The transhumanist philosophy underlying neurocognitive enhancements and the risk of common good fragmentation

Abstract

In this article, we address the transhumanist philosophy underlying neurocognitive enhancements. We will outline an ethical-social critique of the movement, based on a bibliographic review of works by C. S. Lewis, Michael Polanyi, Jürgen Habermas, Francis Fukuyama, Leon Kaas, Michael Sandel, John Finnis and Jacques Maritain. We also address the issue of the common good in the face of the transhuman and the consequences that could arise from not thinking ethically about the implications of cognitive enhancement. We concluded that the “common good” foreseen in the transhumanist philosophy lacks an adequate completion of the term. The Aristotelian common good is, above all, a virtuous coordination of private goods. Considering, however, that these goods are linked to human nature, which can be substantially altered by transhumanist transformations, there are two risks that present themselves: or that one seeks to modify the human status of all in a hegemonic claim that violates individual freedom; or, in a liberal perspective, that the transformation of only those who so choose will jeopardize human ontology itself. Thus, it could become impossible to speak of the common good, since it derives from the coordination of private goods that, ultimately, depend on the sharing of a common ontological status.