After the seminal works of Putnam (1975), Burge (1979), and Kripke (1982), the next important contribution to externalism is certainly Davidson’s (mainly 1987, 1988, 1989, 2001). By criticizing the positions of these philosophers, Davidson elaborated his own brand of externalism. We shall first present some features of Davidson’s externalism (the importance of historical-causal connections for the foundation of language and thought, for the explanation of how language can be learned, and how attitudes can be identified by the interpreter, and finally how mental content is determined by appealing to the idea of triangulation), to prepare the discussion of a few problems. We then discuss two questions in Davidson’s externalism. First, how to reconcile the fact that external factors determine mental content, as Putnam, Burge and Davidson himself argued convincingly, with token-physicalism, the thesis that mental events are identical with physical events occurring “in the head” (or the thesis that mental events supervenes locally on brain activities)? The second main problem is how to reconcile the first person authority with some prima facie consequences of externalism, mainly that we should know the relevant parts of our (natural and social) environment in order to know the content of our own thoughts? We argue that Davidson’s answer to the first question is not successful, while his answer to the second was a breakthrough.

Consider the two following quotes from Davidson’s work. The first is quite recent: “…the view that a history of encounters with some of the things we speak about and have beliefs about is necessary if
we are to refer to and form attitudes towards those objects is at the heart of the sort of externalism I embrace. The second quote is from a paper in which Davidson exposes for the first time his externalism: “...all thought and language must have a foundation in [...] direct historical connections, and these connections constrain the interpretation of thought and speech.” In these quotes, Davidson points to two important features of his externalism. Firstly, historical and causal connections must take place between a creature or a person, on the one hand, and elements in his/her immediate environment, on the other hand; otherwise we could never learn to master concepts and to use words, and the reference, linguistic or mental, to objects, substances or events would never reach the target and thus would be seriously compromised, if possible at all. Secondly, Davidson's claim points to the main situations described by him under the heading “Triangulation.” The first application of the idea of triangulation (the primitive one) involves two (or more) creatures deprived of language and conceptual thought, reacting to the same event, object or scene, each one trying to associate the reactions of the others to the same event (object, scene) perceived. More interestingly, the second application involves a learner, usually a child, that does not yet have a language, but in that case the social environment provides teachers. The third situation involves two persons using different languages but having no common language. In the last two cases, the application of the idea of triangulation certainly involves ostensive teaching and ostensive definitions, and this seems to be of a decisive importance to establish the historical connections mentioned by Davidson. It is through the establishment and the strengthening of these causal-historical connections that our ability to master concepts and the correct use of words becomes stable, firm and reliable.

We can see that by having a glance to Swampman’s short biography. Why is it that Swampman, Davidson’s famous molecular replica, cannot mean what Davidson means by the use of the word “house”? The simplest answer is: Swampman never learned the meaning of that word in the first place. But let us take stock in order to describe the situation in a fine-grained way. Roderick M.
Chisholm5 introduced, almost three decades ago, the idea of a "rooted property." A rooted property is a relational property whose instantiations presuppose either the existence of something entirely different from the object that instantiates it or presuppose the existence of the object that instantiates the property before or after the time of its instantiation. I cannot, for example, instantiate the property of being at 30 meters of the Eiffel Tour if the Eiffel Tour does not exist. Similarly, I cannot instantiate the psychological property of perceiving an apple if there is no apple in my immediate surroundings. However, the properties that most interest us here are rooted in the past and they are thus introduced by Chisholm:

The property G is rooted outside time at which it is had =def. Necessarily, for any object x and for any time t, x has the property G at t only if x exists at some time before or after t.

