

HUSSERL AND TWARDOWSKI: TWO PATHS FOR THE REFORM OF LOGIC

CARLOS LOBO

Centre Gilles-Gaston Granger (Aix-Marseille Université),
Archives Husserl de Paris (École Normale Supérieure), FRANCE
carlos.lobo.ag@orange.fr, carlos.lobo@univ-amu.fr
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9844-8107>

Abstract. This paper reconstructs, in a historical and critical perspective, the Brentanian project of a reform of logic and the bifurcation that emerges between Twardowski and Husserl. Against the widespread tendency to frame the Austro-Polish debates through the metaphysical opposition realism/idealism, it argues that the decisive issue concerns the constitution and scope of a formally sound yet epistemologically relevant logic. Building on Brentano's reduction of judgement to existential acceptance or rejection, the paper highlights how "modification" becomes the operator through which predicative judgements are transformed into existential form. It then examines Twardowski's theory of logical modification—grounded in the distinction between attributive and modifying adjectives and in the thesis that representation does not posit existence—and shows how this framework motivates his account of intentional (in-)existence and his stance on general objects. Husserl's critique, by contrast, relocates modification within a phenomenological theory of meaning and intentionality: nominalization, *suppositio materialis*, and especially neutralization articulate a layered system of logical and intentional modifications. The paper concludes that Husserl's reform opens a systematic place for modalizations (possibility, necessity, probability) as constitutive features of meaning and noematic content.

Keywords: Husserl • Twardowski • Brentano • logical modification • modalization

RECEIVED: 01/11/2024

ACCEPTED: 24/01/2025

The source of the modern schism between analytical and other philosophies stems from the debates around the constitution of formal logic and its scope for critical reflection. The founders of the first trend believed that, with mathematical logic, as it has been constituted by Frege, Russell and others, philosophical thought was equipped with a new organon that enable one to discuss and clarify any matter. From the point of view of Husserl and others belonging to the Brentano School or other, the constitution of a formal logic not only complete, but epistemologically relevant was still in the making.

Contemporary with the efforts of Frege, Peirce and Schröder, the *Logical Investigations* published in 1901, and republished and partially rewritten in 1913, were, as has



been repeated over and over again since Husserl's time, a *work of breakthrough and expansion* for phenomenology. And one of the central tasks defined even before the *Prolegomena* was precisely to help and clarify the constitution of a new formal logic. But what effect did this have on the development of logic proper, which is the object and the issue at stake? Was this research just the umpteenth attempt, quickly bogged down in the uncertain waters of a 'philosophical logic', a 'transcendental logic', or did it contain a genuine proposal for a formal logic, not only viable from a theoretical point of view, but also fruitful? We cannot answer this question without becoming, at least provisionally, a historian.

My aim in what follows is therefore historical and critical. We need to go back to what had been Husserl's essential goal since his work in 1895, around what he then called a *logic of content*. It is also necessary to take the measure of what constitutes the turn or inflexion in relation to the Brentanian tradition in which he is embedded, on which I have insisted in other places, and which can be dated from 1909.

In order to clarify the question here at stake, we must return to the very source of the Polish school of logic and its founder, Twardowski, who was himself indebted to Brentano. However, the project of a radical reform of logic, characteristic of the Brentanian school, also known as the Austrian school,¹ has generally been underestimated, and consequently the perspective in which Husserlian reflection on formal logic was engaged has not been considered from this particular perspective. Among the central aspects of this reform as initiated by Brentano comes to the fore the fundamental thesis that any judgement is reducible to existential judgement, that is positive or negative assertions on the existence of states of affairs. From this starting point it is understandable that Husserl was led to insist of the requirement of an enrichment of "existential judgement" by the introduction of modalized forms of existence (possibilities, necessities, probabilities, etc.). Twardowski, for his part, felt a similar need, and developed a theory of modified meaning, and introduced the grammatical and logical concept of modification.

1. Logic of content and the Brentanian reform of logic

Despite the extensive and in-depth research on Austrian philosophy and the Brentanian school over the last few decades, the precise perspective of the logical reflections of the Brentanian school (and the way in which Husserl made a decisive bifurcation) has been blurred by the metaphysical debates on realism and idealism. Husserl's ongoing debate with Twardowski, whether implicit or explicit, is likely to help us to grasp the ins and outs of this bifurcation, and consequently the profile of Husserlian reform of logic, and to grasp the status that modalities play in it.

Twardowski's very rich and subtle article, *On the Theory of the Content and Object*

of *Representation*, appeared in 1894.² The idea of a logic of content as an algebraic calculation based on a logical analysis of content is set out by Husserl in his 1891 article as a *fait accompli*. Its general aims are (1) to show against general scepticism, i.e. simple prejudice, among logicians that it was *possible*, and (2) that it was equivalent to the extensional calculus established by certain ingenious technicians such as Boole, Schröder, Venn or Peirce; last, (3) that as far as logical clarification and the foundation of a logic of deduction and arithmetic were concerned, if it was no more effective than the class calculus, it was no less effective. And if so, to demonstrate negatively and critically the lack of foundation of the so-called new logic³ and the gap between its claims⁴ and its actual achievements.⁵ However, despite its limited scope (and ‘its limited practical usefulness’), such a search for a logically sound calculus should not be ‘underestimated’ and could prove fruitful.

Husserl’s *Logical Studies*, published the same year, dealt with the same subject and brought together the results of earlier attempts in 1891 and 1893. Husserl saw and read Twardowski’s article as a convergent attempt to clarify psychologically and logically the basis of a *reformed logic*, namely a logic of content. Consequently, in connection with the project of a logic of content, Twardowski gave rise to promising formal achievements: the theory of parts and sets, later called *mereology* by Leśniewski (from 1911). He also provided the impetus for the breakthrough of phenomenology and, consequently, the break with Brentanian methodology.

This happened when Husserl came across Twardowski’s theory of the ‘intentional object’ as a ‘*modified existence*’ and realised that the methodology implemented in his *Philosophy of Arithmetic* was inadequate. Husserl’s examination of Twardowski did not take place until 1896, and Twardowski represents one of the major references in the *Logical Investigations*. The result of the entire critique of the *Logical Investigations* can be read as an extraordinarily refined and subtle clarification of the fundamental concepts at stake here: *content*, *object* and *representation*. All the other issues at stake (the logical theory of the concept, the logical clarification of the notion of *representation*, judgement and proposition, the problem of general objects and that of representations without objects, etc.) consist in dispelling the ambiguities of this single notion, that of ‘modification’. We could follow the transformation of this theory and this notion throughout Husserl’s work, from 1894 to the end. Of course, a systematic study is unthinkable in a few pages, and I shall only cover half the subject. But it will suffice to point out two or three significant *places* in the *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas I*.

