Obrigação, autoridade e demanda moral
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n2p386Resumo
O artigo discute a relação entre obrigação e autoridade moral a partir da pressuposição endossada por Peter Strawson, R. Jay Wallace e Stephen Darwall de que moralidade se constitui como um contexto normativo relacional. Depois de destacar o problema, analiso o papel preponderante que culpa moral e atitudes reativas negativas possuem para determinar aquilo que constitui a erradez moral de uma ação. Isso posto, abordarei os tipos de obrigação moral que podemos extrair deste modelo e sua relação com o que chamarei de coeficiente de autoridade. Por fim, questiono o resultado dessa relação e apresento considerações que desafiam essa estratégia.
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