Being the next President of Brazil, being divorced, taking a second holiday at Foz do Iguaçu, are such properties. Among the psychological properties of that kind we have: remembering one’s father, recognizing one’s friend, and knowing the meaning of a word. It is precisely that kind of property that Swampman lacks, because he never met Davidson’s father or Davidson’s friends, and never learned the use of the word ‘house’. Gilbert Ryle, appropriately, explained that in one important sense of the verb, “knowing” means, “having learned something and not forgotten it.”6 The psychological properties I just mentioned are relational or extrinsic properties and externalism in the philosophy of mind corresponds precisely to the claim that at least some of our psychological properties are extrinsic. I think Davidson’s main contribution to externalism consists, above all, in his emphasis on these properties rooted in the past, in the personal history of a cognitive agent, involving these past singular encounters with objects, persons, substances, events, etc., which are, so to speak, the roots of (actual and future) reference.7 To recognize Davidson’s friends (to instantiate the corresponding property at a time t), Swampman should have existed at a time prior to t, and we know he didn’t; and to know the meaning of the word “house” at a time t, he would have,

likewise, to exist at a time prior to t, the time corresponding to the
learning of the word-meaning (or corresponding to the various
occasions in which the learning of the word-meaning took place).
Davidson makes that point repeatedly:

> a word one has been conditioned to hold applicable by the presence of snakes will refer to snakes. Of course very many words and sentences are not learned this way; but it is those that are that anchor language to the world.8

Here we should add: “That anchor the language a person is using,” because, according to Davidson, we never know in all details what language is that. The same observation holds, or so it seems to me, for any linguistic and conceptual ability. Ability is acquired capacity and the actual possession of any such capacity by a person presupposes necessarily the existence of that person in the past, at a moment where causal-historical connections took place, strengthened by practice. So, to sum up: “[T]he situations in which words are learned confer meaning on them,” and also “what someone means depends, at least in part, on what others in the linguistic community mean by the same words,” especially our “teachers,” those who just happened to be there and whose linguistic use we just try to imitate. The meaning of other words also confers meaning to each word in the language (holism), so that the meaning of each single word depends on (or is determined ultimately by) the whole language. However, my interest here is the more direct word-object connection.10

II

Now I want to discuss what Davidson presented as the main thesis of “Knowing One’s Own Mind,” namely that mental states can be both “inner” (in the sense that having them does not presuppose the existence of nothing beyond their bearer, because they would be identical to some brain event) and “ordinary” (in the sense that they are usually individuated “in terms partly of relations to objects and events other than the subject”).11 Here Davidson criticized
Putnam for defending that no mental states provided with conceptual content satisfy both conditions (being “inner” and being identifiable in terms of relations to objects and events entirely different from the subject). The sort of externalism Davidson wants to promote tries to sustain simultaneously: 1) token-physicalism (or mind-brain supervenience); 2) the fact that most contentful mental states are “broad”; and, 3) our Cartesian intuitions on self-knowledge and first-person authority. In the context of that philosophical undertaking, Davidson (1987, 1988, 1989) attacked Putnam’s conclusion, more or less dramatically expressed in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” in these terms: “Cut the pie anyway you like, meanings just ain’t in the head.” Putnam’s argument is well known. Schematically, it could be stated like this. Suppose two twins (molecular replicas) in slightly different natural settings. The only difference consists in the internal structure of two substances with exactly the same stereotype. The two substances look alike, taste alike, and serve the same purposes in both settings. Suppose now that the twins form a token of the same thought involving a mental reference to these substances. If we accept the principle that intension determines extension, or that the content of a thought determines what it refers to, and that thoughts are individuated by their content, the following valid argument yields Putnam’s conclusion:

1) The twins are thinking about or referring to different substances;
2) Therefore, their thoughts have different contents;
3) Therefore, they have different thoughts;
4) But the twins are physical duplicates;
5) Therefore, their thoughts are not (wholly) determined by the physical nature of their bodies and heads;

\[\therefore\] Therefore, their thoughts are not (wholly) in their heads.\(^\text{12}\)

Here I say, “thought” and not “meaning,” as Putnam does, but it doesn’t matter. More precisely, Putnam was talking about “the knowledge of the meaning of a word.” Of course, meanings are not in the head, especially when they are conceived of either as objects

