Philip Pettit e a concepção republicana de liberdade
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2022.e90069Palavras-chave:
Pettit, Liberdade, Dominação, Republicanismo, LiberalismoResumo
O objetivo do artigo é examinar a concepção de liberdade como ausência de dominação, apresentada por Philip Pettit como originária do pensamento republicano e como uma alternativa à oposição dominante no debate político contemporâneo entre liberdade negativa e liberdade positiva. Pretende discutir se ela corresponde à concepção de liberdade que pode ser encontrada no republicanismo e se ela pode ser considerada realmente uma alternativa à oposição entre liberdade negativa e liberdade positiva.
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