SHAPES OF HATRED AND VIOLENCE IN SHAKESPEARE

Formas de ódio e violência em Shakespeare

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Abstract: I use five Shakespearean plays to discuss how the meaning of the shapes of hatred and violence depend on individual character traits. In this sense, hatred and violence can either make comic characters meet some sort of reconciliation or self-destruction in the case of tragic characters. In *The Comedy of Errors*, the Dromio brothers, who are subject to violence from their master's part, are the ones who can find redemption nonetheless. In *The Merchant of Venice*, the structural hatred between Shylock and Antonio seems to configure a form of meaning to them. In *King Henry V*, the enablement of violence during war time seems to suggest that the capacity for violence is inherent to every human being. This suggestion is carried over through *Titus Andronicus*, in which Shakespeare explores the traumatic effects of violence within a mythical realm. Finally, in *Macbeth*, we see how the protagonist, who is accustomed to the violence of war, can have his own nature changed when he is forced to unwillingly commit a murder outside the context of war.
Keywords: Pain; Hatred; Violence; Drama; Shakespeare.

Resumo: Neste artigo, abordo cinco peças de Shakespeare para discutir como o significado de formas de ódio e violência dependem de traços individuais de personagens. Nesse sentido, ódio e violência podem fazer com que personagens cômicos consigam alcançar alguma forma de reconciliação ou autodestruição no caso de personagens trágicos. N'*A Comédia dos Erros*, os irmãos Dromio, que são submetidos a violência por parte de seus donos, são os que encontram redenção apesar do sofrimento. N'*O Mercador de Veneza*, o ódio estrutural entre Antônio e Shylock parece configurar uma forma de sentido para eles. Em *Henrique V*, a habilitação de violência durante um período de guerra parece sugerir que a capacidade para violência é inerente ao ser humano. Essa sugestão é observada também em *Tito Andrônico*, em que Shakespeare explora os efeitos traumáticos da violência em uma esfera mítica. Finalmente, em *Macbeth*, vemos como um personagem acostumado com a violência da guerra pode ter sua própria natureza mudada quando é forçado a involuntariamente cometer um assassinato fora do contexto de guerra.
Palavras-chave: Dor; Ódio; Violência; Teatro; Shakespeare.

To be, or not to be, that is the question –
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,

And by opposing end them. To die, to sleep –
No more; and by a sleep to say we end
The heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to
(William Shakespeare, Hamlet, 2003, p. 158, lines 3.1.56-63*)*

The nature of a character is fueled by individual will. Will is an individual trait, a force that drives one to think and act. What a character thinks and how he or she acts is going to qualify that character as either comic or tragic. Additionally, this individual force that causes will is expressed somehow, and the result is an individual self. Hence, "will" and "self" may, in a sense, be interchangeable: a self is formed by a character's will, and yet we do not know with certainty how will is formed. According to Harold Bloom, "Shakespeare's term for our 'self' is 'selfsame,' and *Hamlet* (…) is very much the drama in which the tragic protagonist revises his sense of the selfsame. Not self-fashioning but self-revision; for Foucault the self is fashioned, but for Shakespeare it is given, subject to subsequent mutabilities" (Bloom, 1998, p. 411). Stephen Greenblatt (1988), who shares Michel Foucault's view of the self, believes that individual thought is no more than the historical consequence of the circulation of social energies:

> If the textual traces in which we take interest and pleasure are (…) are the signs of contingent social practices, then (…) we can ask how collective beliefs and experiences were shaped, moved from one medium to another, concentrated in manageable aesthetic form, offered for consumption. The "life" that literary works seem to possess long after (…) the death of the culture for which the author wrote is the historical consequence, however transformed and refashioned, of the social energy initially encoded in those works. (Greenblatt, 1988, p. 5-6)

To Greenblatt, "collective beliefs and experiences were shaped, moved from one medium to another". There is no individual thinking, i.e., language does the thinking for the individual. Additionally, Greenblatt repeatedly finds evidence to show that "massive power structures (…) determine social and psychic reality" (Greenblatt, 1980, p. 254) and concludes that "fashioning oneself and being fashioned by cultural institutions—family, religion, state—were inseparably intertwined" (Greenblat, 1980, p. 256). Again: "In all my texts and documents, (…) the human subject itself began to seem remarkably unfree, the ideological product of the relations of power in a particular society. (…) If there remained traces of free choice, the choice was among possibilities whose range was strictly delineated by the social and ideological system in force" (Greenblatt, 1980, p. 256). According to Thomas McAlindon (2016), although elsewhere Greenblatt "accords Shakespeare a dangerous and sinister individuality, in his essay on 'The Circulation of Social Energy' he conducts a subtle attempt to dissolve his identity and deny his manifest superiority to all his contemporaries" (McAlindon, 2016, p. 6). Additionally, the "determinist bias came to prominence first in Stephen Greenblatt's seminal study, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*"

(McAlindon, 2016, p. 10). According to McAlindon, in his eminently Foucaultian Epilogue, "fatalistically sees disciplinary society producing the modes of opposition that in the end merely confirm the system from which the rebellious individual never escapes" (McAlindon, 2016, p. 10). McAlindon calls this view deterministic or fatalistic because it regards human will as a product of the culture of a specific time and place. In Greenblatt's view, therefore, the inner self is an illusion, because will is overdetermined by the culture of a time and place.

My approach regarding how hatred and violence are dealt with it has an emphasis on individual character. My understanding of character types is based on Northrop's Frye major division of literature, in his *Anatomy of Criticism* (1957), into two modes: the comic and the tragic. Therefore, with emphasis on character in mind, it ensues that character can be, in a general sense, of two types: either comic or tragic. Such categorization, I argue, depends on the nature of their will. If a character is, for instance, *willing* to avoid or accept violence, he os she is comic. If on the other hand, a character is *willing to* employ violence to achieve his or her goals, thus, he or she is tragic. Having in mind, Frye's theory of comedy, which conveys the meaning os salvation – presented in *The Myth of Deliverance* (1983) –, i.e., a comic character is *willing* to maintain the social *status quo* by averting violence, it follows that tragedy conveys the meaning of destruction, i.e., a tragic character is *willing* to disturb the *status quo* to achieve his or her goals through violence.