referred to (in the case of proper names) or as set-theoretical entities (functions from worlds to sets or from worlds to truth-value). In the case of an Ideational Theory of Language, all meanings could be seen as something in the head (mind), but that’s quite another story. Traditionally, the grasping or the knowledge of meaning has been conceived of as a mental act or state, something that, supposedly, depends entirely upon “what’s in the head.” That was Putnam’s target. Externalism can be and is usually construed as the negation of mind-brain supervenience, as the negation that twins (molecular replicas) cannot have different thoughts. Supervenience, in Davidson’s own terms, is the thesis that “there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but different in some mental respect, or (...) an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect.” Davidson accepts that relations to objects outside the subject individuate thoughts. But what does it mean to say that a thought is individuated by reference to something out there? He would accept, I suppose, that our twins are referring to different substances (and so have different thoughts) because of the different historical-causal connections each twin has to the substance encountered in his/her respective environment. But this has been largely understood to mean that the individuation of a thought may depend on the identity of the object referred to, and, consequently, that the object is somehow constitutive of the thought. If you change the intentional object involved in a thought for another one qualitatively identical to the first object, the thought is not the same because the two objects are numerically distinct. One classical example is the perception of an apple: When I perceive an apple, the apple is the intentional object of my perception; now suppose that a talented illusionist, with a hand quicker than the blink of an eye, change the apple for another one qualitatively identical to the first, and put it on the table in front of me in exactly the same position. I do not perceive the same apple, the intentional object is not the same; consequently the perception too is not the same. In general, the identity of the thought depends upon the identity of the intentional object. Davidson simply downplays that dimension of any mental state with a broad mental content. Many of our mental properties are
relational in that sense, in fact all de re mental states fall in that category. Wanting a sloop (the one my neighbor just bought) is a very different mental property from wanting a sloop (the one I would like to be able to construct one day). If we accept, as externalists do, the existence of such relational or extrinsic mental properties or such mental states with broad content, the following conclusion drawn by Woodfield holds:

[An]… interesting consequence [from externalism] is that all versions of the mind-brain identity theory are false. No de re mental state about an object that is external to the person’s brain can possibly be identical with a state of that brain, since no brain state presupposes the existence of an external object. Any state which did incorporate an environmental object would not be a state of the brain, but would be rather a state of the brain-environment complex.14

Jaegwon Kim in many places suggested that those who want to preserve the supervenience thesis for de re mental states should enlarge the superveniente basis to include the relevant parts of the environment, or simply to abandon mind-brain supervenience in favor of global supervenience. In general, relational higher order properties do not supervene locally. Intentionality, or the relational property of being about something is a case in point. Davidson goes on to say that externalism “…can be used […] to discredit type-type identity theories; but if anything it supports token-token identity theories.”15 Here Davidson looks very confident and categorical. Until the end of this section, I’ll try to show why he shouldn’t. Externalism, I shall argue, is not compatible with token-physicalism or mind-brain supervenience.

Davidson does not accept Putnam’s conclusion and goes on saying that to pretend that meanings aren’t in the head because they are partly identified by relations to objects outside the head, “…would be as bad as to argue that because my being sunburned presupposes the existence of the sun, my sunburn is not a condition of my skin.”16 As a matter of fact, a scare caused by a knife might be indiscernible from another one caused by a broken bottle. The
scare is also a “condition of my skin.” However, Davidson’s metaphor clearly won’t do, simply because there is nothing relational about my skin! My skin, certainly, is not relational in the same sense as meaning and mental content are said to be “relational.” Brentano created the expression “quasi-relations” for these intentional or semantic relations that do not presuppose the existence of all their relata. My skin does not instantiate any intentional or semantic property in that sense. Intentional and semantic phenomena are precisely relational in nature. They are mind-dependent and relational. Mental properties are instantiated by persons, people; of course their brain must be in order, but brains are not subjects of experience. Perceiving a dog might be described as a “condition of my brain,” but what happens in my brain cannot be described as being “about” a dog or whatever: What happen therein are brute facts. Davidson has always been a strong advocate of the irreducibility of the concepts we use to describe our mental life to the concepts we use to describe physical phenomena.17 Like Quine, he accepted Brentano’s thesis in Chisholm’s formulation: We cannot get outside the circle of intentional notions. But what is described as relational is, of course, a mental property qua mental property, and the famous distinction between “narrow” and “broad” content makes sense for mental states qua mental states. All “ordinary” wide-content mental states would be “narrow” if described as neural events.

