Non-Ideal Theory in Climate Agreements

Ushana Jayasuriya

Resumo


My research explores climate justice and non-ideal theory. Using Laura Valentini’s conception of non-ideal theory, this is applied to the distribution of climate mitigation obligations, with a particular focus on the common but differentiated responsibilities of developed and developing countries. I wish to evaluate this distribution of obligations and determine whether it is an effective method of climate change mitigation, with consideration to non-ideal elements of partial or non-compliance. Climate change is one of the biggest challenges faced by the international community, and it is a problem that requires collective action. However, due to ineffective international agreements and a lack of willingness to alter lifestyles, this action is often not achieved. Agreements commonly result in targets that are not sufficient to exact the change required, instead representing only the states’ willingness to mitigate the destructive aspects of climate change while maintaining economic growth. I suggest that a shift in focus is required to obtain relevant and effective agreements that will reach the required targets. I propose that an Ability to Pay approach and a turn to investment incentives may result in more favourable outcomes. Recent climate agreements have focused more on the investment in clean energy and sharing of resources, however, I argue that this needs to be taken further in order to achieve the collective goal of mitigating climate change.


Palavras-chave


Non-ideal theory; Climate justice; Obligations; Development; Innovation

Texto completo:

PDF/A (English)

Referências


Aldred, Jonathon. 2016. “Emissions Trading Scheme in a ‘Non-Ideal’ World.” In Climate Justice in a Non-Ideal World, edited by Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser, 148-168. Oxford: University Press.

Caney, Simon. 2010. “Climate change and the duties of the advantaged.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 13, no. 1: 203-228.

Caney, Simon, 2010(b). “Markets, Morality and Climate Change: What, if anything, is Wrong with Emissions Trading?” New Political Economy 15, no. 2: 197-224.

Cutlip, Lauren, and Fath, Brian D. 2012. “Relationship between carbon emissions and economic development: case study of six countries.” Environment, Development and Sustainability 14, no. 3: 433-453.

Light, Andrew, and Taraska, Gwynne. 2016. “Enhancing Action on Short-Lived Climate Pollutants,” in Climate Justice in a Non-Ideal World, edited by Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser, 169-188. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Miller, David, 2004. “Holding Nations Responsible.” Ethics 114, no. 2: 240-268.

Miller, David. 2011. “Taking Up the Slack? Responsibility and Justice in Situations of Partial Compliance.” In Responsibility and Distributive Justice, edited by Zofia Stemplowska and Carl Knight, 230-245. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Moellendorf, Darrel. 2009. “Treaty Norms and Climate Change Mitigation.” Ethics and International Affairs 23, no. 3 (September): 247-265.

Pickering, Jonathon, and Barry, Christian. 2010. “On the Concept of Climate Debt: Its moral and political value” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15, no. 5: 667-685.

Posner, Eric, and Weisbach, David. 2010. Climate Change Justice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Shue, Henry. 2011. “Face reality? After you! – a call for leadership on climate change.” Ethics and International Affairs 25, no. 1: 17-26.

Shue, Henry. 2014. Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Valentini, Laura. 2012.“Ideal vs non-ideal theory.” Philosophy Compass 7, no. 9 (September): 654-664.




DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p461

          

 

 

ethic@. Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, SC, Brasil, eISSN 1677-2954

Licença Creative Commons
This work is licensed under a  Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial-SemDerivações 4.0 Internacional