The project of reforming logic is inherent in the Brentanian approach. It is not surprising, therefore, that in decisive areas of Husserlian research, long after the *Logical Investigations*, reference to Brentano continues to be made, and precisely in relation to the project before us. Husserl inherited the idea of a reform of formal logic from Brentano, as did others (including Twardowski and Meinong). This will become clear

if we follow in detail the theses or objectives of Brentano's reformed logic and those of Husserl's. I will, however, confine my considerations to recalling certain essential points of an important article that has gone unnoticed in the literature on Brentano, namely Enoch's article (1893), which revisits the logical movement sparked off by Brentano. In it, he recalls the main lines of the project to reform logic, set out in the first volume of his *Psychology* (1874):

In 1874, Franz Brentano published the first volume of a *Psychology* in which, in the space of a few pages, a complete reform, even the overthrow of traditional logic, was announced and presented in its most extreme outlines. His statements immediately caused a stir in the world of philosophy, at least in Germany. A series of writings dealing with the questions suggested by Brentano were published. Moreover, many people felt obliged to at least take a stand on them. Among those who rejected or criticized Brentano's innovations were Windelband, Sigwart, Bergmann, Steinthal, Schuppe and Paul. . . , while Miklosich, Marty, Stumpf, Kerry and others accepted, defended and added to them. More recently, Hillebrand. . . has given a complete exposition of Brentano's logic, which at the same time contains part of the discussion of that logic.⁶

Brentano's posterity is also attested: "His work was clearly intended to replace the publication of the '*Neue Elementarlehre*', announced but not carried out. Brentano himself was a seminal figure. His logic can be called *Austrian logic and placed alongside the English school of quantifying logicians*" (Enoch 1893, p.433–434). Among Brentano's innovations in logic, Enoch lists the following, derived from the new classification of acts with which we are all familiar: "Representation, judgement and the manifestations of love and hate" (Enoch 1893, p.433–434).

The first concerns the definition of judgement in terms of the 'quality' of acts. 'The essence of judgement consists in recognizing or rejecting the content of a representation. Judgment can extend to any content. This must be considered as its matter, to which recognition or rejection gives the form of the judgement. So, the differences between judgements all derive from the 'matter' of the judgement, not from its quality. In other words, 'the affirmative and the negative are the only two kinds of judgements' (Enoch 1893, p.434).

A judgement is not defined as a "combination of representational contents". There can be affirmative or negative judgements of simple representations. With this consequence, which is the antithesis of both the classical theory of predication and modern theories of propositional function: "The distinction between subject and predicate thus becomes obsolete" (Enoch 1893, p.434). The quantity of judgement, which was fundamental in traditional logic and remains so in the perspective of predicate logic with quantifiers, becomes something secondary, something derived, since 'quantity is referred to matter'.

Finally, any judgement can be reduced to a judgement of existence. It is the form

corresponding to the true essence of the act. It is in this form that the true meaning of judgements is revealed, and knowledge of it leads to entirely new teachings. The argument put forward in favour of this fundamental thesis invokes the *possibility* of reducing any predicative judgement to the simple form of existential propositions, subjected however to an operation that will occupy the Brentanian tradition: a modification.

The theory of valid deductions and inferences is corrected or rejected consequently:

Brentano believes he can demonstrate that the *deductions and inferences*, considered as valid since Aristotle, are largely erroneous or meaningless. Of all the direct deductions, he admits only those *ad contradictoriam*. Many of the conclusions drawn from two premises are, in his opinion, invalid. He declares the main laws of traditional syllogistic to be false. Thus, according to him, there are valid conclusions with four *termini*, and even ‘the *quaternio terminorum*, severely reprobated, is squarely erected as a law’. Now, instead of *ex mere negativis*, we say: *ex mere affirmativis nihil sequitur*. The *dictum de omni et nullo* is rejected by him. The traditional separation of syllogisms according to the four figures is presented as inessential. The identity proposition must be identical to the contradiction proposition. *In fact, as we can see, a complete reversal of current logic.* (Enoch 1893, p.434–435, emphasis added)

Reducing all judgements to acts of rejection or acceptance, insofar as what the English logicians retain from traditional logic is transferred to the quality of the judgement, it is understandable that we can define Brentanian logic as a qualitative and not a quantitative logic. This is a point that brings us closer to the Husserlian reform: it touches on the traditional distinctions of quantity, quality, relation and modality. If the only form of judgement resides in *affirmative and negative qualities*, this means that the rest is part of the content, i.e. the matter of judgement. This *can encompass simple or compound contents*, even contents of negative or uncertain states of affairs, which means that all these distinctions are part of the matter, i.e. they are constituents of the predicates.

As we know, the latter distinguishes quantity, quality, relation and modality as determinations of the form of judgements. The English logicians Hamilton, Jevons and Boole introduced the quantification of the predicate and transformed judgements into equations between the subject and the predicate. Their logic is entirely quantitative. *Brentano’s logic can be called qualitative logic.* (Enoch 1893, p.435, emphasis added)

While the English tradition, known as Algebraist, is part of the continuity of Aristotelian logic, Brentano’s reform logic represents a radical break.

The English wanted to complete Aristotle's logic, to give it mathematical elegance and security. But they fully recognised the traditional basis. *Brentano wanted to redo everything. But is his upheaval justified? Is what he puts in place of the old sustainable and usable? Does his reform live up to its lofty ambitions? Has Aristotelian logic been eliminated by Brentano?* (Enoch 1893, p.435, emphasis added)

We shall have occasion to return to this opposition, between an extensional algebraic approach and a conception attentive to the content (the matter) of the judgement, or between English-language logic and German logic. In particular, it will come up in Husserl's series of reviews of the Peirce school and its German emulators, especially Schröder. But first we need to grasp one of the threads that link the Husserlian reform of logic to that of Brentano. I am referring to the ongoing dialogue with Twardowski. The operator of the reduction of judgements to existential form, as we have said, is a modification. We shall see that this theory of modification is at the heart of Twardowski's logic, and that without it we can understand neither the distinction he makes between content and object, nor what will lead Husserlian attempts to clarify what is at stake in these modifications of content to a theory of logical modifications whose core consists precisely of modalizations.

2. Twardowski's theory of logical modifications

But first let us recall what Twardowski's concept of modification is. The clarification and analysis of *content*, and the distinction between logical *content* and psychological *content*, involve a methodology that gives direct access to psychological 'content'. But at the same time, according to Brentano's theory of representation, this direct perception as an inner representation *cannot in itself posit this content as an existing object*, unless a judgement based on this representation does so. But above all, the content that defines a phenomenon as psychic is precisely its representational character, that is, its intentional characteristic, the fact that it refers to an object. Now, since this content is part of psychic phenomena, it must not be posited as real, as simply 'existing', — it exists only in a 'modified sense'.

1. For the psychologist and the logician, the concept of *modification* is logical in the narrow sense of the term, and yet ambiguous. To support the distinction between the object as such and the *object as represented*, and to avoid major paradoxes and logical difficulties, Twardowski uses a logical distinction between *determining* and *modifying meanings*, and more precisely between *attributive* and *modifying adjectives*. In reference to the linguistic model used by followers of Brentano such as Marty and Twardowski, logical modifiers are introduced as follows. The expression 'the object as represented' or 'the object [as] represented' refers to the 'content' of the

representation, or 'the intentional object', and not to the object as such. Expressions such as 'intentional', 'as represented' or 'represented' function as *modifying adjectives*.

The expression 'the represented object' or, more briefly, 'the represented' (*das Vorgestellte*) is still ambiguous, since it can refer either to the *object of the representation* or to the *content of the representation*. According to Twardowski, the only way to firmly establish the difference in meaning is to remember the distinction between *attributive* and *modifying adjectives*.

Examples: in the expression 'a good man', *good* is attributive; in the expression 'a dead man', the adjective is *modifying*, since a 'dead man' is no longer a man. Or 'false friend' or 'false diamond' is a modifying adjective, because neither a 'friend' nor a 'diamond' truly exists in this case (Twardowski 1977, p.13). As Jens Cavallin points out, the scale of modifiers is linguistically rooted and variable, since it depends 'on the tolerance within the linguistic or cultural community concerned of the use of adjectives and nouns determined (modified) by them',⁷ and proposes a distinction 'between "pure" modifiers such as "false", "faked", "putative", "pretended" on the one hand and "semi-modifiers" such as those of interest here: "presented", "imagined", "intended", "thought of", etc.

