Inabilities, excuses and exemptions
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2015v14n1p104Abstract
In this paper I will argue, following Moody-Adams’s (1994) paper “Culture, responsibility and affected ignorance,” that inability does not excuse in general, but against Moody-Adams I will argue that this is not because of “affected ignorance” but simply because of responsibilities individual agents have by virtue of belonging to and participating in the collective actions of a certain kind of collective. Excusability has been misdiagnosed as depending on whether the ignorance of wrongdoing involved is culpable or non-culpable.
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