture and technology. Even though people have been living in SCL since 2019, it is far from being completed. Like in Songdo, the future of SCL seems uncertain.

Smart Floripa

Florianópolis (affectionately shortened "Floripa"), capital of the state of Santa Catarina in southern Brazil, shelters a population of 508,828 inhabitants (2020). In terms of its geographical uniqueness, the city is divided between an island part and a continental part. The continental portion borders the municipalities of Biguaçu, São José, and Palhoça, which together form the Florianópolis Metropolitan Region, characterized by a marked conurbation totalling a population of 1,174,811 inhabitants (2020).

Florianópolis is internationally recognized for its abundance of natural amenities, including beaches, waterfalls, and lagoons. Over the past decades, the city has solidified its position as a summer tourist destination, structuring its economy mainly in the tourism, commerce, and services sectors (Machado, 2000). However, recently there has been a notable growth in the technology sector, which currently represents 14% of the capital's GDP.[2]

[1] The MCMV is a federal housing program created in 2009 by the Lula government. The program subsidizes the acquisition of a house or apartment for families with a monthly income of up to R$ 1,800.00 and facilitates access to housing for families with income of up to R$ 9,000.00.

[2] Data obtained from: https://exame.com/brasil/florianopolis-e-destaque-com-polo-de-inovacao-e-tecnologia/. (accessed on February 1st 2024).

The central areas of the island, the continental portion, and neighbouring cities constitute the most densely urbanised regions of the Metropolitan Region, concentrating the majority of households, workplaces, commercial establishments, and essential services (Sugai, 2002). In contrast, the insular part presents a diversified topography, characterised by mangroves, massifs, hills, steep slopes, lagoons, dunes, and extensive coastal strips. About half of Florianópolis's insular area is designated as areas for environmental preservation (Ferretti, 2019), which exerts significant influence on the island's urbanisation.

The scarcity of buildable areas, combined with the proximity to many touristic beaches, results in much higher property values, rents, and construction costs per square meter on Florianópolis's island, making it more elitist compared to continental areas (Sugai, 2002). It also creates a persistent pressure from construction companies, real estate agencies, and local landowners on the city for the relaxation of urban coefficients to allow for more intensive occupation of the island's land (Peres; Abreu; Calheiros, 2023). This quest for flexibility is often supported by a relationship of relative subordination or alliance between the City Hall and these agents: urban space in Florianópolis is produced through an articulation between the state, real estate capital, and the traditional press, often serving the interests of local dominant groups (Peres; Abreu; Calheiros, 2023).

It is in this context that the "Smart Floripa" reports should be read. They refer to two documents: "Smart Floripa 2030: Transforming Florianópolis into a Smart City", published in 2018, and "Smart City Florianópolis: Journey to Creating the Innovation Path of a Touristic Island", published in 2020 (Yigitcanlar; Costa; Sabatini-Marques, 2018; Yigitcanlar *et al*, 2020). We would refer to both reports as "Smart Floripa" due to their similarities in content, authoring team, and methodology.

It is noteworthy that the coordinators of the Smart Floripa documents, excellent in their fields as they may be, are not really academically diverse. Being predominantly researchers in technological or business management areas, they are prone to offering a technocratic or corporate reading of issues. Several local entities also signed the documents: private education institutions, technology and business-related departments of public universities, state agencies, and organised private sector groups.

Peres, Abreu, and Calheiros (2023) emphasize that the "Floripa 2030" project stands out as a milestone in establishing an ideological basis for dominant elites' narratives around sustainability and smart cities. This project goes beyond investment in real estate projects, also addressing creative economies, job creation, and the pursuit of social inclusion. Moreover, it argues that sustainability requires a comprehensive streamlining of

public administration, which for them means involving Social Organizations (SO) – ostensibly non-profit organisations – in the management of public infrastructure and services.

The document begins with an ambitious phrase: “all together for the common good”. As Lima Junior (2003, p. 4) explains, this reflects a depoliticization of the polis, as political participation is funnelled into a kind of “social pact” in the form of consensus, even if one predominantly influenced by the business sector. In neoliberal culture, these actors are seen as the most capable of defining strategies in the face of threats and opportunities for urban development (Lima Junior, 2003).

The Smart Floripa reports are presented as researches into the strengths and weaknesses of Florianópolis in the path to becoming a smart city. Interviews were conducted with the agents deemed most capable of helping define public policies for the city. The interviewees were selected from four groups, which the authors call “helixes” (Yigitcanlar *et al*., 2020, p. 6), representing the state, businesses, universities, and non-profit organisations. This model assumes that these sectors must operate in harmony to build the “common good” for the city.

