¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/808-1711.2016v20n3p427

Abstract

In this paper I focus my attention on the proposal given by Howard Wettstein in 1980 to the cognitive phenomenon stated by Gottlob Frege in his paper “On sense and reference”. I offer three arguments in order to show that his answer does not weaken this phenomenon. Particularly, I defend three ideas: first, it is legitimate that philosophical semantics, in contrast with what Wettstein defends, provides an answer to the cognitive phenomenon; second, Wettstein does not conceive Frege’s argument correctly by considering it generates a semantic theory from a purely mentalist phenomenon; third, the explanation supplied by Wettstein is assumed by Frege when he states the phenomenon.

Author Biography

David Suarez-Rivero, University of Campinas

Ph. D in Philosophy of Language, University of Barcelona

Published

2016-09-09

Issue

Section

Articles