Triângulo de fraudes de Cressey (1953) e teoria da agência: estudo aplicado a instituições bancárias brasileiras

Michele Rílany Rodrigues Machado, Ivan Ricardo Gartner

Resumo


Esta pesquisa examinou se o triângulo de fraude de Cressey (1953)  e a teoria de agência, em conjunto,  possibilitam investigar a ocorrência de fraudes corporativas em instituições bancárias brasileiras. Foram formuladas seis hipóteses de pesquisas, segregadas nas dimensões do triângulo de fraude – pressão, oportunidade e racionalização – e mensuradas a partir de variáveis extraídas da teoria da agência, criminologia e estudos empíricos sobre fraudes. A identificação da probabilidade de ocorrência de fraudes foi operacionalizada a partir de regressões logísticas multinomiais, aplicadas a dados de 44 bancos, no  período de janeiro/2001 a dezembro/2012. Para a dimensão de pressão, confirmou-se a hipótese nº 01, ao indicar que quanto menor o desempenho anterior da instituição, maior a probabilidade de ocorrência de fraudes. Na dimensão de oportunidade, a hipótese nº 03 foi confirmada, ao colocar em evidência que baixos indicadores de governança corporativa aumentam a probabilidade de ocorrência de fraudes. Na dimensão de racionalização, confirmou-se a hipótese nº 06, portanto, a  predominância do gênero feminino na gestão restringe a probabilidade de fraudes. Conclui-se, que o triângulo de Cressey, aliado à teoria da agência, constitui-se numa ferramenta apropriada para dirigir a investigação de ocorrência de fraudes corporativas em instituições bancárias.


Palavras-chave


Instituições Bancárias; Fraudes Corporativas; Teoria da Agência; Economia do Crime; Triângulo de Fraude

Texto completo:

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Referências


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CRESSEY, D. R. Other People’s Money: A study in the social psychology of embezzlement. Glencoe, IL: The free press, 1953.

CRUTCHLEY, C. E.; JENSEN, M. R. H.; MARSHALL, B. B. Climate for Scandal : Corporate Environments that Contribute to Accounting Fraud. The Financial Review, v. 42, p. 53–73, 2007.

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FAMA, E. F. Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. The Journal of Finance, v. 25, n.2, p. 383–417, 1970.

FIELDS, T. D.; LYS, T. Z.; VINCENT, L. Empirical research on accounting choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics, v. 31, p. 255–307, set. 2001.

GARTNER, I. R. Modelagem Multiatributos Aplicada à Avaliação do Desempenho Econômico-Financeiro de Empresas. Pesquisa Operacional, v. 30, n. 3, p. 619–636, 2010.

GOLDBERG, V. P. Regulaffon and administered contracts. The Bell Journal of Economics, v. 7, n. 2, p. 426–448, 1976.

GRELLET, F. PF busca provas de fraude nos Correios do Rio. Exame. São Paulo, 27 nov. 2014. . Acesso em: 29 nov. 2014.

GRILLI, L.; RAMPICHINI, C. A Multilevel Multinomial Logit Model for the Analysis of Graduates’ Skills. Statistical Methods and Applications, v. 16, n. 3, p. 381–393, 2007.

HAAN, P.; UHLENDORFF, A. Estimation of Multinomial Logit Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity using Maximum Simulated Likelihood. The Stata Journal, v. 6, n. 2, p. 229–245, 2006.

HAMBRICK, D. C. Upper Echelons Theory: An Update. The Academy of Management Review, v. 32, n. 2, p. 334–343, 2007.

HAYNES, M.; WESTERN, M.; SPALLEK, M.. Methods for Categorical Longitudinal Survey Data: Understanding Employment Status of Australian Women. In: HILDA Survey Research Conference,. 2005, Melbourne. Anais... Melbourne: University of Melbourne, p. 1-24

HILBE, J. M. Logistic Regression Models. New York: CRC Press, 2009.

JENSEN, C.; MECKLING, H. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 3, p. 305–360, 1976.

JENSEN, M. C. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow , Corporate Finance , and Takeovers. The American Economic Review, v. 76, n. 2, p. 323–329, 1986.

JENSEN, M. C.; MURPHY, K. J. Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives. Journal of Political Economy, v. 98, n. 2, p. 225–264, 1990.

JOHN, K.; SENBET, L. W. Corporate Governance and Board e Effectiveness. Journal of Banking & Finance, v. 22, p. 371–403, 1998.

KELLEY, S. W.; FERRELL, O. C.; SKINNER, S. J. Ethical Behavior Among Marketing Researchers : An Assessment of Selected Demographic Characteristics. Journal of Business Ethics, v. 9, p. 681–688, 1990.

LENNOX, C.; PITTMAN, J. A. Big Five Audits and Accounting Fraud. Contemporary Accounting Research, v. 27, n. 1, p. 209–247, 2010.

LOCHNER, L. Education, Work, and Crime: A human capital approach. International Economic Review, v. 45, n. 3, p. 811–843, 2004.

