The constitutional view

Authors

  • Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira Federal University from Rio de Janeiro Rio de Janeiro, Largo de São Francisco 1

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n2p165

Abstract

This brief paper is devoted to criticizing the widespread reading of Kant’s first Critique, according to which reference to subject-independent objects is “constituted” by higherorder cognitive abilities (concepts). Let us call this the “constitutional view”. In this paper, I argue that the constitutional reading confuses the un-Kantian problem of how we come to represent objects (which I call the intentionality thesis), with the quite different problem of how we cognize (erkennen) (which I call the “cognition thesis”) that we do represent objects, that is, things that exist independently of the subject.

Author Biography

Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira, Federal University from Rio de Janeiro Rio de Janeiro, Largo de São Francisco 1

Professor do Departamento de Filosofia da UFRJ.

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Published

2016-05-23

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Section

Articles