Pain is a constant in human life, a perennial element of human nature. Although this statement could be understood as a platitude, a banal remark, I take it as a translation for the aforementioned verses, which is an insight included in Hamlet's famous "To be or not to be" soliloquy: human flesh is heir to heart-ache and a thousand natural shocks. In the soliloquy, Hamlet muses on suicide. There are several instances of suicide in Shakespeare's work, the most famous one depicted in the most popular work of the bard, *Romeo and Juliet*. However, I will not cover self-inflicted violence, i.e., suicide, in this article. Pain takes different configurations according to different characters and their natures. Therefore, my approach avoids historical and theoretical views on violence. My understanding is, instead, pragmatic. In this sense, the contours and shapes violence takes in each play is character-dependent, i.e., the meaning violence conveys in each case is individualized in accordance to the nature of characters. My goal with this article, therefore, is to discuss how pain, in the form of hatred and physical violence, is configured according to character's traits in a few plays: *The comedy of Errors*, *The Merchant of Venice*, *King Henry V*, *Titus Andronicus* and *Macbeth*. The depiction of hatred and violence in each one of these plays reveals how the relevance of individual character is determinant in the actions they take towards others characters. Therefore, in a general sense, tragic characters employ violence, while comic characters accept the violence employed towards them.

When discussing Shakespearean tragedy, Tom McAlindon (2016), in *Shakespeare Minus 'Theory'*, argues that behind

> Shakespeare's delineation of the hero's moral fall lies a conviction that 'In men as in a rough-grown grove remain / Cave-keeping evils that obscurely

sleep' (*Luc.*, 1249–50). (…) Misguidedly essentialist or not, the notion of cave-keeping evils in every human being was one which Shakespeare clearly took for granted (McAlindon, 2016, p. 110-111).

Lucrece, the main character in Shakespeare's narrative poem *The Rape of Lucrece*, provides this remark after being raped by Tarquin, a friend of hers and her husband. Evil, thus, came "unexpectedly" from someone whom she trusted. Hence, according to McAlindon (2016), Shakespeare took for granted that cave-keeping evils were an inherent part of human nature. And evil, in practical terms, entails the infliction and the taking of pain. Pain, thus, is a constant in human life.

Violence in *The Comedy of Errors*, although traditionally understood as appropriate to the genre of farce, shows a certain aspect of human nature: the need for pain. According to Samuel Coleridge (1914), in *The Comedy of Errors*, Shakespeare presented us with a "legitimate farce in exactest consonance with the philosophical principles and character of farce (…) A proper farce is mainly distinguished from comedy by the license allowed, and even required, in the fable, in order to produce strange and laughable situations" (Coleridge, 1914, p. 78-79). Farce, however, is, like any other generic categorization, a reductive classification. According to Charles Whitworth, what

> critics usually have in mind when they label the play as farce is the increasingly hectic and crazy action in the middle acts generated by the presence in Ephesus of two sets of identical twins, and in particular the physical violence of which the two servant Dromios are the main victims. Their increasingly irritated and uncomprehending masters, the Antipholus brothers, resort to beating and threats of such punishment on several occasions—there are specific directions in the Folio only at 2.2.23 and 4.4.45—and there is much talk of beating, especially by the Dromios. *Beat*, *beaten* and *beating*, always in the primary sense of physical blows (…), occur a total of fourteen times in *Errors*, more than in any other play in the canon. (…) But to categorize the *whole* play as 'farce', even 'the only specimen of poetical farce in our language, that is intentionally such', as Coleridge did, solely because there are twins and people mistake them or because masters sometimes beat servants, would seem to be wilfully to ignore its other facets (Whitworth, 2002, p. 203).

Hence, as I mentioned, classifying the play as farce is scarcely important for its comprehension.[1] An important thing to understand when we watch a production or read the

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[1] Specific genre classifications may not very helpful, but broader and more general classifications might prove helpful. In tragedy, deaths are not natural, but caused by external factors. In histories, in which wars are common, deaths are also not natural, but they are not tragic. In comedies, even natural deaths are averted. What I am indicating here is that elements that define genre – such as marriages in comedies, wars in histories, and death in tragedy – lose relevance when we pay more attention to character. Hence genre classifications are only helpful insofar as they subserve characterological features. In other words, genre is relevant insofar as it helps identifying the presence of a tragic or comic character in a play. The problem with genre begins when the ultimate goal of a critic becomes categorization, i.e., when the hunt for structural patterns becomes the focus of critic to the detriment of aesthetic understanding and appreciation. In this sense, I considerably detract from F. Anne Payne (1981), who, in the beginning of her *Chaucer and Menippean Satire*, states that the "failure to recognize that a work belongs to a particular literary genre causes universal difficulties to critics" (Payne, 1981, p. 3). But she also admits: "To recognize that an author's work belongs to a particular literary

text of *The Comedy of Errors*, therefore, is how wisdom about human nature can be grasped from an aesthetic object. In the particular case of this comedy, the wisdom that can be grasped is, as I mentioned, the need for pain from the part of some of the characters. As Whitworth mentioned, the Antipholus brothers resort to physical violence and there is much talk of beating, especially by the Dromio brothers. The two Dromios are constantly subjected to violence by the two Antipholuses:

> DROMIO S. But I pray, sir, why am I beaten?
> ANTIPHOLUS S. Dost thou not know?
> DROMIO S. Nothing, sir, but that I am beaten
> ANTIPHOLUS S. Shall I tell you why?
> DROMIO S. Ay, sir, and wherefore; for they say every why hath a wherefore.
> ANTIPHOLUS S. Why, first for flouting me; and then wherefore –
> For urging it the second time to me.
> DROMIO S. Was there ever any man thus beaten out of season,
> When in the why and the wherefore is neither rhyme nor reason? Well, sir, I thank you.
> ANTIPHOLUS S. Thank me, sir, for what?
> DROMIO S. Marty, sir, for this something that you gave me for nothing (Shakespeare, 2015, p. 74-75, lines 2.2.38-49).