The document lacks a clear explanation of the criteria for selecting the interviewees to represent each “helix”; technical reasons are implied, as if there are no political aspect to the choices. Moreover, diversity among those selected is limited. So, for example, it is not clear whether the “public authorities” interviewed are professionals appointed by current administrations, if they are civil servants, or even if there was any attempt to consult experts who might disagree with the current municipal and state administrations. Similarly, representatives from the academic sector were predominantly chosen from technological or administrative fields, which tends to reinforce a technocratic and managerial perspective regarding the city. By portraying the city as a corporation, this approach neglects the importance of defining the political implications of planned urban renewals, focusing instead on how to manage specific resources more efficiently. This approach diminishes the relevance of ideological debates about urban development in favour of a market-oriented perspective. Some choices are particularly odd, to say the least; a member of the Federation of Industries of the State of Santa Catarina (FIESC), for example, was included in the “non-profit organisations” helix (Yigitcanlar *et al.,* 2020, p. 36).

The Smart Floripa documents emphasize the need to diversify economic activities in Florianópolis, which are currently concentrated in the tourism, commerce, and services sectors. The idea of building an “innovation island”, “innovation districts”, and an “innovation capital” recurs in the text. More than merely integrating technologies into the

management or urban landscapes; Florianópolis should establish itself as a national leader in producing these technologies. To achieve this, various strategies are presented to attract technology companies and specialized labour, as well as to retain them in the city.

Some of these strategies are actual policy proposals (such as fiscal incentives), but others involve the use of these very documents as propaganda: for example, a mapping of the city's main educational institutions, and a section highlighting the advantages of living in Florianópolis. This includes praise of the city's high HDI levels in comparison with other Brazilian capitals, as well as touting the idea that the local population is healthy and educated. However, the document crucially neglects urban life outside the island of Florianópolis, which comprises less touristic and more impoverished areas of the Metropolitan Region.

The documents often allude to “innovative ideas”, yet fail to present truly innovative content, lacking proposals to address the urban challenges Florianópolis faces – ranging from environmental conservation to urban mobility and housing issues – or to enhance the quality of life of its inhabitants. Nothing concrete is presented – not even “smart”, “technological” remedies – and no specific agent is assigned responsibility. For example, regarding the housing issue, it is said that:

> in 2012 there were 13,231 people living in slums in Florianópolis. In order to address the issue of slums, the Social Housing Plan was approved in 2012, providing guidelines for the construction of new housing for a 15-year period and for the development of infrastructure in these areas (PMF, 2012). However, the federal funds provided to support the plan are not sufficient to carry out the necessary work. The City Hall is currently developing new projects and trying to secure new financing resources. On the other hand, Florianópolis has about 24% of vacant housing units (13% due to the summer season and 11% actually vacant), one of the highest rates in Brazil. (Yigitcanlar *et al*, 2020, p. 31-32, our translation).

The housing deficit in the municipality is recognised, as well as the high number of vacant residences. However, the documents do not present any path to resolving this issue; they simply justify that the city does not have enough resources to adequately deal with this matter. There is no mention of the possibility of intervening in vacant properties or those subject to real estate speculation, even though data on these vacant residences is presented. The complete subordination of human needs to the reproduction of wealth seems to be the striking feature of the Smart Floripa proposal, since the housing deficit is not a technological or corporate challenge, but a political and social one.

It is also remarkable that the roles played by companies and the state are blurred, suggesting the establishment of harmonious relations between the two agents:

> This study aims to unpack the socioeconomic, geographical, and governmental conditions, plans, and processes of the city, as well as describe the historical progress of the city, focusing on key domains of development to explore its transition journey from a tourist island to the prospect of an innovation island and a smart city (Yigitcanlar *et al*, 2020, p. 11, our translation).

> [… In] Brazil's governance system, [...] municipalities receive a small portion of the taxes generated in the city itself. As a result, municipalities have limited financial resources to make the city attractive to entrepreneurs (Yigitcanlar *et al*, 2020, p. 35, our translation).

> […] Another critical issue related to governance is that current policies and regulations are unclear and send confusing messages to potential investors (Yigitcanlar *et al*, 2020, p. 37, our translation).

Representing yet some sort of repetition of neoliberal urbanisation policies, the documents treat Florianópolis in a reductionist way: as a “touristic island”, whose main development challenges are to diversify its economy, enhance its national competitiveness, attract technology companies, increase tax revenue, and create an attractive environment for businesses with skilled labour.

