Pierre’s Rational and Public Beliefs
Abstract
http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n3p451
Paradigmatic cases of disagreement seem not to be compatible with a widespread kind of solution to Kripke’s celebrated Pierre puzzle. As a result, the classical puzzle about rational belief is shown to be also a puzzle about public disagreement/agreement phenomena. In this paper, I defend that the new public version of the puzzle is substantial and challenging and conclude that a full solution to Kripke’s considerations must offer a satisfactory account of both the rational and public character of belief attributions. I then argue that a notion of non-belief-individuating understanding is plausibly the key notion that would allow us to arrest both versions of the Pierre puzzle.
Keywords
Full Text:
PDFDOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n3p451
Copyright (c)