Dromio of Syracuse "thanks" his master for giving him "something" – the beating – for "nothing" – he had not actually disrespected ("flouted") his master previously. When Dromio thanks his master for beating him, he is obviously being ironic. But this irony reveals a deeper truth: why is Dromio unable to revolt against unjust violence? Why does he "accept" being beaten? This reveals a trait of comic characters: the *need for pain*. The Dromio brothers have no discernible reason for accepting the violence their masters inflict on them. But they accept it nonetheless. This other passage reveals the story between the other brother, Dromio of Ephesus, and his master:

> DROMIO E. I have served him from the hour of my nativity to this instant, and have nothing at his hands for my service but blows. When I am cold, he heats me with beating; when I am warm, he cools me with beating; I am waked with it when I sleep, raised with it when I sit, driven out of doors with it when I go from home, welcomed home with it when I return. (Shakespeare, 2015, p. 107, lines 4.4.27.33)

According to Harold Bloom, the "two long-suffering clowns have had to sustain numerous blows from the Antipholuses throughout the play" (Bloom, 1998, p. 27). However, considering the account of Dromio of Ephesus, I ask: have the blows been sustained only during the time-frame of the play? And, considering the dialogue between Dromio and Antipholus of Syracuse, I ask further: do the masters have good reasons to "correct" their servants through violence? This is, in my view, an often unnoticed aspect of comic

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genre is, of course, only the first step. The main problem—understanding the meaning implicit in his handling of the conventions—is the problem I will be dealing with in the remaining chapters" (Payne, 1981, p. 37). Thus, I argue that, from a pragmatic perspective, meaning is independent of genre. In some cases, however, acknowledgment of genre can be more helpful than in others.

characters. Masters constantly assault servants for no good reason, while the servants do not do not oppose their senseless beating.

Why does a slave (or servant for that matter) does not revolt against their masters? Is it because they have no choice, i.e., if they revolt against their masters, they put their life in danger? And, thus, they prefer to keep their lives, even if it is painful? Or is it because they are somehow satisfied with their condition, that is, they want to keep their painful life rather than risk it in order to achieve freedom and a less painful life? *The Comedy of Errors* seems to side with the second answer. Comic characters, like the Dromios, seem to possess, as I mentioned, a *need for pain*. The contentment felt by the two Dromios when they meet each other, contrasted with the bleakness resulting from the meeting of the two Antipholuses seems to be more meaningful than a foreseen and all-encompassing joy that is commonly expected from a comedy. The Antipholuses are rich abusive merchants, but the Dromios are poor abusing servants. Nonetheless, they are the ones who have a natural capacity for happiness, regardless of the uncountable blows – or, as Hamlet puts it, the "thousand natural shocks / That flesh is heir to" (Shakespeare, 2003, p. 158, lines 3.1.62-63) – they take either from their masters or from life. Other plays that are similar to the *Comedy of Errors* in this regard, such as *The Taming of The Shrew* and *Twelfth Night*,[2] also display violence in a way that might be considered "harmless". However, the subtle manner through which violence is displayed in *The Comedy of Errors* reveals the nature of comic character more fully than other Shakespearean comedies.

In *The Merchant of Venice*, in a darker tone than the one seen in *The Comedy of Errors*, the hatred between Shylock and Antonio almost ends in bloodshed. According to Bloom, "Antonio, as so many critics observe, is Shylock's mirror image, bonded with him in mutual hatred, and no more cheerful than Shylock is" (Bloom, 1998, p. 177). The mutual hatred between Antonio and Shylock is the central conflict in *The Merchant of Venice*. But what does Shylock really hate in Antonio? Antonio's fashion of making business allegedly bothers Shylock more than religious belief:

> I hate him for he is a Christian;
> But more, for that in low simplicity
> He lends out money gratis, and brings down
> The rate of usance here with us in Venice (Shakespeare, 2003, p. 84, lines 1.3.33-36).

"Shylock prefers 'usance' to 'usury'" (Mahood, 2003, p. 84), which suggests that the connotations that Shylock attributes to money-lending go beyond the usual pejorative sense. Money-lending, to Shylock, seems to be more than a mere activity that provides income:

> He hates our sacred nation, and he rails
> Even there where merchants most do congregate
> On me, my bargains, and my well-won thrift
> Which he calls interest. Cursed be my tribe

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[2] *Twelfth Night* is classified as high farce by certain critics (Bloom, 1998, p. 227).

If I forgive him! (Shakespeare, 2003, p. 85, 1.3.39-43)

"'Interest' was a better name than 'usury', but by no means as fair sounding as *thrift*, the pursuit of which was a virtue in the eyes of citizens" (Brown, 2000, p. 24). It seems that money-lending, to Shylock, is a way of life. Now, does Antonio hate Shylock's tribe because of their religious beliefs? Shylock claims to hate Antonio because he is Christian and also claims that Antonio hates Jews ("our sacred nation"), but when the threat of bloodshed arises, Antonio provides a more concrete reason as to why Shylock hates him:

> He seeks my life, his reason well I know:
> I oft delivered from his forfeitures
> Many that have at times made moan to me;
> Therefore he hates me (Shakespeare, 2003, p. 138-139, lines 3.3.21-24).

By delivering those in Shylock's forfeitures, i.e., by helping those in debt, Antonio reduces the rate of interest in Venice, thus, affecting Shylock's earnings. For that, Shylock, according to Antonio, hates him. But Antonio says nothing about why he hates Shylock. Now, does Antonio help those in Shylock's debt because he is a good Christian? Or because he hates Shylock and wants to harm him? Who hated first? Shylock or Antonio? An attempt to answer these questions, in my view, is fruitless. The only unambiguous conclusion that can be achieved is that money-management is a stronger cause of hate between the two than religious belief. Shylock says that he hates Antonio, but he also exposes the history between them, according to which Antonio had always loathed him for his usance. However, from this history, what can be acknowledged is that both always shared mutual hatred because of the way each one deals with money. There is physical abuse and patent aggression from Antonio's part toward Shylock: "You call me misbeliever, cut-throat dog, / And spit upon my Jewish gaberdine, / And all for use of that which is mine own" (Shakespeare, 2003, p. 88, lines 1.3.103-05). To this, Antonio replies: "I am as like to call thee so again, / To spit on thee again, to spurn thee too" (Shakespeare, 2003, p. 88, lines 1.3.122-23). But this kind of aggression is not enough to engender structural hatred from Shylock's part considering the nature of his character. As I explained, the ultimate reason as to why Shylock hates Antonio is his interference in the rate of interest in Venice. What is relevant to have in mind, thus, is that all the characters hate Shylock, and he hates back: "If a Jew wrong a Christian, what is his humility? Revenge. If a Christian wrong a Jew, what should his sufferance be by Christian example? Why, revenge! The villainy you teach me I will execute, and it shall go hard but I will better the instruction" (Shakespeare, 2003, p. 122, 3.1.53-57). "To better the instruction" means to outdo the teachers of villainy.