Does the distinction depend on the way a state is described? If someone were described as a grandfather, says Davidson, that description would entail one or more true existential sentences about the sons and grandsons, daughters and granddaughters. Remember Quine’s eccentric mathematician-cyclist: The distinction narrow-wide would be dependent on the way the mental state is described, much like the distinction essential-accidental, according to Quine, would depend on the way a property is picked up linguistically.

Well, with all due respect, here I have to disagree. I do not think that the distinction narrow-wide depends only on the way a mental state is described. Consider the verbs denoting mental states or events, verbs like ‘perceiving’, ‘recognizing’ or ‘remembering’. As a simple matter of logical analysis, if someone perceives an apple, then the apple must exist. Otherwise, that would not be a
case of perception, but rather one of hallucination. If I recognize someone, I must have met him/her before on some occasion, and to remember someone, there must be a situation in which I related to that person in a specific way. So the next remaining question is: Do these verbs apply or not? If they do, the mental state described by their use has a wide content.

Davidson seems to be carving something like a narrow content from Swampman’s “ordinary” attitudes in order to explain Swampman’s actions. But Swampman has no “ordinary” attitudes (as we saw, he lacks the relevant properties), and what he has in common with Davidson is physical. Furthermore, we saw that the distinction wide-narrow applies to mental states qua mental states. (As Woodward rightly observed, all neural states are internal and do not presuppose the existence of something outside the body). By hypothesis, Davidson’s molecular replica acts exactly as Davidson would do in the same circumstances. When he meets Davidson’s friends, he greets them and talks with them fluently. He goes to Davidson’s house, sits and starts writing essays on radical interpretation in good English.

I now want to question the plausibility of Davidson’s science-fiction example. Mental states of all types, desires, beliefs, intentions, and justified beliefs are dispositions of a person and as such they must have a physical realization. No one could speak fluently a language without a set of verbal dispositions realized in the brain. The physical realization of these verbal dispositions is what Swampman has in common with Davidson. The problem is that Swampman does not know English, because he never learned. Swampman’s language has no anchor; the meanings of his words are not rooted in his past experience. The question is: Is such a set of finite verbal dispositions enough to speak fluently, to use English creatively? Apparently, Swampman reacts creatively to Davidson’s friends, or write creative essays on radical interpretation. But how Swampman could form the intention to use words whose meanings he never learned — and therefore does not know — to utter new sentences he does not even understand? Creative uses of words presuppose judgments of similarity: A new situation must be similar enough under relevant aspects to former situations to justify the use of the
same words in the new situation. Arguably, Swampman would be unable to form that kind of judgments, simply because he does not have the knowledge of these former situations. In Davidson science fiction story, everything happen as if Swampman’s mind were indiscernible from Davidson’s mind. But this is highly implausible, since Swampman cannot have Davidson’s attitudes (certainly not with the same sentential or propositional content).

Davidson’s example is interesting and efficient in order to create a contrast showing what Swampman is lacking (a huge set of causal-historical connections grounding his language and thought), but arguably does not serve to show how externalism and token-physicalism might hang together. On the contrary. I believe that there is more to the normal use of language than a set of verbal dispositions. We just saw that a set of similarity judgments is required. Swampman is not a zombie; he is a conscious being with sensations and experiences. But he is a kind of zombie that only seems to use correctly words he never learned and seems to recognize people he never met. This is a very weird predicament indeed, because, usually, mental phenomena are what they seem to be, and we invoke them precisely to explain behavior. Davidson says that Swampman needs time, supposedly to ground his language and thoughts. But how are we to explain his behavior when he just comes out the swamp? By attributing attitudes he cannot have but only seems to have? If, as Davidson explains, “…what a speaker means is not determined solely by what is in his head, [but] depends also on the natural history of what is in the head,” and if mental content is a kind of meaning, then Swampman cannot have the attitudes Davidson has.

Swampman has never learned English, has no theoretical or practical knowledge of the language. But knowledge or justified belief is a first-person perspective notion, a mental state that is widely individuated. I could not know that Pico da Neblina is the highest mountain in Brazil if that mountain were inexistent. If most “ordinary” mental states have broad content and are individuated by their content, and if having a mind is having, inter alia, attitudes (beliefs, desires, intentions, propositional knowledge, etc.), together with sensations and conscious experiences, then Davidson’s mind is
very different from Swampman’s mind, in spite of the fact that, ex hypothesis, their brain are qualitatively identical. So, in a nutshell, my point is simply that, under any reasonable interpretation, the three following theses do not hold together:

A) Davidson’s brain is equal to Swampman’s;
B) Davidson’s mind is different from Swampman’s;
C) Token-physicalism (or mind-brain supervenience) is true.

