Remuneración ejecutiva y riesgo
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/2175-8069.2022.e81436Palabras clave:
Remuneración, Ejecutivos, RiesgoResumen
El propósito de este artículo es identificar la influencia de la compensación de ejecutivos en el riesgo de las empresas que cotizan en B3 (Bolsa de Valores de Brasil). Para ello, se colectaron datos de 230 empresas, en el período de 2010 a 2019, las cuales fueron sometidas a regresiones por datos de panel desbalanceados, utilizando el método de momentos sistémicos generalizado (GMM-SYS). Los resultados sugieren que la remuneración total y media, así como el salario fijo, el bono y la remuneración por acciones y opciones pagados a los ejecutivos aumentan el riesgo contable y disminuyen el riesgo de mercado de las empresas. La disparidad entre los salarios más altos y los más bajos aumenta la percepción del mercado sobre los niveles de riesgo de las empresas. Además, el desempeño, el endeudamiento y aspectos relacionados con la turnover, tenure y edad de los ejecutivos influyen en el riesgo de las empresas.
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