Note that 'painted' and 'represented' are also modifiers. This helps us to understand why and in what sense Twardowski drew the famous analogy between *intentional content* and the *picture* or image. This analogy has given rise to many objections, notably from Husserl. But it would be a serious mistake to see Husserl as reducing Twardowski's notion of content to an ordinary theory of the 'mental image', a mere variant of the 'picture theory' (*Bildertheorie*).

2. Husserl's objection. Husserl's objections to Twardowski's conception of the *content of representation* are *not that* he confuses *object* and *content*, transforming content into an 'immanent object', nor that content as an 'immanent object' implies some form of inner existence. Rather, Husserl's objections are formulated as follows: "I need not say that I regard this position as untenable. If the 'immanent' object (as we put it bluntly, instead of saying 'intentional') is *literally* immanent in the representation, then its existence is just as genuine and respectable as that of the representation itself, and it then becomes totally incomprehensible that we should devalue it and allow it to be regarded as having only a 'modified' existence. Nor do we understand what the modification in question is and what it means. *There are* undoubtedly cases of authentic immanence. But they are also *eo ipso* cases of authentic existence".⁸ Phenomenological analysis reveals that something completely different has been substituted for the intentional object⁹, and that the explanation that reduces the 'general object aimed at' to an internal component of the lived experience is in fact a substitution. Although erroneous, and whatever the modality of *existence of the object of an intuitive representation such as a perception* (for example, that of a pine tree), there is no doubt that the 'object meant' appears as 'in' the representation, i.e. 'as

meant', 'as intentionally contained' in the perceptual representation. The distinction between object *in* representation and object *of* representation (see Lobo 2017) and the notion of object 'in' representations are nevertheless ambiguous. The 'immanent object' (*immanenter Gegenstand*) is not an 'object *in the* representation';¹⁰ on the side of the representation, there is nothing other than the 'aiming at this object', as the 'sense-content of the representation'. Returning to the example and the representation corresponding to the common noun 'pine' ('Tannenbaum') (a tree of a kind determined by such and such characteristics), and possibly in an intuitive act of representation, the 'immanent object' is not reducible to the simple perception of a pine tree, nor to the lived experience of representation as such. And inner perception is doubly disqualified: methodologically, it cannot grasp the 'complex intention of meaning' at stake here and *must not be* substituted for the fulfilment of that intention. The constraints of the 'method' of inner perception, that of Brentano's school of psychology, inevitably lead to this illusion and confusion. If this is the case, we are led to conclude that this method cannot account for the identification and analysis in question here and must be abandoned.

3. Cavallin's objection to Husserl's objection. According to Cavallin, Husserlian criticism of the confusion between content and object is based on a misunderstanding: 'Husserl has [...] misread Twardowski on this point', and he asserts that "Twardowski does not normally speak of intentional *objects* at all, although he uses the term on a few rare occasions as a synonym for 'content' (e.g., ZL 40)" (LI, III, § 2, 51; Husserl 1984a, 231 *passim*). Rather, he refers to objects of intentionality, not objects of content; he refers to objects of presentation that have no real existence but only an intentional one. Because of his Brentanian theory of judgement, judgement alone can posit existence, while representation provides the relation to the object, the objective content, and the object *in* representation has nothing but 'intentional existence', i.e. 'inexistence'. As Cavallin puts it: "the modification brought about by the qualifier 'intentional' is a radical modification, since it eliminates the 'original' meaning of the term to which it applies". The notion of 'modification' applies to the use of adjectives/predicates, with an immediate ontological impact on the 'object' in question, since it deprives it of its existence, and can therefore *a fortiori* confer no existence, either on the 'object' of 'representations without an object', or on 'general objects'. This is the meaning of intentionality for Twardowski and the meaning of 'intentional' (in-)existence. This should also explain the pictorial analogy between the content of representation and painting.

4. Husserlian response to this objection. Far from dispelling Husserl's objection, these criticisms miss the point, for the fundamental line of Husserl's objection evolves precisely around Twardowski's theory of modification. The objection that Twardowski could not fall into such confusion because of his theory of judgement (whose fundamental form and definition is that of a *positing of existence*) is *precisely* what is

criticised and, ultimately, rejected by Husserl. Even if we accept that the theory of the ‘mental image’ is merely metaphorical or analogical, the fact remains that (1) Husserl does not regard the ‘intentional object’ in general as a *modification of the image*; (2) Twardowski sees in the modification in question something other than his own conception of the ‘modification of the image’, i.e. a form of *negation of existence*. This theory of image modification was Husserl’s to a certain extent, at least until the 1909 lessons on *Imagination, Image Consciousness and Memory*, i.e. before he realised that what was at stake in imagination was another kind of modification, i.e. a form of neutralisation.

Conversely, when Cavallin concedes that the ‘analogy’ is misleading and leads Twardowski (1) into a kind of Platonism and (2) into contradiction with his absolute distinction between Representation and Judgement (*Vorstellung und Urteil*),¹¹ we should rather argue that (1) this peculiar form of Platonism is an opportunity, provided we go beyond a narrow and rigid Platonism (see Lobo 2017); (2) that going beyond the absolute distinction between perception and judgement is an opportunity and is vital.

Finally, when Husserl adds that intentional correlates are not only objective, but that there is another, truer and deeper parallelism, that between objects and contents, this is again an error, as he will show in the Third and Fourth *Logical Investigations*. The idea that there is a parallelism between content and object is in fact erroneous and misleading (LI IV [A304–305] [B296–297]; Husserl 1984a, p.312–313). To the question: do the complexity and simplicity of meaning reflect the complexity and simplicity of the object? The answer is unequivocally: No. (1) On parallelism as such. The ‘copy’ (*Abbild*) metaphor is misleading, and this parallelism does not exist at all. For example, the expression ‘*simple object*’ is complex. Twardowski’s thesis that such a parallelism exists stems from the confusion between intuitive representation and meaning. (2) Twardowski completely misses the real “*concept of meaning that alone is fundamental in logic*”, which leads him to “take the constituents of meaning” (as ‘without mountains’) as “auxiliary representations that resemble linguistic roots (*etyma*)” (LI, III, § 2).

But the Brentanian methodology of descriptive psychology raises another difficulty. As a “sphere of (scientific) knowledge, which enjoys the privilege of being indubitable or self-evident”, both the act and the content of the act are accessible to “inner perception”, and enjoy not a weaker but a more established existence than any object.

3. From logical modifiers to intentional modifications

To sum up, Husserl stresses the inadequacy of the distinction between object, act and content, and the inevitable confusions and difficulties ‘into which Twardowski has fallen’. In particular the notion of ‘presentative activity moving in two directions’, the complete ignorance of meaning in the ideal sense, the psychologistic elimination of simple differences of meaning by recourse to etymological distinctions and, finally, the treatment of the doctrine of ‘intentional inexistence’ and the doctrine of universal objects. But all his critical remarks converge towards a transformation of the monolithic notion of modification, which is the cornerstone of his psychology and logic, into a phenomenological notion. This phenomenological analysis then led the reform of Husserl’s logic in a new direction, involving an entirely new treatment of modalities.

