Davidson on the impossibility of thought without language: comments on Diana I. Pérez

Authors

  • Marcelo Fischborn Universidade Federal de Santa Maria

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n3p489

Abstract

Diana Pérez (2005) criticizes Davidson’s argument for the thesis that there is no thought without language, and offers an alternative defense of that thesis on the basis of empirical studies on developmental psychology. In this comment I argue that more recent studies do not seem to affect Davidson’s argument in the way Pérez suggests, and that her alternative defense of the thesis that there is no thought without language is insufficient. At the end, I offer a sketch of how a weaker and more tenable version of the argument could be articulated.

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Published

2012-09-23

Issue

Section

Notes/Discussions