Opacidad referencial y atribución intencional a animales sin lenguaje

Authors

  • Laura Danón Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (National University of Córdoba)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n2p143

Abstract

In this paper I examine Davidson’s argument from referential opacity against the attribution of thoughts to non-linguistics animals. I will begin by reconstructing the strongest version of the argument — i.e., the one which is better suited to overcome the different objections that have been raised against it. Once that is done, I will also object this version arguing, in a nutshell, that the fact that non-human animals lack language does not preclude us from acquiring some knowledge (although such knowledge may be partial) of their mental contents. Thus, I conclude that the argument from referential opacity fails to support Davidson’s radical skepticism regarding the possibility of acquiring knowledge of the mental contents of non-linguistic animals, and of legitimately attributing intentional mental states to them.

Author Biography

Laura Danón, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (National University of Córdoba)

Phd in Philosophy Professor of Philosophy and of Psychology. National University of Córdoba

Published

2016-05-23

Issue

Section

Articles