Ambiguities in Twardowski’s theory of modification. As a *modifier*, the term ‘represented’ (i.e. ‘represented object’) is ambiguous. Twardowski’s theory of modification leads to confusion between meaning and intuitive representation, and between ‘having a meaning’ and ‘having an object’. For him, the *absence of an object* is equivalent to the *absence of meaning* (LI, I, [B55]; Husserl 1984a, p.59–60). This is an illusion caused by the psychological method based on inner perception, with the presupposition that inner perception is irrefutable. But *content* is not the ‘object’ of intuitive representation.

It *only* becomes an object through psychological reflection or rather, phenomenological reflection (LI II [B217]; Husserl 1984a, 220). Is a modification involved here? The answer is clearly yes. A modification called *abstraction*, but which implies something totally new (an entirely new concept of abstraction), which Frege will not grasp, which presupposes a modification of the mereological formal framework, and in particular a new concept of ‘parts’ and ‘partition’. The *content* of an act of representation is an *abstract moment*, consisting in considering as existing apart that which *does not* really and concretely exist apart (LI II [B217]; Husserl 1984a, 220). To a certain extent, this resembles the Aristotelian concept of *aphairesis*. But it goes much further.

The distinction between *modifying* and *attributive predicates* is in fact confused, and the notion of modification must be very carefully elevated to the level of a purely logical notion in order to be generalised and applied effectively to the whole domain of meaning. From this perspective, nominalization is itself a modification. Incidentally, pure logical grammar develops into a theory of the various forms of modification of meaning.

Faced with possible objections, and in particular the fact that any meaning of any category could be placed “in the subject position otherwise occupied by substantive meanings”,¹² Husserl argues that what is at work here is a kind of modification, analogous to the medieval *suppositio materialis*, as when we say that: *The word ‘long’ is*

short; or: 'Long' is short. In this case, we could also say: 'Long' is an adjective, although 'Long' here means a form of (adjectival) meaning, and, thanks to a specific kind of nominalisation, it functions, in this particular sentence, as the *name* of that meaning. A rigid conception of logic would object that this is an abnormal functioning of terms and expressions. But what is abnormal from the point of view of such a rigid conception must be seen, from a purely logical grammatical point of view, as an indication of certain *essential possibilities* and essential structures of any language.

1. The *suppositio materialis* in the strict sense of the term is a first possibility. Example: 'The earth is round' is an assertion. What is represented is the statement as such. The proposition expressed is not *articulated or stated*, but 'named', or 'nominalised', and its initial moment of positing is thus neutralised.
2. An analogue of *suppositio materialis* occurs when what is named is not the *ordinary meaning* but a moment of meaning, a moment of a term or syncategorematic expressions. Example: 'man', 'table', 'horse' are concepts of things. Or: 'and', 'but', 'greater than' are dependent senses. Once again, these expressions are *heterogrammatical modes of expression*, expressions that use 'modifying predicates' and not 'attributive predicates'.
3. More generally: 'is', 'is not', 'is true' or 'is false' are modifying predicates. Consequently, any judgement is *itself a modification of meaning and expresses a modified meaning*. Example (the true proposition): *It is false that $2 \times 2 = 5$* .

Leaving aside any subjective (psychological or phenomenological) modifications, these modifications are logical and not accidental. They belong to the very essence of meaning as such and point to something essential in the apophantic domain. And the whole logic of content, as a theory of meaning, consists fundamentally in exploring and exposing the *a priori* laws according to which these modifications occur. This is why all logic of consequence, and all logic of truth must explore and formalise the system of these pure modifications (a distinction proposed by Husserl).

We must stick now to the logical and grammatical notion of *term* or *name*. Once we understand that nominalisation is one of the key modifications, we obtain an initial distinction between syntactic form and syntactic matter, logical form and logical matter (*Stoff*).

But nominalisation can occur in a variety of ways. For example: the adjective form *green*, such as in the proposition: *Grass is green*. It can be modified into 'Green is a colour', or into 'Being green is a specification of being coloured'. In the first case, we are talking about a dependent part of a concrete object. In the second case, we carry out a nominalization of being, which is the correlate of the predicativity attached to the predicate member of a categorical predicate and applied to its subject. What

is common to all these modified forms is the ‘core’, the ‘nucleus’, the ‘heart’. This ‘core’ is *never given without these forms or modifications; it is always given through these modes*. The nucleus qua kernel is an *abstractum* with several forms. The forms are kernel-forms to be distinguished from syntactic forms, because the latter always appear with complete ‘terms’ (kernel-forms and kernel-contents) and constitute what Husserl calls syntactic matter.

The task of a pure formal theory of content as *meaning*, i.e. of a purely logical grammar, is consequently a theory of composition and modification as operators, as defined in the Fourth Logical Investigation: “The task of an accomplished science of meanings would be [I] to study the structure of meanings related to essence and governed by laws, as well as the laws of *combination* and *modification* of meanings that depend on them, and [II] to reduce these laws to the smallest possible number of independent elementary laws.” (See LI IV, § 13 [B314–333]; Husserl 1984a, p.336–341.)

The first task — labelled [I] — of purely logical grammar is detailed as follows:

1. List the *primitive* forms of meaning.
2. List and describe ‘the primitive forms of independent meaning, of propositions complete with their internal articulations, and the structures contained in these articulations’.
3. Establish the primitive forms of composition and modification permitted by the essence of the different possible categories of elements, considering the possibilities of *nominalisation* of propositions.
4. Identify the types of derivable forms, derivable ‘by means of composition or repeated modification’.

Phenomenological tasks can be defined as follows.

If we now turn to the phenomenological side, i.e. the analysis of acts, we arrive at the theory of the ‘*qualitative*’ dimension of objectifying acts — the quality of the act here indicating the modal and possibly positional moment of any intentional act (LI V, § 38. See below; Husserl 1984a, 499–504).

According to Husserl, and contrary to Brentano, both representations and judgements contain positional moments, i.e. modal contents, and can be modified in such a way that their original qualitative moment is neutralised, keeping the ‘matter’, the ‘what’, unchanged. This happens for representations as well as for judgements: “We find exactly the *same modification* in the case of judgements. Each judgement has its own *modified form*, an act which simply presents what the judgement *holds to be true*, which has an object, *without any decision as to truth or falsity*” (emphasis added). And Husserl continues: “From the phenomenological point of view, this *modification* of judgements is of quite the same order as that which consists in *positing nomi-*

nal acts” (my emphasis). All judgements as ‘positing a propositional act’ have their corresponding presentative form, ‘in non-positing propositional acts’. And conversely, nouns can be taken in their positional form, or in their non-positional form (see RL V, § 34; Husserl, 1984a, p.480–484). As positional, they “name their object as really existing, without being more than names” (i.e. without becoming the expression of judgements, i.e. ‘propositions’). Consequently, the notion of ‘proposition’ has to be ‘expanded’ in line with this expanded concept of position. And we can present this position in a new form, through a modification such as ‘*The really existing S*’.

Another important type of modification “transforms any positional nominal act into a simple representation with the same matter” (See § 38, op. cit.). The same applies to judgements. And this modification is quite different from the one referred to by Twardowski, who confuses the one just described with reflexive modification (§ 39). Against this confusion, Husserl argues: “The qualitative modification of an act is an ‘operation’, so to speak, different from the production of a presentation of this act”. And he indicates a criterion that will be at the heart of the theory of the positing of modifications developed in *Ideas I*: “The latter admits of iterations, the former does not.”¹³

This is a clear criticism of Twardowski, who makes this confusion, since he considers that ‘the representation of representation’ is ‘phenomenologically undiscoverable, as a mere *fiction*’. He confuses the two operations: qualitative modification and nominal modification, which is representational objectification. If we do not make this distinction, we cannot distinguish between simple representation (without position) and positing representation either. Fictional modification is a *sui generis* modification that can occur with any object, content or act. Pictorial representation is itself a modification, and the differences between image and simple perception are precisely a distinction in these characteristics of acts, and to begin with in the ‘intentional matter’ of the act.¹⁴ Methodologically, these distinctions are obvious for a phenomenological analysis. But I will not go into the details.