In the war of hatred, the winner is not the one with more money, but the one who can manipulate power in their advantage. Portia wittily saves Antonio employing a peripeteia.[3]

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3 According to William Greene, peripeteia (περιπέτεια), "ordinarily translated as 'reversal of fortune' or 'reversal of situation' really conveys a more precise meaning: it is the outcome of an action which is the opposite of what was intended" (Greene, 1944, p. 92). This description fits Portia's trick perfectly because what was intended was that Shylock took a pound of flesh from Antonio, but he ends up backing off.

But Shylock, in my view, is the winner in the contest of representing reality:

> BASSANIO Do all men kill the things they do not love?
> SHYLOCK Hates any man the thing he would not kill? (Shakespeare, 2003, p. 149, lines 4.1.66-67)

However grim or even biased this might sound, Shylock seems to win the battle against Bassanio regarding the better understanding of reality. The fantasy of eliminating that which one hates is a trait of human nature. As Bloom remarks, "Antonio's anti-Shylockism and Shylock's anti-Antonioism are parallel instances to the madness of those who lose control when they encounter a gaping pig, become insane at seeing a harmless necessary cat, or involuntarily urinate when the bagpipe sings" (Bloom, 1998, p. 187). According to Bloom (1998), unreasonable, sheer hatred is madness. In my view, it is an essential trait of human nature. The mutual hatred between Antonio and Shylock seems to reside in their very ways of life. Shylock values the hoarding of money and goods:

> Nay, take my life and all, pardon not that:
> You take my house when you do take the prop
> That doth sustain my house; you take my life
> When you do take the means whereby I live (Shakespeare, 2003, p. 161, lines 4.1.370-73).

Usance is just something which Antonio naturally abhors, and the opposite is true for Shylock, i.e., he hates that Antonio does not value money and goods. In conclusion, they hate each other's way of life. In Bloom's view, the

> antipathy between Antonio and Shylock transcends Jew baiting; Gratiano is an instance of that Christian sport, but Antonio cannot be let off so easily. His ambivalence, like Shylock's, is murderous, and unlike Shylock's, it is successful, for Antonio does end Shylock the Jew, and gives us Shylock the New Christian.(...) It is horrible to say it, but the broken New Christian Shylock is preferable to a successful butcher of a Shylock, had Portia not thwarted him. What would be left for Shylock after hacking up Antonio? What is left for Antonio after crushing Shylock? In Shakespearean ambivalence, there can be no victories (Bloom, 1998, p. 190).

From a pragmatic perspective, it could be said that Shylock and Antonio hate each other simply because they acknowledge each other's existence. The hate they feel for each other is primordial. Their hatred, as Bloom observes, is a diversion of self-hatred. And such hatred also provides excitement since it is ambivalent. In a sense, it provides meaning for their lives, i.e., they would not have much left if they did not have each other to hate. Shylock and Antonio, thus, are great examples of primeval mutually ambivalent hatred.

In *Titus Andronicus*, Shakespeare portrays a cycle of revenge between two families. According to Reginald A. Foakes, as he writes in *Shakespeare and Violence*, in

> the world the play depicts, violence is inflicted casually, and no one is safe. A Clown appears in 4.3, carrying a basket with pigeons in it; he is

commissioned by Titus to take a letter to the Emperor Saturninus. The uncomprehending Clown delivers his pigeons and the letter, wrapped round a knife, in the following scene, and the response of Saturninus on reading the letter is: 'Go, take him away and hang him presently' (4.4.45). The action of Saturninus here in ordering the instant death of the Clown has been seen as 'inexplicable. Unexplained in the sense that no overt reason is given for it'. Just so; the action of Saturninus appears automatic and unmotivated as the Clown (…) is casually sent off to execution. If the violence of other characters is often 'selfishly purposeful' they can kill and torture unthinkingly and without feeling, like automatons. The death of the Clown is representative of the action of a play that relishes violence for its own sake (Foakes, 2003, p. 55-56).

Furthermore, "the violence in *Titus Andronicus* is disconnected from any moral centre and so appears gratuitous and designed to shock" (Foakes, 2003, p. 57). Moreover, the play relishes "the passion for sensation and violence that was a feature of the popular theatre" (Foakes, 2003, p. 58). This passage is an emblematic example of the play's gory setting:

> Come, brother, take a head,
> And in this hand the other will I bear;
> And Lavinia, thou shalt be employed in these arms;
> Bear thou my hand, sweet wench, between thy teeth (Shakespeare, 2016, p. 115, lines 3.1.278-81).

This scene takes place after Titus, being tricked by Aaron, had cut off his own hand to offer as ransom for the lives of his two sons, Martius and Quintus, who had been decapitated. Titus, then, asks Marcus, his brother, to carry one of the heads, while he carries the other, and Lavinia, Titus's daughter, carries his hand in her mouth with her teeth. Contrary to Foakes, I do not think that this scene is intended as gratuitous and merely designed to shock. Aversion for depiction of violence is highly subjective, bordering ideology. The depiction of violence in the plays seems to serve more atavistic purposes.

These atavistic aspects refer to a conditioning to which humankind is submitted. In the view of Northrop Frye, we are shaped after a "mythological conditioning":

> within a mythological universe, a body of assumptions and beliefs developed from his existential concerns (…) [which are] culturally inherited. Below the cultural inheritance there must be a common psychological inheritance, otherwise forms of culture and imagination outside our own traditions would not be intelligible to us. (…) One of the practical functions of criticism, by which I mean the conscious organizing of a cultural tradition, is, I think, to make us more aware of our mythological conditioning (Frye, 1982, p. xviii).

Criticism, to Frye, is a tool to make us aware that the criticism "can make us conscious of our mythical and metaphorical conditioning, as well as of its opposite, our activity as subjects in an objective world where words do not form models of experience, but are only servomechanisms for acquainting us with things and events" (1984, p; 476). In Sophocles' *Antigone*, when she threatened by Creon, she resorts to the "gods' unwritten and unfailing laws":

> For me it was not Zeus who made that order.
> Nor did that Justice who lives with the gods below
> mark out such laws to hold among mankind.
> Nor did I think your orders were so strong
> that you, a mortal man, could overrun
> the gods' unwritten and unfailing laws.
> Not now, nor yesterday's, they always live,
> and no one knows their origin in time (Sophocles, 2013, p. 44, lines 450-57).

