Common-sense Realism and the Unimaginable Otherness of Science

Authors

  • Bradley Monton University of Colorado at Boulder

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/%25x

Abstract

Bas van Fraassen endorses both common-sense realism — the view, roughly, that the ordinary macroscopic objects that we take to exist actually do exist — and constructive empiricism — the view, roughly, that the aim of science is truth about the observable world. But what happens if common-sense realism and science come into conflict? I argue that it is reasonable to think that they could come into conflict, by giving some motivation for a mental monist solution to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. I then consider whether, in a situation where science favors the mental monist interpretation, van Fraassen would want to give up common-sense realism or would want to give up science. 1. The Potential Tension
Bas van Fraassen is a common-sense realist: Constructive empiricism

Author Biography

Bradley Monton, University of Colorado at Boulder

Department of Philosophy
University of Colorado at Boulder EDUCATION
Princeto n Unive rsi ty, Ph.D. in Philosophy received November 1999.
Dissertation: Quantum Ontology and Quantum Observers. Advisor: Bas van Fraassen.
Rice Uni ver sity, B.A. in Physics and Philosophy received June 1994.
EMPLOYMENT
Uni ve rsi ty of Colorado at Bo ulde r, Associate Professor, starting Fall 2006.
Uni ve rsi ty of Kentucky, Associate Professor, Fall 2005 to Spring 2006.
Uni ve rsi ty of Kentucky, Assistant Professor, Fall 2000 to Spring 2005.
Ame ri can Uni ve rsit y of Bei rut, Assistant Professor, Fall 1999 to Spring 2000.
Princeto n Unive rsi ty, Teaching Assistant, Fall and Spring 1996, Fall 1997, and Spring 1998.
AREAS OF INTEREST
Ar eas of Spec ializatio n:
Philosophy of Science (especially Philosophy of Physics), Probabilistic Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion.
Ar eas of Compe tenc e:
Metaphysics, Epistemology, Logic.

Published

2007-01-01

Issue

Section

Articles