Conexões sociais e rotatividade involuntária do CEO: evidências do mercado brasileiro

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/2175-8069.2021.e76116

Palavras-chave:

Conselho de administração, Conexões sociais, CEO, Rotatividade involuntária

Resumo

Este estudo teve como objetivo investigar se as conexões sociais entre os membros do conselho de administração (CA) e o Chief Executive Officer (CEO) diminuem a probabilidade de rotatividade involuntária do CEO no contexto brasileiro. A partir dos dados do Formulário de Referência entre 2012 e 2018 das empresas listadas na Bolsa Brasil Balcão [B]3, desenvolveu-se um Índice de Conexão Social (ICS). Os resultados da regressão logística indicam que a probabilidade de rotatividade involuntária do CEO diminui quando o ICS aumenta, consistente com estudos precedentes. O resultado se manteve mesmo na presença de indicadores de governança corporativa e de demais controles. Os resultados evidenciam, assim, que as conexões sociais afetam o monitoramento do CA quanto à rotatividade, bem como que a análise agregada dos dados através do ICS proposto captura melhor este efeito no mercado brasileiro.

Biografia do Autor

Letícia Gomes Locatelli, Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS)

Doutoranda em Ciências Contábeis (UNISINOS), Porto Alegre/RS, Brasil

Fernando Maciel Ramos, Universidade do Contestado

Doutor em Ciências Contábeis (UNISINOS)

Professor do PPG em Administração na Universidade do Contestado, Concórdia/SC, Brasil

Cristiano Machado Costa, Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS)

Doutor em Economia pela University of Pennsylvania

Professor do PPG em Ciências Contábeis (UNISINOS), Porto Alegre/RS, Brasil

Referências

Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2007). A theory of friendly boards. The journal of finance, 62(1), 217-250. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.x

Alexandre, N. M. C., & Coluci, M. Z. O. (2011). Validade de conteúdo nos processos de construção e adaptação de instrumentos de medidas. Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 16, 3061-3068. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S1413-81232011000800006

Balsam, S., Kwack, S. Y., & Lee, J. Y. (2017). Network connections, CEO compensation and involuntary turnover: The impact of a friend of a friend. Journal of Corporate Finance, 45, 220-244. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.05.001

Beiner, S., Drobetz, W., Schmid, M. M., & Zimmermann, H. (2006). An integrated framework of corporate governance and firm valuation. European Financial Management, 12(2), 249-283. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-7798.2006.00318.x

Black, B., Carvalho, A. G., Khanna, V., Kim, W., & Yurtoglu, B. (2017). Corporate governance indices and construct validity. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 25(6), 397-410. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12215

Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão [B3]. (2018). Regulamento do novo mercado. Disponível em http://www.b3.com.br/pt_br/regulacao/estrutura-normativa/listagem/

Brookman, J., & Thistle, P. D. (2009). CEO tenure, the risk of termination and firm value. Journal of Corporate finance, 15(3), 331-344. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.01.002

Brown, L. D., & Caylor, M. L. (2004). Corporate governance and firm performance. Available at SSRN 586423. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.586423

Bushman, R., Dai, Z., & Wang, X. (2010). Risk and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 96(3), 381-398. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.03.001

Cadbury, A. (1992). Report of the Committee on the financial aspects of Corporate Governance, Gee & Co. Ltd., London, United Kingdom

Campbell, S. M., Braspenning, J. A., Hutchinson, A., & Marshall, M. (2002). Research methods used in developing and applying quality indicators in primary care. Quality and Safety in Health Care, 11(4), 358-364. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/qhc.11.4.358

Campbell, T. C., Gallmeyer, M., Johnson, S. A., Rutherford, J., & Stanley, B. W. (2011). CEO optimism and forced turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(3), 695-712. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.004

Céspedes, J., González, M., & Molina, C. A. (2010). Ownership and capital structure in Latin America. Journal of business research, 63(3), 248-254. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.03.010

Chahine, S., & Goergen, M. (2013). The effects of management-board ties on IPO performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 21, 153-179. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.02.001

Chahine, S., & Goergen, M. (2014). Top management ties with board members: How they affect pay–performance sensitivity and IPO performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 27, 99-115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.04.007

Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., & Malloy, C. (2010). Sell‐side school ties. The Journal of Finance, 65(4), 1409-1437. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01574.x

Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2014). Co-opted boards. The Review of Financial Studies, 27(6), 1751-1796. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhu011

Cooper, D. R., & Schindler, P. S. (2016). Métodos de Pesquisa em Administração-12ª edição. McGraw Hill Brasil.

Crisóstomo, V. L., de Freitas Brandão, I., & López-Iturriaga, F. J. (2020). Large shareholders’ power and the quality of corporate governance: An analysis of Brazilian firms. Research in International Business and Finance, 51, 101076. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2019.101076

Fracassi, C., & Tate, G. (2012). External networking and internal firm governance. The Journal of finance, 67(1), 153-194. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01706.x

Gao, H., Harford, J., & Li, K. (2017). CEO turnover–performance sensitivity in private firms. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 52(2), 583-611. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109017000126

Grant, J. S., & Davis, L. L. (1997). Selection and use of content experts for instrument development. Research in nursing & health, 20(3), 269-274. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1098-240X(199706)20:3%3C269::AID-NUR9%3E3.0.CO;2-G

Gujarati, D. N., & Porter, D. C. (2011). Econometria básica-5. Amgh Editora.

Guo, L., & Masulis, R. W. (2015). Board structure and monitoring: New evidence from CEO turnovers. The Review of Financial Studies, 28(10), 2770-2811. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv038

Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (2008). A theory of board control and size. The Review of Financial Studies, 21(4), 1797-1832. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhl030

Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1998). Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. American Economic Review, 96-118.