According to William Greene, "Antigone appeals to 'the unwritten and steadfast laws of the gods, whose life is not of to-day or yesterday but of all time'; in other words, she appeals in a profound sense from human law to the law of nature which the gods themselves express and uphold, from *nomos* to *physis*" (Greene, 1944, p. 140). Some of the entries for νόμος (*nomos*) in the Greek-English lexicon are: "*that which is in habitual practice*, *use* or *possession* (…) *usage, custom*" (Lidell-Scott, 1961, p. 1180). For φύσις (*physis*): "*origin* (…) *nature*, *constitution* (…) of the mind, one's *nature*, *character* (…) *the regular order of nature*" (1961, p. 1964-65). *Nomos* is the artificial law created by humanity, while *physis* is the natural law created by the gods. Frye's hint at a mythological conditioning seems to be reminiscent of Antigone's reference to "unwritten laws". In short, myth, in Frye's view, seems to be a form of expression of the unwritten and natural laws by which humankind is guided, i.e., our mythological conditioning is related to "central structural principles that literature derives from myth, the principles that give literature its communicating power across the centuries through all ideological changes" (Frye, 2008, p. 8-9).[4] And archetypes are one of the forms through which literature manages to convey meaning across centuries.

Titus Andronicus brings up archetypal topoi: "As Titus indicates, he has Ovidian precedent in the supper served by Progne, Philomela's sister, to the rapist Tereus, who unknowingly devoured his own child, and there may hover also Seneca's *Thyestes*, with its

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[4] Authors from other fields, such as psychology and philology, also emphasize the atavistic aspect of myth. The British philologist Geoffrey Kirk argues that myths "concern us not only for (...) anthropological interest (...) but also because of men's endearing insistence on carrying quasi-mythical modes of thought, expression, and communication into a supposedly scientific age. (…) what really matters for most of us (…) lie closer to that poetical view of myths" (Kirk, 1970, p. 2). Kirk also highlights that "stresses within the family" (Kirk, 1970, p. 202) was one of the commonest themes of Greek mythology. This matter because, as Kirk argues, "greed, jealousy and lust remain prominent among the hereditary qualities of men. The emphasis on family tensions in ancient Greece should be seen as a broad response to a continuing human characteristic rather than as a specific reaction to extreme social conditions" (Kirk, 1970, p. 194). The reason, therefore, why family matters are the most relevant aesthetically is because they say respect to "continuing human characteristics". What I want to emphasize from this is that the issues addressed by myth are deeply rooted psychological and existential ones. It is no wonder that, according to Kirk, most "of the recurrent figures of myth carry a load of psychological implications" (Kirk, 1970, p. 268). The Canadian psychologist Jordan Peterson explains that the medieval man lived in a *moral* universe, in which everything, was "characterized in large part by their *moral* nature—by their impact on what we would describe as affect, emotion or motivation; were therefore characterized by their *relevance* or *value* (which is impact on affect). Description of this relevance took narrative form, mythic form" (Peterson, 2002, p. 4). Peterson also claims that our behavior is shaped by the same "mythic rules—*thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not covet*—that guided our ancestors for (…) thousands of years (…). This means that those rules are so powerful (…) that they maintain their existence (…) even in the presence of explicit theories that undermine their validity. That is a mystery (Peterson, 2002, p. 7). My point, here, is to indicate the powerful impact that myth has in the psychology and the philosophy of human life.

climax in the sinister feast of Atreus" (Bloom, 1998, p. 85). The topos of the shame experienced by a raped woman is also brought back in *The Rape of Lucrece*, a poem in which Lucrece, the main character, considers suicide because of shame. Filicide is archetypal. Instances are Abraham in Judeo-Christian myth, and Iphigenia and Medea in Greek myth. Shame related to rape is also archetypal. But feeding someone their own children's bodies might not be archetypal, although there are precedents in the episodes of Greek myth known as the curse of the house of Atreus:

> The sons of Pelops were Pittheus, Atreus, Thyestes, and others (...) And when a discussion took place concerning the kingdom, Thyestes declared to the multitude that the kingdom ought to belong to him who owned the golden lamb, and when Atreus agreed, Thyestes produced the [stolen] lamb and was made king. But Zeus sent Hermes to Atreus and told him to stipulate with Thyestes that Atreus should be king if the sun should go backward; and when Thyestes agreed, the sun set in the east; hence the deity having plainly attested the usurpation of Thyestes, Atreus got the kingdom and banished Thyestes. But afterwards being apprised of the adultery, he sent a herald to Thyestes with a proposal of accommodation; and when he had lured Thyestes by a pretence of friendship, he slaughtered the sons, Aglaus, Callileon, and Orchomenus (...) And having cut them limb from limb and boiled them, he served them up to Thyestes without the extremities; and when Thyestes had eaten heartily of them, he showed him the extremities, and cast him out of the country (Apollodorus, 1921, p. 163-167).

This is the subject-matter of Seneca's *Thyestes*. Northrop Frye defines archetypes as "recurring or conventional myths and metaphors" (Frye, 1976, p. 118). These topoi are archetypal in the Fryean sense of recurrence of images. Filicide and shame of rape recur. Feeding parents their own children does not. Regardless if feeding someone their own children's bodies is archetypal or not, it is certainly a powerful event, but neither Titus, nor any other character in the play, soliloquizes about it. There is no prominent personality in the play that poetically expresses their take on such action. In conclusion, to dismiss Titus Andronicus as a display of excessive violence seems to be a critical mistake. If the play is simply mocking the audience's taste for violence, it would not be possible, in the context of a parody, to read these lines by Lucius as an expression of hopelessness and despair: "Ah, that this sight should make so deep a wound, / And yet detested life not shrink thereat!" (Shakespeare, 2016, p. 114, lines 3.1.245-46). Bloom, similarly to Foakes (2016), complains about the violence in the play. According to him, in productions of Titus Andronicus he had attended, the audience would never know "when to be horrified and when to laugh, rather uneasily" (Bloom, 1998, p. 77). Scene 3.1, as an example, seems to be rather poignant in the display of despair. And despair is a rather uneasy feeling to be shared. In my view, it is not inappropriate or unnatural that Titus starts laughing in the middle of this scene, after his hand and the heads of his two sons are sent back. Marcus reacts to his laughing:

> TITUS When will this fearful slumber have an end?
> MARCUS Now farewell flatt'ry; die Andronicus,
> Thou dost not slumber: see thy two sons' heads,

> Thy warlike hand, thy mangled daughter here,
> Thy other banished son with this dear sight
> Struck pale and bloodless, and thy brother, I,
> Even like a stony image, cold and numb.
> Ah, now no more will I control thy griefs;
> Rent off thy silver hair, thy other hand
> Gnawing with thy teeth, and be this dismal sight
> The closing up of our most wretched eyes.
> Now is a time to storm; why art thou still?
> TITUS Ha ha ha!
> MARCUS Why dost thou laugh? It fits not with this hour.
> TITUS Why, I have not another tear to shed;
> Besides, this sorrow is an enemy,
> And would usurp upon my wat'ry eyes
> And make them blind with tributary tears (Shakespeare, 2016, p. 114, lines 3.1.251-68).