Neoliberal smartness

Technocracy (and bureaucracy more generally) has long been an object of criticism in anarchist theory. It is decried as an opposition to politics itself; an authoritarian bypassing of conflict. This happens through a restructuring of culture and organisational practices such that certain procedures become reasons in themselves for legitimising their political outcomes – this legitimacy being then used to impose these decisions. When discussing decision-making methods that are theoretically compatible with an anarchistic ethos, for example, Nappalos (2012, p. 306) warns that:

> Solutions should not be reduced to their “technical” dimension: we cannot merely invent an economic scheme for settling, say, fights over where pollution will end up. […] communities will have to [...] debate, compromise, and craft the best solution for all. [...] struggles concerning power can be mediated by structures, but structures are only the shell of a solution. They provide no guarantees, and ultimately such political problems require a material, social, and

> historical analysis of that situation. Inevitably we require more experiences, practice, and experimentation to address it beyond truism, vague generalities, and empty formalisms.

Smart cities go further in that they might embed a technocratic logic into the very building blocks of the urban environment. They can do so by automating processes that deeply affect lives in a way that people would otherwise conceive as political. By hiding such decisions behind literal layers of silicon and metal, responsibility is clouded and outcomes are more likely to be seen as "purely technical" (which are tended to be seen as good – the "cultural" counterpart to technocratic politics).

Plans for automation often draw scrutiny for two reasons. First, the integration of digital technology in urban settings can often mean the creation or reinforcement of a web of surveillance, which can then be employed for repression. More than a concern for who happens to be in the political opposition at the moment, this is particularly insidious for historical minorities. Today, racism is already a huge factor in predictive policing and AI-assisted judicial sentencing; biometric sensors capable of determining whether someone is pregnant before even the pregnant person themself can tell mean danger where abortion is forbidden. On the other hand, digital technology can also allow for the automation of human behaviour according to the demands of capital less through direct repression than through context-aware, personalised incentives, a phenomenon recently made more notable by Zuboff (2021) as "surveillance capitalism".

The Smart Floripa documents, however, do not go anywhere near these scenarios – not because they are explicitly mentioned as undesirable, but because no particular scenario is ever actually described. Becoming "smart", in this case, boils down to the enforcement of market interests by the state. The documents' authors invoke the idea of smart cities, trusting that collective awareness of it – facilitated by projects such as Songdo and SCL – will prime readers (or, more likely, those who come across the publication but do not actually read it in full) to assume what the document is about. But read closely, all it does is equate neoliberal governance to intelligence in public administration.

The documents do not contain proposals for Florianópolis to become a "smart city" like Songdo or SCL, and yet their authors claim the city will become smart if it is governed according to neoliberal principles. The connection between the neoliberal order and smart city projects, briefly elaborated above, contextualizes this claim so that it is not surprising, even if it is unsubstantiated. In their study of the emergence of the "smart city" paradigm in connection to neoliberalism, Wyly et al. (2018, p. 13) remark that, for an ideology "so concerned about individual rights and the achievements of the entrepreneur", there is an

ironic assumption that the “information bequeathed by market evolution sustains a ‘spontaneous order’ that surpasses all that can possibly be known — not just by any human but by all humans”.

The work of Margareth Rago (2014) offers an insightful key to understanding this historical connection. The historian examines how discourses on the city, working class homes, women and children in early-20th-century Brazil had already sought to embed control over workers inside spatial organization and cultural codes so that personal domination (by e.g. bosses) is disguised. Things themselves were not automatic, but the technocratic impulse aligned to a new vision of urban consensus was already consequent for the development of Brazilian capitalism.

Just as Rago (2014) thought that anarchist resistance to such a project offered an important perspective through which to comprehend it, anarchist theory helps understand the allure contemporary smart cities hold for neoliberals. Automation that removes decision-making from the political realm, obfuscates responsibility for decisions, and makes said decisions harder to question and revert in practice (due to being interwoven with material infrastructure) is smart not because it fosters creativity, sensibility, and problem-solving, but because it forces people to obey in ways that do not seem personally grating or even forced at all. The Brazilian saying featured in the title – “those who can give orders, do so; those who are smart, obey” – reveals a notion of intelligence associated with an assessment of current power relations as immutable: it is folly to challenge them and wise to conform to them. Neoliberal governance makes for a “smarter” city, even if there are no specific proposals for e.g. attaching sensors to street lights or automating recurring processes, because smartness is ideologically conceived as the political effects of digital technology, not as the technology itself: effects neoliberalism can achieve in the absence of cameras and wide wireless internet coverage.

