Elision fiscal y valor de la empresa: evidencia en Brasil
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/2175-8069.2016v13n30p114Resumen
En este trabajo se investiga la relación entre la evasión del impuesto de sociedades y el valor de la empresa en Brasil. Si bien puede esperarse que las prácticas de evasión fiscal en consecuencia la generación de valor para los accionistas, teorías alternativas sugieren que esto no siempre ocurre; los costes de agencia implícitas, recientemente detectados en la literatura, pueden superar los beneficios de ahorro de impuestos, causando la destrucción de valor. Para comprobar lo que sucede, se llevó a cabo un análisis de datos de panel que incluye 323 empresas que cotizan en los años 2006 a 2012, por un total de 1.704 observaciones de tipo firme años. El BTD se adoptaron, controlado por acumulaciones, como sustituto de la evasión fiscal y la q de Tobin como un indicador de valor de la empresa. Los resultados muestran que la evasión fiscal y el valor de la empresa se asoció negativamente. También levantó la vista el efecto de gobierno corporativo, la mentira pruebas limitadas de que se puede mitigar la destrucción de valor.
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