Inabilities, excuses and exemptions

Autores

  • David Botting IFILNOVA, FCSH, Universidade Nova de Lisboa LISBON, PORTUGAL

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2015v14n1p104

Palavras-chave:

moral responsibility, the inability thesis, reactive attitudes, collective responsibility, collective intentionality

Resumo

In this paper I will argue, following Moody-Adams’s (1994) paper “Culture, responsibility and affected ignorance,” that inability does not excuse in general, but against Moody-Adams I will argue that this is not because of “affected ignorance” but simply because of responsibilities individual agents have by virtue of belonging to and participating in the collective actions of a certain kind of collective. Excusability has been misdiagnosed as depending on whether the ignorance of wrongdoing involved is culpable or non-culpable.

Biografia do Autor

David Botting, IFILNOVA, FCSH, Universidade Nova de Lisboa LISBON, PORTUGAL

Postdoctoral Research Fellow

Referências

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Publicado

2015-08-31

Edição

Seção

Artigos