4. Modifications as constitutive parts of the intentional content, i.e. the noema

But, as Husserl would later remark in 1913, the analyses proposed in the Fifth Logical Investigations dwell essentially on the noetic side, and say nothing about the noematic side, i.e. the content. And he notes, (LI [B488]; Husserl 1984a, 508) alluding to the paragraphs 109–114 and 117 of *Ideas I*, that an essential modification, which is thematically and methodologically at stake here, namely the modification of neutrality, is not stabilised in these texts.¹⁵

Once the distinction between noetic and noematic modification has been mas-

tered, Husserl will be methodologically and thematically in a position to describe the composition of intentional essences, and more specifically of the cognitive intentional essence, which implies the dynamic relation between intention and fulfilment of intention, and the correlative forms of noema, empty and more or less full.

4.1. A new distinction between act, content and object

In his analysis of content as meaning and object (*Ideas I*, § 129), Husserl makes an essential distinction between what constitutes the core of the noematic structure and what constitutes its ‘changing characteristics’ (*Merkmale*), characteristics that are brought about by the flux of different kinds of modifications. This core remains vague. And the notion of ‘content’ is equivocal: it can designate (1) the sense or meaning, by which or in which consciousness refers to something objective as ‘its’ objective something, (2) the reference to something itself, or (3) the object itself.

Although Twardowski’s distinction between act, content and object represents a great scientific advance, it could be reduced to a slogan. Husserl praises and appreciates Twardowski’s “beautiful treatise”, which discussed certain “ordinary confusions and made their error obvious”. But he notes, once again, that “in the clarification of the relevant conceptual essence, he has not gone much further than what was known to the philosophers of previous generations” (“in spite of their imprudent confusions”). But this admission of failure is not intended as a reproach, for Twardowski could not go beyond this by remaining within the limits of psychology, even of a reformed psychology, that of Brentano, with its method based on inner perception. To go beyond it implied the breakthrough of another method, freed from the presuppositions of Brentano’s empirical psychology and of all other empirical or constructive methods. Husserl insists on this point: “This is not a fault that can be reproached to him. A radical advance was simply not possible before a systematic phenomenology of consciousness. What is and what is not, what should and should not be called an ‘act’, and in particular ‘content’, ‘object’ of ‘representation’, and ‘representation’ itself, all remain to be known scientifically”.

In place of these distinctions, Husserl substitutes a new distinction between ‘*matter*’ and ‘*quality*’ of the act, thanks to the phenomenological distinction between “intentional essence” and “cognitive essence”. But, as we have said, and as Husserlian researchers in the *Logical Investigations* are well aware, these distinctions remain largely *noetic* and say nothing about the constitution of the noema. The first decisive distinction proposed in the Fifth Logical Investigation was therefore limited by this “unilaterality of the noetic direction of the gaze in which these differentiations were made and signified”. But at the same time, this limitation can “easily be overcome” “by taking into consideration the noematic parallels”.

4.2. Forging a new scientific terminology

To avoid new failures and misunderstandings, Husserl proposed a new terminology: Quality of the act = ‘positing character’ [*Setzungscharakter*] = ‘thetical character’ [*thetische Charakter*]. The term *quality* is abandoned, as is that of ‘matter’ (*Materie*) (the ‘what’, *das Was*), which is now described as the ‘noematic nucleus’. But this is not just a question of terminology. These terminological changes express the deepening of a phenomenological analysis, namely a more profound division of intentional essence and cognitive essence. It is now a matter of ‘*analysing these concepts and bringing them to fruition in all the noetic-noematic provinces*’. This is not a ‘secondary question’, but an important one, since these are “essential moments belonging to the central structure of all intensive mental processes”. Relation to something objective (*Beziehung auf Objekt*) — awareness of something (*Bewusstsein von Etwas*). The two ways of speaking seem equivalent. But they are not. At least, not completely and not always. Kersten’s translation is misleading on this point. We should rather say and read: “If we recall our previous analyses, we find that the complete noesis refers to the complete noema, as its intentional and complete what”.¹⁶ This means that the ‘what’, from a noematic point of view, goes beyond the *narrow* notion of ‘object’ (emphasis mine). Narrow in what sense? To answer this question, let us return to Twardowski’s notion of object (excluding general objects and the ontological rigidity of objectivity). Two broadenings are involved here:

1. The extension of quality to the quality of judgement, to the quality of wish, and so on. Thus, the theory is not monopolised by judgement, but is extended, against Brentano’s and Twardowski’s classification of acts, to volitional acts and acts of feeling.
2. The ‘noema’ and the ‘object’ *have* thetical characteristics correlative to the noetic characteristics. Let us develop this second point. According to the previous analyses, the noema seems to be reduced to ‘its intentional and full What’. For, to the positing moment of the noesis corresponds a moment of the noema. And the noema and the ‘what’ are to be taken in this extended sense. Husserl is emphatic on this point: “To every noetic moment, especially to every thetic-noetic moment, corresponds a moment in the noema, and in the latter we must distinguish between the complex of thetic characters and the noematic nucleus characterised through it.”¹⁷

To return to point 1., Husserl criticises the expression ‘*intentionale Erlebnis*’ by asserting that it is objectively referred.¹⁸ Part of this complex are the moments corresponding to the attentional and directional moments on the side of the noesis. These directional moments convert ‘potential’ thetic moments into actual thetic moments.

The gaze that crosses the noesis and converts the moments of position into rays of actuality of position [*Setzungsaktualität*] of the Ego, and if we pay attention to the way in which this Ego now ‘directs’ itself with them towards something objective [*auf Gegenständliches ‘richtet’*], as grasping being (*als seinserfassendes*), as judging plausible (*vermutendes*), as desiring, etc. [*wünschendes*], then we will have a better understanding of the Ego. How his gaze traverses the noematic core [*wie sein Blick durch den noematischen Kern hindurchgeht*] — we then become attentive to the fact that, with the statements on the relation (‘reference’) [*Beziehung*] (and specifically the direction) [*und speziell Richtung*] of consciousness to its something objective, we are returned to a most intimate moment of the noema. (*Ibid.*)

The objective reference is therefore the most intimate moment of the noema, but not the complete noema, as Twardowski and other followers of Brentano assume. Husserl: ‘It is not the just-designated nucleus itself, but rather something else which, so to speak, constitutes the necessary central point of the nucleus [*den notwendigen Zentralpunkt des Kerns*] and functions as ‘bearer’ of the noematic peculiarities belonging specifically to the nucleus [*als ‘Träger’ für ihm speziell zugehörige noematische Eigenheiten fungiert*]; i.e. the noematically modified properties of the ‘signified as such’ [*die noematisch modifizierten Eigenschaften des ‘Vermeinten als solchen’*]” (Husserl 1976, 299).

