Does opportunism at the level of public expenditure compensates in search of Re- election in Santa Catarina’s municipalities in the 21st Century?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/2175-8085.2019v22n1p113Abstract
From road construction to increases in public workers' salaries, through tax cuts before elections, budget manipulations in election years are a phenomenon observed in many nations, states, and municipalities around the world. Many politicians believe that by raising spending in the election year and during the term, they will increase their chances of re-election. But does this really happen in Santa Catarina? And is it that in all the municipalities of Santa Catarina this phenomenon is the same? When studying the municipal elections in Santa Catarina between 2005 and 2016, it was contacted that the voters of Santa Catarina reward the opportunistic behavior of their mayors, both in public spending and investments. It was also observed that opportunism compensates only in municipalities with higher levels of MHDI.References
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