Showing and saying. An Aesthetic difference

Authors

  • Vicente Sanfélix Vidarte Universidad de València, València

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2016v15n2p328

Abstract

This article defends that Wittgenstein's distinction between showing and saying and the critical thesis associated with it, i.e: that what is shown can't be said, is crucial to understand not only his first philosophy but even his second one; and not only his philosophy of language but also his Aesthetics.  

Author Biography

Vicente Sanfélix Vidarte, Universidad de València, València

Vicente Sanfélix Vidarte es catedrático de filosofía en el Departamento de Metafísica y Teoría del conocimiento de la Universidad de València, València, Espanha

References

WITTGENSTEIN, L. Estética, psicoanálisis y religión. Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 1976.

WITTGENSTEIN, L. Cartas a Russell, Keynes y Moore. Madrid: Taurus Ediciones, 1979.

WITTGENSTEIN, L. Conferencia sobre ética. Barcelona: Paidós, 1989.

WITTGENSTEIN, L. Aforismos. Cultura y valor. Madrid: Espasa Calpe. 1995.

WITTGENSTEIN, L. & ENGELMANN, P. Cartas, encuentros, recuerdos. Pre-Textos. Valencia. 2009a.

WITTGENSTEIN, L. Cuadernos de notas (1914-1916). Madrid: Editorial Sintesis, 2009b.

WITTGENSTEIN, L. Sobre la Certeza. Barcelona: Gedisa, 1988.

WITTGENSTEIN, L. Tractatus Logico-philosophicus. Madrid: Alianza, 1991.

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Published

2016-12-17

Issue

Vol. 15 No. 2 (2016)

Section

Articles

License

Licença Creative Commons
This obra is licensed under a  Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial-SemDerivações 4.0 Internacional