4.3. A new theory of parts and wholes

Beyond Husserl’s early research in *logic and psychology* from 1889 onwards, one of the decisive steps in the construction of a modern theory of parts and wholes can be read in the *Logical Investigations*, particularly in the third Logical Investigation (LI III [B269-271]; Husserl 1984a, 275), which deals with the partition of sets and the relations between sets and their mediate parts, with reference to Bolzano’s *Wissenschaftslehre*, (I § 58) and Twardowski on ‘*Die materialen Bestandteile des Gegenstandes*’ (§ 9, pp.49–50). For ‘extended wholes’, the division into fragments (fragmentation) is homogeneous and the notion of order or rank has no foundation. Any hierarchy in the division of the whole loses its foundation here. For other ensembles, such as a melody, the situation is different, since each part is an ‘intensive moment’, a ‘moment of quality’. What is essential in this deepening of the mereological distinction between mediate and immediate parts is the introduction of a *distance*, a *measure* of degree and rank in mediations. But, rather obscurely, Husserl seems to be pursuing another goal. One of which is a question of priority – ontological and phenomenological priority – between the two kinds of abstract parts we have been discussing. In the example of melody, both types of abstraction are at play. When analysing a melody, we could adopt a purely extensive point of view, saying that it is a simple

succession of sounds, and analyse it in sub-groups, and sub-sub-groups, etc. of relative and arbitrary rank 1, 2, etc. But a melody is an intensive whole, made up of intensive parts (*tone*) made up of other intensive parts (quality, intensity, etc.). To observe the qualitative moment or the moment of intensity of a 'note', the note as such must be *withdrawn*. But this phenomenological situation must not be confused with the objective state of affairs; the priority of sound over the qualitative moment is not arbitrary, but objectively founded. Here, the rank of mediation has an objective significance.

What follows is rather obscure, or at least equivocal. But Husserl aims to show that the objective stratification of degrees is not similar to the 'phenomenological stratification'. For example, the 'generic qualitative moment' (pitch *c*) is firstly *inherent* in the singular qualitative moment of the tone, secondly inherent in tones as such, and thirdly inherent in the melody as such. If we now consider the eidetic content of the 'Tone', it belongs from the outset to the individual 'Tone' as such, and is therefore presupposed in all its medial parts, whatever their rank. Take the note *C*, for example: *it is inherent* in all *C* tones as a 'generic moment' (*Gattungsmoment*), and inherent in this moment is the 'generic moment' of the mediate parts (tone quality, tone intensity, etc.).¹⁹ If we are right in saying that there is a part of the quality, for example pitch *C*, of the tone in question, which represents its generic 'moment', which it has in common with all tones, then this 'moment' is primarily inherent to the quality, secondarily to the tone, and thirdly to the entire tone scheme, etc.

Later, in LI III [B277] (Husserl 1984a, p.283–284), we read again an objection to Twardowski's assertion: "sets, with the exception of decomposable sets, lack binding forms of unity", e.g. the unity of tone quality and tone intensity rests on simple reciprocal or unilateral foundations, without any formal unity as such. Husserl objects: "No whole, whatever it may be, is deprived of this formal unity as its own unity. Every set *has a* unity, and yet this unity is not a 'real predicate', but a 'categorical predicate'." (LI III [B280]; Husserl 1984a, p.286) Twardowski's 'queer' psychological analysis set out in §10 of his essay is based on the confusion between 'sensible matter' and 'categorical form' ('*sinnlicher Materie*' und '*kategorialer Form*'), between "possible a priori conceptual differences" and the "components (moments) of objects."²⁰ In §23 (LI IV [B297]; Husserl 1984a, p.304), Husserl sketches a comparison between his notion of the aggregate (*Inbegriff*) and that of Twardowski. This paragraph deals with the field of formal ontology and its connection with eidetic regions. An aggregate (*Inbegriff*) is not a whole and has a categorical form *that is indifferent to its matter*. This state of affairs indicates that the unity in question is not based on content. Sets, on the other hand, are founded units, governed by ideal laws according to which, for example, the founded content depends on the essence (genus) of the founding content. There is a pure law that makes the genus of the 'founded' content dependent on the definitively indicated genus of the 'founding' content. The whole, in this genus, is *determined by*

the genus of the parts. Example: The genus of the melody is determined by the genus of the parts (quality, intensity, etc.).

5. Formal ontological implications of the theory of logical modifications

The problem of general objects could be posed in new terms, to such an extent that the anti-Platonic assumptions of Twardowski's theory appear as a mere prejudice. The problem of general objects (LI, II, [B129] ; Husserl 1984a, p.222) could be summed up as follows: Are they '*nothing*' or a '*nothing*', and if so, are they reducible to the internal, immanent and real content of the psychic act of representation? Twardowski refutes their 'real' existence, for reasons that are not coherent, although they are coherent with his hypothesis, and the proposed solution is itself incoherent. The prejudices at play are the rejection of 'ideal entities' and their assimilation to 'fictions', i.e. images with an extended re-presentation function. To say that they have an intentional existence ('modified existence') is tantamount to saying that they have only an internal and psychological existence, i.e. not *real*, but nevertheless psychologically real ('*reell*'). This discussion takes place in the context of the critique of Locke's argument: the 'Lockean triangle'.²¹ Husserl responds with the following arguments.

Argument 1: Locke's objection should be rephrased: 'the triangle has triangularity, but triangularity is not triangular'. It appears that Locke confuses the *general meaning* (the concept), the *attribute* which is the content of the concept, and the *subject* of the attribute (the object of the concept, i.e. the ideal singularity which 'belongs' to the concept or which is 'subsumed' under the concept). Although formally consistent, Twardowski's rejection of general objects is based on the same confusion as Locke's. A general object is a 'modified object', i.e. a 'non-object': "Twardowski is therefore consistent in rejecting the existence of universal objects, and he is right about *the absurd objects* he has substituted for them". But this position is nonetheless untenable since: "All existential statements (propositions) in mathematics should be meaningless and objectless".

Argument 2: But Husserl not only refutes the interpretation of 'modification' as a mere negation of existence, and the implicit restriction of existence to the external world and to real physical existence (spatiotemporally individuated), but also the negation of any intuitive grasp of general objects. (1) Concerning the first aspect, Husserl maintains that *the negation of the real existence of general objects*, which is indeed absurd, *does not entail the negation of other modes of existence, and in particular that of general objects, where 'general' indicates a mode of existence*, and correlatively, on the noetic side, a modality of position. (2) The reduction of the general object to a constituent of the content or of the object does not imply that the general object

is not intuitive. Whatever the general object may be, whether it is a kind of colour such as 'green' or a formal object, it is not clear why it should be deprived of all intuitiveness. The concept may not be intuitive, but that does not mean that the *object* of the concept is not intuitive. As regards the conditions of such intuition, we should analyse the modification by which the reference to a prior object can function as the basis of a second-order act that refers to a higher-order object.²²

Paragraph 12, on the hypothesis of 'common images' (*Gemeinbilder*), alludes to this 'functioning'. Let us quote this passage at length. Locke's and Twardowski's theory of the representation of images, as well as the theory of 'common images', appear in this context as empirical hypostases of 'universal objects'. This second form of hypostasis leads to the same absurdities and confusions as in the first argument. The same typical *metabasis eis allo genos* occurs: the transfer of characters from the act to its content.