The three sentences form an inconsistent set. Furthermore, if the negation of B) be true, each of us could be a brain in a vat, a possibility that any serious externalist should rule out. So I conclude that Davidson fails to reconcile externalism and token-physicalism.

III

Much more convincing is Davidson’s attempt to reconcile externalism with self-knowledge and first-person authority. The conception of self-knowledge based on introspection or “internal observation” blatantly fails to explain first-person authority, because it is just an internalization of the way we perceive public objects. If the perception of external public objects is not entirely reliable, how could the perception of “internal objects” on the stage of the “Cartesian Theatre” by the “mind’s eye” be more reliable? So, that model must be rejected altogether.

The problem externalism created for self-knowledge is the recognition of the fact that we are sometimes ignorant of the internal structure of the objects referred to, or ignorant of some convention in the linguistic community we belong to, or finally ignorant of the causal-historical connections between our language or thoughts and the objects that are the mundane “roots” of our mind. These mundane roots are not always cognitively accessible from a first-person perspective. If my thoughts are not wholly in my head because their identity depends upon the identity of an object outside my body, do I have to know parts of my environment in order to

know my own thoughts?

Davidson, for all I know, was the first to see that very natural way out: To reconstruct self-knowledge as second-order attitudes having exactly the same mental content as the first-order attitudes. Our intuitions talk loudly: There is a clear asymmetry between the way we know what we think and the way we know what the others think. I do not use the same kind of evidence to know what someone thinks and to know what I think. (Do I really use any “evidence” to know what I think?) I know what I think immediately and “without observation” as Anscombe once said. I could be wrong, of course; sometimes, I do not know exactly what I want, what I prefer, what gift I should buy, etc. I may hesitate. It is something immediate, not discursive; it is something I feel. I can say to myself: “Do I prefer this to that?” The “this” and the “that” refer exactly to the same objects of a first-order belief expressed by “This is beautiful but that is beautiful too.” The question expresses a second-order attitude about the first-order belief. A second-order attitude (for instance the belief that we have a determined belief) inherits the mental content of the first-order attitude. The meaning of the words we use is determined partly by events and circumstances of which we may be ignorant. But from this, it does not follow that we do not know what we mean, for the content of what we think we mean is determined by the same circumstances. According to Davidson, “My ignorance of the circumstances that determine what I mean and think has no tendency to show that I don’t know what I mean and think.” Burge goes exactly in the same direction when he writes:

One is thinking that $p$ in the very same event of thinking knowledgeably that one is thinking it. [...] So any conditions that are necessary to thinking that $p$ will be equally necessary to the relevant knowledge that one is thinking that $p$. Here again, to think the thought, one need not know the enabling conditions. It is enough that they actually be satisfied.

IV

If the ignorance of the circumstances that determine what we mean, “has no tendency to show” that we do not know what we mean and think, then, after all, Swampman knows what he means by the use of the word ‘house’. Does he? May be we might say something like this: Swampman does not know which are the “enabling conditions” associated with his actual use of the word ‘house’, but he has an imperfect knowledge of the meaning of the words he uses. I do not remember exactly in which circumstances I learned the use of the word ‘table’, but this does affect my knowledge of the meaning and use of the word. As a matter of fact, the externalists stressed that important point, especially Putnam and Burge: The knowledge that the average speaker-hearer has of the meanings of the words is less than perfect if we compare it with the knowledge of a professional lexicographer. For most of us, “knowing the meaning of a word,” means the same as “being able to apply it correctly, most of the time, in most contexts of use.” But it seems that Swampman does not even have that knowledge: He simply never learned the meaning of ‘house’.

