Analysis of the impact of public inspections disclosure on the economic growth of Brazilian municipalities
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/2175-8069.2022.e82172Keywords:
Disclosure; Fiscal Policy; Economic GrowthAbstract
The disclosure of inspection findings by public control bodies has the potential to cause impacts on public management. Since there was a gap in the economic consequences of these control bodies, this research used the Brazilian case to verify the extent to which the effect of the disclosure of inspection reports affects local governments’ economic dynamics. Using data from Brazilian municipalities, panel models were estimated to ascertain the impact of the various types of disclosure of public inspection findings on municipal economic growth. The results show that the disclosure of inspection reports with critical failures negatively affected the economy of Brazilian municipalities. These results contribute to the debate regarding disclosure in the work of public control bodies. In the field of accounting, the results presented here have the potential to impact public inspection rules, procedures, and their relationship with its auditees, to mitigate adverse economic effects.
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