Hoitash, U. (2011). Should independent board members with social ties to management disqualify themselves from serving on the board?. Journal of Business Ethics, 99(3), 399-423. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-010-0660-5

Hoitash, U., & Mkrtchyan, A. (2019). Directors’ ties to non-CEO executives: Information advantage or entrenchment?. Available at SSRN 3372471. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3372471

Hsu, C. C., & Sandford, B. A. (2007). The Delphi technique: making sense of consensus. Practical Assessment, Research, and Evaluation, 12(1), 10. https://doi.org/10.7275/pdz9-th90

Hu, J., & Kim, J. B. (2019). The relative usefulness of cash flows versus accrual earnings for CEO turnover decisions across countries: The role of investor protection. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 34, 91-107. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2019.02.005

Hwang, B. H., & Kim, S. (2009). It pays to have friends. Journal of financial economics, 93(1), 138-158. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.07.005

IBGC - Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa. (2015). Código das melhores práticas de governança corporativa.

Interagentes, G. (2016). Código brasileiro de governança corporativa. Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa–IBGC.

Ishii, J., & Xuan, Y. (2014). Acquirer-target social ties and merger outcomes. Journal of Financial Economics, 112(3), 344-363. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.02.007

Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x

Jones, J., & Hunter, D. (1995). Qualitative research: consensus methods for medical and health services research. Bmj, 311(7001), 376-380. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.311.7001.376

Kang, J. K., Liu, W. L., Low, A., & Zhang, L. (2018). Friendly boards and innovation. Journal of Empirical Finance, 45, 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2017.09.007

Kaplan, S. N., & Minton, B. A. (2012). How has CEO turnover changed? International Review of Finance, 12(1), 57-87. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2443.2011.01135.x

Khedmati, M., Sualihu, M. A., & Yawson, A. (2020). CEO-director ties and labor investment efficiency. Journal of Corporate Finance, 65, 101492. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.101492

Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., & Masulis, R. W. (2013). The supply of corporate directors and board independence. The Review of Financial Studies, 26(6), 1561-1605. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hht020

Krishnan, G. V., Raman, K. K., Yang, K., & Yu, W. (2011). CFO/CEO-board social ties, Sarbanes-Oxley, and earnings management. Accounting horizons, 25(3), 537-557. https://doi.org/10.2308/acch-50028

La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The journal of finance, 54(2), 471-517. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00115

Silva, A. L. P. D., Lana, J., & Marcon, R. (2018). Agreeing and impacting: The effect of the shareholders' agreement on firms' market value. BBR. Brazilian Business Review, 15(1), 88-104. https://doi.org/10.15728/bbr.2018.15.1.6

Liu, Y. (2014). Outside options and CEO turnover: The network effect. Journal of Corporate Finance, 28, 201-217. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.03.004

Lynn, M. R. (1986). Determination and quantification of content validity. Nursing Research, 35(6), 382–385. https://doi.org/10.1097/00006199-198611000-00017

Martins, G. (2006). Sobre confiabillidade e validade. Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios-RBGN, 8(20), 1-12. https://doi.org/10.7819/rbgn.v8i20.51

McGuinness, P. B. (2018). IPO firm performance and its link with board officer gender, family-ties and other demographics. Journal of Business Ethics, 152(2), 499-521. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3295-3

McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks. Annual review of sociology, 27(1), 415-444. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.415

Nguyen, B. D. (2012). Does the Rolodex matter? Corporate elite's small world and the effectiveness of boards of directors. Management science, 58(2), 236-252. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1457

OECD - Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo. (2016). Directrices de la OCDE sobre el Gobierno Corporativo de las Empresas Públicas.

Parrino, R. (1997). CEO turnover and outside succession a cross-sectional analysis. Journal of financial Economics, 46(2), 165-197.

Perlin, M., Kirch, G., & Vancin, D. (2018). Accessing financial reports and corporate events with GetDFPData. Available at SSRN 3128252. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3128252

Polit, D. F., & Beck, C. T. (2006). The content validity index: are you sure you know what's being reported? Critique and recommendations. Research in nursing & health, 29(5), 489-497. https://doi.org/10.1002/nur.20147

Renneboog, L., & Zhao, Y. (2020). Director networks, turnover, and appointments. European Financial Management, 26(1), 44-76. https://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12213

Schmidt, B. (2015). Costs and benefits of friendly boards during mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(2), 424-447. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.02.007

Sutton, C., Veliyath, R., Pieper, T. M., Hair Jr, J. F., & Caylor, M. (2018). Secondary agency conflicts: A synthesis and proposed measurement model. Long Range Planning, 51(5), 720-735. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2017.12.004

Tung, F. (2011). The Puzzle of Independent Directors: New Learning. Boston University Law Review, 91(3), 1175-1190.

Vieira, C. A., & Martins, O. (2018). Influência da estrutura do conselho de administração e do controle corporativo no turnover do CEO das empresas abertas no Brasil. Revista Contemporânea de Contabilidade, 15(34), 181-201. https://doi.org/10.5007/2175-8069.2018v15n34p181

Westphal, J. D. (1999). Collaboration in the boardroom: Behavioral and performance consequences of CEO-board social ties. Academy of management Journal, 42(1), 7-24. https://doi.org/10.5465/256871

Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal–principal perspective. Journal of management studies, 45(1), 196-220. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00752.x

Publicado

2021-07-20

Como Citar

Locatelli, L. G., Ramos, F. M., & Costa, C. M. (2021). Conexões sociais e rotatividade involuntária do CEO: evidências do mercado brasileiro. Revista Contemporânea De Contabilidade, 18(48), 124-137. https://doi.org/10.5007/2175-8069.2021.e76116

Edição

Seção

Artigos