This is a clear sign of despair, which, again, is rather difficult felling to share, and bound to provoke ambivalent reactions in audiences. Lavinia carrying Titus' hand with her teeth is supposed to be disturbing. If it prompts uneasy laughter, it could be because despair is a difficult sensation to share, specially depending on the kind of audience watching and how the scene is directed. But it could also be that this is not the best way to convey despair, thus, the inappropriate reaction from the audience. What I am insisting on here is that the violence in the play is not gratuitous. According to Bloom, "*Titus Andronicus* performed an essential function for Shakespeare, but cannot do very much for the rest of us" (Bloom, 1998, p. 86). Bloom, alongside Foakes (2003), clearly considers the violence an exclusively negative aspect. The display of violence, therefore, could be a way of shedding light on the darker corners of human nature. Violence, rather than socially or historically induced, could be an intrinsic aspect to humankind, although the way violence is employed and received varies according to the individual.

Lisa Starks-Estes (2014) argues that Shakespeare locates trauma in the depths of extreme sorrow that is pronounced in myths and related legends. In creating his Roman nightmare, Shakespeare employs the full range of myth and other legends to explore eroticized aggression and the traumatic effects of violence, remaking the myths into a revenge play (Starks-Estes, 2014, p. 97). *Titus Andronicus* is not just relishing delight in violence. The display of violence in a mythical context shows how *Titus Andronicus*, hence, is an example of how pain, hatred and violence seem to possess atavistic roots. We also see this aspect in *King Henry V*, on which I focus now.

Wars are a common element to Shakespearean histories. During war time, violence is enabled. Hatred, in *The Merchant of Venice*, as I showed, could easily have degenerated into physical violence. We see another instance of this, in a different setting, in *King Henry V*. King Henry V, when invading France, addresses the inhabitants of Harfleur by eloquently describing what his army is to do if he is not allowed to pass:

> If I begin the battery once again,

> I will not leave the half-achieved Harfleur
> Till in her ashes she lie buried.
> The gates of mercy shall be all shut up,
> And the fleshed soldier, rough and hard of heart,
> In liberty of bloody hand shall range
> With conscience wide as hell, mowing like grass
> Your fresh fair virgins and your flowering infants (Shakespeare, 1995, p. 216-7, lines 3.3.7-14).

Where does this "widening of conscience" come from? Of course, for the ultimate level of free carnage to be reached, hatred must be nurtured. If the king and his troops are allowed passage, uncontrolled violence is not going to happen. But what I am pointing out here is that the seed of hatred is universal, i.e., a major part of human nature. Real love exists, but is much rarer that real hatred, which the king attempts to rhetorically justify:

> What is it then to me if impious war,
> Arrayed in flames like to the prince of fiends,
> Do with his smirched complexion all fell feats
> Enlinked to waste and desolation? –
> What is't to me, when you yourselves are cause,
> If your pure maidens fall into the hand
> Of hot and forcing violation? (Shakespeare, 1995, p. 217, lines 3.3.15-21)

He blames "war" instead of his own lust for violence, and, by blaming war, he averts revealing his individual self as the root cause of hatred and violence. In other words, the late prince Hal, now king Hery V, conceals his own bloodlust with a rhetorical speech. In *King Henry V*, England is not defending itself. It is deliberately attacking France to claim territories. And hatred and bloodlust are not exclusive to Englishmen either. King Henry continues:

> What rein can hold licentious wickedness
> When down the hill he holds his fierce career?
> We may as bootless spend our vain command
> Upon th'enraged soldiers in their spoil
> As send precepts to the leviathan
> To come ashore. Therefore, you men of Harfleur,
> Take pity of your town and of your people
> Whiles yet my soldiers are in my command,
> Whiles yet the cool and temperate wind of grace
> O'erblows the filthy and contagious clouds
> Of heady murder, spoil and villainy.
> If not, why, in a moment look to see
> The blind and bloody soldier with foul hand
> Defile the locks of your shrill-shrieking daughters,
> Your fathers taken by the silver beards,
> And their most reverend heads dashed to the walls,
> Your naked infants spitted upon pikes,
> Whiles the mad mothers with their howls confused
> Do break the clouds, as did the wives of Jewry
> At Herod's bloody-hunting slaughtermen.
> What say you? Will you yield and this avoid?
> Or, guilty in defence, be thus destroyed? (Shakespeare, 1995, p. 217-8, lines

3.3.22-43)

Once released, "licentious wickedness" cannot be held back anymore. Despite Hal's rhetorical justifications, this is a truth of human nature. Hatred and violence, when fully enabled, hardly can be contained again. It does not take much, however, for "the filthy and contagious clouds / Of heady murder, spoil and villainy" to overblow "the cool and temperate wind of grace". And when that happens, the results are smashed skulls, raped women, and impaled babies. Where there is lust for violence, only a brief spark is needed for it to be fully enabled. Real hatred, I argue, is an element of human nature to be revered, not in a worshiping, but respectful manner. It can, as Henry indicates, easily take control over us.

Referring to this passage of the play, Foakes argues that at "these points in the play the idea of war itself as impious is developed, and the gruesome vision of horrors, of naked infants 'spitted upon pikes' and so on, provides a sensational backdrop to the action of the play, something to engage the imagination of the audience" (Foakes, 2003, p. 102). Stephen Greenblatt, on the other hand, claims that the "play deftly registers every nuance of royal hypocrisy, ruthlessness, and bad faith—testing, in effect, the proposition that successful rule depends not upon sacredness but upon demonic violence" (Greenblatt, 1988, p. 56). In Foakes' (2003) view, the passage is just another instance of violence for its own sake. To Greenblatt (1988), however, the play shows that the success of politics depends on the success of violence. I side with Greenblatt (1988) here and add that Henry's speech reminds us of Lucrece's remark on evil I mentioned earlier: "In men as in a rough-grown grove remain / Cave-keeping evils that obscurely sleep" (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 309, lines 1249-50).