The imprecision and elusiveness of generic images with regard to specific differences does not change their concrete character. Imprecision is a *definite characteristic* of certain contents; it consists in a certain mode of continuity in the qualitative transition. As for elusiveness, it changes nothing in the concreteness of each rapidly evolving content. The essence of matter does not reside in changing contents, but in the unity of an intention directed towards constant attributes.²³

Husserl does not deny the existence of such 'common' images, but the fact that they can explain anything on their own, i.e. without considering intention and the constitution of intention. The fact that an image becomes vague and elusive does not explain the way in which it functions as 'arbitrary', since vagueness is a concrete characteristic of such an image and can be considered as such. The elusiveness (*Flüchtigkeit*) or rather the fleeting and changing aspects of an image are, on the contrary, something that is not a characteristic and does not alter the concreteness of the content, which remains a concrete and defined 'image' at every phase. What is not explained is precisely what is maintained as unity through such a process, and this unity is not something in the image as a psychic concretion, but something that is attributable to the 'intention as such'. But the question remains. What and how? Can an act modify and transform something concrete and a changing multiplicity into an ideal unity? That is the question.²⁴

Moreover, in the same Logical Investigation (LI II [B140-141]; Husserl 1984a, p.145–146), we read a response to these criticisms, where Husserl states that we have 'general representations', i.e. representations of *general objects and species as well as* representations of individuals, and moreover, potentially evident intuitive representations, and not just symbolic representations. Symbolic representations are already objectifications of species and general objects and, in certain circumstances, these

(empty) symbolic intentions are intuitively realised, thanks to a particular ‘functioning’ of the individual image. For example, ‘an individual group of four units’, which ‘certainly floats before us’ and serves as a support for our ‘representations’ and ‘judgements’. But when we use the noun ‘four’ in its arithmetical sense, we *are not referring to this support*, but to the ‘number four’ itself, ‘the specific unit of our subject’ and the states of judgement about this specific object. Unity, like species, is nothing that concretely belongs to the image. ‘If it were, it would be something individual, a here-and-now thing’, and once again ‘our representation would be empty or inadequate and the judgement consequently false’.²⁵ This is another objection to Twardowski.

The phenomenological description that follows will deepen this analysis.²⁶ The relationship between blind intention and intuitive intention,²⁷ between intention and fulfilment, and in the field of intuitive representation, will explain how the same intuitive substratum (individual image) can function *differently in aiming at individual or general objects*,²⁸ as we are subjectively aware of them, as we are aware of them, and as they are eventually intuitively given to us.

Finally, concerning concepts of general objects produced by abstraction (LI II § 40; Husserl 1984a, p.217), Husserl asserts that the content of the representation of a general object is not reducible to the abstraction of the moments dependent on the content or on the individual object,²⁹ but that it is produced by another type of abstraction — eidetic abstraction (§ 41) or ‘ideating abstraction’ or ‘generalising abstraction’ (LI II § 42; Husserl 1984a, 223). The abstract moments contained in the representations of concrete objects serve as a support for the fulfilment of an intention directed towards a general object (*species*), but do not constitute this intention or its intentional content, its meaning. Modifications belong to the content as such. The content is always this central point *plus* the ‘properties’, among which are the *thetic noematic characters*, which are not merely of simple existence, but of different ontological and axiological modalities. If we take this analysis a step further, we immediately realise that, at the cognitive level, the distinction between ‘content’ and ‘object’ must be made not only for consciousness, for the intensive mental process, but also for the noema itself. In this case, the object is the same as that of the noesis, because then the ‘parallelism’ of noema and noesis is once again completely confirmed, as well as another parallelism, that of objectifying acts and non-objectifying acts.

To sum up, Husserl’s critique of the theory of the *predicate modifier* is as follows.

1. Twardowski’s theory is based on a monolithic conception of intentionality and logical and phenomenological modification. Intentionality is not *a modification as such*, but rather a compound of different modifications, among which modifications called modalizations play a decisive role. Modalizations are modifications of the modes of being (or non-being) of the object referred to in the intention (act) and in the signification (content of the act). This also explains why and how ‘objectual-

ity' must be extended to a wider range of entities than individual beings, individual existences, but also encompasses objects that are constituted by modal *predicates*. Leaving aside subjective (noetic) modifications, such as attentional modifications, the analysis focuses on other complexes of modifications. Paragraph 130 of *Ideas I* confirms the wide range of modifications, and in what sense the content of acts, i.e. the noema, is merely the compound of the correlates of the modal complex of noetic modifications.

2. The modification involved in the 'mention' of meaning is not a *negation of existence*, or an annihilation of existence, but a neutralisation. Subsequently, all expressions of such a reflexive attitude are used in a modified sense; with 'inverted commas'. When they are 'objectively signified', these meanings are taken in their 'noetic sense'. When such a neutralisation is implemented, the modes of reference, the modes of consciousness (for example, in memory, perception, intuitively, conceptually) are 'excluded', set aside. Only 'noetic' modes, belonging to the signified as such, are described. The same applies to the 'predicates' of form, which "in their modified conceptual sense, determine the 'content' of the core-object of the noema in question".

3. Hence the third error and correction: Intentionality as *re-presentation* and *re-production*, as *Abbildung*, as imagination and image-consciousness (or pictorial consciousness) is not a negation of existence. Husserl shows that, far from clarifying intentional modification, it is on the contrary the intentional analysis of the *thetic moments* of the noema and the noesis that clarifies the intentional constitution of imagination and image consciousness and their contents. They are based on a specific form of neutralisation, the modification of the *quasi*. Imagination and image consciousness must therefore be seen as forms of neutralisation.

4. In general: all intentions in general, and especially those of logical importance, must be explained by such a modal composition (Lobo 2017).

References

- Cavallin, Jens. 1997. *Content and Object: Husserl, Twardowski and Psychologism*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Enoch, Wilhelm. 1893. Franz Brentanos Reform der Logik. *Philosophische Monatshefte* XXIX: 433–458.
- Hillebrand, Franz. 1891. *Die neue Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse: eine logische Untersuchung*. Vienna: A. Holder.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1976. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, 1. Halbband: Text der 1.-3. Auflage*. Hua III/1, ed. K. Schuhmann. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1984a. *Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, Erster Teil: Untersuchungen*

- zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. Text of the 1st and 2nd editions. Hua XIX/1, ed. U. Panzer. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1984b. *Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, Zeiter Teil: Elemente einer phänomenologischen Aufklärung der Erkenntnis*. Hua XIX/2, ed. U. Panzer. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1994. *Early Writings in Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics*. Trans. D. Willard. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Husserl, Edmund. 2001. *Logical Investigations*. Ed. D. Moran. Trans. J.N. Finlay. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Lobo, Carlos; Bastos, Cleverson Leite; Vargas, Carlos E. de Carvalho. 2015. On essentialism and existentialism in Husserlian Platonism: A reflection based on modal logic. *Axiomathes* 25: 335–343.
- Lobo, Carlos, 2017. Husserl's reform of logic: An Introduction. *New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* 15: 16–48.
- Rollinger, Robin D. 2020. *Concept and Judgment in Brentano's Logic Lectures: Analysis and Materials*. Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie. Boston: Brill.
- Twardowski, Kasimir. 1977. *On the Content and Object of Presentations: A Psychological Investigation*. Trans. M. Grossmann. Melbourne International Philosophy Series, 4. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Twardowski, Kasimir. 1982. *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine psychologische Untersuchung*. Unveränderter Nachdruck der 1. Auflage Wien, 1894, mit einer Einleitung von Rudolf Haller. München, Wien: Philosophia Verlag.

Notes

¹See Enoch 1893. For an introduction to Husserl's own conception of this reform, see Lobo 2015 and 2017. – For a general overview of Brentano's Logic, see the recent studies by Robin D. Rollinger (2020).

²Kasimir Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine psychologische Untersuchung*, Unveränderter Nachdruck der 1. Auflage Wien 1894, mit einer Einleitung von Rudolf Haller, Philosophia Verlag, München Wien. 1982.

