Non-natural natural law: bridging the gap between Aristotle and Ross

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.e79185

Palavras-chave:

Aristotelianism, Naturalism, Non-Naturalism, The Open-Question argument, Metaethics

Resumo

Aristotelianism is often considered to be a version of naturalism. As a result, non-naturalism is often considered to be incompatible with Aristotelianism. In this paper, I will show that the Aristotelian can actually accept much of what the non-naturalist wants to say. I will show that the Aristotelian can accept a non-natural account of the good, need not be concerned by G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument and that, as long as we carefully consider and define our terms, they can accept much of non-naturalism in abstract. This then paves the way for the possibility of a non-natural natural law and should go some way to challenging the prevailing orthodoxy that Aristotelianism is a version of naturalism. I do not go so far as to label Aristotelianism a form of non-naturalism as there are some important areas of disagreement. Instead, I think that Aristotelianism should count as its own label and that it will resist any attempts to label it a form of naturalism, non-naturalism or, indeed, supernaturalism.

Biografia do Autor

Richard Playford, St Mary's University,Waldegrave Road,Twickenham,London,TW1 4SX.

Lecturer in Religious Studies

Referências

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Moore, G. E. (1903) Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University press. Reprinted 1951.

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Quinn, W. (1993) ‘Rationality and the Human Good.’ In Morality and Action by W. Quinn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 210-17.

Ross, W.D. (2002) The Right and The Good. Edited and with introduction by Philip Stratton-Lake. Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Stratton-Lake, Philip. (2013) “Rational Intuitionism” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics (2013) Edited by Roger Crisp. Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Thomson, J.J. (1994) “Goodness and Utilitarianism” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67, 7-21. - (2008) Normativity. Open Court: Chicago.

Veatch, Henry B. (2003) Rational Man: A Modern Interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics (Originally published 1962) Liberty Fund.

Publicado

2021-04-30

Edição

Seção

Artigos - Fluxo Contínuo