In *Macbeth*, Macbeth's rage launches him into a destructive and self-destructive campaign. In the play, there are two different contexts in which violence takes place. The first is that of wars and what we see is something similar to that of *King Henry V*: war, in a sense, enables violence as something trivial. During the wars, Macbeth makes "Strange images of death" (Shakespeare, 1999, p. 115, lines 1.3.95). Violence is generally associated with the uncanny. Not only violence, however, but the whole play conveys a sense a sense of uncanniness, as Dolores Aguero explains: "When things that are unnatural happen, the uncanny arises. It is strange for a person to be not born of woman, or for an inanimate object such as a forest to move, though the violence in *Macbeth* is more than strange—it is strangely familiar" (Aguero, 2009, p. 37). One way to look at the uncanny in *Macbeth* is to examine its interest in repetition. In this way, the uncanny, like violence, is not alien, because it has always been with us, although suppressed (Aguero, 2009, p. 67), much in the sense of Lucrece's cave-keeping evils that obscurely sleep within men. However, I will not focus too much in this uncanny aspect. My point in discussing violence in *Macbeth* is to show how unenabled violence can change character. In a second moment, violence, in *Macbeth*, outside the context of wars, becomes more intimate and personal. And while the violence that happens in war does not affect Macbeth, Duncan's assassination and the subsequent murders affect him deeply.

Antony Nuttall (2001) argues that "Macbeth, it is often said, is in danger of slipping

from the tragic because its hero is so wicked, with the consequence that the conclusion is too 'poetically just' – the dead butcher brought down – and so perhaps a matter as much for satisfaction as for pity or terror" (Nutall, 2001, p. 77). Another way of phrasing it is saying that the line separating a tragic hero from a comic villain is very thin. This is more evident in Macbeth's case because we see his transition from a wavering comic villain to a full tragic hero. It is noteworthy that the protagonist himself acknowledges this:

> I have no spur
> To prick the sides of my intent, but only
> Vaulting ambition which o'erleaps itself
> And falls on th'other – (Shakespeare, 1999, p. 133, lines 1.7.25-28)

Macbeth explicitly states to have ambition, but no will. The metaphor here is *intent = horse*. Regardless of its interpretation,[5] the resulting failure, that is, falling down from a horse, is always comical – in the sense of being funny. Macbeth, therefore, has, at least in the beginning, a tendency toward being a comic villain. It is Lady Macbeth who first impels him to change his nature. It is the fear of humiliation before a woman that impels him to commit the murder.[6] Nonetheless, Although Lady Macbeth says that her husband's "nature (...) is too full o'th'milk of human kindness" (Shakespeare, 1999, p. 123, lines 1.5.15), Macbeth, in my view, cannot be seen as a (temporary) full comic character because, as a skilled warrior, he kills people. If he had not been induced to commit the murder, he would have pushed toward a comic stance since he would have accepted the humiliation imposed by Lady Macbeth, i.e., it would have corresponded to him falling down from the horse. Thus, he would not have begun his transition into a tragic character had not he resisted the anxiety of his "heat-opressèd brain" (Shakespeare, 1999, p. 140, lines 2.1.39).

Robert Reid characterizes "Macbeths' journey into darkness as three equally significant stages of spiritual catastrophe, three distinctive and theatrically potent dimensions of evil as it evolves and festers in the human psyche" (Reid, 2000, p. 118). Macbeth is directly responsible for three initial murders, namely, Duncan and his guards, and, subsequently, indirectly responsible for the murder of Banquo, Lady Macduff, her children and servants. The murder of Duncan, nonetheless, is a turning point: "Had I but died an hour before this chance, / I had lived a blessed time, for from this instant, / There's nothing serious in mortality" (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 154, lines 2.3.84-86), i.e., there is

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[5] "Two interpretations of Macbeth's images have been offered: (1) continuing the equine images of 22-3, Macbeth distinguishes his intent to murder, which he imagines as an unspurred horse, from his ambition to be king, which he imagines as an eager rider who overdoes his vault ('o'erleaps') and thus fails to land in the saddle; (2) horse and rider together fall when the pair fails to over-leap an obstacle. (...) Lady Macbeth's entrance interrupts the speech, but the audience may supply 'side' (of the imaginary horse or obstacle) as Macbeth's next (unspoken) word" (Braunmuller, 1999, p. 133).
[6] Macbeth hesitates to kill Duncan, and Lady Macbeth challenges him: "When you durst do it, then you were a man" (Shakespeare, 1999, p. 135, line 1.7.49). In the next scene, he has a vision of a dagger – "art thou but / A dagger of the mind, a false creation, / Proceeding from the heat-oppressèd brain?" (Shakespeare, 1999, p. 140, lines 2.1.37-9) –, which represents an association between pursuit for sexual success and the murder, i.e., violence. This argument, of course, requires more elaboration, but I will not discuss it here in detail because it is out of the scope of the main argument.

nothing serious in human existence from this point on. After the first murder, Macbeth keeps doing and saying things that express that he is not yet fully evil because he is transitioning from the partial comic to the full tragic. Shortly after Duncan's murder, Macbeth begins to be taken by rage and initiates his transition of nature by killing the two guards: "O, yet I do repent me of my fury / That I did kill them" (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 155, lines 2.3.99-100). In 3.2, he says: "Things bad begun, make strong themselves by ill" (Shakespare, 2002, p. 172, lines 3.2.55). Finally, in 3.4, he says that he is "yet but young in deed" (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 184, lines 3.4.144) and sets out to see the witches.