This is a confusing situation: One the one hand, the whole science fiction story has one purpose: To underline a huge set of causal-historical connections that grounds Davidson’s language and thought and that Swampman lacks, and this seems to be an important contribution to externalism; on the other hand, Davidson seems to downplay what Swampman’s story reveals in order to restore the coherence of the system and to maintain some cherished theses like token-physicalism or the first-person authority. My diagnosis is that externalism corresponds to the more recent phase in the development of Davidson’s impressive philosophical system, and those more ancient philosophical theses (token-physicalism or mind-brain supervenience, and the ontology of events) do not fit perfectly in the resulting final picture.

References

Keywords
Externalism, rooted property, Davidson’s philosophy, Swampman’s story, self-knowledge.

Resumo
Depois dos trabalhos seminais de Putnam (1975), Burge (1979), e Kripke (1982), a próxima contribuição importante para o externalismo é certamente a de Davidson (principalmente 1987, 1988, 1989, 2001). Ao criticar as posições desses filósofos, Davidson elaborou sua própria marca de externalismo. Apresentaremos primeiro algumas características do externalismo de Davidson (a importância das conexões históricocausais para a fundamentação da linguagem e do pensamento, para a explicação de como a linguagem pode ser aprendida, e como as atitudes podem ser identificadas pelo intérprete, e finalmente como o conteúdo mental é determinado pelo recurso à ideia de triangulação), para preparar a discussão de alguns problemas. Discutimos então duas questões no externalismo de Davidson. Primeiro, como reconciliar o fato de que fatores externos determinam o conteúdo mental, como Putnam, Burge e o próprio Davidson convincentemente argumentaram, com o fisicalismo de ocorrências, a tese de que eventos mentais são idênticos a eventos físicos ocorrendo “no cérebro” (ou a tese de que os eventos mentais supervêm localmente em atividades cerebrais)? O segundo grande problema é como reconciliar a autoridade de primeira pessoa com algumas aparentes conseqüências do externalismo, principalmente de que deveríamos conhecer as partes relevantes de nosso ambiente (natural e social) de modo a conhecer o conteúdo de nossos próprios pensamentos? Argumentamos que a resposta de Davidson à primeira questão não é bem sucedida, enquanto que sua resposta à segunda foi um avanço.

Palavras-chave
Externalismo, propriedade enraizada, filosofia de Davidson, estória do Swampman, auto-conhecimento.

Notes
2 D. Davidson, “Knowing One’s Own Mind” (1987), in SIO, p. 29.
3 See “The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self,” in SIO, p. 87: “…without numerous successful ostensions, I would have no thoughts.”
4 “Knowing One’s Own Mind,” p. 19: “It [Swampman] can’t mean what I do by the word ‘house’, for example, since the sound ‘house’ Swampman makes was not learned in a context that would give it the right meaning — or any meaning at all.”
5 R. M. Chisholm, Person and Object, La Salle, Open Court, 1976, p. 127.
7 Here a few comments are in order about Davidson’s use of the word ‘property’. Apparently, he did not consider properties, intensional entities, as “creatures of darkness” like Quine, but during the sixties and early in the seventies, he tried, as far as possible, to represent the logical form of action sentences or the logical form of sentences attributing propositional attitudes in an extensionalist way. Otherwise, he seems to use the word ‘property’ freely and without any qualms.
10 See “The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self,” in SIO, p. 89: “Sentences, or rather the attitudes they express, owe their content, that is their meaning, to two things: their relations to other sentences or attitudes, and their relations, direct or indirect, to the world through perception.” Also, in “The Myth of the Subjective,” p. 51: “There are no words, or concepts tied to words, that are not understood and interpreted, directly or indirectly, in terms of causal relations between people and the world (and, of course, the relations among words and other words, concepts and other concepts).”

11 “Knowing One’s Own Mind”, p. 20.
14 Andrew Woodfield, “Foreword,” in Thought and Object, viii.
15 “Knowing One’s Own Mind,” p. 33.
16 “Knowing One’s Own Mind,” p. 31.
17 Idem, p. 25, where he writes, interestingly: “I can imagine a science concerned with how people think and act purged of ‘folk psychology’, but I cannot think in what its interest would consist.”
18 See “Knowing One’s Own Mind,” p. 19, n. 3.
19 See “The Myth of the Subjective,” p. 44.