Particularities of the domestic market of cattle in Brazil: case study on the problem of bargaining at animal fairs in the interior of Alagoas

Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of the effects of bargaining in agricultural markets, specifically the cattle market, based on a theoretical and empirical analysis method. Using primary and secondary data, and theories of cooperative games, through Nash's solution and Rubinstein's theorem, in order to evidence the inequality that can occur in negotiations at agricultural fairs. The results show an inequality between the possible prices between buyer and seller, as also the work diagnosed, through the theories, that for matching the corresponding price with a situation of equality in the bargaining power, it would be necessary a virtual easing of the point of disagreement of the buyer, so in comparison with the model of the Nash solution there would be a difference in bargaining power unfavorable to the seller. The results also show a difference in the seller's patience soon confirming also the existence of disadvantage for the seller during the commercializations by the model of Rubinstein.