Objective List Theory of Well-Being as an Explanatory Theory.





Generally it is argued that the Objective List Theory (OLT) cannot support an explanatory view of what well-being is because OLT cannot identify one single good-maker property that it is responsible for unifying all the element that compose well-being. Then, Objective List Theory only can be an enumerative view of well-being. In this paper, I aim hold that we may offer an explanatory view of well-being even without identify a single good-maker property that is shared by all the elements that compose well-being. I hold that the OLT is still explanatory, because it is possible to identify each good-maker property in each element that is supposed to compose the list that is responsible for defining what well-being is. In addition, I hold that in order to have a full explanation about the concept of well-being we need to keep separate two question: 1) why something is good intrinsically and; 2) How the things that are good intrinsically could benefit us. My conclusion is that we may conceive one explanatory and pluralistic list that having constitutive elements of well-being and that a good explanation of well-being should keep separating the two question listed above.

Biografia do Autor

Bruno Aislã Gonçalves Santos, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

Mestre pela Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC). Atualmente em estágio doutoral na University of St. Andrews (Scotland) sob a supervisão do Professor Tim Mulgan com apoio do Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES).



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