Here, the contrast with a comic character aids my explanation. The difference resides in that comic characters, like the Dromio brothers, "accept" and redeem. Tragic characters, however, do not accept and confront – even if such confrontation necessarily leads to misery. Therefore, if a comic character meets deliverance, it is because his nature is suitable for "acceptance". If the tragic character meets destruction, it is because his nature is suitable for confrontation.[7] Once again, if Macbeth had backed out of his decision to murder Duncan, he would have maintained his tendency toward the comic because he would have accepted his wife's humiliation. In his own words, he would not have dared to do more than what "may become a man" (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 134, lines 1.7.46). It is important to keep in mind that the notion of "manliness" Macbeth employs here is not exactly ethical. It is, in fact, pragmatic in the sense that what suits ("becomes") a man does not suit a beast. In other words, from Macbeth's perspective, only a beast would murder Duncan without hesitation. My point, here, is that if we emphasize Macbeth's responsibility for the murder of Duncan, we lose track of the tragic sense of the character and misunderstand the play for what it is, i.e., an aesthetic object. Harold Goddard uses criminological data to argue not for ethical responsibility, but for the tragic meaning of the play:

> the husband, not the wife, is the truly tragic figure, and the play is rightly entitled *Macbeth,* not *The Macbeths.* Professor Stoll's [who authored *Shakespeare Studies*] own criminological data suggest just this distinction. He quotes penological authorities to show that the sleep of criminals is not disturbed by uneasy dreams and that signs of repentance, remorse, or despair are seldom to be detected in them. In one group of four hundred murderers such signs were found in only three, and in another group of seven hundred criminals only 3.4 per cent "showed signs of repentance or appeared at all moved in recounting their misdeeds." That that exceptional 3.4 per cent were specimens of what Nietzsche calls the "pale criminal" and included probably the only ones capable of exciting tragic interest Professor

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[7] Regarding *King Lear*, Andrew Cecil Bradley argues that we feel "we feel also the presence of the tragic ὕβρις [*hubris*] (…) Lear (…) is (…) choleric by temperament (…) And a long life of absolute power (…) has produced in him that blindness to human limitations, and that presumptuous self-will, which in Greek tragedy we have so often seen stumbling against the altar of Nemesis" (Bradley, 1912, p. 282). I argue, however, that that *hubris* is an ethical notion in the sense that it configures a boundary which cannot be crossed so that social order be maintained. Nonetheless, if we consider individual traits of characters, such as Lear's choleric temperament, mentioned by Bradley (1912), we see that individual traits are more determinant than a socially conventional idea of ethical boundary when the issue at hand are individual actions, such as the employment or acceptance of pain. Hence, if a character with a less choleric temperament, such as most comic characters, were in Lear's place, thus, a tragedy would not have unfolded.

> Stoll does *not* go on to say. Imaginative literature is not criminology, and, except incidentally or for purposes of contrast, has no interest in portraying primitive, brutal, or moronic types. When rich or noble natures display atavistic traits or slip back into atavistic conduct, as do Hamlet and Othello, those traits begin to assume tragic interest, for tragedy has to do with men possessing the capacity to become gods who, monetarily at least, become devils. The normal man has little in common with these murderers of Professor Stoll's who slay their victims as unconcernedly as an old hand in a slaughterhouse kills cattle. But the normal man, in his lesser degree, *is* Orestes, Macbeth, and Raskolnikov. Such characters tell us, not how the ordinary run of criminals react, but how Aeschylus and Shakespeare and Dostoevsky would have felt, if they had themselves fallen into crime. They are the 3 per cent of the 3 per cent (Goddard, 1951, p. 114-15)

Macbeth is not, as Goddard (1951) indicates, a primitive, brutal, or moronic type. Nonetheless, he slips into atavistic conduct by committing the murders. His slip, however, is not momentary since he engages in a sequence of murders that cause him to transform his nature. Macbeth's guilt is instructive in that he murders Duncan *unwillingly*, i.e., he resisted the cave-keeping evils that obscurely slept in him but was ultimately taken by them.

We see, thus, that violence in Shakespeare's work can have several different consequences according to character. Comic characters, like the Dromio brothers, apparently "accept" violence. There are characters, like Antonio and Shylock, that even seem to depend on hatred as a form of meaning. Of course, violence is always more "serious" when the threat of bloodshed arises. In times of war, violence is enabled. The notion, provided by Lucrece, that there are cave-keeping evils sleeping in every man and woman seems to shine more intensely in times of war. We seem to resist Lucrece's notion that all of us seem to have a capacity for evil, however conditional the circumstances for the triggering of violence might be. Retaliation, for instance, which is what we see in in *Titus Andronicus*, is a natural reaction to the infliction of violence. In Macbeth, we see change of nature happening because of coerced execution of violence. Violence, therefore, in its several degrees and in tis various shapes, can have several different effects on different individual characters with specific traits.

According to Lionel Charles Knights, in "the mass of Shakespeare criticism there is not a hint that 'character' – like 'plot,' 'rhythm,' 'construction' and all our other critical counters – is merely an abstraction" (Knights, 1947, p. 18). Additionally, Knights claims that "Falstaff is not a man, but a choric commentary" (Knights, 1933, p. 15). According to Nuttall, in such a statement, "Knights's unguarded epigram expresses a hard formalist view and can be easily rebutted. Falstaff is quite clearly presented, through fiction, as a human being" (Nuttal, 1983, p. 82). Pain, as Hamlet suggested in his soliloquy, and evil, as Lucrece suggested after being raped, are constants in human life. Propensity towards the employment of violence and the acceptance thereof depends on individual will. Individual character is determined by individual will, on which historical aspects have little influence. In this sense, the presence of hatred and violence in human life seems be more related to inherent and atavistic roots, which are revealed by myth, than social factors. Therefore, the formation of

individual self or character seems to be less influenced by historical or social circumstances than inherent and individual features. These features, however, cannot be controlled at will. My point, therefore, is to indicate that, however deterministic the formation of self or nature of character may be, the determinant factor is not social or historical. Whatever this predominant factor may be remains a mystery. In conclusion, character can deal with violence in two ways: either they avert or accept it or they incite and employ it somehow. The first one is a comic type of character; the second, a tragic type. In conclusion, external circumstances are relevant insofar as they determine the range of possible or likely actions, which usually comes down to the threat of violence. Whether or not a character will decide to spill blood depends mostly on his nature rather than on historical circumstances. On the other hand, a character with a comic nature will avert bloodshed when within a situation in which violence is a possibility. Therefore, the study of violence in fiction can shed light not only on the nature of fictional characters, but also on the nature of human beings in real life.

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NOTAS DE AUTORIA

Tiago Cabral Vieira de Carvalho (tiagocabralvieira@gmail.com) have a major in English focusing on literary studies, having written my undergraduate monography about William Shakespeare. I have a Masters' degree in literary studies (with emphasis in literary theory) and I am currently a doctoral student in literary studies (with emphasis in anglophone literatures), writing a dissertation about Shakespeare's *Macbeth*.

Aprovação de comitê de ética em pesquisa
Não se aplica.

Conflito de interesses
Não se aplica.