Conclusion

The Smart Floripa urban agenda stands out for its subordination of human needs to the reproduction of capital. Urban problems cannot be solved solely through the use of technologies, attracting companies, and generating wealth, but rather by addressing the real needs of the people. The opinion of common people from Florianópolis regarding their needs, however, is entirely absent in both reports; only business sectors and the government matter. For the current agenda of Smart Floripa reports, the “common good” seems to be subordinated to the unquestionable interests of capitalist market.

References

ABRÃO, Camila Lima. **Smart City Laguna (CE):** *na ideia, no território, na prática.* 2020, 148 p., Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Arquitetura e Urbanismo, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Arquitetura e Urbanismo. Brasília, 2020.

ANDUIZA, Eva; CRISTANCHO, Camilo; SABUCEDO, José. Mobilization through online social networks: the political protest of the *indignados* in Spain. **Information, Communication & Society.** v. 17, n. 6, 2014, p. 750-764.

BRENNER, Neil; THEODORE, Nik. Cities and the Geographies of "actually existing neoliberalism". **Antipode.** v. 34, n. 3, 2002, p. 349-379.

CESARE, Cláudia de. O cadastro como instrumento de política fiscal. In: ERBA, D. A; OLIVEIRA, F. L.; LIMA JUNIOR, P. N. **Cadastro multifinalitário como instrumento de política fiscal e urbana.** Rio de Janeiro, 2005, p. 39-70.

COSTA, Emannuel dos Santos *et al.* Análise da mobilidade cotidiana em Florianópolis. **Geo UERJ.** n. 37, 2020, p. 1-20.

COULDRY, Nick; MEJIAS, Ulises A. **The Costs of Connection:** *how data is colonizing human life and appropriating it for capitalism.*Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019.

DATTA, Ayona. The digital turn in postcolonial urbanism: Smart citinzenship in the making of India's 100 smart cities. **Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers.** v. 43, n. 3, 2018, p. 405-419.

FERRETTI, Orlando Ednei. Áreas protegidas na ilha de Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, Brasil. **ACTA geográfica.** v. 13, n. 31, 2019, p. 66-89.

FIGUEIREDO, Gabriel Mazzola Poli de. **O Discurso e Prática da Smart City:** *perspectivas críticas e aproximações sistemáticas no contexto de metrópoles latino-americanas*. 2018, 80 p., Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Arquitetura e Urbanismo, São Paulo, 2018.

HACKWORTH, Jason. **The neoliberal city:** *governance, ideology and development in American Urbanism*. Ithaca: Cornell Univeristy Press, 2007.

HALPERN, Orit; GÖKCE, Günel. FCJ-215 Demoing unto death: Smart cities, environment and preemptive hope. **The fibreculture journal:** *digital media + networks + transdisciplinary critique.* n. 29, p. 51-73, 2017.

HARVEY, David. From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation of urban governance in late capitalism. **Geografiska Annaler.** v. 71, 1989, p. 3-17.

HARVEY, David. Do gerenciamento ao empresariamento: a transformação da administração urbana no capitalismo tardio. **Espaço e debates**, n. 39, 1996.

HERMIDA, Jorge; LIRA, Jailton de Souza. Estado e Neoliberalismo no Brasil (1995-2018). **Cadernos de Pesquisa:** *pensamento educacional*. v. 13, n. 35, 2018, p. 38-63.

KITCHIN, Rob. Making sense of smart cities: adressing present shortcomings. **Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economics and Society.** v. 8, 2015, p. 131-136.

KRAUSE, Cleandro; BALBIM, Renato; NETO, Vicente Correia Lima. Minha Casa Minha Vida, nosso crescimento: Onde fica a política habitacional? **Texto para Discussão.** n. 1853, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), Brasília, 2013.

INBEC "Localizada no Ceará, Smart City Laguna é a primeira cidade inteligente social do mundo.", 21/02/2020. Available in: <https://inbec.com.br/blog/localizada-ceara-smart-city-laguna-primeira-cidade-inteligente-social-mundo>; and <<https://planetsmartcity.com.br/>; accessed in: 31/08/2023.

INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA. **Tipologia intraurbana:** *espaços de diferenciação socioeconômica nas concentrações urbanas do Brasil.* Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 2017.

LEFÈBVRE, Henri. **Le retour de la dialectique:** 12 *mots clef pour le monde moderne*. Paris: Messidor/Éditions Sociales, 1986.

LIMA JUNIOR, Pedro de Novais. **Uma estratégia chamada "planejamento estratégico":** *deslocamentos espaciais e atribuições de sentido na teoria do planejamento urbano*. 2003, 279 p. Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Pesquisa e Planejamento Urbano, Rio de Janeiro, 2003.

