Apel versus Habermas: the controversial trajectory of the two original variants of discourse ethics

Abstract

The construction of discourse ethics, with regard to its two original variants, was held under controversy. This was due to the different ways the sphere of moral discourse was addressed in each author’s program and to the distinct ways they conceived the concept of practical reason. The answers given to the problem of the very sphere of moral shall bring about two programs of discourse ethics that eventually move away from their common roots and, finally, project two conceptions of practical reason that are quite distinct and, to great extent, incompatible, so that it is impossible to combine them under the same rubric. Thus, due to the differences in each author’s initial program concerning the formulation of a stricter notion of moral – deontological, as defended by Habermas – or broader – deontological-teleological, as proposed by Apel – the consequence will be that, for Habermas, moral and practical reason shall be placed within a theory or philosophy of discourse and practical reason cannot be understood in moral sense; in Apel, both spheres shall be placed in discourse ethics itself, so that moral occupies part A and the sphere of practical reason occupies part B – teleological – and shall be understood in moral sense.