The role of affects in human life

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.e80042

Abstract

The aim of this article is to present some of the philosophical positions that dialogue with different areas of knowledge and that help us take a step further in the understanding of the relationship between reason and emotion. First, we present Damasio's idea of somatic-markers, which elucidates the role of affections in the development of rational thought. Second, we observe that these exhibit a reduced capacity in different spheres of life, with a decreased ability to connect negative components to moral norms, resulting in inappropriate moral behavior and interfering with deliberative capacities. Finally, we present Shaun Nichols' theory on Affective Resonance, the norms that comprise affective support (mainly negative) exhibit cultural transmission advantages to the detriment of affectively neutral norms. These studies prove the importance of affections inrational thinking and in the maintenance and propagation of moral norms and rules. The main idea defended herein is that a close relationship between reason and emotion takes place. By elucidating this relationship, we are able to deepen studies concerning the human condition, especially with regard to reason and morality.

Author Biography

Viviane Zarembski Braga, Professora Substituta do Instituto Federal do Tocantins (IFTO), Campus Palmas, Palmas, Tocantins (TO)

Doutora em Filosofia pela Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS). Professora Substituta do Instituto Federal do Tocantins (IFTO), Campus Palmas, Palmas, Tocantins (TO). Atua na área de Ética, Filosofia da Linguagem e Racionalidade. E-mail: vivianezbraga@gmail.com.

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Published

2021-04-30