MACHADO, Ewerton Vieira. **Florianópolis:** *um lugar em tempo de globalização.* 2000, 272 p., Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas, São Paulo, 2000.

MOROZOV, Evgeny; BRIA, Francesca. **A cidade inteligente**: *tecnologias urbanas e democracia*. São Paulo: Ubu, 2019.

NAPPALOS, Scott. Ditching Class: The Praxis of Anarchist Communist Economics. In: SHANNON, Deric; NOCELLA II, Anthony J.; ASIMAKOPOULOS, John (Eds.). **The Accumulation of Freedom**: *Writings on Anarchist Economics*. Oakland: AK Press, 2012. P. 291–312

PERES, Lino Fernando Bragança; ABREU, Miriam Santini de; CALHEIROS, Fernando Vonsowaki. Cidade à venda: inflexão ultraliberal na produção do espaço em Florianópolis. **Cadernos Metrópole**. v. 25, n. 58, 2023, p. 1143-1169.

PIRES, Manoel. Public investments: 1947-2021. Brazilian Institute of Economics, 2022. Available at: https://observatorio-politica-fiscal.ibre.fgv.br/series-historicas/investimentos-publicos/investimentos-publicos-1947-2021. Accessed on: December 16, 2022.

RAGO, Margareth. **Do cabaré ao lar**: a utopia da cidade disciplinar: Brasil 1890–1930. 4th ed. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2014.

ROLNIK, Raquel. **Guerra dos lugares:** *a colonização da terra e da moradia na era das finanças*. 2015, 351 p. Tese de Livre-Docência - Faculdade de Arquitetura e Urbanismo, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2015.

ROLNIK, Raquel et al. O Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida nas regiões metropolitanas de São Paulo e Campinas: aspectos socioespaciais e segregação. **Cadernos Metrópole.** v. 17, n. 33, 2015.

SANTOS, Milton. **Técnica, espaço, tempo:** *globalização e meio técnico-científico-informacional.* São Paulo: Hucitec, 1994.

SPRINGER, Simon. **The discourse of neoliberalism:** *an anotomy of a powerful idea.* Londres: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.

TRERÉ, Emiliano. **Hybrid media activism:** *ecologies, imaginaries, algorithms.* Londres: Routledge, 2018.

TRIVIÑOS, Augusto Nibaldo Silva. **Introdução à pesquisa em ciências sociais:** *a pesquisa qualitativa em educação*. São Paulo: Atlas s.a., 1987.

VILLAÇA, Flávio. **Espaço intra-urbano no Brasil**. 2. Ed. São Paulo: Studio Nobel/FAPESP/Lincoln Institute, 2017.

WYLY, Elvin et al. Hayek in the cloud. **City**, doi:10.1080/13604813.2018.1549863, 2018.

YIGITCANLAR, Tan; COSTA, Eduardo Moreira da; SABATINI-MARQUES, Jamile. In:

YIGITCANLAR, E.; COSTA, E. M.; SABATINI-MORAES, J. (orgs.). **Smart City Florianópolis:** *jornada de criação do caminho de inovação de uma ilha turística*. Florianópolis: SENAC/SC, 2018.

YIGITCANLAR, Tan *et al.* **Smart Floripa 2030**: *transformando Florianópolis numa ilha inteligente de inovação.* Florianópolis: SENAC/SC, 2020.

ZUBOFF, Shoshana. **A era do capitalismo de vigilância:** *a luta por um futuro humano na nova fronteira do poder***.** Rio de Janeiro: Intrínseca, 2021.

NOTAS

AUTORIA

German Gregório Monterrosa Ayala Filho
Mestre em Geografia
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina/Departamento de Geociências
gg.ayala@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2435-0243

Peterson Roberto da Silva
Doutor em Sociologia e Ciência Política
Departamento de Sociologia e Ciência Política
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
peterson.235@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6206-2002

CONJUNTO DE DADOS DE PESQUISA

FINANCIAMENTO

Não se aplica.

AGRADECIMENTO

Agradecemos à Frankie Hines por importantes apontamentos de leitura.

LICENÇA DE USO

PUBLISHER

Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Programa de Pós-graduação Interdisciplinar em Ciências Humanas. Publicação no Portal de Periódicos UFSC. As ideias expressadas neste artigo são de responsabilidade de seus autores, não representando, necessariamente, a opinião dos editores ou da universidade.

EDITORES

Daniel Serravalle de Sá

HISTÓRICO

Recebido em: 16-10-2024 – Aprovado em: 28-02-2025 – Publicado em: 04-03-2025.

.