The motivation debate in non-reductionist naturalistic moral realism

Abstract

Morality and motivation are commonly related phenomena whose coexistence leads us to think about the relationship they establish. Motivational internalism vs. externalism in morality mobilizes a series of authors and arguments in an attempt to compose a correct description of moral discourse. This article will discuss this from the perspective of Cornell Realism in order to demonstrate the plausibility of an externalist understanding of motivation with consequences for the practical character of morality. In order to do this, the context in which the investigation will take place will be described, namely non-reductionist naturalistic moral realism. This will be followed by a contextualization of the debate on motivation and then externalist arguments on motivation, such as David Brink's amoralist argument and Sigrún Svavarsdóttir's reversal of the burden of proof. The aim is to show how robust the arguments in favor of motivational externalism are and how this favors naturalistic realism.