Metaethical assumptions of philosophical anarchism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p33Abstract
As a positive thesis, philosophical anarchism claims that political authority is always at odds with practical rationality insomuch as authoritative directives are best analysed as content-independent reasons. The aim of this paper is to clarify the metaethical assumptions behind such a claim. Since philosophical anarchists reject as irrational the possibility that an agent can follow content-independent reasons issued by another agent, emphasising agents’ responsibility to assess the content of every directive before acting in conformity with it, it is safe to say that philosophical anarchists must be cognitivist in metaethics. At the very least, were there no right or wrong answers to questions such as “what does one have reason to do in these circumstances?”, answers such as “one should follow authoritative directives” would be as good as any other. However, philosophical anarchism requires much more than metaethical cognitivism; indeed, it requires a very specific (and ambitious) type of cognitivism. I intend to show which one.
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