É o método filosófico baseado na intuição?

Abstract

There is a current and lively debate that opposes naturalistic philosophers to non-naturalistic philosophers about intuition. I start with a critical analysis of that debate, presenting the arguments that naturalistic philosophers make use of in order to debunk the alleged method based on intuitions of non-naturalistic philosophers. Then I introduce the solution that consists in trying to reduce metaphysics to a merely descriptive task, concluding, however, that this move is not satisfactory. I therefore describe ‘stylistic’ solutions whereby it is argued that the term “intuition” and its derivatives play a rhetorical function in philosophy, or reflect a careless use of vocabulary. Although partly correct, I try to show that they do not eradicate the alleged importance of intuition in philosophy. Finally, I present my own point of view about the issue at hand: in case intuition plays a role in the pursuit of knowledge, be it scientific or philosophical, that role is not methodological, but heuristical.