Showing and saying. An Aesthetic difference
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2016v15n2p328Abstract
This article defends that Wittgenstein's distinction between showing and saying and the critical thesis associated with it, i.e: that what is shown can't be said, is crucial to understand not only his first philosophy but even his second one; and not only his philosophy of language but also his Aesthetics.
References
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