³Husserl: 'The logical considerations on which techniques are built are for the most part of a type that does not stand up to the most superficial examination' (Husserl 1994).

⁴'the great pretension of being an entirely reformed logic; and on the whole: a very limited practical usefulness' (Husserl 1994).

⁵'the logical foundation of arithmetic is just as fragile' (Husserl 1994).

⁶Emphasis added. The references given by Enoch are as follows: 1. Kaindl, in the *Philosophische Monatshefte*, vol. XXVIII, p.278 ff. 2. Franz Hillebrand, *Die neue Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse: eine logische Untersuchung*. Wien: A. Holder 1891. 102 p.8, *Philosophische Monatshefte* XXIX, 7 and 8. 28.

⁷'Practices and customs vary depending on whether the deceased are considered to be persons in the true sense of the word or mere corpses. The rituals surrounding corpses and the respect, often also protected by law, accorded to people who are no longer alive express

the point of view applied in the particular culture concerned'. (Cavallin 1997, note 173, p.120).

⁸Husserl 1994, p.352, Section 3. Critique of this attempted solution, Intentional Object.

⁹See Husserl, LI II [B202]. References to the *Logical Investigations* are taken from the Husserliana series, and we give the pages of the Niemeyer edition [A for the first edition, B for the second edition]. We sometimes use the English edition by Dermot Moran, translated by J. N. Findlay (1970), Dordrecht, London and New York, 2001.

¹⁰LI IV [A304-305] [B296-297]; Husserl 1984a, p.312–313.

¹¹As an excuse, Cavallin invokes Aquinas's concern for "objects" of love, which "have existence outside the mind".

¹²LI IV, § 11 [B322]; Husserl 1984a, p.330.

¹³See note below on *Ideas* I, §§ 109 to 114 and § 117.

¹⁴LI V, § 40. *Fortsetzung. Qualitative and imaginative Modifikation* "Sehr nahe liegt es, die setzenden Akte als für wahrhaltende ihre Gegenstücke als einbildende Akte zu bezeichnen. Beide Ausdrücke haben, soviel im ersten Augenblick für sie zu sprechen scheint, ihre Bedenken, welche zumal der terminologischen Fixierung des letzteren entgegentreten. Wir nehmen die Erwägung dieser Bedenken als Anlass, um einige nicht unwichtige Ergänzungen auszuführen." (Husserl 1984a, p.509).

¹⁵"Vgl. jedoch dazu die Interpretation der 'Gattungsgemeinschaft' als ein eigentümliches Verhältnis von „Wesen und Gegenwesen“ in meinen *Ideen*, S. 233. Überhaupt hat die weitere Verfolgung der Ergebnisse dieser vorliegenden Untersuchung zu manchen wesentlichen Vertiefungen und Besserungen geführt. Vgl. insbesondere die §§ 109 bis 114, 117 über *Neutralitätsmodifikation*". LI, [B488]; Husserl 1984a, 508.

¹⁶"Erinnern wir uns an unsere vorausgegangenen Analysen, so finden wir die volle Noesis bezogen auf das volle Noema, als ihr intentionales und volles Was". Husserl 1976, Husserliana 3/1, p.299.

¹⁷Husserl says: "denn jedem noetischen Moment, speziell jedem thetisch-noetischen, entspricht ein Moment im Noema, und in diesem scheidet sich gegenüber dem Komplex thetischer Charaktere der durch sie charakterisierte noematische Kern". (Husserl 1976, 299).

¹⁸"Das intentionale Erlebnis hat, so pflegt man zu sagen, 'Beziehung auf Gegenständliches'". Kersten's translation is misleading. Cairns translates: "has objective reference". (Husserl, 1976, p.298)

¹⁹"Sind wir berechtigt in der Qualität, etwa c, des betrachteten Tones einen Teil anzunehmen, der das, was ihm mit allen Tönen als solchen gemeinsam ist, also ihr Gattungsmoment darstellt: so wohnt dieser Teil (1) der Qualität primär, (2) dem Ton sekundär, (3) dem ganzen Tongebilde mindestens tertiär ein; usw." (Husserl 1984a, p.278).

²⁰"1) die unbegrenzte Mannigfaltigkeit a priori möglicher, sich nach einer idealen Gesetzmäßigkeit ins Unendliche komplizierender Auffassungsunterschiede"; "2) die Gegenstände als reale Momente" (LI III [B280]; Husserl 1984a, p.287).

²¹LI, II, [B134-137]; Husserl 1984a, p.139–140.

²²cf. LI VI, §§ 51–52, about the foundation of categorial intuition. Husserl 1984b, p.688–690.

²³"Die Verschwommenheit und Flüchtigkeit der Gemeinbilder hinsichtlich der spezifischen Differenzen ändern nichts an ihrer Konkretion. Verschwommenheit ist eine *Bestimmtheit* gewisser Inhalte, sie besteht in einer gewissen Form der Kontinuität qualitativer Übergänge.

Was *aber* die Flüchtigkeit betrifft, so ändert sie doch nichts an der Konkretion jedes einzelnen der wechselnden Inhalte. Nicht im wechselnden Inhalte, sondern in der Einheit der auf die konstanten Merkmale gerichteten Intention liegt das Wesentliche der Sache" (LI, II, [B136]; Husserl 1984, p.141).

²⁴Maybe Twardowski in this case, since the treatment of the example of the general rectangular triangle appears in Twardowski, § 11, p.60 [English trans. p.146] "Verhältnisse zwischen den primären formalen Bestandteilen. Das grundlegende dieser Verhältnisse besteht in der Gemeinsamkeit eines Gliedes sämtlicher Eigenschaftsrelationen eines und desselben Gegenstandes. Ein anderes hierhergehöriges Verhältnis ist das der kausalen Abhängigkeit, in welcher eine Eigenschaftsrelation zur anderen desselben Gegenstandes stehen kann. Dadurch, dass der ‚rechtwinkliges Dreieck‘ genannte Gegenstand drei gerade Seiten und einen rechten Winkel hat, ist das Haben der im pythagoreischen Lehrsatz ausgedrückten Beschaffenheit seitens desselben Gegenstandes bedingt". (Twardowski 1982)

²⁵"Tun wir dies in unserem Falle. so schwebt uns im Bild allerdings irgendeine einzelne Vierergruppe vor, und insofern liegt sie unserem Vorstellen und Urteilen zugrunde. Aber über sie urteilen wir nicht, sie meinen wir nicht in der Subjektvorstellung des obigen Beispiels. Nicht die Bildgruppe, sondern die Zahl Vier, die spezifische Einheit ist das Subjekt, von dem wir sagen, es sei relativ prim zu Sieben". LI II [B141]; Husserl 1984a, p.145.

²⁶The passage just quoted anticipates *Ideas I* analyses.

²⁷"zwischen blindem (d. i. rein symbolischem) und intuitivem (eigentlichem) Meinen aufzuzeigen". (Husserl 1984a, p.146)

²⁸"bewußtseinsmäßig" (im Gebiete des intuitiven die verschiedene Weise klarzulegen, wie das individuelle Bild bewußtseinsmäßig fungiert, je nachdem die Intention auf Individuelles oder auf Spezifisches geht)". *Bewußtseinsmäßig* = zu subjektivem Bewußtsein rund evtl. *einsichtiger Gegebenheit* kommen". LI II [B141]; Husserl 1984a, p.146.

²⁹See § 4.3 above on mereology.