LONG, J. S.; FREESE, J. Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata. 2. ed. Texas: Stata Press, 2006.

LOU, Y.; WANG, M. Fraud Risk Factor Of The Fraud Triangle Assessing The Likelihood Of Fraudulent Financial Reporting. Journal of Business & Economics Research, v. 7, n. 2, p. 61–78, 2009.

MACEY, J. R. Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations. Boston University Law Review, v. 71, p. 315–340, 1991.

MACIEL, L. et al. Impacto dos Contratos Futuros do Ibovespa na Volatilidade dos Índices de Ações no Brasil: Uma análise na crise do subprime. Estudos econômicos, v. 42, p. 801–825, 2012.

MARKIN, R. J. The role of rationalization in consumer decision processes: A revisionist approach to consumer behavior. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, v. 7, n. 4, p. 316–334, 1979.

MATOUSEK, R. et al. Bank Performance and Convergence During the Financial Crisis: Evidence from the “old” European Union and Eurozone. Journal of Banking & Finance, v. xxx, p. 2 – 9, 2014.

MENARD, S. Applied Logistic Regression Analysis (Sage University Papers Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Science, series n. 07-106). 2. ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001.

MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO FEDERAL – MPF. Procuradores da Força Tarefa concederão entrevista coletiva, às 14h, na sede do MPF/Paraná, em Curitiba. Curitiba, 22 ago. 2014. Disponível em . Acesso em: 07 set. 2014.

POSNER, R. A. Economic analysis of law. 7. ed. Chicago: Aspen Publishers, 2007.

PRIMO, U. R. et al. Determinantes da rentabilidade bancária no Brasil. BASE - Revista de Administração e Contabilidade da Unisinos, v. 10, n. 4, p. 308–323, 2013.

REYNOLDS, S. J. A Neurocognitive Model of the Ethical Decision-Making Process: Implications for Study and Practice. The Journal of applied psychology, v. 91, n. 4, p. 737–48, 2006.

ROSEN, Sherwin. Contracts and the Market for Executives. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1990. Disponível em: . Acesso em: 07 jul. 2013.

ROSS, S. A. The Economic The Theory of Agency : Principal’s Problem. The American Economic Review, v. 63, n. 2, p. 134–139, 1973.

RYAN, H. E.; WIGGINS, R. A. The influence of firm- and manager-specific characteristics on the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance, v. 7, n. 2, p. 101–123, 2001.

SADKA, G. The Economic Consequences of Accounting Fraud in Product Markets: Theory and a Case from the U.S. Telecommunications Industry (WorldCom). American Law and Economics Review, v. 8, n. 3, p. 439–475, 2006.

SCHEUFELE, D. A. Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another Look at Cognitive Effects of Political Communication. Mass Comunication & Society, v. 3, n. 2&3, p. 297–316, 2000.

SCHRAND, C. M.; ZECHMAN, S. L. C. Executive overconfidence and the slippery slope to financial misreporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, v. 53, n. 1-2, p. 311–329, fev. 2012.

SILVA, A. L. C. Governança Corporativa, Valor, Alavancagem e Política de Dividendos das Empresas Brasileiras. Revista de Administração, v. 39, n. 4, p. 348–361, 2004.

SINGLETON, T. W.; SINGLETON, A. J. Fraud Auditing and Forensic Accounting. 4. ed. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2010.

SKRONDAL, A.; RABE-HESKETH, S. Generalized Latent Variable Modeling: Multilevel, longitudinal and structural equation models. New York: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2004.

SKRONDAL, A.; RABE-HESKETH, S. Multilevel Logistic Regression for Polytomous Data and Rankings. Psychometrika, v. 68, n. 2, p. 267–287, 2003.

STEFFENSMEIER, D. J.; SCHWARTZ, J.; ROCHE, M. Gender and Twenty-First-Century Corporate Crime: Female Involvement and the Gender Gap in Enron-Era Corporate Frauds. American Sociological Review, v. 78, n. 3, p. 448–476, 2013.

TRAIN, K. E. Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. 2. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

TRAPP, A. C. G. A Relação do Conselho Fiscal como Componente de Controle no Gerenciamento de Resultados Contábeis. 2009. 133 f. Tese (Doutorado em Ciências Contábeis). Departamento de Contabilidade e Atuária da Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2009.

TROY, C.; SMITH, K. G.; DOMINO, M. A. CEO demographics and accounting fraud: Who is more likely to rationalize illegal acts? Strategic Organization, v. 9, n. 4, p. 259–282, 2011.

TYMOIGNE, É.. Securitization, Deregulation, Economic Stability, and Financial Crisis. Part I: The evolution of securitization. Working paper, Nova York, Levy Economics Institute, 2009.

WANG, T. Y. Corporate Securities Fraud: Insights from a New Empirical Framework. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, v. 9, p. 1–34, 2011.

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2175-8069.2017v14n32p108



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