Ignorância moral e o papel das virtudes
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p61Resumo
O objetivo deste artigo é investigar o problema da ignorância moral, especificamente, quero saber em que medida uma ação errada cometida por um agente responsável pode ser apropriadamente censurada, considerando que a ação errada foi cometida por ignorância. Inicio com uma descrição do fenômeno da ignorância moral e uma definição. Posteriormente, investigo como a virtude epistêmica da autonomia e a virtude moral da justiça nos auxiliam a melhor lidar com o problema em questão a partir do escopo da responsabilidade coletiva. Por fim, ressalto os aspectos sociais deste tipo de ignorância, com destaque para os fenômenos do viés cognitivo e progresso moral. Proponho que a ignorância moral de um agente pode ser um alvo apropriado de censura apenas quando ele estiver justificado epistemicamente de forma moderada, mas não expressar as virtudes cidadãs da autonomia e justiça.
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