Moral ignorance and the role of virtues
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p61Abstract
The aim of this article is to investigate the problem of moral ignorance, specifically, I want to know to what extent a wrong action committed by a responsible agent can be properly blamed, considering that the wrong action was committed from ignorance. I will start with a description of the phenomenon of moral ignorance and a definition. Later, I will investigate how the epistemic virtue of autonomy and the moral virtue of justice help us to better deal with the problem in question from the scope of collective responsibility. Finally, I will highlight the social aspects of this type of ignorance, with emphasis on the phenomena of cognitive bias and moral progress. I will propose that an agent's moral ignorance can be an appropriate target of blame only when he is epistemically justified in a moderate way, but does not express the citizen virtues of autonomy and justice.
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