INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE OF PRINCIPIA – 4\textsuperscript{TH} FILOMENA WORKSHOP

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The 4th edition of the Filomena Workshop (Philosophy, Logic and Analytic Metaphysics) took place at the University of Bergen in October 15th and 16th, as part of a collaboration between the “Carolina Blasio” Logic Study Group from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte (Brazil) and the Bergen Logic Group. The program included three invited talks as well as ten contributed talks. The invited speakers were Prof. Daniel Durante (UFRN, Brazil), Prof. Michaela Mcsweeney (Boston University, USA) and Prof. Peter Verdée (UCLouvain, Belgium).

It is no exaggeration to say that this fourth edition was a success in exploring a number of topics across important subjects for contemporary philosophy of logic, covering foundational issues in the intersection between logic, science and metaphysics. The following papers represent well the themes that the Filomena Workshop has always been interested in. They are thus:

Ferreira and Silva’s paper discuss Robert Brandom’s logical expressivism, arguing that it is an anti-realist theory about logic. Logical expressivism proposes that logic plays the expressive role of making explicit inferential relations implicit in our linguistic practices. Ferreira and Silva present criteria for classifying logical theories as either realist or anti-realist, and show as a case example that Frege’s view is a realist one, since he defends the independent existence of logical facts in relation to our cognitive and linguistic practices. By contrast, they show that Brandom’s view is anti-realist, and moreover propose to use logical expressivism as the foundation of a pragmatist alternative to examining the normativity of logic, the phenomenon of rival logics and the nature of our rationality.

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Molick’s paper applies Larry Laudan’s reticulated model of science to the problem of theory choice within the discussion of anti-exceptionalism about logic. In particular, it addresses the question of the role of logical data within the process of revision of logical theories. Molick argues that the ubiquitous nature of logical data is responsible for the proliferation of several distinct methodologies for logical theories. The result is a liberal pluralist approach, where logical theories may be motivated in different ways, by varying how to interpret data, the method for selection, and the theoretical goal.

Mai’s paper discusses the ontological commitments of plural logics. These logics try to capture the meaning of plural quantifiers from natural language (such as “some things are P”). Mai argues that there is reason for rejecting the claim of ontological innocence advocated by so-called pluralists. The preference that pluralists have towards plural first-order logic, in light of a specific version of the comprehension scheme and under the presupposition that for every plurality there is a coextensive set, it is argued that pluralists’s semantics commits them to the existence of set-like objects. This issue is seldom given its due in philosophical theorizing, and the paper is thus a welcome addition to the debate on plural logics.

Erickson’s paper is inserted in the contemporary topic of logical anti-exceptionalism, that is, the view that logic is not an exceptional area of science. Instead, it is claimed that logic falls under the same sort of methods of theory revision as other areas of science. Since the main approach of logical anti-exceptionalism is to claim that a logical theory is chosen based on “inference to the best explanation” (which is the method of theory choice proposed by scientific realism), the author expresses concern that if anti-exceptionalism is uncarefully formulated can lead to a kind of logical realism (the view that unobservable entities postulated by logical theories are believed to be existing entities.) Erickson argues against the classification of metaphysical and epistemological anti-exceptionalism and instead proposes a new classification between broad anti-exceptionalism and narrow anti-exceptionalism. The former encopasses proposals for theory revision in logic more generally, while the latter stresses logic’s affinity with science.

Notes

¹Not to be confused for logical pluralists within the topic of logical pluralism.